Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X 1/16/2025
:
GABINO GENAO :
:
Plaintiff, :
: 24-cv-2077 (LJL) -v- : : OPINION AND ORDER
ELVIS RUIZ, JR., et al., :
:
:
Defendants. :
:
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X
LEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Gabino Genao (“Plaintiff”), who is appearing pro se , brings this action against Defendants Elvis Ruiz Jr., Kenneth Stukes, Robin Collins, Tamara Fee, Sharon Forbes, Eugenio Oliva, Avi Trope, John Does 1–2, and the City of New York (the “City”) (collectively, “Defendants”) in connection with his pretrial detention at various facilities on Rikers Island. The City of New York moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim to relief. Dkt. No. 27.
For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.
BACKGROUND
For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the allegations of Plaintiff’s
complaint and the documents of which the Court may take judicial notice.
See Simon v. Fed.
Prison Indus. Inc.
,
While incarcerated at the North Infirmary Command (N.I.C.), Plaintiff was denied contact visitation in June 2021 due to two infractions dated February 29, 2020, and June 5, 2020. Dkt. No. 1 at 7–8, 12–13, 16–17, Ex. B at ECF 26–27. [1] Plaintiff initiated an Article 78 proceeding regarding this restriction in the Supreme Court of Bronx County, arguing that the infractions had been dismissed for due process violations. Id. , Ex. B at ECF 19, 21. The Article 78 hearing was scheduled for August 14, 2021. , Ex. B at ECF 19. [2]
On the same day as Plaintiff’s Article 78 hearing, Defendant Ruiz Jr., Captain of OSIU, threatened to transfer Plaintiff “around the world,” which Plaintiff understood as a threat to transfer him to multiple facilities where he would be abused by the inmates. Id. at 22, 75, 106. Five days later, on August 19, 2021, Plaintiff was transferred to the Anna M. Kross Center (A.M.K.C.), where he was informed that no housing was available and was instructed to sleep in the recreation room. Id. at 39. Within five minutes of settling in, approximately ten prisoners attacked Plaintiff, kicking him and striking him with closed fists as he curled up on the floor, covering his face. Id. at 40, 44–45, 48. During the ten-minute attack, Plaintiff’s head was stomped on and struck against the floor, and he was stabbed in the lower back. Id. at 46, 48, 51. The assault left Plaintiff with blurry vision, hearing loss, concussion symptoms, and head trauma, in addition to wounds on the face, head, and back. Id. at 49, 52, 65. Despite these injuries, Plaintiff was denied medical attention and was instead placed in an intake holding pen. Id. at 59. He did not receive any medical care until five or six days later. Id. at 61. [3]
On August 25, 2021, Plaintiff was escorted to the clinic of Defendant Oliva, a physician at A.M.K.C., where Plaintiff requested further evaluation and treatment for his injuries, citing fluid leaking from his ears and his history of traumatic brain injury. Id. at 63–65, 70. Defendant Trope, a medical administrator at A.M.K.C., and Defendant Oliva denied the request. Id. at 67, 71. Trope stated that Plaintiff would see a neurologist within two weeks. Id. at 67.
Between August 25 and September 11, 2021, Plaintiff was transferred three times: first to the Robert N. Davoren Complex (R.N.D.C.), then to the George R. Vierno Center (G.R.V.C.), and finally back to N.I.C. Id. 72, 83, 88. During this period, Plaintiff’s medical requests were denied by officers at both R.N.D.C. and G.R.V.C., id. at 77, 85, and he was not examined by a physician until September 14, 2021, after his return to N.I.C., id. at 90.
Upon examination, the physician determined that further evaluation was necessary and referred Plaintiff to Bellevue Hospital for an MRI/CT scan and an audiologist examination, despite opposition from Department of Correction staff. Id. at 90–96. The MRI/CT scan results were negative. Id. at 97. On or around September 22, 2021, an audiologist diagnosed Plaintiff with bilateral hearing loss. Id. at 100. Plaintiff continues to experience inner ear pain, vertigo, tinnitus, and hearing loss, and difficulties with walking. Id. at 108, 111.
On or about October 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Claim with the Office of the New York City Comptroller, which was delivered on October 29, 2021. [4] Id. at 113, Ex. B at ECF 56. However, during a conversation with the Office of the Comptroller, a staff member informed Plaintiff that the Notice of Claim was “never received.” Id. , Ex. B at ECF 58. Plaintiff attempted to follow up with the Office of the Comptroller again on May, 16, 2022, but received no response. Id. , Ex. B at ECF 59.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing the complaint on March 15, 2024. Dkt. No. 1. Construed liberally, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as Article 1, Sections 5, 8, 9, 11, and 12 of the New York State Constitution. Id. at ECF 16. Plaintiff seeks $4 million in total damages, consisting of $1 million each for compensatory damages, punitive damages, future damages, and consequential damages. Id.
