*1 CORPORATION, MOTORS GENERAL
Appellant, COUNTY BOARD OF
OKLAHOMA
EQUALIZATION, Keyes, George Coun- County,
ty Assessor Oklahoma Barnes, County B. Treasurer of
Joe County, Appellees, Cartwright, Eric
Jan Oklahoma,
Defendant-Intervenor/Appellee.
No. 58438.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
May 1983.
As Corrected June 1983. Rehearing
As Amended on Grant of 1983. Supplemented Rehearing
Opinion Opinion
Amended Denied 1983. Oct.
234 Detroit, Corp., Raleigh, Motors
P. Mich., appellant. for Gen., Cartwright, Atty. James Jan Eric Fern, Michael Scott Asst. B. Franks and Gen., City, appellees. for Attys. Oklahoma IRWIN, Justice: Authority Industries The Oklahoma trust, (OIA), pursuant created § amended, O.S.1961, seq., et “public financing for sponsored the trust” Corpo- the construction of General Motors (GMC)assembly plant in ration’s Oklahoma City. presented The issue is whether machinery (improvements, GMC’s plant subject to ad equipment) contends its inter- valorem taxation. GMC because of a tax abate- est is not taxable agreement between it and the State asserts that of Oklahoma. GMC of Okla- agencies and officials agreed that if would build its homa plant that such assembly Oklahoma subject to ad valorem plant would not be twenty years. taxation for rendering summary The trial court that Art. judgment against GMCfound Const, § 5, prohibits a contract of the Old. surrenders, contracts suspends or taxation, although away power disputed, a contract is the existence of established, contract, if it even could be law; contrary to would be void and assembly plant possession is in executory pur- contract of under an rel. and is taxable under State ex chase Dunbar, Okl., P.2d 900 Cartwright Legislature first authorized the Since the for trusts as a vehicle creation financing in numerous “public trust” throughout the state have been facilities using such by private entities constructed explains the method financing. Dunbar and such generally employed in Oklahoma financing part was used method Snider, assembly plant. Fellers, of GMC’s Joseph construction D. John James Here, McMorrow-Love, Fellers, Snider, indenture a lease contract bond Margaret public trust entered into between the Tippens, were Blankenship, Bailey & Robert help Leitch, (OIA) and GMC. OIA issued bonds.to Atty., Kevin Asst. Dist. Macy, Dist. costs of Smith, pay part of the construction City, Atty., Otis M. John incorporated con- tion was into and became paid all additional facility. GMC legal holds title to the of the tax costs. OIA abatement be- struction payments to OIA lease tween OIA and the State. property. GMC’s issue to amortize bond are sufficient Closely argument related GMC’s “purchase” will and other costs. GMC imposition of the ad im- valorem taxes $1,000 when the bonded project entire pairs obligations of its tax abatement *3 is satisfied. indebtedness agreement is its assertion that it has been proper that the trust Dunbar we held In process. argues denied due GMC that the posses a private in which entities hold ties through Fifth Amendment the Fourteenth interest virtue of a sory and contractual of the Federal Amendment Constitution agreement public with a trust as hold lease taking property just of forbids the without to ad valorem legal subject title was er of compensation tax and that its abatement was bottomed on the taxation. Dunbar agreement property right. says is a GMC agreement theory that the Dunbar lease property rights that both contract and aris- nothing than an executo more or less was agreement ing from its tax abatement property a of sale and that ry contract protected by the Due Process Clause as sale-purchase a ex public trust held under Impairment well as of Contract constitutionally tax ecutory contract is not Clause. assembly that its exempt. GMC concedes we considered the constitu- Dunbar plant would be taxable under Dunbar but § O.S.1981, tionality of 60 178.7 enacted agreement. the tax abatement for a tax 1977. That enactment authorized says characterization of its GMC that the exemption period years for a of all inter- a “lease” or “exec- agreement with OIA as public property, ests trust but the lessee consequence as is not of utory contract” (GMC-here) public property