*1 аlleged made to error in permitting Reference is testimo- representatives regard to the intention of ny plaintiffs’ question of law need not parties. be discussed trial, the decision of the Court at the time of the presently dismissing Exceptions, is based solely itself. the contract upon BUILDERS, INC., Appellee,
GENE & HARVEY PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION COMPANY, Appellant.
INSURANCE Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of
Argued Sept. 1986.
Decided Nov. *2 Berlin, Plate, Hutzelman, Joseph May, Shapira, May, J. Brabender, Erie, for appellant. Walsh & Kuhn, Sharon, appellee. for William NIX, C.J., LARSEN, FLAHERTY, Before d McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA an PAPADAKOS, JJ. THE
OPINION OF COURT FLAHERTY, Justice. general liability a insur-
At issue this case whether form, ance has become a standard policy, written what obligates the insurance to defend and compаny indemnify insured, contractor, building its a a filed lawsuit house, who claims that his constructed homeowner contractor, has become uninhabitable because it built on land has negligently subsided. Although present lawsuit is & Harvey between Gene Builders, (hereinafter contractor”) Inc. “the and Pennsylva- (herein- nia Manufacturer’s Association Insurance Company company”), “the insurance the underlying dispute after homeowners, D’Augostine, Marion and Erna between and the contractor. D’Augostines purchased
In of 1979 a parcel October Township, land in Neshannock Penn- County, Lawrence Estates, from Merritt Inc. At about the same sylvania time, contracted with Gene and Builders to they Harvey parcel construct a house on this of land. The house was and delivered on March and the D’Au- completed ,1, *3 1982, however, gostines February moved in. In in complaint County homeowners filed a the Lawrence Merritt Court of Common Pleas Estates and the complaint alleged contractor. This that the land had subsid- this, away premises, along ed and fallen from the and that construction, in ajar with defects caused doors to come and further complaint floors to become unstable. stated that the house was useless because subsidence that sinkholes and subsidence on the land were known or should have been known to both the seller of the land and Further, alleged the contractor. it was that the subsidence in by filling was concealed sinkholes. in an
Subsequently, complaint, D’Augostines amended claimed construction performed negligently that the was in knowledge an unworkmanlike manner with of the land. also claimed that They defects and subsidence the true condition of the land misrepresented contractor respect complaint After the amended with subsidence. filed, D’Augostines bankruptcy was filed for complaint granted demurrer this amended was in D’Augostines longer parties were no the real interest. 1, 1982, However, on a trustee for bankruptcy December D’Augostines instituted an action on the same subject Estates, against Merritt Inc. and Gene and Harvey matter Builders, Inc. in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence following allegations, contains the County. complaint complaint: are identical to those in the earlier some which defects apparent PARAGRAPH That have become dwelling recent months in said construction of and in the for by undermining land caused minerals and subsidence undermining. as a result of said 13. That sinkholes and PARAGRAPH subsidence were on said land and said condition apparent was known Estates, Inc., should have been known to Mеrritt Builders, Harvey Gene & Inc. That addition to the being land, on apparent predecessors condition said Estates, ownership from Merritt Inc. purchased whom land, creating said land mined said the conditions actually mining which caused the subsidence. The said was known or should have Fur- been known Defendants. ther, premises the contractor filled sinkholes on the sold to D’Augostine’s under cover darkness [sic] order to fraud. perpetrate dwelling
PARAGRAPH 29. That said residential was constructed and in an unworkmanlike manner negligently knowledge with of the land of the defect and subsidence constructed; on dwelling which said residential unfit, unsafe, dwelling said has rendered and unin- been habitable as a result of the actions of Defendant second *4 Harvey named and [Gene Builders]. Builders,
PARAGRAPH 31. That Inc. Harvey Gene & named, Defendant second constructed said premises with of the defects in knowledge knowledge said land and with of said subsidence on said land and misrepresented premises true condition of said and its concealed true condition, all of is more specifically set forth Complaint. [Reproduced of the
Paragraphs above.] arose,
During action & D’Augostines’ the time Gene Builders, (the contractor) Inc. under a Harvey insured insurance standard form under- general liability policy Pennsylvania written Manufacturers Association Insur- by policy grant is intended to Company. comprehen- ancе general liability receiving After sive complaints D’Augostines filed by as well as complaint subsequently by bankruptcy, filed the trustee in Manufacturers As- Pennsylvania the contractor delivered original of the Company copies sociation Insurance The insurance at first un- complaints. company amended contractor, insured, a dertook defense of the its subse- but it quently coverage notified the contractor that was denying proceed under the and declined to further policy with Consequently, provided defense the case. contractor present separate his own and has filed the action defense for in the of Common Pleas of declaratory judgment Court interpretation County, requesting judicial Mercer of the coverage general liability its provided comprehensive Compa- policy Pennsylvania with Manufacturers Insurance ny. parties summary judgment, Both moved for granted Court of Pleas of Mercer County Common affirmed, Superior motion of the favor contractor. Court relying opinion. on the trial court’s
At courts erred appeal issue whether lower Pennsylvania Manufacturers holding Company of the to defend required the terms the contractor. indemnify Builders courts Harvey
Gene & contends the lower follow- did not err and thаt is afforded under the ing policy provisions: LIABILITY
1. COVERAGE B—PROPERTY DAMAGE all sums company pay will on behalf as legally pay shall obligated which the insured become damages
Coverage bodily liability A.
