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Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University
536 A.2d 1
D.C.
1987
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*1 GAY RIGHTS COALITION OF

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW al.,

CENTER, Appellants, et Columbia,

District

Intervenor-Appellant, UNIVERSITY,

GEORGETOWN et

al., Appellees.

Nos. 84-51. Appeals.

District Columbia Court of

Argued en banc Oct. 1985.

Decided Nov. *3 Dolkart, A. Zavos and Jane L.

Michele D.C., Washington, curiae filed amicus Fund, Legal Defense brief for the Women’s Equal Rights, Center Constitutional Lesbian Rights Advocates and Project, George Neuborne, Law Ass’n for Women of Burt City, New York and Gil- Washington University, Nat. Women’s Po- Gaynor, bert filed an amicus curiae brief Caucus, Opportunities litical Wider Union, for the American Civil on Liberties Women, and Women’s Law Collective of appellants. behalf of Columbus School of Law at Catholic Univ- Douglas Jewett, Seattle, City Atty., N. ersity, appellants. on behalf of Wash., Kiner, and Marlaina Director of Hu- D.C., Spitzer, Washington,

Arthur B. Rights, man filed an amicus curiae brief brief, filed an amicus curiae on behalf of Seattle, City Washington, for the appellees. appellants. behalf of Hoffman, City,

Elliot P. New York filed Ogletree, Charles J. filed an amicus curi- an amicus curiae brief for the Nat. Jewish ae brief for Div. Indi- 5: Criminal Law and (COLPA), Com’n Law Public Affairs vidual of the District of Columbia appellees. on behalf of Bar, appellants. on behalf of *4 Biondi, Herge George J. Curtis and V. Rubenfeld, Nashville, Tenn., Abby R. McLean, Va., filed an amicus curiae brief filed an amicus curiae brief for the Lambda Freedom, Religious for the Coalition for on Fund, Legal Defense & Educ. on behalf of appellees. behalf appellants. Gross, Richard A. with whom John F. PRYOR, Judge, Before Chief and D.C., Daly, Foggan, Washington, Laura A. MACK, NEWMAN, FERREN, BELSON Bogard, Ronald E. City, New York TERRY, Judges, Associate brief, Jennings, appel- J. Carol were on for NEBEKER,* Judge, Associate Retired.

lants. Wilson, H. Charles with whom Vincent J. MACK, Judge: Associate Fuller, Preiss, Nancy F. and James C. Columbia, In the District of the Human brief, Gregg, D.C., Washington, were on Rights prohibits Act an educational institu- appellees. for against discriminating any tion from indi- Prager, Deputy Lutz Alexander Asst. vidual on the basis of his or her sexual Counsel, Reid, Corp. with whom Inez Smith gay rights student orientation.1 Two Corp. Counsel at the time the brief was groups contend that Universi- filed, Suda, Principal Deputy Corp. John H. ty statutory this command re- violated Counsel, filed, at the time the brief was fusing grant “University Recogni- them Reischel, Corp. Deputy and Charles L. together equal tion” access to the Counsel, D.C., brief, Washington, were on additional facilities and services that status intervenor-appellant. for University, relying the tri- entails. The on Madison, Wis., Shelley Gaylord, finding George- court’s factual J. filed al grant “University Recognition” an amicus curiae brief for the Governor’s town’s Issues, religiously guided “endorse- Gay Council on Lesbian and State includes Wisconsin, recipient group, student re- appellants. on behalf of ment” *Judge physical handicap any or individu- Nebeker was an Associate of this income al_ argument. court at the time of His status [Emphasis added.] Retired, changed Judge, Septem to Associate provides: Section 1-2501 ber Council of the District It is the intent Columbia, enacting chapter, to se- (1987) provides: 1. D.C.Code 1-2520 § District of Columbia to cure an end in the discriminatory practice It is an unlawful any other than that for reason discrimination ... an educational institution: merit, including, but not limited of individual to, (1) restrict, deny, abridge To or to or condi- by reason of char- [various discrimination of, to, any tion the use or access of its facili- including sexual orientation]. acteristics any person qual- ties and services to otherwise (28) provides: Section 1-2502 ified, whotly partially, discriminatory male or female orientation" means "Sexual reason, race, color, religion, upon based heterosexuality homosexuality, bisexuali- sex, status, origin, age, per- national marital practice. ty, by preference or orientation, appearance, family sonal sexual affiliation, responsibilities, political source sponds that the Free Exercise Clause of sexual orientation violated the Human protects the First Amendment it from offi- Rights only, Act. To that con- extent we compulsion cial organiza- to “endorse” an Georgetown’s sider the merits of free exer- challenges tion which tenets. cise defense. On that issue hold we Upholding the asserted constitutional de- compelling the District of Columbia’s inter- fense, judgment the trial court entered in est in the eradication of sexual orientation Georgetown. favor of groups outweighs discrimination any burden im- appeal. posed upon Georgetown’s exercise of reli- analysis Our gion by the issues equal provision tangi- differs from the forced outset, that of the trial court. At the we ble benefits. sever the artificial connection between the Thus, statutory rather than constitu- “endorsement” and the benefits grounds, tional we affirm the trial court’s Georgetown’s contained in scheme of grant conclusion that need not “University Recognition.” respect With “University Recognition” thereby to—and University’s grant refusal to the status groups. “endorse”—the student The Hu- “University Recognition,” we do not Rights does, man however, mandate Georgetown’s reach constitutional defense. the student given equal Contrary to the trial understanding, court’s access additional “facilities and ser- the Human require Act does not one triggered by vices” George- that status. private actor Thus, to “endorse” another. town’s asserted free exercise defense does Recog- denial of “University overcome the Human Act’s edict nition”—in this case carrying a status *5 tangible the benefits be distributed intangible “endorsement” —does not violate regard without to sexual orientation. We the Although statute. affirming the trial part, affirm in part, reverse in and order entry judgment court’s for the Universi- judgment the trial court to according- enter

