Geico v. WillisGeico v. Willis
Brandy Hicks, pro se.
S. POWELL, P.J.
{1} Appellant, Brandy Hicks, appeals the decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Geico Choice Insurance Company (“Geico“).1 For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{2} On December 4, 2020, Geico filed a complaint against Hicks and her son, Donovan Willis, in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas as the insurer, assignee, and subrоgee of its customer, L.J.G. To support its complaint, Geico alleged that the then 17-year-old Willis stole L.J.G.‘s vehicle from a parking lot located in Middletown, Ohio on May 3, 2020. Geico alleged that Willis then caused $16,629.50 in damages to the vehicle because of his negligent operation of said vehicle. While acknowledging that Willis was the driver of the vehiсle, Geico alleged that Hicks was liable for the full $16,629.50 in damages because she had negligently supervised Willis by allowing him to operate a stolen vehicle and causing damage to the vehicle. Geico further alleged, in the alternative, that Hicks was responsible for up to $10,000 in damages caused by Willis pursuant to
{3} On December 22, 2020, Hicks filed a joint
[Geico] alleged that [Willis] stole someone‘s vehicle, and wrecked that vehicle. [Geico‘s] allegations are baseless, and it asks the court to assume facts that they have no evidence of. The allegations that [Geico] is asking the court to assume to be true on face value have no merit. [Willis] has never been question[ed] in connectiоn with the alleged incident. Willis has never been charged in connection with this alleged incident.
Willis has never been arrested for this alleged incident. There is no criminal case pending regarding this alleged incident against Willis. There has never been a criminal case brought against [Willis] in regard to this alleged incident. [Willis] nor I, have any knowledge of the alleged inсident.
{4} Hicks also stated in support of her
[Geico] failed to state any facts that definitely prove that [Willis] actually took the vehicle. [Geico] further failed to show any factual basis that [Willis] possessed the alleged vehicle at the time that it was allegedly damaged or that he actually was driving the vehicle when it was allegedly damaged. Given these facts, this case could not prevail in favor of [Geico], if it was allowed to proceed to trial.
{5} Shortly after Hicks filed her joint motion to dismiss, Geico filed a motion requesting the Butler County court transfer venue to Warren County. To support its motion, Geico cited to both
{6} On April 30, 2021, the Warren County Court of Common Pleas (hereinafter, “trial court” or “court“) assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued a decision denying Hicks’ joint motion to dismiss. In so doing, the trial court initially stated in regard to Hicks’
[Hicks] has admitted that she and her son live in Warren County, making them Ohio residents. The Court clearly has jurisdictiоn over them. [Hicks] also challenges the venue in this case. The case was transferred from Butler County to Warren County where she has admitted living. Therefore, Warren County is the proper venue for this case.
[Hicks] has alleged [Geico] does not have any evidence that [her son, Willis] stole the car at issue. However, this is not a motion for summary judgment where evidence must be considered, this is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) only requires the complaint to state enough facts to determine if the plaintiff has properly alleged a cause of actiоn. *** Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds that if taken as true [Geico] has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The motion to dismiss is denied.
{8} The matter then proceeded to discovery. This included Hicks filing responses to Geico‘s interrogatories and request for admissions. These responses included Hicks’ objection tо Geico‘s interrogatories that “the interrogatories asks for information that if true would be self-incriminating to defendants and violates our 5th amendment rights.” Hicks similarly objected to Geico‘s request for admissions “on the basis of self-incrimination if it were to be true.” However, although generally providing no explicit admissions within her responses to either Geico‘s interrogatories or request for admissions, Hicks did “assert for the record” that “when contacted and asked if [Willis] had ever taken a vehicle before, [Hicks] responded in the affirmative.” Hicks further admitted that she knew Willis had previously “took and wrecked a vehicle in Mason.”
{9} On November 15, 2021, Geico filed a motion for summary judgment. Geico attached tо its motion evidence indicating Hicks knew that her son, Willis, had stolen L.J.G.‘s vehicle and that, given her responses to its request for admissions set forth above, Hicks knew that this was not the first time Willis had stolen a vehicle. Geico also attached to its motion evidence indicating Willis’ negligent operation of L.J.G.‘s vehicle resulted in damages amounting to $16,629.50. Hicks did not file any rеsponse to Geico‘s summary judgment motion.
