This is аn appeal by General Motors Corporation (“GMC”) from a final judgment of the Superior Court. The Superior Court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the primary appeal filed by the appellee/appellant-cross-appellee below, New Castle County and the Dеpartment of Finance of New Castle County (“the County”). In the same final judgment, the Superior Court dismissed GMC’s cross-appeal. The County has not filed a cross-appeal with this Court.
This Court has concluded that the Superi- or Court properly dismissed the County’s primary appeal. We have also concluded, however, that the cross-appeal filed by GMC should not have been dismissed. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed.
Facts
GMC owns and operates an automobile assembly plant on 122 acres of land along Boxwood Road in New Castle County. In
On May 26, 1992, the Superior Court granted GMC’s first mandamus action compelling the Board to schedule hearings on both of GMC’s appeals. Those proceedings were consolidated. The Board conducted a hearing between October 15, 1992 and November 23, 1992. The Board approved a reduction in both the original and the supplemental assessments of the building. The land valuation did not change.
On December 23,1992, the County appealed the ruling by the Board to the Superior Court, pursuant to 9 Del.C. § 8312(c), which provides:
Any person who, after properly filing an appeal before any bоard of assessment or department of finance, feels aggrieved by the decision of such body may, within 30 days by postmark date after receiving notice of its decision, appeal therefrom to the Superior Court of the county in which such person resides.
9 Del.C. § 8312(c). On December 31, 1992, GMC filed a notice of cross-appeal pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 72(h). 1 The complete record of the Board hearing was not filed with the Superior Court until nearly two and one-half years had passed, and only after GMC’s second mandamus action had been instituted.
On August 25, 1995, in an unrelated proceeding, another judge of the Superiоr Court held that the County did not have a right to appeal decisions of the Board pursuant to 9
Del.C.
§ 8312(e).
See New Castle County v. Chrysler Corp.,
Del.Super.,
On February 5, 1997, thе Superior Court dismissed the County’s appeal challenging the reduction to GMC’s property assessments for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Superior Court concluded that the viability of GMC’s cross-appeal depended upon the invocation of its subject matter jurisdiction by the County’s primary appеal. According to the Superior Court, GMC’s timely cross-appeal became an untimely primary appeal, once the County’s primary appeal was dismissed. 2 Consequently, the Superior Court dismissed GMC’s cross-appeal when it dismissed the County’s primary appeal.
Superior Court Decision
The Superior Court concluded that this Court’s decision in
Chrysler
holding that the County had no right to take an аppeal from an adverse Board ruling, should be applied retroactively and, consequently, compelled the dismissal of the County’s direct appeal. The Superior Court then dismissed GMC’s cross-appeal. The Superior Court relied upon the
ratio decidendi
of
Ewing Holding Corp. v. Egan-Stanley Invs., Inc.,
Standard of Review
A right to appeal exists only to the extent established by statute or the Delaware Constitution.
duPont v. Family Court for New Castle County,
Del.Supr.,
Chevron and Stoltz Retroactive Applications
The United States Supreme Court announced the following framework for determining whether a decision should be applied retroactively:
First, the decision to be applied nonretro-actively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed .'... Second, it has been stressed that ‘we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ ... Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for ‘[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of non-retroactivity.’
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
This Court adopted the
Chevron
factors in
Stoltz Management Co. v. Consumer Affairs Bd.,
Del.Supr.,
The Parties’ Contentions
GMC appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing its crоss-appeal. GMC contends that its cross-appeal should survive the dismissal of the County’s primary appeal because, on the date the County filed the primary appeal, the. then extant Superior Court case law recognized the right of the County to appeal adverse decisions of the Board under Section 8312(e).
See New Castle County v. Wolfgang,
Del.Super., C.A. No. 87A-NO-8, Taylor, J.,
The County did not file a cross-appeal in this Court to challenge the Superior Court’s dismissal of its primary appeal. The County asserts that the Superior Court properly concluded that this Court’s affirmation of Chrysler’s holding should be applied retroactively and required dismissal of its primary appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In response to GMC’s Chevron argument, the County contends that: first, the Superior Court applied Chrysler to the County’s primary appeal, not to GMC’s cross-appeal; and, second, assuming Chevron was also applied to GMC’s cross-appeal, the Superior Court properly weighed the factors in favor of dismissing the cross-appeal. In addition, the County argues that the Superior Court correctly determined that GMC’s cross-appeal failed to independently meet the jurisdictional requirements for taking a timely primary appeal. Consequently, the County argues that the Superior Court properly dismissed GMC’s cross-appeal.