Coverage damage B. property applies, occurrence, this insurance by to which caused an shall have the company right duty to defend any seeking damages suit the insured on account bodily injury damage, of such or if property any even allegations groundless, of the suit are false or fraudu- lent____ defines “occurrence” as: accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, in bodily which results or injury property damage expected neither nor intended from stand- insured____ point of the
Pennsylvania Manufacturers on Company, hand, other coverage asserts that should be denied under following exclusions: (n) property damage products ... the named insured’s arising out of such or products any part products; such (o) property damage performed ... to work on by or arising behalf of the named insured out or of the work thereof, materials, any portion parts equip- or out of or therewith; ment furnished connection (p) damages withdrawal, ... claimed for the inspection, repair, replacement, or loss of use the named insured’s products complеted or or for work the named insured or of such or form a any property products which work part, if such products, property work are withdrawn from the any market or from use because of known or suspected defect or deficiency therein. Standard Venetian Blind Co. v.
As this Court stated Empire American 300, 304-305, 503 Pa. principles Pennsylvania which courts apply interpreting contracts of insurance are well established:1 joined Concurring Opinion
1. This Mr. writer authored Justice Blind, places Hutchinson in Standard Venetian the "focus on price replace whether an insured who is asked to or return the his product liability reasonably expect own failed from his could view, however, (Emphasis supplied.) carrier.” did not com- interpreting gener- contract The task [an insurance] jury. *6 rather a performed by a court than See ally v. Steel Corp., United States 277, Gonzalez 484 Pa. 398 (1979); Community Beaver College County 1378 A.2d of Society Faculty, the 576, v. 473 Pa. of course, goal is, of that task of to ascertain (1977). of as the of parties language intent the manifested the See Mohn v. American Casual- instrument. the written Reading, Co. ty 576, (1974). 458 Pa. A.2d 346 326 of ambiguous, of a the provision policy is Where is to construed favor of the insured and provision be insurer, drafter agreement. the the of the See Casualty Reading, supra. v. Mohn American Co. of however, Where, language of contract is the the clear and is effect unambiguous, required give a court to to that Pennsylvania Ass’n. In- language. See Manufacturers’ v. Casualty Surety surance Co. Aetna & (1967). Pa. A.2d 548 the absence of 426 233 “[I]n fraud, ‘failure to read an una- proof [the contract] avoidance, excuse and cannot an vailing justify or defense any or or provi- modification nullification the contract ” Estate, 483, 488, Olson sion thereof.’ 447 Pa. Phillips Gas Orner T.W. & Oil quoting 98 Co., 401 Pa. 195, 199, (1960). A.2d contracts, to insurance are principles, applicable These principles dissimilar to traditional actuality, essentially goal the interpretation any the contracts: governing the in the absence of parties, determine intent of the plain meaning agreement the will be ambiguity, McChesney, enforced. Steuart v. 45, 444 Pa. A.2d 659 ambiguity language Because there is no case, we turn the insurance contract involved complaint made and their relation to the claims of the language insurance contract. complaint alleges performed neg- that the contractor fashion, he concealed