The initial pre-trial conference was held on August 9, 2024. Dkt. No. 21. The Court issued an order granting Defendants leave to file a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 22. The Court also notified Plaintiff of its intent to convert Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, attaching the full text of the Notice to Pro Se Litigant Who Opposes a Rule 12 Motions Supported by Matters Outside the Pleadings, in accordance to Local Civil Rule 12.1. [5]
Defendant City of New York filed the instant motion to dismiss on behalf of itself on September 16, 2024, along with a supporting memorandum of law and declaration. [6] Dkt. Nos. 27–29. As part of the motion to dismiss, the City submitted a General Release signed by Plaintiff on December 16, 2022. Dkt. No. 28-1, Ex. A at ECF 4–5. The General Release is part of a settlement agreement between Plaintiff and the City in Genao v. City of New York et al. , 20 Civ. 4872 (MKV) (S.D.N.Y.). Id. , Ex. A at ECF 4. In the General Release, Plaintiff agreed to discharge all civil rights claims against the City arising before December 16, 2022, except for seven pending claims that do not include the present action. The General Release states in relevant part:
I, Gabino Genao, . . . do hereby release and discharge defendants the City of New York . . . their successors and assigns and all past and present officials, employees, representatives, and agents of the City of New York or any entity represented by the Office of the Corporation Counsel, collectively the “RELEASEES” from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action alleging a violation of my civil rights and any and all related state law claims from the beginning of the world to the date of this General Release, including claims for costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees, with the exception of [seven] claims.
evidence at trial. The full text of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is attached.
In short, Rule 56 provides that you may NOT oppose the defendant’s motion simply by relying upon the allegations in your complaint. Rather, you must submit evidence, such as witness statements or documents, countering the facts asserted by the defendant and raising issues of fact for trial. Any witness statements must be in the form of affidavits. You may submit your own affidavit and/or the affidavits of others. You may submit affidavits that were prepared specifically in response to defendant’s motion. If you do not respond to the motion on time with affidavits or documentary evidence contradicting the facts asserted by the defendant, the court may accept defendant ’ s factual assertions as true. Judgment may then be entered in defendant’s favor without a trial.” Local Civil Rule 12.1.
[6] The motion to dismiss expressly states that it is not made on behalf of Defendants Forbes, Fee, and Ruiz Jr. Dkt. No. 28 at ECF 1. However, it is unclear whether this exclusion extends to the remaining Defendants. Id.
Plaintiff filed two memoranda of law opposing the motion to dismiss on October 15, 2024, and October 17, 2024, along with a Stipulation of Settlement with the City that contains the same language as the General Release. Dkt. Nos. 29–30. The City replied on December 23, 2024. Dkt. No. 31.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f ... matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary
judgment under Rule 56,” and “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all
the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The decision whether to
convert is within the Court’s discretion.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. N. Picco & Sons Contracting
Co.
,
The City supported its motion to dismiss with the Stipulation of Settlement outside the
pleadings. Dkt. No. 28-1, Ex. A at ECF 4–5. Plaintiff was properly notified of the meaning and
consequences of conversion to summary judgment upon receiving a copy of Local Civil Rule
12.1 in the written order issued on August 9, 2024, and he filed two separate opposition briefs.
Dkt. Nos. 22, 29–30. Accordingly, the Court converts the City of New York’s motion to dismiss
into one for summary judgment.
See Parada v. Banco Indus. De Venezuela, C.A.
,
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56;
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
,
Although “special solicitude” is given to
pro se
litigants on motions for summary
judgment,
Harris v. Miller
,
DISCUSSION
The City argues that the complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the General Release. Dkt. No. 28 at ECF 1. In response, and construed liberally, Plaintiff raises eight arguments challenging the validity of the General Release: (1) the language of the General Release differs from what Plaintiff orally agreed to during the settlement conference; (2) the General Release was executed by fraud; (3) the City acted in bad faith; (4) the General Release isunconscionable; (5) the General Release was executed under duress; (6) Plaintiff is allowed to pursue relief under his sustained Article 78 order; (7) Plaintiff is entitled to special solicitude as a pro se litigant; and (8) the prior knowledge exclusion doctrine applies. Dkt. No. 29 at ECF 3–6; Dkt. No. 30 at ECF 1.
I. The General Release Bars Plaintiff’s Claims
It is well established that “settlement agreements are contracts and must therefore be construed according to general principles of contract law.” Mateo v. Carinha , 799 F.
App’x 51, 53 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting
Collins v. Harrison–Bode
,
The broad terms of the General Release clearly and unambiguously bar Plaintiff’s claims.
The General Release discharges the City from “
any and all
liability, claims, or rights of action
alleging a violation of [Plaintiff’s] civil rights . . . , from the beginning of the world to the date of
this General Release [December 16, 2022].” Dkt. No. 28-1 Ex. A at ECF 4–5 (emphasis added).
When general language is used in the release, “the release is to be construed most strongly
against the releaser,” and “the burden is on the releaser to establish that the release should be
limited.”
Middle E. Banking Co. v. State Street Bank Int’l,
II. Plaintiff’s Challenges to the General Release Fail
Plaintiff argues that he did not intend for the General Release to reach the present claims.
Dkt. No. 29 at ECF 3. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he did not agree to release the City from
future claims at the settlement conference.