trust agree- tax abatement understands its required pay to an annual sum in lieu of ad with GMCstates the sub- ment Oklahoma. year following taxes for each valorem and this lawsuit is stance of anniversary date of the issuance of tenth agreed to a tax abatement that Oklahoma the revenue bonds. assembly plant in return for GMC §5, 50, that Art. In Dunbar we said Okl. constructing plant in Oklahoma. GMC Const., Legislature from ex- prohibits the says it has fulfilled its that except any property taxation empting from agreement. provided in the Constitution. We held agreement was contends that the property similarly situated that since other any when made and state action lawful taxable, legislative at- statutorily any obligation agree- that impairs the which tempt delay the status of a les- to taxable §1, 10, violates Art. of the United ment public property trust see’s interest Leg- argues the States Constitution. GMC §5, with Art. su- would be in conflict Act classified islature the Public Trust pra, unconstitutional. pursu- property purposes for tax industrial § § Const., 10, 22, Art. of the Constitution Art. of the Okl. to ant to prop Legislature classify activity and create authorizes the economic improve taxation; Oklahoma; OIA, and the valu agen- erty purposes a state jobs Act, of different classes different pursuant to the ation cy which was created a Legislature has means or methods. with GMC for the abate- bargained classifying sub ment; range discretion in negotiations and contracts wide taxation, justify judicial negotiations jects and con- and to constitute the of OIA interference, must be the classification of Oklahoma. GMCalso tracts of State arbitrary clas opin- based on an unreasonable or General’s submits (69-156) Company v. rendered in in which he sification. Continental Oil ion etc., Board expressed public proper- the view that Oklahoma State trust taxa- subject ties were not to ad valorem belonging parties agree did that in the event the property
Although the
exempt from taxation—
any
trust
or
of its subdivi-
public
a
§ 6,
a
Okl. Const.—the
payment
any
Art.
demand the
sions shall
prop
(GMC-here)
has in
trust
lessee
would
general or ad valorem tax that GMC
taxation.
erty
subject
to ad valorem
pay the tax.
Dunbar, supra.
assume,
OIA,
arguendo,
willWe
here had not been
property
If the
into the tax abate-
agency,
state
entered
trust,
it would have
from
“leased”
GMC;
agreement with
and that both
property
all other
similar
taxed as
been
the then current Attor-
parties
statutory
general
our
under
situated
expressed
ney General’s
attempt, legisla
Any
of taxation.
scheme
properties were not
view that
trust
otherwise,
exempt property tive or
subject to taxation.
possession
in the
of a “lessee”
taxation
purchase
executory contract of
under an
general
legal principles,
Under
*4
in
property
to the
the record title
where
power to bind the
public agents have no
trust,
exempt
prop
and not
similar
a
any
apparent
its subdivisions
state or
property
record title to the
erty where
their actual authori
authority
excess of
trust,
a
private entity instead of
a
law;
“An
act is not a
ty.
unconstitutional
§10, 22, supra.
Art.
would contravene
one,
protects
no
no one.” Lit
it binds
we also held that the State
In Dunbar
Worthen;
Rock, etc.,
Railway v.
tle
estopped
assessing
the “les-
not
was
Worthen,
97, 7
120 U.S.
Huntington v.
of its reliance on
property because
see’s”
469,
Legislature
L.Ed. 588. If the
S.Ct.
held view that such
generally
within the framework of the
has not acted
holding
exempt from taxation. Our
was
Constitution, it has not acted. An unconsti
that a state and
principle
on the
was based
rights,
no
creates
tutional statute confers
estopped from
cannot be
its subdivision
protection.
liability, and affords no
no
public offi-
public rights when
protecting
425, 6
Shelby County,
118 U.S.
Norton
erroneously or failed to
have acted
cials
1121,
In
long
abandoned
both
federal
been
courts and this abandonment is
and state
opinion
‘equities
“In our
in this
Kurtzman, 411
in Lemon v.
U.S.
discussed
case do
applica-
not authorize retroactive
(see
U.S.
though
passed”) was
it had never been
Loan Association v.
Building and
Home
merely
in Lemon. Lemon
not abandoned
Blaisdell,
78
U.S.
