OPINION
1.GCM, Inc. appeals from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court’s summary judgment for Kentucky Central Life Insurance Company and its liquidator, Donald M. Stephens. The Court of Appeals decided this ease by memorandum opinion. GCM, Inc. v. Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co., NMCA No. 16,849, slip op. (filed Oct. 1, 1996). We affirm the grant of summary judgment and the order denying GCM’s motion for reconsideration.
I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
2. GCM is a joint venturer in Guadalupe Plaza Joint Venture (the Joint Venture), which is itself a limited partner in Guadalupe Plaza Limited Partnership (the Limited Partnership). Ron Brown is both a co-joint venturer in the Joint Venture and the principal of the general partner in the Limited Partnership. Kentucky Central is a lender of the Limited Partnership.
3. The Joint Venture contributed real property to the Limited Partnership as capital, retaining a priority claim in the first $1.7 million obtained through any sale or transfer of the property by the Limited Partnership. GCM owned a 50% interest in the Joint Venture and, therefore, in the priority claim.
4. The Limited Partnership, with Ron Brown acting as general partner, obtained a $5.8 million construction loan from Kentucky Central in return for a $5.8 million promissory note secured by a mortgage on the real property and the personal guarantee of Ron Brown. In the proceedings below, GCM alleged that Kentucky Central pressured the Limited Partnership to expand in such a way as to create an undue financial burden on the Limited Partnership and a resulting inability to meet its obligations under the construction loan.
5. In attempting a workout of the debt, GCM informed Kentucky Central of its interest in the real property. In the negotiations, Kentucky Central suggested that the Limited Partnership transfer the property to Kentucky Central, and in return, Kentucky Central would grant GCM an option to purchase the property. Instead, Brown, on behalf of the general partner of the Limited Partnership, deeded the property to Kentucky Central and released Kentucky Central from potential lender liability claims in exchange for a release of his personal guarantee. Neither party has asserted that the Limited Partnership has been dissolved.
II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW
6. GCM filed this claim against Kentucky Central in the district court for intentionally causing Ron Brown to breach a fiduciary duty owed to GCM. GCM alleged that Brown’s transfer of the property and release' of claims constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty to GCM and the Joint Venture. GCM further alleged that Kentucky Central intentionally induced Brown to violate his duty to GCM with knowledge that GCM would be harmed. GCM requested as relief for this claim a rescission of the agreement to deed the property to Kentucky Central and an equitable lien on the real property in favor of GCM.
7. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Kentucky Central and denied GCM’s motion for reconsideration. Both the district court and the Court of Appeals found that Ron Brown did not owe a fiduciary duty to GCM directly in his dealings with Kentucky Central, and therefore, GCM could not pursue an action belonging to the Limited Partnership. The Court of Appeals suggested that a direct relationship should exist between the injured party and the tortfeasor in order to state a claim for intentionally inducing another to breach a fiduciary duty. In its motion for reconsideration, GCM attached a purported assignment of rights from the Joint Venture to GCM. In denying the motion, the district court did not refer to the assignment. The Court of Appeals found that the assignment did not properly assign the Joint Venture’s claims to GCM. We granted certiorari to examine both the tort of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in a partnership context and the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
8. GCM contends that there need not be a direct relationship between an injured party and a third party inducing the breach of fiduciary duty. We agree. Further, GCM contends that because Brown breached a duty owed to GCM at Kentucky Central’s urging and with Kentucky Central’s knowledge, it has sufficiently stated a claim for which relief can be granted. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the district court and the Court of Appeals that the scope of any duty Brown may have owed to GCM did not reach the dealings of the Limited Partnership with Kentucky Central. In addition, GCM argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly interpreted the assignment. We need not address the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the assignment because we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
9. Under Rule 1-012(B) NMRA 1997, if “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 1-056----” A similar direction is contained in Rule 1-012(C) NMRA 1997, for motions for judgment on the pleadings. In its motion, Kentucky Central specifically requested “summary judgment pursuant to Rule 1-056.” In addition, Kentucky Central attached exhibits to its motion and stated that summary judgment was the proper procedure “because the motion relies on materials outside the pleadings.” GCM disputed this characterization and stated that Kentucky Central’s motion was filed in response to the trial judge’s direction to file a motion to dismiss. Nonetheless, GCM attached an affidavit to its Response Brief in support of its allegations. Finally, the district court granted “summary judgment.”
