Gene Smith v. Lanson Newsome and Michael Bowers, Danny Smith v. Lansome Newsome and Attorney General for the State of Georgia

cause of death A doctor testified and Before JOHNSON velocity entering the vic- high a bullet EDMONDSON, Judges, and Circuit ear, travelling upward and back- right tim’s Judge. *, Circuit NICHOLS Senior ward, through top of the exiting Howard, Larry director of the head. Dr. Judge: EDMONDSON, Circuit lab, that the wound Georgia crime testified (“Gene”) and Lamar Smith fired made a bullet could have been Colquitt indicted in (“Danny”) were Smith body also rifle. The from .223 caliber murder County, Georgia, car. over appeared to have been run con- separately. Gene and were tried crimes, Colquitt after Months charges was sentenced victed of both tele- received a twenty County Deputy Sheriff life terms of to consecutive Nichols, Jr., designation. Philip U.S. Cir Senior *Honorable Circuit, sitting by Judge cuit for the Federal phone call which led to an interview with 3391-92, L.Ed.2d 1090 possess Baker who claimed to Federal corpus “imposes special knowledge about incident. Although costs on our system_ federal In crimi- Baker for time some claimed not to have nal trials ... [the hold the initial States] present been at the time of the shooting, responsibility for vindicating constitutional she ultimately there, admitted that she was rights. Federal intrusions into state crimi- implicated and she petitioners. Petitioners nal trials frustrate both the States’ sover- themselves, surrendered and the state trial eign power punish to offenders and their appointed court G. Keith Murphy repre- good-faith attempts to honor constitutional sent both. Isaac, rights.” Engle v. 456 U.S. 1558, 1572, 102 S.Ct. (1982). 71 L.Ed.2d 783 parties The stipulated in writing that petitioners Baker and would under- A. Assistance Ineffective go tests, polygraph which were to be ad- ministered interpreted and expert an The state solicited Danny Smith’s polygraph petitioners examiner. Both testimony against Gene, and Danny’s law attorney signed their these stipulations. yer discussed proposal this Danny. with The examiner stated that he believed that argues Gene that he received ineffective truthfully Baker “yes” answered ques- assistance of counsel because his tions whether she knew who shot Pete represented conflicting by partici interests Bostick, whether she was present when pating plea bargain negotiations on be shot, Bostick was whether Gene Smith shot half but not Gene. Danny com Bostick and whether she with was Gene plains that Murphy could vigorously Smith when Bostick was shot. pursue a plea bargain for Danny while representing Gene. Petitioners were asked they Bostick, knew who Pete shot whether Gene demonstrate a violation of “[T]o his Sixth Bostick, Smith shot they and whether knew rights, Amendment a defendant must es happened what gun was used to tablish that an actual conflict interest They shoot Bostick. answered “no” to adversely affected lawyer’s perform question, each and the examiner believed ance.” Cuyler Sullivan, v. 446 U.S. answers were untruthful. (1980); Strickland v. Washington, Baker testified at trial that she and the 668, 692, 104 petitioners 80 L.Ed. committing were a 2d 674 victim, Petitioners cite when the who was special deputy a Ruffin (11th Cir.1985), 767 F.2d 748 sheriff, upon came the scene. According to negotiated which counsel Baker, plea a bargain struggled Bostick, with wrest- one of his two clients to the exclusion of ed a rifle from the victim and him with shot the other. The court concluded it. Baker testified that in trying get Ruffin case, “[o]n away she ran over the victim’s feet. [counsel’s] facts of conduct of plea bargain negotiations actual II. Brown, DISCUSSION offering part of the deal Brown’s testimony client, his own We review the peti- dismissal of habeas precluded plea bargaining effective on be keeping tions (albeit in mind the limited half of Ruffin and thus constituted an ad extremely important) role of federal habeas impact verse performance.” on counsel’s corpus. process “When the of direct re- Id. at 752 (emphasis added). end, view ... presumption comes to an finality legality attaches to the convic- distinguishable case; from this Ruffin tion_ here, role of pro- federal habeas joint representation prevent did not ceedings, important assuring while plea bargaining effective of ei- behalf rights observed, constitutional are is sec- ther client. The expressly court Ruffin ondary and limited. Federal are not courts relied on the prosecutor fact was forums in relitigate which to open plea state trials.” Id. Gene’s law- negotiations. Estelle, yer deposition testified by at Gene’s first Barefoot petition- yond a reasonable doubt as to both hearing plea negotiations state habeas ers. precluded, not because were for Gene Danny, but possibility of deal bargain unwilling to state was because the 1. Procedural Default indicated that Gene evidence with Gene: found that The district court man, prosecutor trigger was claim on the issue barred Sandstrom penalty. On this seeking the death default. Gene raised record, representation of Murphy’s joint issue for the first time in his second possibili- Danny did not alter Gene and proceeding. According to state habeas ty bargain of a for Gene. sec. 9-14-51 O.C.G.A. Danny demonstrate adverse Nor does grounds by peti- for relief claimed [a]ll lawyer’s performance. Mur- impact on his corpus shall tioner for a writ of habeas Danny’s state habeas hear- at phy testified original in or amended raised ... his negotiate a deal ing that he could grounds not so raised are petition. Any testify, refused to Danny because of the waived unless the Constitution any in consistently denying involvement or of this state otherwise United States Murphy represent- if had crimes. Even any judge requires or unless ... finds Danny, Murphy could not have only ed grounds for relief asserted therein which Dan- negotiated plea for because in reasonably have been raised could testimony to ny always claimed to have original petition. amended Petitioners have not estab- offer the state. purpose speed the The of this rule is “to performance lawyer’s lished that their finality of a defendant’s conviction and the conclude adversely affected.1 sentence, efficiency execution of his with lawyer performance for the defendant’s and due consideration affected, not ad- adversely we do

