34 Cal. 125 | Cal. | 1867
Lead Opinion
Upon the allegations of the complaint and admissions in the answer, and also upon the facts as found by the Court, we think Moss held the contract assigned and delivered to him as security for the payment of the note for three thousand one hundred dollars, as a pledge, and not as a chattel mortgage. The complaint avers that the contract was assigned and delivered “to be by him held as collateral, to secure the payment of the said note and interest as aforesaid,” and the allegation is repeated in various forms, and in one place the averment is: “ that said assignment from said White to defendant of said contract was a pledge thereof,
At the time of the sale the value of the contract was found by the Court *to be eight thousand dollars. There was at the time due Moss on the three thousand one hundred dollar note, three thousand seven hundred fifty-four dollars and ten cents, as found by the Court. The amount for which Moss is liable on the conversion, is the value of the pledge eight thousand dollars, less three thousand five hundred seventy-four dollars and ten cents, the amount due him, and interest on said balance from the date of the sale, June 17th, 1863, at the rate of ten per cent per annum. (Douglass v. Krafts, 9 Cal. 562.)
All the necessary facts appear from the admissions of the pleadings and findings of the Court. The finding that the assignment and delivery of the contract was a mortgage, and not a pledge, although stated as a finding of fact, is, in view of the other facts found, and, also, of the facts admitted in the pleadings, the statement of a conclusion of law. There is, therefore, as the District Court suggests in its opinion denying a new trial, no reason why this Court should not direct the proper judgment to be entered in the case.
The judgment is reversed, and the District Court directed to enter judgment against defendant, Moss, for the balance, after deducting the amount found due said Moss, viz : three thousand seven hundred fifty-four dollars and ten cents, from the value of the pledge, viz : eight thousand dollars, and interest thereon from June 17th, 1863, the date of the sale, at ten per cent per annum.
Rehearing
Bespondent’s counsel, in his petition for rehearing, bases his whole argument upon the hypothesis, that the further findings, made by the Court in response to plaintiff’s exceptions for defects in the original findings, were filed without authority of law, and that they are, therefore, nullities, and constitute no part of the record. He claims that the findings upon which the decision turned are improperly in the record; firstly, because no written finding was demanded by the plaintiff; and secondly, because the exceptions for defects were not filed in time, and, being filed too late, the original findings were conclusive, and the Court had no authority to supply the defects in response to the exceptions. The Court was undoubtedly authorized to file written findings in the first instance, whether demanded or not, and it did, in fact, file them. But suppose it were otherwise ; neither of these
But under section one "hundred eighty the plaintiff was entitled to file and serve his exceptions within five days after receiving from, or giving to, the adverse party written notice of the findings.” It nowhere appears when written notice of the findings was given or received, or whether it was ever given. Uotice may well have been given within five days of the 14th of January. If so, the filing and serving of the exceptions were “ in due time,” and the record says they were “ in due time.” This is conclusive, and the subsequent findings in response to plaintiff’s exceptions affirmatively appear to be in all respects regular.
We have nothing to do with the evidence on this appeal, and the facts as found by the Court, and not as alleged by the answer, must be taken as the real facts of the case. On these facts it appears, not as respondent assumes, that defendant Moss assigned his three thousand one hundred dollar note, delivered the pledge with it as an incident to, and security for, the note, but, on the contrary, that “ defendant Moss sold and assigned said contract (Exhibit A—the pledge) to William 8. Eitck for the sum of six thousand dollars,” etc., and “ that the consideration of said sale and
The respondent, in his petition for rehearing, has also labored to show, that the common law mortgage of personal
Rehearing denied.
Mr. Justice Rhodes expressed 210 opinion.