Id.
at ECF 5. “Where a contract is clear and
unambiguous on its face, the intent of the parties must be gleaned within the four corners of the
instrument, and not from extrinsic evidence.”
RJE Corp. v. Northville Indus. Corp.,
329 F.3d
310, 314 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted);
see Mateo
,
Plaintiff was aware of his intentions to bring the present claims when he allegedly filed a
Notice of Claim with the Office of the New York City Comptroller on or about
October 18, 2021, more than a year before he signed the General Release. Dkt. No. 1 at 113;
Dkt. No. 28-1, Ex. A at ECF 5. Even if he was unaware, “a release may encompass unknown
claims, . . . if the parties so intend and the agreement is ‘fairly and knowingly made.’”
Centro
Empresarial Cempresa
,
Plaintiff’s argument that he was fraudulently induced into executing the General Release
based on language not discussed during negotiations is unavailing. Dkt. No. 29 at ECF 5. Under
New York law, fraudulent inducement requires, among other things, proof that the defendant
made a “material” false representation and that the plaintiff “reasonably relied” on it.
Wall v.
CSX Transp. Inc.
,
Plaintiff also asserts that the City acted in bad faith by initially failing to include an
exception for the seven cases in the General Release and retaliating him for reaching a
settlement. Dkt. No. 29 at ECF 7–8. In New York, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing applies to a party’s performance of a contract in a way that frustrates the contract’s
purpose and parties’ intent.
See Bank of China v. Chan
,
The initial omission of the seven exceptions is not sufficient for a defense of
unconscionability either. “A determination of unconscionability generally requires a showing
that the contract was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable when made[.]”
Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
,
Plaintiff argues that the City forced him to agree to the broad language of the General
Release on a “take it or leave it” basis, which the Court construes liberally as a claim of duress.
Dkt. No. 29 at ECF 5. Duress requires,
inter alia
, a wrongful threat.
Kamerman v. Steinberg
,
Plaintiff’s sustained Article 78 order has no effect on the General Release’s enforceability. First, the Article 78 order granted only the restoration of Plaintiff’s contact visitation. Dkt. No. 30 at ECF 2. In fact, the issuance of the Article 78 order on September 22, 2021—over a year before the General Release—reinforces that Plaintiff had the intention to bring the present claims and understood the implications of the General Release’s broad terms. Id.
Plaintiff’s
pro se
status when he executed the settlement agreement does not alter the
analysis. Dkt. No. 29 at ECF 3. To the extent Plaintiff believed the General Release would not
bar future claims
, id.
at ECF 6, the unambiguous language of the General Release—not
Plaintiff’s subjective understanding—governs.
See HOP Energy, L.L.C. v. Loc. 553 Pension
Fund
,
Finally, Plaintiff contends that his claims are “reserved” under the prior knowledge
exclusion doctrine, given the City’s awareness of his future claims. Dkt. No. 29 at ECF 4.
However, the prior knowledge exclusion doctrine applies narrowly to the denial of insurance
coverage and is therefore inapplicable to this case.
See, e.g.
,
Cement & Concrete Workers Dist.
Council Pension Fund v. Ulico Cas. Co.
,
III. Leave to Amend
Although district courts should generally grant a
pro se
plaintiff an opportunity to amend
a complaint, “leave to amend need not be granted when amendment would be futile.”
Terry v.
Inc. Vill. of Patchogue
,
Based on the Court’s foregoing analysis of the enforceability of the General Release,
granting Plaintiff leave to amend would be futile. The General Release is broad and
encompasses the time period during which Plaintiff’s civil rights were allegedly violated.
Evidence in the record present no indication that he could reasonably challenge the validity of
the Release.
See, e.g.
,
Borden v. City of New York
,
CONCLUSION
Defendant City of New York’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the claims against the City are dismissed with prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the City of New York as Defendant.
SO ORDERED. Dated: January 16, 2025 __________________________________
New York, New York LEWIS J. LIMAN United States District Judge
Notes
[1] Pin cites prefixed by “ECF” refer to the page numbers at the top of the page in the ECF filing.
[2] Elsewhere in the complaint, Plaintiff states that hearing occurred on August 18, 2021. Dkt. No. 1 at 21. The date of hearing is not relevant for the purposes of this motion.
[3] Plaintiff alleges that he was left at A.M.K.C. for six days without receiving medical attention, Dkt. No. 1 at 61, but also alleges that he was escorted to Oliva’s clinic five days after the attack on August 25, 2021, id. at 63.
[4] In Plaintiff’s email exchange with the Office of the Comptroller, Plaintiff dated the Notice of Claim as October 13, 2021. Dkt. No. 1 at 58.
[5] The notice states: “The defendant in this case has moved to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(b) or 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and has submitted additional written materials. This means that the defendant has asked the court to decide this case without a trial based on these written materials. You are warned that the Court may treat this motion as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For this reason, THE CLAIMS YOU ASSERT IN YOUR COMPLAINT MAY BE DISMISSED WITHOUT A TRIAL IF YOU DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS MOTION by filing sworn affidavits or other papers as required by Rule 56(e). An affidavit is a sworn statement of fact based on personal knowledge that would be admissible in