was not right hearing.” a full and fair Presnell to existed. an actual conflict dress whether 835 F.2d Cir. 1988). properly the im The rule stresses Jury on Intent B. Instructions trial, portance prevents piecemeal of a are argument that collateral review of convictions which admitted at oral The state valid, finality charge presumptively promotes and jury on intent the trial court’s preserves judicial resources. charges to other scarce quite similar this case was “[Pjrompt finality ... deters others from held violated Sandstrom v. we have which committing impor crime.” The state’s Montana, Id. prompt finality undercut the state contends tant interest but L.Ed.2d 39 pro- by successive collateral attacks on convic shown no cause for his that Gene has goals The any issue and that tions and sentences.2 served default of this cedural Georgia’s petition rule are was harmless be- successive error in the instruction indicates, explanation Murphy's performance was we do not think this as that 1. As evidence affected, petitioners point adversely petitioners suggest, Murphy also to Mur- that decided pro- Danny’s phy’s explanation state habeas taking the because of a conflict between stand why ceeding did not take the stand Danny. duty duty Gene and his to Mur- his to exculpating testify statement made to to an phy he avoided the stand did not state that course, witness: "Of I was him the state’s star representing both defendants. because he was question Jean Baker about this able to it, Murphy decided not to As we understand it, ah, jury of a she denied in front take the stand because he determined that me; with ever had that conversation she’d challenged Shirley adequately Baker's credi- had and, ah, she, ah, I felt that I told me that never bility taking weaken and that the stand would jury get point as to the was able to across defendants. him as an advocate for both time, credibility point concerning at that her nothing gained and I decided importance 2. For a further discussion stepped good I then bit would be lost if I felt a cases, Friendly, finality see Is Inno- in criminal repre- testify up while I was there and tried on Criminal cence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack strategy, senting defendants. A matter both Judgments, 146-51 38 U.CHI.L.REV. Record, With- Exhibit at 32. Your Honor.” "strategy” reflecting of this out on the soundness