S.Ct.
exception to the rule of Nor-
recognized an
This
88 A.L.R.
L.Ed.
equity under
applied
a court of
ton
disput-
of law cannot be
general statement
prescribed conditions. As we shall
certain
position,
support
not
GMC's
ed but it does
demonstrate,
parameters
briefly
con-
purported tax abatement
because
exception
many
have
times been
Lemon
law
in accord with Oklahoma
tract
not
Court;
applied by
recognized and
this
was made.
at the time it
those
further demonstrate
we shall
in Dunbar
is control-
decision
Our
present
not
in the case at
parameters are
property
bar and GMC’s
ling in the case at
bar.
taxation unless the
subject to ad valorem
is
Pennsylvania’s
striking down of
After
legal
abatement
disputed tax
non-public
statutory program to reimburse
The Federal Constitution
ly enforceable.
for secular educational
sectarian schools
contract
protect unenforceable
does not
Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
services in Lemon v.
if it
disputed agreement, even
rights. The
(Lemon
602, 91
JUDGMENT
However, Appellants
der
the scheme.
request
injunction
their
to
abandoned
concur.
All the Justices
payment. The schools
prevent the initial
OPINION ON
SUPPLEMENTAL
performing the services authoriz-
continued
REHEARING
sum-
by
ed
statute. Not until a motion for
Appellants
filed did
mary judgment was
PER CURIAM:
enjoin.
their intent to seek to
first indicate
hereby supplement
the
.of
We
not, prior
The schools could
to Lemon
3.
1351)
(54
May
1983 O.B.J.
this Court
,
predicted the act’s unconstitu
I
have
(54
1983
by Order of
as amended
un
tionality
assurance sufficient to
with
2068)
the follow-
by adding thereto
O.B.J.
Appellees’ reliance on the statute.
dermine
ing:
I was not “foreshadowed.”
Lemon
Kurtz
A further review of Lemon v.
had a “reliance interest”
4. The schools
man, 411
93
36
U.S.
S.Ct.
equity
fashioning
considered in
an
to be
(1973) impels the conclusion
151
L.Ed.2d
calling
recognition
a “sensible
decree
Shelby County,
rule
v.
of Norton
practical realities of the situation.”
the
1121,
equal paid to the salaries two BARNES, C.J., HODGES, LAVEN- 1, 1933, deputies to the date of DER, DOOLIN, HARGRAVE, OPALA, 27, 1936), filing (April the suit and a WILSON, JJ., and ALMA D. concur. sum for their own use and bene- similar fit. ORDER FOR STAY OF MANDATE special “The trial court held that the unconstitutional, THE APPLICATION FOR STAY OF further act was MANDATE filed in that the case of v. Board this Court on the 15th held Wade County, 161 day August, by Plaintiff-Appel- Commissioners Harmon controlling Okl. lant, Corporation hereby General Motors case, the issues involved herein. In that granted as follows: ‘The members of the board it was held: THE MANDATE IN ISSUANCE OF county county commissioners of a will hereby stayed THE ABOVE CAUSE is payment penalized not be ... for the (90) period ninety days from this date county an un- salaries to officers under Plaintiff-Appellant opportunity to allow pay- constitutional local act where judgment to seek review of the of this good made in faith and ments were be- by Supreme of the Court United unconstitutional, fore the law is declared States. they proper are advised or before unconstitutionality.’ official as its Plaintiff-Appellant pro- In the event that timely judg- “No contention is made that defend- ceeds to seek review of proper Court, ants were ever advised Supreme the United States unconstitutionality as officials to the the issuance of mandate shall continue to posi- special act. Plaintiffs take the until such time the United stayed be that since this court on several occa- tion Supreme Court makes a final deter- States has held acts to unconsti- sions similar mination thereof. tutional, defendants, being chargea- law, knowledge ble with a of the
chargeable knowledge with of the uncon-
stitutionality special act involved
herein. We cannot concur in this conten- spe- unconstitutionality
tion. had never
cial act involved herein been
judicially established. Defendants were
entitled to thereon as a source of
authority for their official acts without incurring heavy
assuming the risk of was sub-
penalties the event such act
sequently declared to be in controvention
