General Electric Co. v. City of Passaic

COMPANY, ETC., GENERAL ELECTRIC AND OF DIVISION APPEALS, TREASURY, TAX THE DEPARTMENT OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, PASSAIC, v. CITY OF A CORPORATION, MUNICIPAL DEFEND ANT-APPELLANT. Argued October November Decided December1958.

See also 2d Super. William Mr. N. Gurtman argued the cause for the ap- pellant.

Mr. John W. Hand for the cause argued respondent Evans, General Electric Hand and Company (Messrs. Evans, attorneys). Boiler,

Mr. Theodore I. Deputy Attorney-General, argued the cause for the respondent Division of De- Furman, partment of the David D. Treasury Attorney- {Mr. General, attorney).

Mr. Nicholas Martini argued cause for Ware- Ejay curiae. housing Company, amicus opinion the court was by delivered J. The defendant Passaic appealed Jacobs, Appellate Division from of the judgment Division of Tax Appeals which cancelled the tax assessment for the personal property owned the General Elec- tric and in Company located operated by warehouse Street, the Ejay at 99 President Warehousing Company Passaic, New certified Jersey. We on our own motion. General Electric at Company operates plant Bloom- field, New Jersey, where manufactures air-conditioning water and equipment, coolers heat In 1954 it en- pumps. tered into an with the White agreement Warehousing for the of merchandise from the Company trucking Bloom- field and plant its at the storage premises Passaic which White had leased Botany Mills, This agreement Inc. Ware- Ejay to assigned 1955 and was related the year to a similar Thereafter in May Company housing Elec- General directly by was executed for 1956 agreement air condition- and 1956 and In 1955 tric Ejay. were manu- which heat units pump water and cooler ing, to the were transferred plant factured at Bloomfield ware- to the daily delivered were They Passaic warehouse. personnel and Ejay by Ejay, in trucks operated house However, General at the warehouse. handled their storage was responsibility an whose inspector did maintain Electric to immediately prior warehouse each unit to check no Electric did General the customer. its to shipment from time to it did but at the warehouse manufacturing or warehouse to adjust send its own employees time No adopted designs. with newly alter units to conform system an I.B.M. card used but warehouse were receipts and released units received record the was employed by Ejay. whether little on the issue of contains but

The record ware- a Iona were Ejay’s premises operated fide Electric. convenience for General business house or Bloom- Moreland, manufacturing manager Mr. Electric, testified that because field of General plant its and the lack of floor plant condition of the congested itself “the decided to relieve Electric General space, and to enter into storing shipping” responsibility Mr. vice- Ejay. Stump, with White the agreements testified that Ejay manager Ejay, president general and that Mr. Muscarelli Muscarelli family owned and is not inter- financially business is in the construction He further testified that on in Electric. ested General 100,000 was approximately square 1955 there October and that premises warehouse space Ejay’s feet of 99% Electric; other occu- only it was General occupied by McDonald, a Coyle rigging warehouse space pant The record is silent as to affiliated with Ejay. company ever activities, if towards so- any, Ejay engaged what from the public generally business or warehouse liciting any requirements available to meet towards making space it does not indicate Similarly the public generally. Electric compared how the rates to General storage charged warehouses in the rates charged by public with the storage New Jersey. area elsewhere in northern Passaic or received from the the fall of 1955 General Electric relating Passaic communication assessor of the City warehouse. It did property Ejay to its personal B. answer file an account of its S. property (see or its counsel had advised the property because 54:A-12) 54:A-3.20. the tax under B. 8. exempt Thereupon was at the assessor the warehouse inspected apply the ratio which the of Passaic prevailed ing 40% $2,000,000. assessed General Electric appealed board of taxation which affirmed the assessment. county Tax General Electric then Division of appealed which, after cancelled the assessment Appeals hearing, under RE.S. ground exempt 54:4—3.20. The from the city appealed judgment of Tax and in of its ad Appeals support appeal Division R. vances contentions: S. 54:4-3.20 following (1) unconstitutional; did not consti (2) Ejay premises tute a within intent warehouse of R. S. purpose 54:4—3.20; of the Division of Tax judgment (3) was not Appeals supported by appropriate findings (see Delaware, Hoboken, &L. W. Co. v. City R. 10 N. J. 418 the Division of Tax (4) Appeals did not (1952)), the initial accord assessment the Passaic assessor the presumption accuracy to which it was en validity titled. See General Motors v. State Bd. Corp. L. (E. Central R. R. Co. v. State Tax Dept., & A. certiorari denied 293 U. 1933), S. 79, 79 L. Ed. 667 (1934).

B. 8. 54:4-3.20 that all provides in a stored warehouse of any person, or co-partnership cor in the business of poration engaged for hire storing goods shall be from taxation under exempt 4 of Title chapter It was enacted to our warehouses an place on equal with those of our states competitive looting neighboring personal where no taxes were See imposed. Co., & Jersey City Liggett v. Tobacco 14 N. Myers J. 113 see also the record in Schwartz v. Essex (1953); Taxation, Board 167-192 Errors County pp. (Court of of & vol. 1710 Appeals, Its was (1943)). constitutionality Taxation, sustained in v. Schwartz Essex Board County of J. 129 N. L. 129 Ct. affirmed 130 N. L. (Sup. 1942), J. 177 & A. and it has been (E. 1943), applied many reported decisions. See Maritime Petroleum v. Corp. City Jersey of 1 N. 287 City, J. Dearborn Chemical Co. v. (1949); Division Tax 135 J. L. 580 Appeals, N. Ct. (Sup. 1947); of Crown Can Co. v. Division Tax 135 J. L. 517 Appeals, of Bowns, Inc., Ct. & Pattison (Sup. 1947); v. Saddle River 129 N. J. L. 135 Ct. Tp., (Sup. affirmed 130 N. J. L. 1942), McLellan, Inc., & 177 & Halligan (E. 1943); v. State Bd. Tax 122 N. L. J. 551 Ct. (Sup. 1939); of Co., Newark Blanchard v. Lumber 21 N. J. Misc. 12 of Bd. Tax Newark (St. 1942); City App. Weyerhaeuser of Co., Timber J.N. Misc. 560 Bd. Tax (St. App. 1940); Newark, Blanchard Lumber Co. v. City 18 N. J. Misc. 32 Bd. (St. App. 1939); Jersey City Liggett cf. Co., Tobacco Myers Borough v. Con supra; Edgewater noil Div. Corp., Super. (App. 1949). ap now seeks pellant reconsideration of holding case, Schwartz it does not although submit materials any were which to the former presented Supreme Court and the Court of Errors and when Appeals sustained the they of R. S. 54:4^3.20. constitutionality The Hew Constitutions Jersey and 1844 were Neeld, silent on the subject taxation. See “Taxation— ” The Tax Clause 2 Proceedings Const. Conv. In 1875 the p. (1951). Constitution 1844 was amended by the addition of a clause to the effect that “prop shall be assessed for taxes under erty laws, and general rules, uniform to its true value.” IV, VII, Art. according § Elsewhere in the the courts had par. country, divided issue of whether such an equality uniformity Taxation, clause forbade all tax exemptions (see Cooley, ed. (4th 1924)); courts, however, our soon § ¶. themselves with those the view that aligned holding clause did not prohibit Legislature providing there exemptions so basis and long proper reason able classification. Board State Assessors v. Central Cf. R. R. & A. Stratton Collins, 43 N. J. L. 1881). Stratton case Justice Dixon pointed out that the equality clause did uniformity “not require to be taxed” and that it left “the power of legislative selecting the subjects of taxation untrammeled it ever was.” See 43 N. J. L. 564. And page the Central R.R. case had Chancellor this to Runyon (48 N. J. L. at say page 279): provision requires that, only constitutional “The that the (cid:127) general laws, by assessment shall be under but that it shall be require property

uniform rules It does not also. that all shall be taxes, property, taxes, assessed for but that when assessed for words, property taxes, inor other such as shall for be assessed general laws, property shall be assessed under etc. Certain has been exempt from taxation ever since the amendments to the constitution adopted, exemption judicial were and such has received the sanction. property taxed, is of the same kind as that which is but the purposes religion, education, use to which it benevolence, etc.,—makes is devoted—the of justifies exemption. it a class and the provision away legis The constitutional does not take from the power selecting subjects lature of the the of taxation. State v. 98; Runyon, Collins, 41 N. J. L. 43 J. L. 562. But v. N. State require it does included in that all the members of class selected shall be taxing law, applied that the rule thereto shall class, be uniform as to the whole of the and that the assessment shall property constituting class; be made at the true value of the requirements by law, and if these are answered is not in provision.” conflict with the constitutional See also Essex Commission v. County Park Town West 77 & Orange, N. J. L. A. 1909); Trustees (E. Public Schools Inhabitants Support v. for Trenton, 30 & N. J. A. Eg. (E. 1879); City of Taxation, Camden v. Camden Board County 121 N. J. L. 262, 264 1938), affirmed 122 N. J. L. 381 (Sup. (E. McGrath, 1939); Tippett N. J. L. (Sup. v. State, Ct. 1903), affirmed 71 N. J. L. 338 & A. Yard, Trenton Iron pros., N. J. L. Ct. 1880). McGrath, Tippett Justice supra, Garrison recognized the constitutional did not withdraw the amendment