14(J5 courts, only to the extent intrinsically served issue is beyond pro peti- federal, honor the rule. ability present. tioner’s Georgia petition successive rule is On Gene’s inability claim of to under- subsequent peti- not an absolute bar stand proceedings, we as- Georgia’s tions. pe- rule bars a successive pro sume that a petitioner se habeas who raising only tition new claims if the new capacity lacked the mental to understand claims could reasonably have been raised in the object nature and proceed- petition. response an earlier In ings present and to his case for habeas argument state’s at his second state habeas relief in a rational manner would have hearing petition that Gene’s second cause omitting a claim proceed- in such successive, brought up illiteracy. ings. person’s But being illiterate does The state court held that Gene had shown not person good mean that the lacks sense. failing insufficient reason for to submit Nor does lack of formal education make a petition claim his earlier and there- person mentally incompetent. There is no petition fore dismissed Gene’s second right legal counsel in proceed- collateral “successive” under O.C.G.A. sec. 9-14-51. ings, Wainwright, Hooks v. (11th Cir.1985); thus, 1437-38 the failure to “A defendant who is procedurally act or think like a cannot be cause raising barred from a federal constitutional failing to assert a claim. Although claim in state court is also barred from did Gene not mention it in his appellate raising the claim in a peti federal habeas (Gene briefs filed a pro brief se and his tion unless he can show cause for and court-appointed brief; counsel also filed a prejudice making actual the default.” done), both were well in pleadings his Zant, 1492, (11th Gates v. 863 F.2d 1500 the district alleged court Gene I.Q. that his Cir.1989); Wainwright accord Sykes, was “well average.” below Because no 72, 2497, 433 97 U.S. S.Ct. 53 L.Ed.2d 594 evidentiary hearing was held the district (1977). prejudice The cause and standard court, we accept allegation this at face applies pro litigant, to a se Alexander v. value; every but because not mental defi- 371, 841 Dugger, F.2d 374 n. 3 Cir. ciency incompetency, amounts to the alle- 1988), and to claims barred state’s gation is insufficient. See McCune v. Es- petition Presnell, successive rule. 835 telle, 611, (5th Cir.1976) (low 612 F.2d at 1577-78. intelligence equal does not mental incom- petence). Cause Default Moreover, The Sandstrom claim was avail support we would find no 3 argument able when Gene filed his first state mentally habe Gene incom- petition, claim petent being but no Sandstrom incompetent sense of presented at that time. As cause for this stand trial. No one has ever asserted that default, illiteracy and mentally incompetent Gene cites his lack of Gene was when he ability pro to understand the state habeas originally tried for murder. In addi- ceedings. tion, reviewing argument In transcript we have read the of Gene’s Gene, acting pro must face this fact: still hearings spoke state habeas where Gene se, raised the issue in his sec Although perform Sandstrom for himself. he did not petition. ond not a case where an hearings competent lawyer This is at these as a rule.") 3. This claim was not novel at the time of Gene’s lin “did not announce a new This court petition. recognized first provided state habeas Sandstrom had been also has that Franklin no Although Franklin, suggests decided. Supreme in his initial Gene novel basis for relief: “In brief that this claim was not available until the Court noted that the basis for the decision in Franklin, Supreme preceded Court decided Francis v. that case Sandstrom could be ” U.S. 105 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d 344 traced back to the Court’s earlier decisions.... Supreme unambiguously Although Court stated Presnell 835 F.2d at 1582 n. 28. Gene prior may validity Franklin that "extend” Franklin did not have been more confident of the Franklin, law. Franklin 471 U.S. at n. his claim after able, the claim was avail- 317-18 5; Aiken, law, long at 1973 n. see Yates v. as a matter of before his first (Frank- (1988) proceeding. state habeas necessary flexibility to address in allow appears rational would, performance his was; procedural de- he in which he contexts he knew where the varied every way: court; his he stated he was why occur. knew can faults were the contentions plainly; contentions illiteracy is cause for state To hold responded directly absurd; he not peti- would allow those default circumstances, Gene’s these questions. In illiterate to en- happen to be who tioners legal cause is not condition general mental shopping. could be gage in forum Claims his default. petitioner for federal court if reserved illitera- dispute Gene’s not The state does might federal perceived fact-finder But doubt it. reason to cy, and we have than claims sympathetic more those suggested that has Supreme Court Presnell, 835 See the state fact-finder. objective ordinarily turns some cause To the extent state at 1579. F.2d Murray petitioner. external factor get the first chance to courts would 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. Carrier, claims, the exhaustion review L.Ed.2d undermined, im- and the doctrine would be why he failed to explain illiteracy does collateral review would portance of state in his first issue raise this Particularly in id. reduced. See illiterates, using know that petition. We limited role of secondary and argu- light of the assert scriveners, often do can peti- as devices of claims; proceedings second Gene federal ably collateral valid claim. pro prison- Sandstrom protection tion advanced for state constitutional hear- his second state said at concerns, stressing ers, these federalism jailhouse with a contact ing that lost prevent- role of state courts proper proceedings, the first habeas lawyer during and the ing unconstitutional confinements Georgia or his assert he does not but convictions, finality importance his efforts to unduly obstructed custodians respect.5 great are due his case—in- help or to handle get other requir- in any inequity do sense Nor we he saw asking more time—as cluding petitioner to raise all pro se ing an illiterate already rejected has The Ninth Circuit fit. ability to raise at lie within his issues—that illiteracy equals cause argument that representa- petition. Even his first all—in even proceedings in collateral default for a lawyer is competent by the most tion help of a petitioner loses the when issues will be guarantee all colorable Idaho State Hughes v. jailhouse lawyer. parties represented hold raised. We (9th Corrections, 800 909 F.2d Bd. of mis- lawyers’ responsible for their would, counsel case Cir.1986). find cause To 478, 488, Carrier, 106 cause effect, per se rule of takes. See establish here, Where, proa illiteracy.4 on based issue, it would to raise an petitioner is able variety of contexts the wide of give him a “second bite at inequitable to be occur, the defaults can in which initially defaults the apple” when given the term has not Supreme “Court deny a chance while second issue we Ross, 468 precise content.” Reed ‘cause’ to raise the petitioner whose fails 2901, 2909, 82 L.Ed.2d 1, 13, 104 S.Ct. U.S. earlier, Furthermore, as noted not issue. rules of cause (1984). Per se 1 enough "competent” to be bound long argument as he suggested is at oral 4. Gene’s difficulty of effect of actions. the cumulative issue, inability, Gene’s illiter- Gene's mental disagree. We acy to cause. We amounted important concerns make federalism 5. These Gene’s difficulty the issue and of think that the materially different procedural defaults nothing ability to his issue, precise add level mental of involving problem of the writ from the abuse difficulty of the claim of On the cause. Engle, petitions. successive federal Cf. was “avail- question whether the claim the able", (federal U.S. at 102 S.Ct. 1575 456 challenges Murray, see 477 Smith v. "special entail convictions L.Ed.2d present on direct review comity concerns” mental complexity On of the issue. convictions). federal constitutionally irrelevant as ability, we it find rights question have rules the states reasonable relevant for the harmless error finality.6 analysis is there was overwhelm- ing participated evidence that if he in the 3. Harmless Error burglary, intentionally. he acted This court has identified two situa We conclude that the evidence was over- tions which a violation can Sandstrom whelming if Danny committed the acts harmless: “if the evidence was over alleged indictment, in the he acted inten- whelming if ... and the instruction was tionally. Shirley Gene, Baker testified that applied to an element of the crime which Danny and she looking drove around for a was not at issue at the trial.” Davis v. burglarize house to Danny (11th Cir.1985) Kemp, 752 F.2d directly involved in the and was (en banc). inquiry under the first “[T]he equal participant every- with Gene in prong of the harmless error test should thing shooting. but the There was no evi- ordinarily focus on whether there exists dence at trial from jury which the could intent, overwhelming evidence of rather have concluded that Danny was an unk- question than guilt.” the more inclusive nowing unwilling participant in the bur- Stephens glary. Cir.1988). “Thus, cases, in many a Sand strom error as to intent can found Polygraph C. Examination harmless where the evidence of intent is parties stipula entered written overwhelming, even where there is conflict regarding tions the admissibility of the re ing evidence as to whether the defendant” polygraph sults of the examinations of the actually committed the crime. Drake v. petitioners Shirley stipu Baker. These (11th Cir.1985) Kemp, 762 F.2d provided lations attorneys were to (en banc). opinion expert receive the polygraph Danny did not default the Sandstrom examiner; also, tests, opin results and grand jury issue. The indicted ion of the examiner were to be admissible burglary. malice murder and There is no at trial. Baker made some aborted participated evidence that attempts polygraph to take a examination. struggle shooting or the Al- the victim. petitioners filed a Brady Counsel mo though jury the court instructed the partic he contended tion which “that all parties conspiracy, Danny to a crime and regard attempted poly ulars with to said felony only. was convicted of murder In- graph examination should be made known ” felony tent is not an element of murder. Record, to the Defendants.... 4 Exhibit only pretrial hearing the at 40. At a motions de Because here we decide presumably improper charge graph, fense counsel asked for “the actual on intent harmless, any graphs papers, was need not show that other written or or the state ” Record, overwhelming Danny whatever he 1 at the evidence was that has.... Exhibit felony prosecutor responded he did present underlying was the 9. The that when jury found that he not have the information defense counsel was committed. The charge requesting not was and that there was no improper was. An intent case, agreement anyone stipulated finding. Danny’s In the but the affect that strong may grant the writ even in prejudice” 6. standard is a federal habeas court The "cause and showing proce- interference with the absence of a of cause for the constraint on federal court 496, Carrier, prisoner has dural default.” 477 U.S. at 106 state the state convictions when ample complied procedures. for the legitimate not state S.Ct. at 2650. There was evidence with Gene, say jury places heavy burden on the to convict and we cannot that he The standard a Incidentally, defaulting any potential probably petitioner. is innocent of murder. But overwhelming, tremendously strong, evidence indicated harsh results reduced if not is slain; intentionally universally critically important recognized the victim was trial, exception prejudice" dispute rule: did not intent at "cause case, telling jury extraordinary a the that Bostick’s death was murder. an where constitu- “[I]n unlikely charge re- probably resulted in the It seems that the on intent tional violation has innocent, actually sulted in Gene’s conviction. conviction of one who is 1468 JOHNSON, Judge, concurs Circuit 10. the results. Id. at review