ligently unworkmanlike Court, majority application but its would mand a reach judice. result in the sub same case presencе of sinkholes filled them under cover of darkness, misrepresented and that he condition buyer-homeowners. to the All premises these claims are from either they excluded because are not “occur- rences,” i.e., events, accidental or fall they under (n) (o). exclusion or exclusion either The alleged concealing intentional of the condition of alleged misrepresentation the land intentional are not under policy, “occurrences” for an act intentional is not (and covered). only an accident accidents are The alleged negligence is also from excluded cover аge clearly (n) because it falls under (o). both exclusions (n), (damage As to exclusion product the contractor’s arising any part out of of the product), all the claims *7 damage (the house) concern to the product insured’s arising i.e., from a part product, the duty a builder’s to be of in reasonably prudent the of a placement house. One does building not contract for the of a house in the sky; of necessity, on houses must rest the earth. Assumed is that the part product contractor’s work will be act prudent to inly placing the house on inspection the lot. Reasonable the lot and the representing condition оf the lot to the are, short, owner in part building house, of the work which is the “product” of a contractor. (o) the
Similarly, case exclusion (damage to performed by work the arising contractor out any portion work), of the the negligence all assertions in complaint the (the concern to damage building house, i.e., the work a building habitation) fit for arising portion out of any the using inspect ground care to reasonable the to work— sound, see that it is normally filling holes which were present in ground, representing the the homeowner- buyers that the land did had or not have certain characteris tics.
Whether the contractor was or negligent whether he intentionally deceived the is homeowners not at issue this case. He may may adjudicated so at be trial. What in the wrong alleged complaint is whether the is
is at issue is excepted by the or whether it by covered is not by exclusion. Because intentional conduct covered conduct— alleged negligent and because policy, actually negligent or not —arises whether it from work, subject it is exclusions product clearly (o). (n) and
Reversed.2 HUTCHINSON, J.,
NIX, C.J., concurring file a opinion.
LARSEN, J., dissenting opinion. files a Justice, concurring. NIX, Chief case, is I the result reached it Although agree with me since upon explain employed rationale incumbent of this еxpressed by majority I do not share view Blind Co. v. American Em Court Standard Venetian 300, 304-305, Pa. 469 A.2d pire in that I noted In the dissent case that both expressed majority and that expressed view members of the Blind concurring Standard Venetian “equally appropriate and neither Court nebulous were Id., Pa. interpretation.” the area of insurance contract at I then to set forth the proceeded at I appropriate. view deemed adhe- a contract of essentially
An insurance contract
*8
rather dictated
bargained
Its terms are not
for but
sion.
under-
by
insurer. Thus the insured’s awareness and
the
in an
standing of exclusions set forth
insurance
presence
from
mere
of such
presumed
not be
the
should
fact that
among
policy’s
terms.
very
exclusions
particular
exclusions indicates
prescribes
insurer
that
could
reason-
assumption
purchaser
otherwise
to
the risk so excluded.
ably expect
be covered
against damage
protect
to his
wanted to
himself
Had the contractor
coverage
by
risk
product,
own
such
is available
so-called builder’s
Pittsburgh Bridge
performance
& Iron
bond. See
insurance or
Cir.1971).
Co.,
(3d
Liberty
(1974), employed by both that court and the trial court matter, and hold the proving a standard of the insured was aware of and fully appreciated the effect of exclusions in the insurance policy permitting before insurer escape duty its defend the insured.
Id.,
I concur in the result. The majority opinion correctly existing However, states law. as noted the majority writer, at 430 n. I the issues presented believe here can analyzed be better using the rationale set forth in my concurring opinion in Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Empire American 503 Pa. Justice,
LARSEN, dissenting. I support dissent and in thereof adopt opinion Court of Common Pleas of Mercer No. 32 County, C.D. 1983, authored The Honorable Albert E. Acker. following Judge Opinion: Acker’s
OPINION ACKER, Judge. upon a Motion for Reconsid- case is before this Court Blind Co. v. American that Standard Venetian
eration
Empire Insurance
[503]
[300], Pa.
