Geiger v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc.Geiger v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc.
Rendered on June 22, 2010
Lane, Alton & Horst, LLC, and Christopher R. Pettit, for appellant.
Saretsky, Hart, Michaels & Gould, PC, Miles D. Hart, Samuel P. Mauch; Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, and Peter A. Rosato, for appellee.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
KLATT, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Jeffrey M. Geiger, appeals from an order of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to modify an arbitration award rendered in arbitration proceedings involving him and his former employer, appellee, Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., as successor-in-interest to Morgan Stanley DW, Inc.
{¶2} Geiger worked for Morgan Stanley as a commissioned financial investment advisor. He resigned under duress and then filed an arbitration statement of claim with
{¶3} The panel rendered a determination nominally in favor of Geiger, awarding him $3,000 plus interest. The face of the arbitration award provides no explanation, rationale, or specific basis for the liability determination, nor does it present any computation suрporting the amount awarded. Morgan Stanley tendered a check for the award amount including interest, and Geiger accepted and cashed the check.
{¶4} Thereafter, Geiger filed a motion in the court of common pleas to modify the arbitration award pursuant to
{¶5} Geiger has filed a timely appeal and brings the following sole assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DENYING APPELLANT JEFFREY GEIGER‘S MOTION TO MODIFY ARBITRATION AWARD.
{¶6} The first issue we must address is whether this appeal is taken from a final appealable order; that is, whether an immediate appeal will lie from a trial court‘s denial of a motion to modify an arbitration award. Ohio precedent is split on this question.
{¶8} The jurisdiction of courts to review аrbitration awards under
Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying, correcting, or vacating an award made in an arbitration proceeding, the court must enter judgment in conformity therewith.
{¶9} The statute thus makes no mention of entering judgment if the court refuses to confirm, modify, or vacate an award. Likewise,
{¶10} Morgan Stanley argues that no final order or judgment entered by the court of common pleas exists in the present case because neither party moved for confirmation, and the court neither modified nor vacated the arbitration award. Since the trial court denied modification, Morgan Stanley asserts, Geiger must first pursue confirmation of the arbitrator‘s award under
{¶11} At least one Ohio court has reached the same conclusion that Morgan Stanley urges on us. In Binns v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc. 9th Dist. No. 24522, 2009-Ohio-3359, the court took a strict reading of the statute and specifiсally held that an order of the court of common pleas denying modification of an arbitration award is not a final, appealable order. The Binns court felt that the trial court‘s order, although rendered in a special proceeding, did not foreclоse appropriate relief in the future since the award could be confirmed and then appealed. Id. at ¶16.
{¶12} In contrast, Ohio‘s Seventh Appellate District held otherwise in FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Wood, 7th Dist. No. 08-JE-13, 2009-Ohio-1513. On slightly different procedural facts, the court considered the case of a party appealing from a denial of a confirmation order under
{¶13} We are persuaded by the analysis set forth in the Wood decision. We find that to require a party to obtain confirmation of an objectionable arbitration award before appealing a denial of a motion to modify that award serves neither the interest of reaching the merits of the case nor that of judicial economy. Injection of a vain and superfluous procedural step, one which, moreover, introduces awkward paradox into the judicial process, does not serve the overarching goals of the arbitration act codified at
{¶14} We now turn to the merits of the appeal, first addressing Morgan Stanley‘s argumеnt that, by accepting the financial benefit of the arbitration award and cashing Morgan Stanley‘s check tendered in satisfaction of that award, Geiger has ratified the outcome of the arbitration process and may no longer contest it. We find that this argument hаs merit.
{¶15} The general rule in civil cases, even beyond those involving arbitration, is that a party who has accepted the fruits of a judgment may not then challenge that judgment on appeal. Julier v. Julier (1900), 62 Ohio St. 90; Block v. Block (1956), 165 Ohio St. 365; State ex rel. Barner v. Marsh (1929), 121 Ohio St. 321; Ohio State Tie & Timber, Inc. v. Paris Lumber Co. (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 236, 239 (overruled on other grounds, Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell‘s Formal Wear, Inc. (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 73). This bar on appeal is sometimes couched in terms of waiver, see, e.g., Fidelcor Mort. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (1987), 820 F.2d 367, 369-70, or as a form of judicial estoppel, Lynch v. Baxley (1974), 386 F.Supp. 378, 403, fn. 10 (Varner, dissenting) and Sealover v. Carey Canada (1992), 806 F.Supp. 59, or both, Price v. Franklin Invest. Co., Inc. (1978), 574 F.2d 594, 597. See also Compton v. Jesup (1897), 167 U.S. 1, 35, 17 S.Ct. 795, 808. The most common term used to express why a party that has accepted the fruits of a judgment cannot challenge that judgment on appeal, is ratification.
{¶16} With respect to post-arbitration proceedings specifically, Ohio courts have gone even further, holding that there is no right even to obtain confirmation of an arbitration award under
{¶17} In summary, we find that Geiger has fully accepted the benefits of the arbitration order and, having thus ratified it, does not have standing to pursue modification of that order in the court of common pleas.
{¶18} Even if Geiger had stаnding, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to modify the arbitration order. First, we find that several procedural errors claimed by Geiger on appeal are without merit. Geiger asserts that the trial court, after docketing his motion to modify the arbitration award, generаted a typical case schedule for the matter including discovery cutoff dates, disclosure of witnesses, and the like. Geiger argues that the trial court thereafter did not comply with its own case schedule, denied him the right to make discovery in the case, and ruled on the motion only based upon the motion itself, the supporting documents attached thereto by Geiger, and Morgan Stanley‘s memorandum in opposition.
{¶19} A motion filed under
{¶20}
{¶21} While Geiger claims that he was entitled to discovery, he points to no credible object of discovery that would have assisted the court of common pleas in ascertaining the merits of his motion. Under
{¶23} In summary, we find that this case presents us with a final, appealable order and we may proceed to consider the merits. It is undisputed that appellant accepted the full monetary benefit of the arbitration award. Therefore, Geiger ratified the award. His ratification of the arbitration award prevents him from challenging the award in the court of common pleas or in this court. We further find that, even if ratification did not bar his attempt to modify the аward, Geiger did not present the court of common pleas a legal basis upon which to modify the award despite the court of common pleas affording all him necessary due process. Therefore, we overrule Geiger‘s assignment of error, and we affirm the judgment of the court of common pleas denying his motion to modify the arbitration award.
Judgment affirmed.
TYACK, P.J., and McGRATH, J., concur.