expert would judgment: the motion. The court overruled dispo- the I concur in ultimate Although to the failed argues that state Danny case, presented in this I the issues sition of concerning the agreement the comply with emphasize de- separately write Danny evidence.7 polygraph admission interpreted be as should not relief nial of the denied contend that does availability of scope or the the narrowing Nothing in expert examiner. of the opinion pris- corpus to relieve state of habeas writ the provides that stipulation written the imposed confinement on inmates inde- provided for results would tests or of the the dictates Constitution. violation Although the trial. pendent review before for a Hughes once wrote Justice Chief and results the stipulated tests parties Court, never be for must unanimous “[i]t admissible, nothing indicates would be corpus is the the writ of habeas gotten that have the attempted to counsel defense personal liberty and safeguard of precious for trial. subpoenaed graphs it higher duty than to maintain there no part of the argues further Johnston, 306 U.S. unimpaired.” Bowen v. allowing the admission agreement 455 83 L.Ed. 19, 26, 59 S.Ct. the was that in this case results polygraph it today as principle is as true This a committal defense give the state would emphasize decisions Recent had petitioners though hearing even necessity col of federal propriety and hearing, de- At the indicted. already been constitutionality of lateral review many get to ask did not on the fense counsel restrictions state confinement v. as he wanted ask. See Harris questions liberty of an individual. — U.S. -, agree- Reed, S.Ct. 109 breached argues that state “plain (1989) (extending L.Ed.2d 308 and fair committal 103 full provide ment 463 Long, Michigan rule of statement” trial testi- hearing; but 3469, 1201 1032, 77 L.Ed.2d 103 S.Ct. U.S. proceeding habeas Danny’s fied state cases); Granberry v. (1983), at trial to objection made that counsel 1671, 131, 129, Greer, 107 S.Ct. U.S. 481 polygraph results admissibility (reaffirming (1987) 1673, 119 L.Ed.2d complied with the had because state remedies failure to exhaust that “the er- no constitutional agreement. We find juris court of appellate deprive does evidence. polygraph regard to the ror with merits of to consider the diction v. Mor Kimmelman corpus application.”); III. CONCLUSION rison, (1986) (refusing to was ei- any L.Ed.2d 305 constitutional error Powell, subject of a or the extend ther harmless Stone to Sixth L.Ed.2d default,8 judgments of the “collat because habeas claims for Amendment petitions these denying court district only frequently the will eral review corpus are AFFIRMED. writs of habeas reviewing courts “Federal crimes. date of the claim on found district court 7. The empowered to corpus petitions by procedural default. We are is barred this issue inability illiteracy rulings trial of state agree. on his Gene relies evidence correct erroneous proceedings as cause for Wainwright, the state Boykins to understand v. courts." already deter- have we Cir.1984). evidentiary his default. (11th claims "State insufficient, showing is of cause this mined corpus cognizable only federal habeas are Danny’s claims on of proceed ato discussion proceeding rulings the state if the render review point. Dugger, 866 fundamentally unfair.” Redman Cir.1989). any We hold F.2d evidentiary challenges of some also 8. Gene funda- evidentiary did render the trial error (1) judge: the admis- rulings trial of by mentally other issues raised unfair. The photographs of gruesome of into evidence sion appellate omitted pro brief but in his victim; (2) of written the exclusion with- lawyer's brief are also appellate his people had been in who taken from statements out merit. on the vicinity murder through means which an accused can effec ates towards such bargain, violates a right counsel”); tuate the Miller v. Fen right constitutional and the rules of ethics ton, 474 U.S. problem is, besides. The when to draw the (1985) (refusing 88 L.Ed.2d 405 to extend line, and I do not see how counsel can draw presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. it inquiries without some to inform himself 2254(d) A. to state court conclusions on § possibility whether the plea of a bargain in voluntariness of confessions because “inde the interest of one to the detriment of the pendent federal traditionally review has other is a real possibility. played important parallel protect role in IAs read 767 F.2d 748 Ruffin ing rights prosecu at stake when the (11th Cir.1985),there plea were actual bar- through tion secures a conviction the defen gain negotiations in which counsel offered admissions”). dant’s own client Brown’s testimony against client Federalism concerns make us mindful of Ruffin. Here plea bargain always important presented state interests in the impossible because neither defendant context, Harris, see 109 S.Ct. at implicate the other and both insisted recognize and we the need for finali they were not at the scene of the crime at — ty. Lane, U.S. -, Teague v. See all. Nor would the state consider one with How Gene, whom it put death, desired to as ever, primary protect our concern is with principal offender. Recognizing Ias do ing rights the constitutional of the individu Murphy explore needed to petitioner. Miller, al See U.S. at 117— possibility plea of a bargain enough to join 106 S.Ct. at 453-54. I cannot if know a require- constitutional and ethical language suggests which that federal re separate representation existed, ment for I petitions corpus brought view for habeas cannot conclude there was a violation on prisons individuals incarcerated in state part his merely because may have troublesome, inappropriate, somehow or possible talked about a plea bargain with precious safeguard less than “the per someone and established there could be liberty.” sonal none. The possibility could not have im-