legislative power certain classes of exempt property taxation, and cited the sus numerous decisions which had tained statutes seminaries of exempting “colleges, learning, used buildings cemeteries, exclusively worship, religious and the and land hospitals buildings R. numerous charitable institutions” 54:4-3 et (see seq.); he summarized the of these purport decisions to be “that for the Legislature may, purpose from taxation, either classify property by some common it, feature possessed or to which it by by uses put its owners.” In the case before him the had Legislature granted partial exemption to enrolled as persons active members of fire any company; this down striking he pointed out did not rest on any characteristics of or use to which it was put rested owners,” but on “the personal status of the a basis he which considered to be Later cases wholly improper. have expressed of this view. complete approval See Turnpike Authority Washington Tp., Taxation, v. Mercer (1954); State Board County 118 of N. 408, J. L. Ct. (Sup. 1937). In Essex Park Commission County Town West v. of the court down Orange, supra, struck a statute which sought to tax on impose county property a owned property district but located in another taxing taxing district. It out that the result of the statute was pointed to remove property certain from the tax pre-existing exemption ap- to and that the plicable governmentally-owned property only location; distinction was its ownership while it that were lawful where the acknowledged exemptions under- were classifications the view lying proper, expressed that accident classification which was on the simply based Camden location of was insufficient. City of Taxation, v. J. Camden Board N. County supra [121 262], Chief Justice noted that the classification in Brogan the Essex Parle case held uncon County Commission “was stitutional because it was not and was in fact general Blum, 93, See v. 101 N. J. L. arbitrary.” Jersey City & A. West 1925); City Borough Newark v. Paterson, 2 N. J. Ct. 1924); Borough (Sup. Misc. Huber, 87 N. J. L. 464 1915). Secaucus Ct. (Sup. When the Schwartz case was former presented Court the Court of Errors and counsel Supreme that the warehouse statute S. urged (R. 54:4^-3.20) was invalid under the expressed in principles Tippett and Essex Park Commission cases. He contended County that from taxation exemptions only be based may upon either the characteristics of or the use to which it was put. rejected court this contention. In the opinion by Colie, Justice it took the that position had power to Legislature classify objects legislation; this included classifications for the power purpose of taxation; taxation and and that the Legis lature could exercise its discretion to so classify long distinction,” classification rested had “substantial upon basis,” “a and reasonable and included all logical while none within the named omitting classifica “falling tion.” See J. L. at 133-134. This pages approach was consistent with taken in other states which recog nize a legislative power grant exemptions (Allen Multnomah County, Or. 173 P. 2d 475 Ct. (Sup. Justices, Opinion Me. 42 A. 2d 47 Davis, ex. rel. (Sup. 1945); State Struble v. 132 Ohio Taxation, St. N. E. 2d 684 Ct. 1937); Cooley, 273, 280; J. 84 C. Taxation supra p. §§ § and with the broad (1954)), principles our expressed by courts when with the constitutional dealing validity classifications in other fields. legislative See Restau Ass’n, Inc., Holderman, rant 300 (1957); Ass’n, State Garden State Racing 173, 136 N. L. J. & A. (E. Holderman, Hotel Suburban System 42 N. J. 84, Super. 92-94 Div. (App. 1956).

