This appeal involves questions of possible error in the admission of photographic evidence, in the exclusion of rebuttal testimony, and errors in the trial court’s charge to the jury as it relates to a motorist’s duty in signaling and making a proper left-hand turn at an intersection. We find no error in the trial.
Plaintiff first assigns as error the admission into evidence of two photographs of the intersection offered by defendant. Plaintiff contends first, that the photographs differed substantially from the actual scene, since they were taken in daylight though the accident occurred after dark; and second, thаt they were not actually used to illustrate defendant’s testimony. A photograph
*362
may be used to illustrate testimony as long as it portrays a scene with suffiсient accuracy, even though it was not made simultaneously with the event to which the testimony relates. 1 Stansbury’s N.C. Evidence (Brandis Revision 1973) § 34. Thus, a photograрh is admissible for illustrative purposes
1
even if it was taken at a different time of day and under different lighting conditions than the event it illustrates.
State v. Lester,
In her second assignment of error, plaintiff contends that the triаl court erred in refusing to allow plaintiff’s rebuttal testimony.
When defendant rested, plaintiff offered the testimony of two rebuttal witnesses, Joseph Ray Broсhure and Joseph Gay. The trial court sustained defendant’s objections to their testimony. Had Brochure been allowed to testify, he would have testified that he was a licensed land surveyor, that he had made a survey of the intersection of North Heritage and Daniel Street and had preparеd an exhibit based on his survey showing the width of the two streets and the width of the lanes of travel of the two streets at the intersection. Gay would have testified to corroborate the testimony of Brochure. Plaintiff concedes that the admission of rebuttal testimony is a matter within the discretion of the trial cоurt, but contends that the trial court abused its discretion in this case. The use of the term “rebuttal” may be misleading in such cases as the one before us. The rеcord here discloses that plaintiff testified that her husband, Joseph Gay, a former highway patrolman, had measured the streets at the intersectiоn; and yet, when Mr. Gay testified in plaintiff’s behalf, he offered no such testimony. Further, both parties offered photographs to illustrate the intersection, аnd plaintiff offered testimony generally as to the width of North Heritage Street. It would, therefore, appear
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that the testimony offered by plaintiff аfter defendant rested was not so much “rebuttal” as it was additional testimony. The general rule is that it is in the discretion of the trial judge whether to allow additional evidence by a party after that party has rested or whether to allow additional evidence after the close of the evidence. 12 Strong’s N.C. Index 3d,
Trial,
§ 14, page 375,
Castle v. Yates Co.,
Plaintiff next assigns error to the inclusion of an instruction on G.S. 20453(b)
2
in the trial judge’s charge to thе jury. Plaintiff contends that the statute is inapplicable to this case. We disagree. The trial judge has the duty to instruct the jury on the legal issues raised by the evidence. G.S. 1A4, Rule 51(a),
Griffin v. Watkins,
Plaintiff also argues that reversible error occurred when the court instructed the jury on G.S. 20453(b), and referred to a turn signal requirement. The portion of the charge to which plaintiff excepts is as follows:
“As to the second contention, the motor vehicle law provides that the driver of a vehicle intending to turn left at an intersection shall approach the intersection in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle, and аfter entering the intersection the left-hand turn signal shall be made so as to leave the intersection in a lane lawfully available to traffic moving in such direction upon the roadway being entered. ”
The trial judge inadvertently added the word “signal” to this portion of the charge. He later instructed the jury fully as to the relevant turn signal statute. We are unconvinced that this
lapsus linguae
confused the jury. Jury instructions are to be construed contextually, and there is no error if they were correct on the whole.
State v. Watson,
The final assignment which we address is whether the trial judge erred in explaining the turn signal statute to the jury. Plaintiff contends that the instructions could have misled the jury into thinking that failure to give a turn signal, in itself, constitutes contributory negligence per se. Plaintiff excepts to a portion of the charge which reads:
“[I]f the defendant has proved . . . the plaintiff . . . was negligent in any one or more of the following respects, . . . by turning from a direct line before turning from a direct line (sic) failing to determine that the movement could be made in *365 safety or failing to give a plain visible signal of her intention to turn.”
Thе jury had previously been instructed that “[I]f the operation of another vehicle may be affected, he [the driver] must give a plainly visible signal. . . . Turning in violatiоn of these duties is not negligence within itself. . . .” Plaintiff admits that this portion of the instruction is correct. Viewing this instruction on the whole, we find no error, and overrule this assignment. See Griffin v. Watkins, supra.
No error.
Notes
. This case arose before October 1, 1981, the effective date of N.C. Sess. Laws Chap. 451 (H 149), which allows photographs to be used as substantive evidence.
. G.S. 20453(b) Left Turns. —The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left at any intersection shall approach the intersection in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle, and, after entering the intersection, the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection in a lane lawfully available to traffic moving in such direction upon the roadway being entered. Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection.