*1 nothing proposi- struction No. 5 as an all or
tion, they totally ignored and that then GENERAL LIFE AMERICAN “the provided Instruction No. which COMPANY, INSURANCE goods reasonable value of furnished.” We Plaintiff-Appellant, instructions, when read to- find that gether, unambiguous are clear and and we Carolyn Sharon Benedict WIEST and any prejudicial errors which do not find Benedict and Lee Jacob Ad the merits of the case. materially Eugene ministrator of the Estate of T. Company, Demko v. H & H Investment See Benedict, Deceased, Defendants-Respon (Mo.App.1975); Collier dents. Roth, (Mo.App.1974); S.W.2d 84.13(b). No. 39140. point Plaintiff’s second relied on and Missouri of Appeals, Court final contention is that the trial court erred District, overruling plaintiff’s motion to set aside 1. Division judgment judg enter verdict and and to April 1978. ment in favor of in that under the evidence, Rehearing Motions for and/or Transfer judgment verdict and should have Denied June been directed for because from evidence no reasonable man could believe Application to Transfer July Denied received no Plaintiff’s defendant oil. 24, 1978. question contention is without merit. The Apex of whether delivered the oil to Marvel properly
was one of fact that was deter by jury.
mined all the evidence in Under case, including testimony
this of defend
ant, it was not established as a matter of Rogers
law that defendant was liable. See Thompson, 364 Mo. S.W.2d 1954). testimony banc in this case such,
is not as to leave no room for reasona differ,
ble minds to as to the conclusion to
be drawn from the evidence. As such is the
case, no verdict should been directed plaintiff. Raffety, Vincent v. generally
S.W.2d 293 See Builders, Bangert
Price v. Brothers Road
Inc., (Mo.1973).
Finding judgment no error is af-
firmed.
WEIER, J., P. CLEMENS STEW- JJ., BELT,
ART, Special and RONALD M.
Judge, concur.
343 *2 $14,500 group life
sured through group life insurance employer. issued to his Benedict policy 28,1976. originally died on March beneficiary his named as second Shar- now Sharon Benedict Wiest. Appellant subsequently received a *3 26, 1976, form dated March designating beneficiary the former as wife insured, respondent Carolyn S. Bene- signed by respondent dict. The form was and not the insured. Benedict Appellant petition interplead- filed its for 8, 1976, September alleged er on proceeds claims on the of the insurance been, policy made Sharon Benedict Wiest, Carolyn S. Benedict and Jacob Lee Benedict as administrator of the estate of Eugene petition Thomas Benedict. The alleged further that due to the two benefi- forms, ciary designation appellant was un- able to determine which claimant was enti- proceeds tled to the and the claimants required interplead should be and settle litigate matter between themselves. Appellant also stated that it had no interest proceeds in the and was indifferent to the Ely, Nussbaumer, L. Kortenhof & Robert respective claimants. Louis, plaintiff-appellant. for All the claimants filed answers and coun- Boeckman, Morley & Daniel V. Boeck- 22, 1976, terclaims. On October the trial man, O’Fallon, defendants-respondents. for granted respondent court Wiest’s motion to counterclaims, dismiss the other claimants’
McMILLIAN, Judge. respondent but leave to Carolyn S. Appellant General American Life Insur- Benedict to file amended counterclaim. Company appeals ance from an order en- Respondent subsequently did file tered in the circuit court of St. Charles Respondent an amended counterclaim. Wi- County sustaining respondent the motion of respon- est then filed a motion to dismiss judg- summary Benedict Wiest for Sharon dent Benedict’s amended counterclaim. appellant’s petition ment of dismissal of for The trial court denied motion to dismiss argues interpleader. For reversal grant respondent but did Wiest’s motion granting court erred in that- the trial make the amended counterclaim more defi- summary judgment ap- motion for because Respondent Carolyn nite and certain. pellant’s petition sufficient facts to any Benedict withdrew claim to the insur- interpleader. entitle it to For the reasons proceeds February ance 1976. On below, discussed we reverse and remand 4, 1977, March the trial court sustained court to with directions trial sustain respondent summary Wiest’s motion for judgment appellant’s peti- of dismissal of tion for and ordered the fund controversy The substantive in this case deposited appel- with the clerk returned to proceeds concerns the of a life insurance Eugene Benedict was in- lant. policy. Thomas
Appellant argues that petition the trial Whether a for interplead sustaining summary alleged dispute erred in the motion for er has which is real substantial, judgment from aver- because and thus warrants inter- petition pleader, ments in the or frivolous or invalid and colorable there persons denied, are who have claims so that should is a appellant and that these claims are such matter within the discretion of the trial E. appellant may Snyder, nature that court. Barr 358 Mo. Respondent argues double Wiest power
that the of the other lacks the respondents dismiss no could under cir- if the dispute real and sub interpreted valid and cumstances be stantial. State ex rel. Creswell v. err in dis- We supra. agree therefore the trial court did not do not with missing argument the trial petition. Wiest’s court did in dismissing not err for inter- 52.07, 507.060, (and V.A.M.R. respondent Carolyn because *4 S. Ben 1969) expanded scope the of in- RSMo has cf., invalid, edict’s claim was on face its terpleader recognized that beyond formerly Bank Baden of Louis v. Trapp, St. 180 see, equity, g., Express in e. Plaza Co. v. 755, (no 757 (Mo.App.1944) S.W.2d basis for 166, (Mo 280 17 Galloway, 365 Mo. S.W.2d claim; where it one is 1955); Kearney Bank v. banc Commercial and other are clearly valid claims without Deiter, (Mo.App.1966). 575 407 S.W.2d so party seeking interpleader merit that the only There two vital facts which must are discharged liability by paying from appear averments from the of the claim). having the claimant the valid Be seeking interpleader: per that party appellant’s petition cause sons have the and that party claims that alleged rival claims have been made on of those claims are such nature the the insurance and that these party exposed liability, to may be double were such that may be see, Security-Mutual Trust Co. g., e. Bank & to exposed liability, double the trial court Buder, (Mo.1961); v. 782 State 341 S.W.2d in sustaining erred for summary motion Scott, v. 491 343 ex rel. Creswell S.W.2d We judgment. reverse and remand with this con (Mo.App.1973). liability Double directions to the trial to sustain the multiple to exposure text means double or interpleader. single v. recovery liability, g., e. Smith for a Preis, 636, (Mo.1965); Furthermore, 639-40 we do not 396 believe S.W.2d 151, Greathouse, 296 153 the trial court should consider the merits Shaw S.W.2d of seeking point If the inter- party beyond the rival claims necessary dispute these whether requirements, alleged has satisfied to determine is right merely has a party then the to real and substantial or frivolous and Scott, supra. two State ex rel. Creswell v. colorable.1 this case the claims were Miller, dissenting opinion Wright because & A. Practice states that Federal and Proce 1704, dure, (1972). p. insubstan § Benedict’s claim was so 371 The fact that one tial, “good justify did not have a faith of the claims is tenuous should not the insurer de long nying interpleader, which claimant it should so the claim “is doubt” about not utterly to so baseless that the stakeholder’s was not double asser therefore reason, dissenting opinion argues, multiple good of claims is not made in For this tion Holtzoff, granted. Al 2 W. Barron A. should not be faith.” & Federal Procedure, 551, p. (Wright though agree should not 230 § we Practice 1961). Thus, par right petitioning ed. de it, ty disagree dissenting pends with whether the stakeholder has a asks for we claims, require regardless opinion’s application good good faith fear of faith adverse of requirement or the merits of those claims whether ment. We believe this means them must meet a “minimum stakeholder himself believes to be merito that the claims Lucas, substantiality” 3A of does not rious. J. Moore & J. Moore’s level Feder threshold Practice, 22.02[1], (3rd 1977). p. 7 3006 merits of such claims. C. al ed. refer the actual
345
which involve a
present
in cases like the
one
beneficiary designation forms.
supported by
the two
plus the fact
several
subject
This information
fund
to the claims of
single
been related to
were or had
claimants
g., Postal Life & Cas. Ins.
parties,
adverse
e.
proba
within the realm of
and thus
insured
Tillman,
121,
Co. v.
127
to create a
are sufficient
ble beneficiaries
Burger,
Life Ins. Co. v.
App.1956); Mut.
50
is
as to which claimant
reasonable doubt
(Mo.App.1932); Supreme
765,
768
S.W.2d
proceeds. Com
to the insurance
Palmer,
Legion
Council of
of Honor
107
filed, creating the
peting claims had been
702
Mo.App.
80 S.W.
double
exposing appellant
possibility of
protect
is to
purpose
of
52.07, V.A.M.R.,
not
liability. Rule
does
seeking interpleader
against double
party
party seeking interpleader
require that
single
recovery
respect
with
to a
multiple
liability;
exposed to double
must be
Costello,
g., Buerger v.
liability, e.
Mo.
may be.
ex rel. Cres
State
sufficient
if it
(1949), especially
App.
S.W.2d
supra, citing South
well v.
stake
party
where the
is a disinterested
Ry. Meyer,
Mo.
western
holder,
protection
of inter-
and seeks
249, 256-58 (1954). Similarly, we do
multiple
ac
pleader against
the threat
respondent Caro
not believe the fact
e.
willing
pay,
tions to recover what
it is
withdrew her claim should
lyn
O’Connor,
Louis v.
Rys.
United
Co. St.
to inter-
adversely
appellant’s
(1910). For
Sovereign Camp Woodmen
cf.,
Mo.App.
interpleader action involves two successive
litigations, one
party seeking
between the
CLEMENS,
J.,
P.
separate
dissents in
rival claimants on the
opinion.
question
propriety
CLEMENS, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
other,
granting interpleader,
after
between the rival claimants themselves on
I dissent and would affirm the trial
claims,
conflicting
g.,
their
e. Moore v. John
court’s denial of
remedy
That
Co.,
Dowling
J.
