63 A.2d 244 | N.H. | 1949
Among the thirteen causes for divorce in this state (R. L., c. 339, s. 6) are "III. Extreme cruelty" and treatment "V. . . . as seriously to injure health or endanger reason." The contention of the libelee that these two grounds are similar is well founded. Jones v. Jones,
The libelant does not contend that the pleadings in this case are model forms of unimpeachable clarity. The first libel, for instance, was lacking the necessary details as to "the specific acts and dates relied upon to constitute a cause . . . for divorce." Superior Court rule 125 (93 N.H. appendix). If objection had been made it would have *318
to be amended in those respects or dismissed. K v. K,
The dismissal of the first libel alleging treatment injurious to health was not res judicata of the second libel alleging extreme cruelty. "Refusal of a divorce on one ground does not prevent a subsequent application on a different ground." I Nelson, Divorce and Annulment (2d ed) s. 2.11. See Rand v. Rand,
The evidence in support of the second libel was not considered by the Trial Court in any form as was done in Brown v. Brown,
Exception sustained.
All concurred.