Upon application of GEICO along with the evidence presented in connection with their summary judgment motion, this Court finds that there are not genuine issues of material fact which remain for trial in this matter as to [Hicks]. This Court grants summary judgment against [Hicks] in favor of GEICO in the sum of $16,629.50 on its negligent supervision claim. Additionally, this court grants summary judgment against [Hicks] in favor of GEICO in the sum of $10,000.00 pursuant to
O.R.C. §3109.09(B) . [Hicks] shall not be responsible to pay more than the total amount sought of $16,629.50 despite judgment on both counts of the complaint against her.
{11} On March 21, 2022, Hicks filed a timely notice of appeal. Oral argument was held before this court on October 31, 2022. Hicks’ appeal now properly before this court for decision, Hicks has raised four assignments of error for review. For ease of discussion, we will address Hicks’ second assignment of error out of order and Hicks’ first, third, and fourth assignments of error together.
Assignment of Error No. 2:
{12} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT‘S MOTIONS FOR DISMISSAL IN TWO SEPARATE MOTIONS.
{13} In her second assignment of error, Hicks argues the trial court erred by denying her
Hicks’ Civ.R. 12(B)(2) Motion to Dismiss
{14} “Pursuant to
{15} Hicks argues the trial court erred by denying her
{16} “A
{17} Hicks argues the trial court erred by denying her
{18} Accordingly, having found no merit to any of the arguments advanced by Hicks herein in support of her second assignment of error, Hicks’ second assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 1:
{19} [THE] TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ERROR BY PLAINTIFF IN STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Assignment of Error No. 3:
{20} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AWARDING MULTIPLE JUDGMENTS FOR THE SAME ASSERTION OF FACTS. DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
Assignment of Error No. 4:
{21} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF RULE 36, FAILURE BY NON-MOVING PARTY TO RESPOND.
{22} In her first, third, and fourth assignments of error, Hicks argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Geico. We disagree.
Civ.R. 56 Summary Judgment Standard
{23} “Summary judgment is a procedural device used to terminate litigation when
{24} “A material fact is one which would affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.” Ownerland Realty, Inc. v. Zhang, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2013-09-077 and CA2013-10-097, 2014-Ohio-2585, ¶ 14, citing Hillstreet Fund III, L.P. v. Bloom, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-07-178, 2010-Ohio-2961, ¶ 9. “In determining whether a genuine issue of material fаct exists, the evidence must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party.” Assured Admin., L.L.C. v. Young, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2019-04-039, 2019-Ohio-3953, ¶ 14, citing Vanderbilt v. Pier 27, L.L.C., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-02-029, 2013-Ohio-5205, ¶ 8. This court reviews a trial court‘s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Faith Lawley, L.L.C. v. McKay, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-08-052, 2021-Ohio-2156, ¶ 26.
Hicks’ Arguments Supporting Her First Assignment of Error
{25} In her first assignment of error, Hicks argues that because Geico‘s motion for summary judgment listed the wrong date that Geico filed its complaint, there is no telling what else Geico may have “misrepresented” within its motion. Hicks also argues that, when
Hicks’ Arguments Supporting Her Third Assignment of Error
{26} In her third assignment of error, Hicks аrgues the trial court should have allowed the case against her to continue through discovery and proceed to trial because she responded to Geico‘s interrogatories and requests for admissions. Hicks alternatively argues the trial court should have “used discretion” to delay issuing its decision and instead ordered her to “show causе that she could prevail if allowed to proceed to a trial.” However, once Geico filed its motion for summary judgment demonstrating there were no genuine issues of material fact remaining for trial, Hicks, as the nonmoving party, was required to supply the trial court with evidentiary materials setting forth specific facts indicating that there was, in fact, a genuine issue of material fact remaining for trial. Springboro Commons Retirement Villa, Inc. v. Feltner, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-07-040, 2021-Ohio-544, ¶ 11. Hicks failed to provide the trial court with any evidentiary materials, let alone evidentiary materials that set forth specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact
{27} Also in her third assignment of error, Hicks argues the trial court erred by awarding Geico a judgment against her in the full $16,629.50 amount when the maximum amount that she could be held liable for her son‘s actions was $10,000 in accordance with
Hicks’ Arguments Supporting Her Fourth Assignment of Error
{28} To support her fourth assignment of error, Hicks argues that because she responded Geico‘s interrogatories and requests for admissions, “[n]o judgment should have been entered against her under rule 36.” Hicks’ argument is illogical given that judgments are not entered against parties pursuant to
{29} For the reasons outlined above, and finding no merit to any of the arguments advanced by Hicks herein in support of her first, third, and fourth assignments of error, Hicks’ first, third, and fourth assignments of error are also overruled.
{30} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON and BYRNE, JJ., concur.