I. IS ERS, INC., ENTITLED TO COVERAGE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTA- TION OF COVERAGE?
The doctrine of expectation reasonable of coverage was argued by briefed and counsel at the of outset this case. We did not previously apply consider or that doctrine the matter, of resolution the for the case was decided under Hionis and its progeny. The is plaintiff again requesting doctrine, of application the but is faced two with sizeable First, problems. whether the expectation reasonable doc- law; second, was, trine ever a our part was if it what is the state health the doctrine in view the near demise of Hionis. plaintiff
The closest that the can state Pennsylvania has embracing come to the expectation reasonable doctrine was v. Co., Sands Granite Mutual Pa.Super. Sands, however, Even the plaintiff can only assert that doctrine was “tacitly the Sands, however, supported” Pennsylvania.2 is readily distinguishable from the In Sands plaintiff case at bar. the had so he requested fully that would be from an agent insurance found to be the repre- was sentative the defendant. plaintiff signed applica- in blank, leaving tion form agent to fill in insurance information. Prepayment accepted application was and the and monies were forwarded to the insurance company for approval. The agent insurance neither explained nor men- the plaintiff tioned to that the application carried brief, plaintiff by pp. 2. The 22-24 cites authorities cases from Facts, 20 Am Jin:. Proof of 2d 59 which it claimed have adopted expectation Pennsylvania the reasonable doctrine. is not among By authority, Pennsylvania “tacitly those states listed. that has Co., supported” the in Sands doctrine v. Granite Mutual Insurance supra. coverage. This of uninsured motorist could have waiver payment mere of two additional dol- been obtained insured, from agent, without instructions lars. indicating the box insured did desire checked such Pennsylvania Legislature amended the
Subsequently, deleting (1971)] by option statute P.S. [40 Hionis coverage. Although rejecting uninsured motorist supra, Northern Mutual is not named Sands, Sands it is noted In principle applied.3 explained to the that he agent plaintiff never *11 coverage, to motorist much less entitled uninsured what plaintiff It comprised is concluded that that because, alia, the uninsured coverage entitled inter was to never mentioned to him and his coverage was motorist “fully insured.” expressed desire be endorsed, Pennsylvania has ever question We whether otherwise, expectations so-called reasonable tacitly or a if expecta- It that the reasonable appear doctrine. would in it a branch Pennsylvania, is but tions doctrine does exist severe, of the Hionis if not undergone tree has Further, if has em- Pennsylvania life-taking, surgery. doctrine, question its expectations we the reasonable braced Blind v. Co. view Standard Venetian state of health Co., supra. Empire American Blind, supra, Venetian Standard stated The court “ Hionis, supra, written held, policy a is ‘Where terms, unambiguous establishing appli- the burden that the proof of the or limitation involved cability exclusion limitation, and that exclusion or insured was aware ” (Emphasis him/ thereof, explained to the effect was for the Hionis doctrine Therefore, applicable, be added.) in unambiguous terms. a written there must be discussed, has been expectations doctrine The reasonable in Pennsyl- decided federal cases several applied but Co., supra, was decided Decem- v. Mutual 3. Sands Granite Co., supra, 22, was Mutual Insurance Hionis v. Northern ber 1974. September decided Pennsylvania under Kravitz vania In Equitable v. law. U.S., Assurance Society 453 F.Supp. (E.D. Life Pa.1978) it held was that where there ambiguity a through lack clarity, obligated Court is to look beyond language interpreting If contract. there a defense on based an exception or an exclusion of the is an policy, defense one affirmative and the burden is upon it, the defendant to establish citing Weissman v. Prashkar, Pa. As to when the expectations might reasonable doctrine applied, be Kravitz, state, Court went on to “Pennsylvania courts on rely public policy overriding will explicit terms in the contract, at least when the contract terms would operate to defeat the expectations reasonable in- sured.” Id. v. at Sands Granite Mutual Insur- citing Co., supra. Kravitz, however, ance In de- nied.
Similarly, coverage was denied in
Taylor
Phoenix
Mutual
(E.D.Pa.1978).
The plaintiff has not proof endeavored to supply estab- *12 against lish that it public would be policy to enforce exclu- (n), (o) case, sions (p) and nor do we them to believe be unenforceable. The policy insurance involved is a policy (n), standard (o) and exclusions (p) are standard The only exclusions. is remaining issue whether the exclu- (n), (o) (p) applicable sions are in this case.