Jurisdiction/StandinglMootness Primary Appeal and Cross-Appeal
The Chevron arguments by both GMC and the County are premised upon the assumption that the continued viability of GMC’s cross-appeal in the Superior Court was dependent upon a prospective application of Chrysler to the County’s primary appeal. Both GMC and the County are also under the imprеssion that, if the Chrysler holding is applied retroactively, the County’s primary appeal to the Superior Court will become void ab initio. An analysis of these assumptions and impressions by both parties requires this Court to parse three related but distinct legal principles: subject matter jurisdiction; standing; and mootness.
The primary аppellate function of this Court and the Superior Court is to review and decide actual controversies.
See
Del. Const, art. IV, § 11;
Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises,
Del.Supr.,
According to the
mootness
doctrine, although there may have been a justiciable controversy at the time the litigation was cоmmenced, the action will be dismissed if that controversy ceases to exist.
Glazer v. Pasternak,
Del.Supr.,
“Unlike the federal courts, where standing may be subject to stated constitutional limits, state courts apply the concept of standing as a matter of self-restraint to avoid the rendering of advisory opinions....”
Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson,
Del.Supr.,
Chrysler’s Retroactive Application County Lost Standing/Primary Appeal Moot
When the County filed its primary appeal with the Superior Court, that Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Board decision and, at that time, the County had standing to bring such an appeal.
Cf. Perry v. State,
Del.Supr.,
GMC’s Cross-Appeal Properly Filed/Still Viable
A cross-appeal rests on its own jurisdictional foundation, upon the subsequent loss of
standing
by the party that filed the primary appeal, if the cross-appellant could not reasonably have known of the defect in the original appeal.
First American National Bank v. Alcorn, Inc.,
Miss.Supr.,
GMC’s cross-appeal properly invoked the subject matter appellate jurisdiction of the Superior Court at the time it was filed. GMC’s actual controversy with the Board’s decision is continuing notwithstanding the mootness of the County’s primary appeal.
Cf. Stearn v. Koch,
Del.Supr.,
Conclusion
The judgment of the Superior Court, dismissing GMC’s cross-appeal, is reversed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Notes
. Rule 72 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure governs "[w]hen an appeal is permitted by law” and allows a party to "cross-appeal from any judgment or order from which an appeal lies to the Superior Court-” Super.Ct.Civ.R. 72(b), (h).
. The parties disagree about the exact date when GMC received notice of the Board’s decision. The two possible choices appear to be November 27, 1992 and November 30, 1992. Neither date would bring GMC’s cross-appeal within the 30-day requirement for perfecting a primary appeal under 9 Del.C. § 8312(c).
. The prerequisites of an "actual controversy” are: "(1) [i]t must be a controversy involving the rights or other legal relations of the party seeking declaratory relief; (2) it must be a controversy in which the claim of right or other legal interest is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting the claim; (3) the controversy must be between parties whose interests are real and adverse; (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination.”
Rollins Internat’l, Inc. v. International Hydronics Corp.,
Del.Supr.,
. Two recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine are situations that are capable of repetition but evade review or matters of public importance.
See Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc. v. Wilson,
Del.Supr.,
.
See Stearn v. Koch,
Del.Supr.,
. In Alcorn, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that a statute dismissing cross-appeаls with original appeals does not apply where the cross-appellant is without fault or the dismissal was a result of an irregularity over which the cross-appellant had no control. In Bridgeport, the Appellate Court of Connecticut held that a cross-appeal is independent and viable if jurisdictionаlly proper. In Floyd, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a cross-appeal is dismissed only when the original appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the cross-appeal does not have an independent ground for jurisdiction. In Roberts, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that if the cross-appeal is dependent on the original appeal for jurisdiction, it is dismissed.
. The Superior Court relied upon Ewing, which appears to be an isolated exception to the other holdings cited.