10. On appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that a Rule 1 — 012(B)(6) standard was actually applied in the case below and reviewed the decision accordingly. Compare Gonzales v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1996 NMSC 041,
11. Kentucky Central moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion. Because exhibits and affidavits, matters outside the pleadings, were presented to the court and not excluded for purposes of the motion, the proper standard of review is under Rule 1-056 for summary judgment. Peck v. Title USA Ins. Corp.,
12. Nevertheless, the specific posture in which Kentucky Central filed its motion requires this Court, in reviewing the grant of summary judgment, to determine whether GCM has alleged sufficient facts to support a legally cognizable claim. In its reply brief on the motion for summary judgment, Kentucky Central stated, “The material facts, as alleged in GCM’s claim, are admitted for purposes of the motion (only), and are not in dispute. The question is whether GCM has stated a claim, if the facts of the petition are accepted as true.”
13. When a party “actually admitfs], for purposes of the summary judgment motion, the veracity of the allegations in the complaint,” a reviewing court should “consider the facts pleaded as undisputed and determine if a basis is present to decide the issues as a matter of law.” Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated, Lines, Inc.,
IV. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE CLAIM
A. Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty
14. While we believe New Mexico has implicitly endorsed tort liability for intentionally causing a fiduciary to breach his or her duties, we now explicitly recognize this form of tort liability. We note that “in some states, it is still unclear whether there is aiding and abetting tort liability of the kind set forth in [Section] 876(b) of the Restatement [ (Second) of Torts (1979) ].” Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,
15. This Court has cited with approval the notion that “a person is under a duty to refrain from intentionally causing another to violate a duty to a third.” Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Garner,
16. The Restatement has taken the position that liability should attach for intentionally causing another to breach a fiduciary duty. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 cmt. c (referencing Section 876). In addition, courts in other states have allowed such a cause of action. See, e.g., Holmes v. Young,
17. Therefore, we today hold that New Mexico recognizes tort liability for the aiding and abetting of a breach of fiduciary duty. In order to state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege and prove the following: (1) a fiduciary of the plaintiff breached a duty owed to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant knew of such a duty; (3) the defendant intentionally provided substantial assistance or encouragement to the fiduciary to commit an act which the defendant knew to be a breach of duty; and (4) damages to the plaintiff were caused thereby. Cf. Holmes,
18. An injured party need not have a direct relationship with the third party against whom liability is sought as an aider and abettor. See Rael,
B. Fiduciary Duties Between Partners
19. In order to allege sufficient facts to support this cause of action, GCM must demonstrate both the existence of a fiduciary relationship between GCM and Brown and Brown’s breach of a fiduciary duty owed to GCM. In New Mexico, a partner cannot assert claims belonging to the partnership. “[A] partnership is empowered to sue or to be sued in the name of the partnership, and a cause of action accruing to the partnership, for damages to partnership property or interests, belongs to the partnership rather than to individual partners.” First Nat’l Bank v. Sanchez,
20. An action for breach of fiduciary duty by a partner can be characterized as both an individual and a partnership claim. 4 Alan R. Bromberg & Larry E. Ribstein, Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership § 15.04(h), at 15:35-36 (1996). The distinction between the two is based on “whether the duty is deemed owed to the partners (as individuals) or to the partnership.” Id. (footnote omitted). While there is a statutory fiduciary duty imposed on partners with respect to the partnership, Section 54-1-21 (A), the legislature has only recently included an explicit concurrent duty with respect to other partners. See NMSA 1978, § 54-1A-404 (effective July 1, 1997) (modifying the earlier law and defining the scope of fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and to the other partners); § 54-1 A-405(b)(2)(i) (effective July 1,1997) (permitting an action by a partner against another partner for breach of fiduciary duty, with or without an accounting and for either legal or equitable relief). However, the controlling statute does not appear to preclude such an obligation if it arises under common law principles. See NMSA 1978, § 54-1-5 (1947) (“In any case not provided for in this act the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant, shall govern.”). In fact, the controlling statute implicitly recognizes such a duty by providing to individual partners a right to a formal accounting based on Section 54-1-21 or “whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable.” NMSA 1978, § 54-1-22 (1947).
