1. It is obvious that there is no coverage under the terms of the express warranty which was issued to the original purchaser, Mr. Ellis, and which was subsequently transferred to appellant. By its own terms it excludes coverage as to all items complained about after the vehicle was driven 12,000 miles.
2. When appellant applied for a transfer of the warranty, and subsequently received and accepted the Protect-O-Plate for use in obtaining warranty work, it became bound by the warranty terms and provisions. That it did not have or receive a copy of the warranty does not alter this conclusion. We must assume that when application for transfer was made the applicant knew what it was applying for. If it did not, it was incumbent upon it to seek and obtain a copy of it from General Motors, or from the dealer through whom the application for transfer was handled. When the application was accepted by General Motors and the Protect-O- *634 Plate issued and delivered, Halco got exactly what it had applied for; it became substituted for Mr. Ellis as the party to whom the warranty had been issued when the car was sold, and entitled to the service and repairs or replacements which the warranty provides to a second purchaser.
The undisputed testimony is that there is only one form of warranty issued by General Motors to the purchasers of its cars, and that the warranty issued to Ellis and subsequently transferred to Halco was on that form.
The application itself provided: "Your application for
transfer of warranty
will be reviewed by Oldsmobile Division and, if in order, you will receive a Protect-O-Plate bearing your name. If transfer of warranty is denied, you will be informed by your dealer.” Thus Halco cannot contend that it sought other than a
transfer
of the Ellis warranty. It admits having received the Protect-O-Plate. Since the warranty provided that it should be kept in the car at all times and provided information to a second purchaser as to what his rights thereunder might be and how to obtain a transfer, it was reasonable to assume that Halco received the original of the warranty when it purchased the car. If that were not the case, it should have asked for another when arranging for the transfer. Cf.
Security Life Ins. &c. Co. v. Gober, 50
Ga. 404;
Hart v. Waldo,
The application for transfer did not contemplate and did not constitute an application for the issuance of a new or different warranty.
3. By its terms the express warranty excluded all implied warranties. It fully complies with the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code, as found in
Code Ann.
§ 109A-2—316 (2).
Brown v. Chrysler Corp.,
4. Even if an implied warranty were not excluded by the terms of the express warranty there could be no recovery by Halco be
*635
cause of a lack of privity between it and General Motors.
Wood v. Hub Motor Co.,
5. When goods are sold by an original purchaser to a third party as used or second-hand goods, there is, of course, no implied warranty with respect to the manufacturer or original seller. Even with respect to the original purchaser or second seller, absent special circumstances, "the rule is that there is no implied warranty as to the condition, fitness or quality of the article.” Keating v. DeArment, 193 S. 2d 694, 696 (Fla. App.). Accord: Smith v. Mooers,
6. If there were an applicable express or implied warranty as to the matters about which complaint was made and as to which General Motors offered to make correction without charge to Hal-co, its right to recover therefor is defeated by Halco’s failure or refusal to make the car available for the work to be done.
Ford Motor Co. v. Gunn,
Defendant has clearly demonstrated that plaintiff is not entitled to recover under either an express or an implied warranty, and it was error to deny its motion for summary judgment.
Judgment reversed. Jordan, P. J., and Hall, P. J., concur.