II. ARE (n), (o) EXCLUSIONS and (p) APPLICABLE
TO THE NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE D’AUGOSTINESAT No. 211 of 1981 and CAL AIARO, AT TRUSTEE No. IN 1007 1982 THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LAWRENCE COUNTY? (n), (o)
The (p) exclusions and were previously held not to applicable by be this Court they explained were not
434 of Hionis Hionis. The required rejection
as clean for a fresh considera- wipes Court slate Supreme exclusionary clauses. tion of these three general liability as a of insurance is known policy grant It intended is the standard form. to policy. It It insurance ob- general liability comprehensive to face company pay up to the amount ligates the insurance against and to defend lawsuits filed policy of the to cause of action giving if rise insured the facts insured constitute an “occurrence”4 against asserted exclusions, alia, inter if are not one they within (n), (o) (p). or construe policy
A an insurance court will rewrite other than what unambiguous language to mean clear and Co., Casualty Surety v. Etna & Blocker [Aetna] says. it v. Grocers 111, (1975); 476 332 A.2d Pa.Super. 232 Pfeiffer Co., 1, Mutual Insurance Pa.Super. A.2d 118 251 379 (1977). according to construed policy
An insurance should be ambiguity so while meaning of words used as avoid plain all of provisions. effect its giving time at same Co., supra; & Casualty Surety Blocker Etna [Aetna] Co., 206 Pa.Super. Fire Insurance David v. Nat. Union policy (1965). language 66 211 A.2d ambiguities, should be to create but should not be tortured Monti v. Rockwood if ambiguities possible. read avoid Co., 450 A.2d Pa.Super. involved, policy of an insurance the construction Where the insurance of the law is the long-standing accident, including continuous or "... an An occurrence means conditions, bodily injury repeated exposure to which results standpoint expected from the property damage, nor intended neither Opinion the nature This Court's first discusses of the insured.” although allegations noting there are claim act, allegations negligent Occur- of a act. there are also an intentional Harleysville Mutual in Barber v. defined and dealt with rence is also, (1982); Pa.Super. See *13 Co., Refuge 437 Pa. Auth. v. Transamerica Lancaster Area 493, language as accepting of the dissent A.2d 368 263 739, 80, (1969). 83, subject Pa.Supеr. 741 in 214 found Opinion pp. on 13-14. discussed in the first of an "occurrence” was
435 is to liberally be construed of favor the insured in close and/or doubtful cases. Habecker v. Nationwide In surance 463, Pa.Super. (1982); A.2d 1222 See also, Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Risk Industrial Insur ers, 289 Pa.Super. the policy upon exclusions of relied by the defendant
are:
“(n) to damage to the named property prod- inssured’s arising
ucts out of products part such or any of such products;
(o) to property damage to performed work or on of
behalf the named arising out the work thereof, or any portion or out the material parts or equipment therewith; furnished connection (p) damages claimed for withdrawal, inspection,
repair, or replacement loss of use of the named or products insured’s completed work or for insured, named property or any which such products or part, form a if products, work such work or property are from withdrawn the market or from use suspected any known defect or deficiency therein.”
In the trustee’s complaint at No. 1007 of it is alleged:
Paragraph “That defects apparent have become recent months in said dwelling, construction of and in the land caused by undermining for minerals substances as a result of said undermining.” allegation same appears Paragraph origi- 9 of the complaint
nаl and amended D’Augostines. Paragraph complaint, of the trustee’s being Paragraph original of the complaint D’Augos- and amended tines, states:
“That apparent sinkholes subsidence were on said land known, and said condition was been or should have
436 Inc., Estates, Harvey to Merritt and Gene &
known Inc____” Builders, not the does
Paragraph complaint, 18 of trustee’s which or of D’Au- original complaints in the amended the appear reads, gostines, above, the has
“That as a result of the said land it purpose; for its intended that is uninhab- unfit become diminished; the itable; and that completely its value subsidence; and the lawn residence has affected been the occupy; proximity unsafe to and the of residence dwelling said unfit for its intended renders subsidence purpose.” reads, the