21. In addition, this Court has recognized a fiduciary duty existing between partners in a partnership. “It is true that partners occupy a fiduciary duty towards one another.” Citizens Bank v. Williams,
22. Under the applicable statute, it is unclear whether a partner may obtain redress from a co-partner for a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the partner by the co-partner before dissolution. See generally Nussbaum v. Kennedy,
23. The tort of aiding and abetting wiU apply in a partnership context if: (1) a partner owes a fiduciary duty to the partnership or partner bringing the action; (2) the partner breaches that duty; (3) the third-party defendant intentionaUy assists or encourages in a substantial manner the partner’s acts constituting the breach with knowledge that these acts would be a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff; and (4) damages to the plaintiff result. See Holmes,
C. Application of Aiding and Abetting to the Facts
24. Our cases suggest that Brown, as the principal of the general partner in the Limited Partnership, owed a fiduciary duty to the Joint Venture, as a limited partner. Additionally, we assume that Brown, as a joint venturer in the Joint Venture, owed a fiduciary duty to GCM, as a co-joint venturer in the Joint Venture. As a result, the aiding and abetting of a breach of fiduciary duty by Brown is potentially a claim upon which relief can be granted both for Brown’s conduct on behalf of the Limited Partnership and, independently, for Brown’s conduct on behalf of the Joint Venture. Nevertheless, this cause of action must be prosecuted by the real party in interest with respect to the breach of duty. Rule 1-017(A).
25. While Brown owed a duty to GCM as a joint venturer in connection with Joint Venture dealings, he did not owe a duty to GCM in the dealings of the Limited Partnership. Rather, in his dealings on behalf of the Limited Partnership, Brown owed a fiduciary duty to the Limited Partnership and to his other partners, including the Joint Venture.
26. The nature of the relief requested and the breach of duty alleged are important indicators of the specific duty at issue. Cf. hitman,
27. The real property and lender liability claims were owned solely by the Limited Partnership. As a result, with respect to their disposition and the distribution of profits, Brown owed a fiduciary duty to the Limited Partnership and to the Joint Venture, as a limited partner; however, Brown did not owe a fiduciary duty to GCM in its individual capacity as a joint venturer. Brown only owed a fiduciary duty to GCM, as a joint venturer, in the dealings of the entity known as the Joint Venture. GCM did not complain of improper actions taken by Brown in the dealings of the entity known as the Joint Venture. A claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty requires an underlying breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff by the principal tortfeasor. GCM failed to allege a breach of fiduciary duty owed to GCM by Brown. Thus, GCM, as a joint venturer, is not the real party in interest to pursue an action for breach of a fiduciary duty by Brown in relation to the dealings of the entity known as the Limited Partnership or, consequently, ,for aiding and abetting that breach. See Daniels Ins., Inc. v. Daon Corp.,
V. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND THE ASSIGNMENT
28. Nevertheless, this Court must also evaluate the effect of the purported assignment to GCM of the Joint Venture’s chose in action. GCM attached the assignment to a motion for reconsideration. A district court has broad discretion in ruling upon a motion for reconsideration and will only be reversed for an abuse of that discretion. See Sun Country Sav. Bank v. McDowell,
A. Potential Legal Effect of the Assignment
29. The purported assignment may be relevant in demonstrating a ratification by the Joint Venture if, as we assumed above, a partner may bring an action against a third party for the aiding and abetting of another partner’s breach of fiduciary duty prior to dissolution. GCM alleged that Brown breached his fiduciary duty to the Limited Partnership and to the Joint Venture as a limited partner. In addition, GCM alleged that Kentucky Central knew of the fiduciary duty and intentionally induced Brown to breach that duty to the Joint Venture’s detriment. GCM also has alleged a priority claim of the Joint Venture to the proceeds of a sale of the property by the Limited Partnership. Further, GCM has alleged that the Joint Venture is the only partner in the Limited Partnership to hold a priority claim on the property, making it a unique interest within the partnership. Finally, the gist of the complaint concerns a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with Brown’s actions on behalf of the Limited Partnership and concerning the property over which the Joint Venture had a priority claim within the partnership. Thus, Brown’s actions may have been within the scope of his fiduciary duty not only to the Limited Partnership but also to the Joint Venture, as a limited partner. 2 Assuming the Joint Venture has a cause of action as a limited partner, the Joint Venture would be the real party in interest to assert an action based on the Joint Venture’s priority claim. As a result, the assignment would be relevant in determining whether GCM may pursue this action on behalf of the Joint Venture.
