26 Wash. 171 | Wash. | 1901
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Respondent instituted thi« suit to recover possession of certain personal property which had theretofore been levied upon and seized by the sheriff of Kittitas county under a general execution in favor of appellant. The complaint alleges that respondent is an unmarried man and is not the head of a family, but is by occupation a mechanic, to-wit, a tailor, and works as such for the support of himself; that he has a tailor shop in the city of Ellensburg, where he is now and has been working at his said trade as a tailor in making and repairing clothing for those who employ him so to do; that the property levied upon consists of tools and instruments needed and used by respondent to carry on his trade for his own support, and also materials used for the same purpose; that none of said materials were kept for the purpose of sale, but were kept by respondent to be used by him exclusively in manufacturing suits of clothes and parts of suits of clothes for his patrons, and the same were at no time offered by him for sale except when manufactured by him into clothing for his patrons; that the judgment under which said execution issued was not rendered for the purchase price of any of said tools, instruments, or materials, and the same was not a lien thereon; that said property is of the value of $500, and respondent has no other property and no other business or means of support for himself than the tailor business; that he has worked at said trade continuously for many years last past and it is the only trade or business in which he can engage; that respondent filed with the sheriff a verified list of all the property owned by him, the same being a list of the property levied upon, and claimed said property to be exempt from execution, and
It is assigned as error that the court overruled the der murrer and entered judgment for respondent. The question presented involves the statute on the subject of exemptions, and calls directly for an interpretation of subd. 6, § 5218, Bal. Code. The said subdivision reads as follows : “To a mechanic, the tools and instruments used to carry on his trade for the support of himself and family, also material used in his trade, not exceeding in value $500 in coin.” It is insisted by appellant that the words “for the support of himself and family” must be construed as applying only to a mechanic who is a householder or the head of a family. It must be admitted that the language is such as may readily lead to discussion concerning the legislative intent. The whole section must, however, be construed together in relation to the subject matter under consideration by the legislature. The subject matter was the designation of the classes of persons who may avail themselves of the benefit of exemption from execution and attachment, and also the specification of the property which may in each case be claimed as exempt. The section begins as follows: “The following property shall be exempt from execution and attachment, except as hereinafter specially provided.” The first and second subdivisions then declare as exempt all wearing apparel of every person and family, and all private libraries, not to exceed in value $500, and all family pictures and keepsakes. The section then
“The popular use of “or” and “and” is so loose and so frequently inaccurate that it has infected statutory enact*175 meuts. While they are not treated as interchangeable and should be followed when their accurate reading does not render the sense dubious, their strict meaning is more readily departed from than that of other Avoids and one read in place of the other in deference to the meaning of the context.” Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §252.
A common purpose seems to have been in the mind of the legislature, that of specifying certain trades or vocations to which an exemption belongs, and we do not believe the context justifies the interpretation that it was intended to subject the trade of the mechanic to a different rule from others mentioned.
We therefore conclude that the demurrer was properly overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.
Reavis, O. J., and Pullerton, Mount and Anders, JJ., concur.