1 Stew. 566 | Ala. | 1828
delivered tbe opinion of tbe Court.
The defendant in error, filed his bill against the plaintiffs in tbe Circuit Court of Monroe county, charging, that in the year 1811 be lent to Matthew Gayle, who, as well as tbe defendant, resided in South Carolina, eleven hundred dollars ; and to secure the payment thereof, took his bond, and a mortgage of fifteen negroes. The bond and mortgage were executed tbe 25th June, 1811, and the money intended to be secured thereby, was payable on the 1st day of the August next thereafter; that some time after, Matthew Gayle moved to the Alabama river, and within the then Mississippi Territory, carrying with, him the negroes which he had mortgaged, the debt being still unpaid; that defendant frequently received letters from said Gayle after his removal, promising to pay the debt; that in the year 1820, said Matthew Gayle died intestate, leaving Mary Gayle, his widow, and Billups Gayle, John Gayle, jr. Levin Gayle, Lucinda Eastin, wife of Thomas Eastin, Maria Gayle, now Maria Woodson, a widow, and Matilda, wife of William F. Ware, his children; that Matilda Ware died before the bill was filed, leaving one child, Edward Ware} and that in Gctcp
The prayer of the bill is, that the administrator may be decreed to pay the debt due to him out of any money belonging to him as administrator} or that such of the de-
There is also a prayer, that the surviving administrator may account, by shewing the manner he has administered the estate, producing an inventory of the goods, &c which, have come to his hands to be administered, and the value thereof, a list of debts due to and from the said Matthew Gayle at the time of his death, exhibiting the balance for and against the estate. There is also a prayer for general relief.
The defendants to the bill are John Gayle, jr. the administrator, Levin Gayle, Maria Woodson, Thomas Eas-tin, Edward Ware, an infant son of Matilda Ware, deceased, formerly Matilda Gayle; Harriet Gayle, Eliza Gayle, Scarboro Gayle, Billups Gayle, and Rees Gayle, infant children of Billups Gayle, deceased.
The bill was filed the 10th July, 1824. At the October term, 1826, it was amended, by making Edgar R. James, who married Maria Woodson, after the bill was filed, a defendant.
Samuel M‘Coll was by the Circuit Court appointed guardian ad litem oí the infant defendant Edward Ware, and answered in the usual way.
John Barrington was appointed guardian ad litem to the four infant children of Billups Gayle, and answers at length, admitting every thing charged in the bill, and shewing that he is the agent for the defendant in error.
It no where appears who Harriet Gayle is, or how she came to be made a defendant. It seems,however, that' she is an infant, as Z. Merriwether is appointed her guardian ad litem.
Judgements pro confesso are rendered against Levin Gayle, Thomas Eastin and wife, and the guardian of Harriet Gayle. James and wife answer, declaring ignorance as to all the charges in the bill, and praying proof, &c.
The answer of John Gayle, jr. the administrator, admits the debt to be due, and the execution of the bond and mortgage as stated in the bill, except the consideration, which is stated in the answer to have been the transmit* r by the defendant in error to Matthew Gayle, the de-
Exhibit C. which accompanies the answer, contains an account of the debts which it is alleged had been presented to the administrator for payment, and which had not been paid, amounting to $10,804 724; and exhibit D. is an account of the moneys which the said administrator alleges he had paid away, amounting to $2,297 55%.
At the March term, 1827, of the Circuit Court, an interlocutory decree was made, by which, on account of its having been considered by the chancellor that the mortgage of the defendant in error had lost its lien as between him and the other creditors of the estate of Matthew Gayle, deceased, on account of the length of time during which the negroes covered by it had been left in the.
On the 20th October, 1827, the commissioners reported that several persons, viz : David Richardson, John How* ard, Smoot and Darling, Felder and M‘Neal, had exhibited satisfactory evidence of debts due to them, amounting in the whole to S3,472 50, including interest up to the 8th of that month, which were added to the demand of the defendant in error, amounting, including interest up to the 8th March, 1828, to $2,376 51, made §5,849 51.
There is also in the record, a statement of one Thomas English, received as evidence by consent of the counsel on both sides, which proves the circumstances of the administrator’s sale, as they are admitted in the answer, except in this, that it states the grown negroes generally to have been bid ofF, agreeably to his recollection, at an average price of about fifty dollars.