NICHOLS, paired performance knew, Judge, Senior Circuit because he learned, concurring none, in the only result. there was impossibil- ity. persons siblings, When accused are here, or otherwise linked natural faulty 2. The instructions on intent affection, thing they may the last want is a were: defense which counsel for each tries to I charge you person the acts of a Moreover, blame a crime on the other. presumed sound mind and discretion are single unified defense under a may head product will, to be the of his but this actually effective, more separate presumption may be rebutted. counsel, zealously striving each impli- I charge you person that a of sound mind client, cate may the other’s be inimical to presumed and discretion is to intend the budgets hard-pressed public both. The probable natural and consequences of his defenders is also for consideration. The acts, presumption but this may be rebut- possibility mere might that one defendant ted. turn state’s evidence another is al- faulty That these instructions were is not ways theoretically present, but it must not disputed to be in this court in view of always preclude possibili- be allowed Franklin, ty Francis v. managed of a unified defense plea bargain turning interests of both. If a but Dan- ny prejudiced “felony one the other is a real was not because his possibility, and needs murder” explored require to be the interests of conviction did not intent to accused, Moreover, either a different kill. situation defense of both who, presents itself. they they Counsel without both were had no elsewhere and consent, actually negoti- part killing client’s informed Bostick. There was no doubt corpse that who- condition from the intent. The did so with killed Bostick

