General Motors Corp. v. WarnerGeneral Motors Corp. v. Warner
OPINION OF THE COURT
In its verified petition, petitioner alleges the following. Respondent purchased a 2003 GMC Sierra, a vehicle manufactured by petitioner, from a dealership known as LaQua 481. In April 2003 respondent brought the vehicle to LaQua because the vehicle would not shift past second gear. On the second repair attempt, in May 2003, the shifting problem was repaired. Thereafter, respondent returned the vehicle to LaQua on three occasions, complaining that, inter alia, the vehicle would not start. On each occasion, the vehicle was repaired and returned to respondent. Respondent subsequently filed a request for arbitration pursuant to General Business Law § 198-a (the Lemon Law).
The Lemon Law entitles a consumer to either recover the value of his or her vehicle, or obtain a comparable replacement vehicle, upon showing that a manufacturer has failed to remedy a defect after a reasonable number of repair attempts. The statute contains a presumption that a reasonable number of repair attempts has been made where the same problem has been subject to repair four or more times, or the vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for one or more problems for 30 days (General Business Law § 198-a [d]). If a consumer demonstrates that it is entitled to the presumption, it is incumbent upon the manufacturer to demonstrate either that the defect does not substantially impair the value of the vehicle or the defect is due to the consumer (§ 198-a [c] [3] [i], [ii]). Pursuant to the statute, a party may elect arbitration of such claims and, here, respondent received an arbitration hearing in February 2004.
The parties contest the evidence adduced at this hearing. In its verified petition, petitioner alleges that respondent conceded that the vehicle was not out of service in excess of 30 days, acknowledged that the shifting problem was repaired after the second repair attempt, and that, after the final repair, the vehicle has not failed to start. In his opposition and in support of his cross motion, respondent denies that the vehicle was repaired and, further, argues that the vehicle was out of service in excess of 30 days. In any event, the arbitrator determined that respondent was entitled to a refund in the amount of $32,413.58. The arbitrator based the award on his finding “that
In support of its application, petitioner contends that the arbitrator’s decision is not supported by the evidence and, as such, must be vacated. Further, petitioner argues that, due to a change in policy of the Attorney General and concomitant change in forms, the arbitrator’s determination is based on an erroneous legal standard. Specifically, the new policy of the Attorney General, as promulgated by the arbitration forms, requires only that a defect exist after a fourth repair attempt and not, as previously required, at the time of the hearing.
At the outset, this court has on prior occasions been asked to determine the appropriateness of the new standard promulgated by the Attorney General in the arbitration forms in the context of proceedings to vacate arbitration awards. On these occasions, this court has determined that the standard set forth in the forms was an error at law (DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Arvonio, Sup Ct, Albany County, July 6, 2004; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Catherman,
Turning to the merits, the court rejects petitioner’s contention that the arbitrator’s determination, finding that the vehicle was subject to repair four or more times for the same, problem, is not supported by the record. Petitioner fails to submit a transcript of the arbitration proceedings and, instead, supplies an affirmation by its attorney, who attended the arbitration, and an affidavit of an automobile repairperson from the dealership, who was also present at the arbitration. These, submissions are insufficient to challenge the factual finding of the arbitrator as they do not provide a record of the evidence before the arbitrator for this court to review. The court also notes that it may not rely on petitioner’s submissions to establish the record as its submissions are contradicted by the arbitration form
Next, petitioner contends that the arbitrator applied an incorrect legal standard based on the form provided to him by the Attorney General. Petitioner argues that the form now provided reflects a change in policy requiring only that a vehicle be subject to four unsuccessful repair attempts for the same problem before a consumer is entitled to a presumption that the manufacturer failed to repair the vehicle after a reasonable number of repair attempts. The Attorney General counters that the policy was changed after he reviewed existing policies as a result of Matter of Bay Ridge Toyota v Lyons (
Initially, the court observes that as the issue presented is “one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent . . . , the [court] need not accord any deference to the agency’s determination, and is free to ascertain the proper interpretation from the statutory language and legislative intent” (Matter of Belmonte v Snashall,
General Business Law § 198-a provides that if “the manufacturer or its agents or authorized dealers are unable to repair or correct any defect or condition which substantially impairs the value of the motor vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable
Here, respondent and the Attorney General urge that the phrase “continues to exist” modifies the prior language “four or more times” and, as such, a consumer is entitled to the presumption if, after four repair attempts, the defect continues to exist, regardless of whether the defect is subsequently repaired. They argue that this interpretation is required when the entire act is read as a whole so as to give effect to all provisions, and, in light of the legislative history, persuasive authorities from other jurisdictions and remedial nature of the statute.
The court cannot agree. Initially, the court notes that although legislative history is relevant, the most compelling evidence of legislative intent is derived from the language itself (see, Matter of Tompkins County Support Collection Unit v Chamberlin,
General Business Law § 198-a (m) (1) and (2) also recites the “four or more” attempts language. Thus, when subdivision (d) is read with subdivisions (c) and (m), all parts harmonize and lead to the same result. As such, the court determines that the presumption does not arise unless the defect is present after the last repair attempt. This court’s determination should not be construed as stating that four attempts are insufficient for the presumption to arise. Rather, this court merely states that in
Next, the Attorney General argues that it is irrational for a consumer whose vehicle is out of service for 30 days to receive the benefit of an automatic presumption, while a consumer, who has four unsuccessful attempts and the manufacturer finally fixes the vehicle on the fifth attempt, is not. The court notes only that it is not for the judiciary to question the wisdom of the Legislature in determining that one consumer is more worthy of relief than another. Rather, the court must interpret the statute as written, and give effect to all of the words contained therein. Here, the statute contemplates separate requirements for the categories of repair attempts versus days out of service. To the extent that this language should be changed, it is for the Legislature to change the language, not the courts.
Further, the court is unpersuaded that such a requirement would require consumers to engage costly experts to determine whether a defect continues to exist. The court is not aware of any canon or rule of statutory construction that allows a court to consider the requisite burden of proof in interpreting the plain meaning of statutory language. While certainly a court cannot accord an interpretation to statutory language in which a burden would be unreasonably high in light of the purpose of the statute, the court is unconvinced that the present circumstances present such a situation. In fact, the consumer is in no different of a position than he or she has been since the legislation’s inception — 16 years ago. Indeed, the 1999 report of the Attorney General applauds the success of the program, which has yielded over $150 million in consumer awards since 1987.
Additionally, the court is unpersuaded that decisions reached in other jurisdictions warrant a different result, particularly in view of the fact that in at least one jurisdiction a review of the statutory language reveals significant differences in the Lemon Law program (see, e.g., Vt Stat Ann, tit 9, §§ 4170-4181). Finally, to the extent that Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer (
Notes
It is noted that the Attorney General takes no position on this issue.