Paragraph complaint 31 of trustee’s Builders, Inc., second “That Gene & Defendant Harvey named, knowledge of premises constructed said with knowledge of subsi- land and with said defects said land, misrepresented and the true condition dence said condition, all premises and concealed its true of said Paragraphs 11 and 13 more set forth specifically which Complaint.” quoted herein. previously 11 and 13 Paragraphs were the suit the trustee Negligence may be established failed to discover the subsi- by showing that the insured erection, making thereby рrior dence and correct it that the insured house It is claimed uninhabitable. damage, bringing towards about the anything did overt alleged, it in the hole filling which exception with to know opportunity denied to the owners property dwelling that the has become It is claimed this subsidence. uninhabitable proximity of its useless subsidence. exclu- (o) are not and novel (n), (p) new
Exclusions (n) Exclusion was dealt with in insurance law. sions Co. Casualty Fidelity Glass Co. Pittsburgh Plate There, Cir.1960). manufac- York, (3d 538 F.2d New that damages paint due to claimed turer Venetian blinds blinds, exposed. metal leaving had flecked from company asserting defended by exclusion no (n), injury there was for to or destruction of goods manufactured, sold, any products or distributed by insured, named out of It accident arose. held that court in refusing lower erred Cadallader v. New Amsterdam Casualty cited court 582, 589, quoted Pa. *15 may a claim potentially “where become one which is within scope policy, the company’s the refusal to the of defend at outset the is a decision it controversy peril.” at its paint makes own It held once had been on, part and, it product baked became of finished therefore, coverage. there was Liberty Building Co. v. (o)
Exclusion is the subject — Co., Royal Indemnity 346 Cal.Distr.Ct.App.-, P.2d 444 stucco had mixed and improрerly There been that, buildings by to the insured. It was an applied held completed, exclusion as to which applied any goods work to manufactured, products sold, or handled or distributed out occurred, of which the accident coverage was properly v. Weedo a denied. lower was Similarly, court reversed Stone-E-Brick, Inc., (1979), 81 405 788 N.J. A.2d concerning (o). (n) a construction of exclusions That twenty judicial court noted that there had years been treatment what known as “business risk” exclu- coverage sion. Such an exclusive for faulty denies work- on manship products damages where claimed were cost correcting the wоrk itself. It was held that exclu- ambiguous and, therefore, sions were coverage not was denied. Williams & Sons (n) Vernon
Exclusion was used in Construction, Inc. v. Continental 591 (Tenn 1979) 760 action coverage. S.W.2d That was deny workmanship materials, grounded upon faulty and it was correcting the cost of for itself. Coss, v.
Saint Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 80 Cal.App.3d [888], Cal.Rptr. 890 145 836 also con- (n) (o). tained similar That exclusions to our court and all were endorsements concluded when could not led the together, they read have properly products liability that he had to believe Casualty is construed Ohio (p) Exclusion Inc., 450, (Minn. Enterprises, v. Terrace 260 N.W.2d Co. 1977). There, settling for the of an permittеd was as a construction due building faulty result apartment an held to be occurrence backfilling. This was negligent backfilling applicable. poor not the exclusion was insured, it one other then the threatened done was cause its building, the value of the but to only to lower- permitted. Boggs Coverage as was destruction well. Co., Casualty Surety & Etna [Aetna] S.C. damages (1979) an effort to recover involved S.E.2d due to walls leaked against a contractor where basement on Plaintiff property. of the residence position locating a house on alleged negligent contractor was held to be an seepage. lоt exposed water liability contractor’s scope within the “occurrence” need sudden to be such, As not be policy. event *16 occurrence, of time. period over a may but be case, is described instant an occurrence
Similarly, causing expo- or repeated, is continuous as an event which found Hauenstein v. Liability was sure to conditions. Co., 242 Indemnity Minn. Mercury St. Paul the insured was distributor N.W.2d where it in used sold a contractor who plaster which was cracked, plaster shrunk and hospital. of a construction re- expense for removal and necessitating its considerable respon- insurance carrier was Thе court held pair. damages. sible for such negli- the alleged of this Court that
It the conclusion on a lot with a constructing a house gent conduct in any of the named lot is not within subsidence is an “occurrence” within (n), (o) (p), exclusions owing. coverage is for which definition If did have case. we no substantial doubt We have our conclusion. doubt, however, change this would doubt, In case of as to whether allegations of a complaint insured state a cause action within of a liability policy compel sufficient action, insured to defend the that doubt will be resolved Insurance, favor, Jur.2d, insured’s 44 Am p. § WHEREFORE, we reaffirm the previously Orders en- tered this case. Pennsylvania, Appellee,
COMMONWEALTH SEESE, Harry Ray Appellant.
Supreme Pennsylvania. Court
Argued Sept. 19, 1986.
Decided Nov.