The warehouse which was originally adopted in 1925 and was later sustained in Schwartz did not rest on the personal status of the owner inas nor was Tippett, based arbitrarily on the accident of location as in Essex County Park Commission. See Maritime Petroleum Corp. v. City Jersey City, 287, 1 N. supra, J. It page 297. was based legislative to further policy common good by encouraging of New development Jersey’s public warehouse industry which then unable to compete fairly with public warehouses in our states where neighboring no personal property were imposts applicable. intro ducer’s statement attached to the warehouse exemption bill Co., v. Linen (see Deaney Thread 578, J. 584-585 after (1955)), its stating object, opined loss of “any taxes in the State of New would be more than Jersey offset increase of taxable New ware- Jersey housemen from their resulting growth.” See Assembly No. 408 (1925). The power of a to foster a Legislature par ticular industry development interest by appro priately based exemption from personal taxation has received judicial elsewhere. recognition See Todd County Bros., v. Bond 224, Ky. 188 S. 2d 325 W. (Ct. App. 1945). Burlington Co. Distilling v. State Bd. Cf. Assessors, 86 N. Ct. (Sup. 1914), affirmed & L. 315 1915); Department & Labor etc., Industry v. New Enterprise, 352 Pa. 43 A. 2d 90 1945). Ct.

In Schwartz the court cited Carmichael v. Southern Coal Coke S. U. 81 L. Ed. for the (1937), well-settled doctrine that the due process equal protection clauses of the Eederal Constitu- tion do a state prohibit from legislature selecting subjects of taxation and taxation. There Justice Stone, in sustaining Unemployment Compensation Act Alabama, noted (1) Eederal Constitution does of rule of “any equality a state impose upon rigid

taxation”; a which result from singling that (2) “inequalities exemption infringe out of one class for taxation or particular limitation”; and no constitutional (3) legislature basis, make rational may “distinctions of degree having must be judicial scrutiny they when subjected if there is conceivable any to rest on that basis presumed here state facts The appellant of which would it.” support that Carmichael did not involve personal property urges “trades was concerned with an indirect tax on taxation but ex but it is clear that the principles occupations”; in Carmichael well as those pressed expressed (as taxation and equally personal property Schwartz) apply Heisler indirect taxation trades and See occupations. 245, 83, Thomas 260 S. 43 S. Ct. Colliery U. Davis, 67 rel. supra. L. Ed. 237 ex (1922); State Struble Jackson, Tax Commissioners Indiana v. State Bd. Cf. 283 of 527, 1248, 537, 540, 51 Ct. 75 L. Ed. 543, U. S. S. noted that the equal where Justice Roberts (1931), iron clause “does not an protection compel adoption taxation, rule differences in variety nor or equal prevent taxation, subjects, or discretion in the selection of or businesses, trades, taxation classification for of properties, Warehouses, Inc., Independent or See callings, occupations.” Scheele, 70, 1062, 91 L. Ed. 1346 U. S. S. (1947). the cus of the light foregoing constitutionality which favors

tomary judicial presumption Arbour, 258, re Loch Village (1957)), (In we would not be warranted from the holding departing R. 54:T-3.20 was not in in Schwartz that violation of the 1844 Constitution as amended. And while attack no made under Constitution Washington has been the 1947 (see Review, Ins. Co. v. Board National it contains which would (1949)), pro seemingly nothing hibit Legislature granting so as there was exemptions by general legislation long proper IV, reasonable classification. See Const Art. basis VII, par. I, 1; VIII, I, Art. 9(6); VIII, par. Art. § § § 2; I, par. VIII, Art. par. 3. we need not Accordingly, § now deal with the Attorney General’s contention that under the second VIII, sentence in I, Art. of the 1947 par. § Constitution this court would R. be to sustain obliged 54:4^3.20 if even it entertained the view the decision in Schwartz was insupportable. Proceedings Cf. Const. Conv. pp. 1 (1949). the warehouse embodied in Although R. 8. 54:4^3.20 has been declared constitutional, to be must be with applied narrowly and caution great a represents from the fundamental departure that principle shall bear its property just public share of the equal burden of taxation. See Julius Roehrs Co. v. Div. Tax of 493, 16 N. J. 497 Appeals, N. J. Au (1954); Turnpike v. thority Washington Tp., 44; supra, page Missions, etc., Neeld, Board National of Atlantic Coast Line R. (1952). Co. v. Phillips, Cf. U. S. S. Ct. Ed. 1977 The (1947). L. objective statutory of noted, as hereinbefore exemption, was to our place warehouses on an public equal competitive with those our of footing states where no neighboring per sonal taxes were property and the imposed, holding constitutionality was grounded on that strictly objective. The claim of taxpayer’s must be scruti exemption carefully nized and if particular circumstances that disclose statutory not furthered policy is being must exemption be denied. & Jersey City Liggett Myers Tobacco Cf. Borough Edgewater supra; v. Connoil Corp., supra. In Liggett Myers this court declined to apply in case a where the did taxpayer not its place a warehouse with customary bailor-bailee warehouseman, control relationship but placed in a its of the portion warehouse which the tax- leased and a controlled under payer landlord-tenant relation- And in Connoil the ship. Division Appellate struck down sublet, claimed where the taxpayer at a nominal rental, tanks to the Lawrence Warehouse storage Company the Warehouse under which

