Geer v. 10th School District

6 Vt. 76 | Vt. | 1834

Lead Opinion

The opinion of the court was pronounced by

Mattocks, J.

— It appears that the plaintiff and two others were duly appointed, by a vote of the district, “ a committee to finish and repair the school-house.” — That after the appointment, the committee distributed the job among themselves — each furnishing a separate portion of the materials, and performing each a separate portion of the labor, and making distinct and several charges against the district. — That there was no joint interest in the labor or- materials, in all or any two of the committee. And for the work and labor, and for the materials by him furnished, the plaintiff brought this suit. And upon these facts, the county court decided that the other committee men should have been joined ; and that this plaintiff alone-was not entitled to recover. And the question is, whether that decision was correct.

It is a general principle, that all actions on contracts, whether by parol or under seal, must be brought in the name of the party who has the legal interest; and upon a bond reciting that the obligor had received forty pounds for the use of C and D, equally to be divided, it was held that C and D might maintain separate actions; and in covenant, where the legal interest and cause of action is several, each may sue separately for his particular damage, although the words of the covenant are joint only; and if a contract is made with several, whether under seal or by paiol, if their legal interest be joint, they must all join. — 1 Chitty, p. 3, 4, 5. This shows that the rule is so powerful, that forms in many instances give way in favor of the party or parties who have the legal interest: and the suit must be in favor of one or more, as the interest is joint or J several. And why should not this be the criterion ? Why should one person sue alone for a debt that belongs equally to others; or several sue for that which belongs to one alone ? In either case, other suits might be required to place the damages recovered in the hands of those to whom they belong.

From this view of the law, it would seem that the plaintiff alone could sustain this suit, and that the other committee need not, and indeed probably could not, join.

But it has been argued that the duties of the committee were joint, and so must be ihe liability of the district.

These duties may, in some sense, be considered joint; or rather, not several. The committee were appointed by the district to finish and repair the school-house ; that is, to cause it to be done. This was a public trust, or power; and as such, can be executed by a majority — although under private power in general all must act. Suppose two of the three had employed several persons, not of the committee, to perform parts of the repairing, or to furnish materials, could there be a question that their claims would have been several, and would have been against the district, in the absence of any special contract to the contrary ? But instead of doing so, they parcelled out the job among themselves, each two agreeing that the third should have such a portion. The house was finished and repaired under this distribution — each one acting for himself in doing it. And what legal objection could there be to this, as the services to be performed are in their nature divisible ? It is not a general question of policy, like guardians Contracting with their wards, or administrators bidding in property at their own sales, that we are called upon to decide, but merely the legal effect of this transaction — it having been made in good faith, as we are bound to presume — the case intimating nothing to the contrary. Indeed, if the committee all contributed personally a portion of labor and materials, which by the vote they had a right to do, they must have kept separate accounts ; and the district for whose benefit the expenditures were made, should have been, as they were, charged in the account'. We do not perceive why this is not like the common cases of selectmen and bank directors, a majority of whom, have the general power to act, but individuals among them perform particular services, as going to other towns, or to cities, on business that requires but one; and each has a separate account, for business done under the direction of the board. In these cases, it never was supposed that their claims were joint.

According to the views we have of the case, it is not necessary to decide whether the parol evidence offered of the allowance of the separate account of the committee by the district, ought to have been received or not, as the plaintiff was entitled to recover without such evidence.

The judgment of the county court is reversed.

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Dissenting Opinion

Phelps, J.,

dissenting. — It is conceded that the authority conferred on the plaintiff and his associates, by the voté of the district, was a joint one, and that the concurrence of a majority of the committee at least was necessary to bind their employers. If so, it is difficult for me to conceive how each of the three can be considered as authorized to act separately and upon his own several responsibility and account. The idea that this' committee can be resolved into three several committees of two each, and three several principals contracting-with the corporation through the medium of their associates, is to my mind altogether artificial and inconsistent with the obvious intent of the corporation. To suppose such a construction of their vote to be intended by them,- is to suppose them destitute of that very common sagacity which could not fail to discover, that such an arrangement must necessarily place the several members of the committee under a strong temptation to favor each other, at the expense of the district.

The vote in question Undoubtedly authorized the com-' mittee to adopt either of the two courses which the pur1 pose of their appointment required : that is, they might' ei-' ther proceed in the character of agent's to contract with5 others upon the credit of the corporation, or they might-make themselves principals contracting with the corporation, by assuming to'themselves to do the repairs, relying'upon- the vote as the consideration- and warrant- for their1 undertaking. The committee chose the latter course, and are therefore to be regarded, not as agents, but as principals. In this character they bring their several suits, and the question is, whether they can sue severally for their respective services and expenditures. Whether we consider the vote as a request to the committee to do the repairs, or as an authority to do them upon the responsibility of the corporation, which is the same thing, it appears to me that the authority was joint. Indeed if the authority is joint in case they elect to act as agents merely, I cannot see why it should not be so if they choose to do the repairs themselves. If I agree with three persons to build me a house, it is very clear that they cannot subject me to three several liabilities by subdividing their job. And even if no particular agreement is made, but their compensation is left upon the footing of a quantum, meruit, the rule is the same.

There are also practical objections to sustaining several suits in this case. Supposing any disputes to exist as to the claims in gross, the defendants are subjected to litigate the same points in three several suits, and, what is worse, disagreements may exist between the members of the committee, which may subject the defendants to three several suits, in order to determine a controversy among the committee. To produce this result, we need only suppose the three individuals to claim the compensation for one and the same item of expenditure ; and we have not only three suits against the defendants, where otherwise none would occur, but we subject the defendants to the risk of paying a second or third time, in consequence of conflicting decisions.

Had the committee employed other persons to do the repair, acting as agents merely, the case would have been different. But here they undertook the job jointly, and the distribution of it among themselves was a mere arrangement for the division of labor.

The case of selectmen of a town, or directors of a bank, is widely different. They are general agents, with multifarious powers and duties. There is a wide difference between employing two men in such a capacity, and contracting with them to build a house.

I confess I am extremely averse to sanctioning the arrangement made by the plaintiffs, (for each has liis suit pending.) There is undoubtedly some controversy as to the claims between them and their employers. If they are permitted to sever in their suits, and be witnesses for each other, they come into court with an immense advantage; and I doubt much whether this is calculated to promote either their own fairness and impartiality as witnesses, or the purposes of justice in the ultimate decision of the controversy.

in my opinion, the judgment below is right.