ever v. Franklin in Francis

Supreme Court the ac- on the fact that

lays great stress shot, the fatal

cused, admitting he fired majority to kill. The he intended

denied clearly in issue intent was

held that “error” in an on whether decision

reserved “harmless.” 471 can ever be

instruction As four 1976.

U.S. at dissented, it is clear even so

Justices go beyond read to its facts. cannot be

case in an instruc- held that error

This court has if intent intent can be harmless

tion about genuine issue. Drake

is not Cir.1985) (en banc). dispute here that if Gene is no

There killers, Gene wielded

Danny were

weapon. disposes of the above persuaded I am issues the case

the constitutional go into all the matters is no need to

there opinion. I am re- court’s

discussed law more to contribute to circuit

luctant affirmance, and justify I need to

than only. concur result

therefore PARKER, Lacy

Robert

Petitioner-Appellee,

Cross-Appellant, DUGGER, Secretary, Florida L.

Richard Corrections,

Department and Robert General, Butterworth, Attorney

A. Florida, Respondents-Appel

State

lants, Cross-Appellees.

No. 88-3189. Appeals, Court of

United States

Eleventh Circuit. 19, 1989.

June

Case Details

Case Name: Gene Smith v. Lanson Newsome and Michael Bowers, Danny Smith v. Lansome Newsome and Attorney General for the State of Georgia

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Date Published: Jun 19, 1989

Citation: 876 F.2d 1461

Docket Number: 87-8314, 87-8477

Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.