and entered into contract the taxpayer’s petroleum store and handle Company agreed “the full N. J. Super. and to extend products 338] [4 a field warehouse its and experience benefit of facilities store whether others might man.” The dictated taxpayer tanks, the Warehouse products their petroleum without storers any other accept would Company there was no The found court consent. taxpayer’s the Warehouse between relationship warehouse bona fide had not and that the taxpayer and the taxpayer Company in the course the statutory exemption; itself within brought court, Eastwood approvingly for the Judge his opinion Trenton Board Tax Appeals, from v. State City quoted affirmed 1941), J. L. & A. 1942), 128 N. J. L. 320 College, Rider Trenton v. said: the court where legal principles present difficulty. right applicable no “The statutory exemption depends entirely upon facts the claimed College particular case. Dana State circumstances each 308, 310, 412; 14 N. J. Misc. Board granting statutes 189 A. 620. Since affirmed exemption of a ‘renunciation of taxation are the nature principle sovereignty,’ with the sound basic and are at war equally upon all,’ they ought are most to fall ‘burden of taxation ‘strongly exemption. against claiming Thus the construed’ those clearly convincingly in each case must facts and circumstances exemp granting right within the statute to establish tion, subjects prop general is which ‘all rule invoked otherwise Country Day erty just public burdens.’ Princeton share of the- to a 136; 515, 517, Board, etc., L. A. v. State School Assessment, Academy Board Taxes State Carteret 886; L. 138 A. 919. A. affirmed 104 N. J. J. L.

N. stated, proofs from fair doubt.’ Carteret must be ‘free Otherwise page 529). etc., supra (102 Academy Board, L. at v. State upon proof claimant to establish the asserted The burden right Englewood Dwight exemption. v. State Board School to 875; A. affirmed 117 114 N. J. L. 36.” J. Tax Appeals the Division of instant matter In the most of occupied Electric the fact General described en- it as because “inconsequential” space warehouse Ejay’s tertained the view that under Maritime Petroleum Corp. City Jersey City, supra, would statutory be even if applicable Ejay’s were viewed as a premises private rather than a public warehouse. In Connoil the'court dis Maritime, tinguished out that there the warehouse pointing company business, was in the public “engaged warehousing owned and maintained tanks for sale of its storage facilities, accepted petroleum all who desired products same,” store and “issued warehouse therefor.” receipts See Super, page 341. While the in opinion Maritime contain a does dictum to the effect that the statu tory exemption as well ware applies private as public houses, it expressly that the recognizes legislative policy not “to alleviate the burden of the individual owners of the property” but was to foster New Jersey’s warehouse which was at industry competitive with “tax- disadvantage free warehouses of states.” See N. J. at neighboring 295-296. The pages of the history statutory as exemption, in fully discussed the record in case, the Schwartz contains ample evidence of the limited legislative purpose. This buttressed history, applicable principles statutory construction, require statute be construed narrowly so as to exclude private warehouses created ox operated for convenience; a broader taxpayer’s construction would enable ready evasions might the stated perhaps impair constitutional justification the entire exemption.

If the taxpayer stores its a well-estab lished or created newly public warehouse, genuinely operated it is such, entitled to the benefit of the statutory exemp tion. See Newark v. Weyerhaeuser Timber 18 N. J. Misc. at supra, On the page hand, other if stores its a warehouse created or operated for its own convenience and not private genuinely operated warehouse, as a then the statutory exemption must deemed for here the inapplicable, be statutory objective is served and no justifiable basis exists for being favoring such against personal property stored We premises taxpayers that, believe in generally. fair- record be to