At the February term, 1828, a final decree was rendered. Preceding this decree, and as the ground of it, many facts are stated to be admitted in the answer of the administrator, and to be sustained by other parts of the record, which I do not consider to be thus admitted or sustained. By the decree, the defendant in error, and each of the creditors, in whose favor the commissioners reported, have the amount of their debts, including interest and the costs, adjudged in their favor against the plaintiffs in error, collectively, “to be levied of the personal estate of the said Matthew Gayle, deceased, in the hands of his said administrator and heirs;” and executions were ordered to issue for the collection of those several sums. It was further decreed, that if the sale of the personal estate did not produce a sufficient sum to pay and satisfy those debts, then upon the return of the executions by the sheriffs, the commissioners appointed by the interlocutory decree, were required to proceed to
Several errors are assigned, the first of which is as follows: “The Court below erred in not dismissing the complainant’s bill when submitted on the bill, answers, and exhibits, for a hearing.”
To support this, assignment,'two positions are taken : 1st. That the Court of. Chancery has no jurisdiction of the cause; the County Court being adequate to afford ample redress; and, 2nd. That other parties should have been made defendants to the suit, to wit: the personal representatives of Billups Gayle, and Mary Gayle, deceased.
. Except the features of a case be in some respects peculiar,‘this Court would be inclined to confine heirs, distri-butees and creditors of decedents? estates, to the County Court, as it is believed, that in the general, that tribunal affords a cheap and speedy remedy to such persons. But certainly many cases may arise in which that Court could not afford a sufficient remedy, and in such cases, a resort to Chancery becomes necessary. Although we are not willing to say that the two jurisdictions are concurrent,, yet we feel no difficulty in determining that the powers which have been vested in the County Court in these cases, has not entirely divested Chancery of its jurisdiction. But in the present case, the defendant in error filed his bill to foreclose the mortgage; this object could alone be effected by a Court of Chancery. It is true, it was decided. and the decision was a correct one, that by his negligence he had given other creditors an equal claim upon the property, covered by the mortgage, with himself; yet this mortgage was good against those claiming as distri-butees of the mortgagor, and the defendant had a right to believe that he would obtain the relief which he sought in Chancery. It was by the proof of facts with which he cannot be presumed to have beep apprized, that he failed in his object. As, however, that Court was compelled to deny the defendant this relief, from circumstances which he cannot be presumed to have been apprized of,
On the other ground, it is believed the Court would not have been authorized to dismiss the bill. In no case can this be done, either because there are too many or not enough of parties to the suit. If too many, it will of course be dismissed as to those who should not have been included; if too few, this is matter of amendment at any stage of the proceedings. The first assignment of error, therefore, is not sustained.
The second and third assignments are, “that the Court below erred in rendering the interlocutory and final decrees.”
After the Court of Chancery properly obtained jurisdiction of the case for any purpose, it was certainly right that it should retain it until a final decree with regard to the whole interest of the parties in the subject matter of dispute. The insolvency of the estate of Mathew Gayle, deceased, was opposed to the recovery of the whole of the defendant’s debt. Whether that insolvency was sufficiently proved, I will not now stop to inquire. By our law, no distinction in the grade of debts is known; every creditor, whether by bond, or account, comes in for an equal distribution, in proportion to the amount of his claim. Chancery never favored the common law distinction with regard to the grade of debts. So soon, therefore, as the insolvency of the estate of M. Gayle, deceased, was proved, it became necessary to call in the other creditors to ascertain what amount the defendant was entitled to recover; and this being done, a final decree as to the rights of all should have been rendered. But it is believed that the proper steps were not taken in the Court below to effect this object. The appointment of commissioners, by the interlocutory decree, to receive evidence of the claims which should be exhibited by the creditors of the decedant, was correct; but the notice which these commissioners were required to give was insufficient. Í would not be understood to say, that the mode and time prescribed for commissioners appointed on a report of insolvency to a County Court, must be followed strictly by a Court of Chancery in similar cases, yet it would'
The answer of John Darrington is a great departure' from his duty as guardian; and although it might not of itself be cause ©f reversing the decree, yet it probably
j. unnecessary to consider the other assignments. The decree must be reversed, and the cause remanded ; each party in the Court below having leave to amend, if under the decision, it should be thought necessary to do so.
laws Ala. 328,