30. In order to assign the right to sue belonging to a partnership, all partners must agree to the assignment. Daniels Ins.,
B. Ratification in New Mexico
31. New Mexico’s Rule 1-017(A) differs from its counterpart in the federal rules by granting discretion to the trial court in whether to allow ratification. Compare Rule 1-017(A) (“Where it appears that an action, by reason of honest mistake, is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, the court may allow a reasonable time for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest____”) (emphasis added), with Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a) (“No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest____”) (emphasis added). This sentence in the federal rule was added in 1966 in order to “avoid forfeiture and injustice when an understandable mistake has been made in selecting the party in whose name the action should be brought.” 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1555, at 411-12 (1990). This purpose reflects the general goal of the federal rules to reduce the burden on parties at the pleading stage and to alleviate the risk of dismissal with prejudice based on an initial innocent miscalculation. Id. § 1555, at 412-14. While the federal rule is mandatory, courts have inferred a prerequisite of “understandable mistake” and a lack of prejudice to the defendant. Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone,
32. The manner in which Rule 1-017(A) differs from the mandatory nature of the federal rule implies a broader discretion over such matters in New Mexico trial courts. Nonetheless, New Mexico’s Rules of Civil Procedure have a similar overall goal of making pleading less burdensome. See Rule 1-008(A) NMRA 1997 (requiring notice pleading); Las Luminarias of the N.M. Council of the Blind v. Isengard,
C. Application of Rule 1-017(A) to the Facts
33. Under Rule 1-017(A), there is no clear direction as to the proper procedure for raising the issue of ratification. Neither the parties nor the district court discussed this rule either in the summary judgment proceeding or in the motion for reconsideration. In addition, the document GCM attached to its motion was labeled an “assignment” rather than a “ratification.” However, “[i]f the trial court does consider ... new material [on reconsideration] and still grants summary judgment, ‘the appellate court may review all of the materials de novo.’” In re Estate of Keeney,
34.Without further information regarding the basis of the district court’s ruling, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying GCM’s motion for reconsideration. The district court might have concluded that the assignment was invalid on its face as a ratification. Neither the assignment nor the motion to reconsider suggested the possible ratification by Elmer Sproul, a co-joint venturer, to a degree sufficient to create a factual question as to his assent. Cf. ICON Group,
35. On this record, GCM has not demonstrated that the trial judge’s decision was either arbitrary or unreasonable. We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
VI. CONCLUSION
36. New Mexico recognizes the tort of aiding and abetting a fiduciary duty. However, this cause of action requires an underlying breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff. The scope of a partner’s fiduciary duty is limited to partnership matters. GCM was not a partner in the Limited Partnership but asserted a claim based solely on the disposition of property belonging to the Limited Partnership. As a result, GCM was not the proper party to assert a cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty arising out of the affairs of the Limited Partnership. Further, GCM’s complaint did not rely on actions taken on behalf of the Joint Venture. As a result, GCM did not allege sufficient facts supporting a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the affairs of the Joint Venture. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Kentucky Central. Because GCM failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial judge, we also affirm the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
37. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. An amended version of the Uniform Partnership Act became effective on July 1, 1997, and replaces the previous act in its entirety. NMSA 1978, §§ 54-1A-101 to -1005 (effective July 1, 1997). Nonetheless, the prior law governs this action.
. Because of our disposition regarding the assignment, we need not decide whether the priority claim would suffice as an interest distinct from the Limited Partnership allowing an individual claim by the Joint Venture.