ness the the should parties, supplemented to the fore- be available on may shed whatever additional light there be full issue; in should particular exploration going in its of the activities by Ejay (and predecessor engaged from the and towards business public soliciting White) meet any available to requirements towards making space should to how presented evidence be as and public, to General Electric with compared rates storage charged rates dona warehouses in by charged storage fide New On Jersey. area or elsewhere in northern Passaic by the supplemented all of the testimony, basis of as relevant which other evidence by any aforementioned Tax introduced, Appeals be Division may should make of fact and should its express appropriate findings whether the claim has determination to under the sustained Electric affirmatively been General forth. the Division up- hereinbefore set Whether principles in should, addition, it exemption, pass holds or rejects the tax- valuation issue which has been raised by on the thus the court record complete afford to payer event further judicial proceedings. reversed and the cause is remanded judgment for further in Division of Appeals proceedings with this

conformity opinion. in remand). may However (concurring Heheb, IY, VII, be viewed under Art. Sec. of the 1844 par. Constitution, 1875, R. as amended September State 54:4^3.20, Schwartz Essex interpreted applied Taxation, L. Board County A. 1943), affirmed 130 N. J. would 1942), VIII, I, Art. par. seem be within the Sec. purview Constitution, of the 1947 Slate providing laws” may only by from taxation be granted “general by law exemptions otherwise “[ujntil provided and now in existence shall be con validly granted taxation that the cited “exemp tinued.” Schwartz holding to all stored applies tion statute it warehouse and includes all within property the state so situated, none.” Can we that the framers omitting say the 1947 had the view, Constitution statute in as so and that dissent interpreted, from the would policy have found expression new draft law, organic it does VIII, as a new embracing exemption provision, Art. I, par. Sec. consideration of the matter subject following in committee and on the floor? Ordinarily, constitu sufficiency tional is measured legislation organic in force Here, law when act was adopted. exemp tions continued are those It is not “validly granted.” that unlikely Convention, knowing provision, determined not to disturb it different or more explicit aby events, At in Mari expression of constitutional policy. time Petroleum Corporation City Jersey City, 1 this court (1949), proceeded the assumption such are The exemptions constitutionally sound. equal pro and due tection clauses process Fourteenth Amend ment to the Federal Constitution as delineated in Carmichael Coal Coke Southern U. S. S. Ct. do not resolve the issue. The basic (1937), Ed. here is the essential of the statute. inquiry meaning This now court holds that the taxpayer stores its “[i]f in a well-established or ware- newly public created house, it such, as is entitled to genuinely operated the benefit “* * * of the if statutory but it stores exemption”; its in a warehouse created or for its operated own convenience and not private as a genuinely operated public warehouse, then the statutory exemption must be deemed for here the inapplicable statutory objective is not being and no justifiable served basis exists for such favoring against personal property stored at of taxpayers premises generally.” majority opinion refers Borough Edgewater then v. Connoil Corporation, Div. Super. is said (App. “the court distinguished” Maritime Petroleum Cor- [there] Jersey poration City, supra, out that “pointing there the warehouse company ‘engaged business, owned and tanks for the warehousing maintained sale of facilities, its storage accepted petroleum products all who desired to store ‘issued warehouse receipts same/ ” determinative considerations seemingly leading therefor/ the ultimate standard rule of action laid down in the here, stated majority opinion supra.

IBut deem this to be an criterion. B. S. 54: 4-3.20 illusory no reference a makes to warehouse: “All “public” personal stored in a in the warehouse” one “engaged business of for hire” is rendered immune from storing goods taxation. The Uniform Warehouse Law Receipts 57:1-1 S. et defines “warehouseman” seq., B. as “a person in the lawfully for engaged goods business storing profit.” “Goods” means “chattels in or merchandise or which storage, has been is be or about to stored.” Ibid. As pointed out Maritime, in a common carrier at the instance storing goods the has held been to be warehouseman consignor a under care. duty Armstrong reasonable Rubber Co. v. Erie R. R. N. Ct. 1927). And a (Sup. automobiles for hire is a garage keeper storing warehouse man with a like charged duty. New Jersey Ass’n Mfrs. Galowitz, Fire Insurance Co. v. N. J. L. 493 & A. Maritime, said in 1930). As policy of “is such to warehouses on place an economic with parity the tax-free states, warehouses of and thus to neighboring lend the aid and found essential to the encouragement of such facilities in New provision Jersey thereby to serve the welfare rather than to alleviate the burden general individual owners of the such im property”; “does not in the munity rest inherent characteristics of the nor in the use to which it is property, but rather in put, the location and of the a relation to business the in was to serve the common designed interest.” n And, said, as there also Uniform Warehouse Receipts to Act achieve primarily designed uniformity to warehouse and thus receipts law to relating effect' use of such ready receipts secure instruments of title and credit. The to “en act all warehousemen applies in the gaged business of for to goods profit,” storing “public” alone; warehousemen and the issuance of ware house is receipts not determinative of the existence of legal McLellan, R. warehouse. S. 57 :1-4 et See Halligan seq. Inc., State Board J. L. 551 (Sup. Ct. 1939).