Realty
166 S.W.2d
should not
Meredith,
(Mo.App.1942); Meredith v.
insurer asks for it.
purpose
of life
148 S.W.2d
provide
insurance is to
the beneficiary with
present
In the
case
trial court should money at the time of insured’s death.
In-
granted appellant’s petition
for inter-
terpleader
purpose.
penal-
defeats
It
proceeded
and then
to the settle
the beneficiary
only by
izes
delaying
—not
litigation
ment or
of the merits between
payment
by depleting
but also
the fund in
respondents,
is whether there was an
allowing
attorney
court costs and
fees. The
effective
of beneficiary,
e.
Per majority opinion
just
would do
that.
America,
sons v. Prudential
Ins.
ofCo.
Interpleader
justified only
when the
(Mo.1950).
goodfaith
stakeholder has a
doubt about
claimant it
pay,
by paying
which
should
summary judgment
of dis
either
stakeholder would be
appeal.
is the
issue on
The trial
missal
risk
of double
As we held in
specifically
appel
made its denial of
State ex rel. Creswell v.
appeal-
lant’s motion to set aside a final and
(Mo.App.1973),
whether
order,
81.06,
able
V.A.M.R. For this
granted depends
should be
on existence of:
reason
Wiest’s counterclaim
“A dispute
which the right to
against appellant for vexatious refusal
interplea turns is real and substantial or
pending
is still
before the trial court.
only feigned and colorable” and should be
*6
appellant’s right
In view of our decision on
granted only
“persons
when
have claims
however,
interpleader,
to
we also believe
against plaintiffs, and that those claims are
that
Wiest’s counterclaim is
of such
plaintiffs may
nature that
be ex
without merit. “.
.
.
It is well settled
posed to
liability.’ Obviously,
‘double
‘dou
open question
that where there is an
‘exposed
ble liability’ means
to double re
or law
of the insurer’s
determinative
liabili-
”
covery
single liability.’
for a
The stake
insurer,
faith,
ty,
acting
the
in good
grounds
interpleader
holder’s
for
ap
must
judicial
a
such
insist on
determination of
pear from the
petition.
facts
its
being
questions
penalized
without
therefor.
”
Trapp,
Baden Bank of
Louis v.
Co.,
Washington
. Cox v.
Nat. Ins.
[4](Mo.App.1944).
S.W.2d 755
We be-
that,
rule,
petition
lieve
under this
the fact
that
here pleads in essence: Ja-
respondent Wiest’s counterclaim is based on
cob
plaintiff’s
deceased-insured in
filing
petition
policy,
designated
the
his
Sharon Ben-
edict,
delay
not an unrelated reason for
and
beneficiary;
and
as
on March
granted'
plaintiff-insurer
that
should have been
received a
of bene-
form,
an
ficiary
signed
by
would constitute
absolute defense. The
not
the insured as
fact,
form,
open question
plaintiff’s printed
existence of
of
that
called for the
an
but
is,
pro-
by
Carolyn, naming
which
is entitled to the
his ex-wife
herself as
ceeds,
opinion
beneficiary;
days
is in our
both a basis for
two
later Jacob Benedict
died;
Carolyn
and a defense to the counter-
both
and
claimed the
Sharon
pay.
policy proceeds;
plaintiff
for vexatious refusal to
and
“is unable to
claim
holding
is entitled to the
reversed. In
this was not proper
which claimant
a
determine
we held: “We
case
do not
proceeds
policy.”
could
any
any
believe that
one
entertain
my
plead
In
view the
failed to
petition
rights
doubt as to the
of
reasonable
the
was entitled to in-
showing plaintiff
facts
question.
parties to the securities
There
This,
terpleader.
petition
nothing
in the
amended
or in the
neither a real
substantial dis-
showed
and
cross-bill to throw shadow of a doubt
a
payable,
as to whom the
were
pute
right
defendant
A. Meredith’s
Charles
be
to dou-
nor
would
ownership
right
possession
and
to
of
liability by paying the named benefi-
ble
any
against
these securities as
claim of
ciary, the insured’s widow.
petition.”
her
by
disclosed
Lafayette-Southside
In
Bank & Trust Co.
rule is well
court reasoned: “The
settled
Siefert, Mo.App.
would have been to the widow of just
her funds until the coils of the law
unwound, penalized further would
her for the attorney insurers’ fees and court
costs. The did not
state facts which
I would affirm and hold the trial court erroneously apply deny-
did not the law in
ing interpleader. Missouri, Respondent,
STATE BROOKS, Appellant.
Oscar
No. 38148. Appeals,
Missouri Court of District,
Division Pour.
April 1978. Rehearing
Motion for Transfer and/or
Denied June 1978.
Application July to Transfer Denied
24,