There is no rational distinction between this regard “public” “private” warehouses. Warehouses some are times deemed “public” sense that they perform a function affected with public interest and are therefore subject for the governmental regulation common good. Yeomans, E. g. Townsend U. Ct. 842, S. 81 L. Ed. 1210 But (1937). con generally warehousing sidered a business operation only of concern to the ware houseman and the he private persons whom stores goods.

Eor most a distinction purposes public private between moment; warehousemen is of no law ordinarily does not require a hold himself warehouseman to out Bank general National Union Reading such. Shearer, 225 Pa. 74 A. Carley Blackburn, 136 Ky. 212, 124 280, S. W. Offutt A., S., Jur., 26 L. R. N. 1114 56 Am. (Ct. 1910). See App. Warehouses, 4, 8, §§

There is in no reason for principle in distinguishing to ad such valorem taxation between regard and “public” warehouses even where the warehouse private “private” used for the of a storage goods single customer and others, is not so where there is open certainly inde- and pendent ownership, management control of the ware- house; and there is no here, evidence contra either direct circumstantial, or was although inquiry less than ex- does haustive. Our statute embody different policy. can no doubt that. There be may, reason related Legislature good to the welfare, as a classify warehousing public

general employ ment, even where warehouse is established conducted Illinois, Munn individuals. by private 113, U. S. Budd, 24 L. 117 N. Y. 22 N. E. 1, (1876); People Ed. 670, 5 R. A. 517, affirmed 143 U. S. App. 1889), (Ct. 12 S. Ct. 36 L. Ed. 247 ex rel. Annan v. People (1891); Walsh, 670, 682, Y. Y. 22 N. E. N. 5 L. R. A. 559 affirmed 143 1889), U. S. (Ct. App. S. Ct. 36 L. Ed. 247 But this the (1891). Legislature not done. The has statute covers all goods warehouse”; stored in “a and to differen tiate in this ware behalf between “public” “private” more, without houses, the one taxation exempt other, but not the is to classification at indulge arbitrary war with fundamental National Ins. Co. Washington law. Review, Schwartz, v. Board (1949). said the statute read all was supra, personal extending warehouse,” stored in “a “all including situated, within the state so none.” was the This omitting accepted act when the Oonsiitu interpretation tion framed and And there approved by people. after, Maritime, the new Court Supreme unanimously held the “to warehouses whether exemption applicable or private.” matter,

It in the fulfillment cannot legislative New warehouses policy Jersey protecting against from the competitive inequality immunity of arising foreign taxation, warehouses from such whether the ware- particular one, house time has two or three or several or given customers. The classification is determined many weal; avowed economic in the service of the purpose common and, so this distinction is unreal and viewed, proffered dis- criminatory.

We are not here concerned with a mere of inde- pretense to secure pendent warehousing planned freedom from ad valorem taxation. Without hypothesizing circumstances that would such and even preclude exemption, though the record made the action of the State below Division could I affirmed, well be consider it to in the be common and the cause individual interest be remanded for a full of the facts and circumstances and a exploration determina- rather tion context of the than foregoing principles I it. the standard laid down conceive majority, J., in result. Hbher, concurring

For reversal and remandment—Chief Justice Weintraub, Justices Burling, Hbhbr, Wacheneeld, Jacobs, Erancis Proctor—7.

For affirmance—Hone. SARNER, PLAINTIFF, SARNER,

JULIA v. SIDNEY DEFENDANT. SARNER, THE IN MATTER OF SIDNEY CHARGED WITH CONTEMPT, APPELLANT. Argued Decided January December 1959. A.

See also 2d certification Super. denied 25 2d

Case Details

Case Name: General Electric Co. v. City of Passaic

Court Name: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Date Published: Dec 22, 1958

Citation: 147 A.2d 233

Court Abbreviation: N.J.