ty point, on that we do statutory so on ly.2 rather than grounds. constitutional We contrary reach a conclusion with re- spect tangible to the accompa- benefits that

ny “University Recognition.” the While FACTUAL BACKGROUND Human compel does not seek to uniformity philosophical by attitudes A. Georgetown University law, force require it does equal treat- year In the in which the Constitu- Equality ment. treatment education- tion govern- was ratified and the federal al concretely institutions is measured created, Georgetown University ment was nondiscriminatory provision of access to Carroll, established. Its founder was John “facilities and services.” D.C. Code priest, George a Jesuit a friend of Wash- (1987). 1-2520 Unlike the “endorse- § later, ington Baltimore, Bishop and as ment,” the various additional bene- prelate the first Roman Catholic in the accompany grant fits that a declared, academy,” nation. “On this he Recognition” are “facilities and services.” my hope flourishing “rests all for the such, they As equally must be made avail- religion in holy our the United States.” able, regard without to sexual orientation Georgetown College, In as it was to other characteristic unrelated to known, formally then committed to the individual merit. refusal to was provide tangible regard guidance Society of the of Je- benefits without control and Mack, Newman, Judge Pryor Judges compelling 2. Chief interest in the eradication of bia's agree requires Belson and Nebeker Rights Human the discrimination sexual orientation require Georgetown grant Act does not religious objection, Georgetown, despite its particular "University Recognition" its form of obey the Human Act’s mandate that issue, groups. to the student On that the trial equal tangible University provide benefits to the However, judgment court's is affirmed. Chief issue, groups. trial court’s On that Mack, Newman, Judge Pryor Judges Ferren judgment is reversed. Terry conclude that the of Colum- District 1815, Congress general In understanding sus.3 bestowed on the was that Georgetown College University university Society first of Jesus owned the granted by president property.” year, charter be federal In that 1, 1815, government. University Act of March Stat. and directors of signed by signed This charter was agreement James with its Jesuit Com- president munity. Madison as of the United exceptions, States. With a few the Jesuits Holy By George- relinquished rights University decree of the See their College given property. town was the status of They also undertook to make University. grant This periodic University. Pontifical from the contributions to the Pope empowered University provisions agreement to confer Other of the 1969 highest degrees in sought “guarantee ecclesiastical Philos- the continued and ophy Theology. presence George- day, and Sacred To this effective of the Jesuits at Among University.” one of two uni- town these were remains promises by Community the Jesuit to make versities the nation with this distinction. services, themselves available for Georgetown College incorpo- In was teaching positions, residential duties and special Congress. rated Act of Act of steps highly and to take to ensure that 10, 1844, June 6 Stat. 912. Its charter was qualified members of their order be as- operate in 1966 amended to allow it to as a signed campus community. nonprofit corporation adopt and to agreement specified desirability, “in or- Georgetown University. name Act of Oct. preserve der the Jesuit traditions Pub. L. No. 80 Stat. 877. Georgetown University,” that the Universi- Today, approaching the bicentennial it ty president Society. be member shares with the ratification of our Constitu- ranks, confining deanships Without to their tion, college Carroll founded on the agreed “qualified it was members of private, is major banks the Potomac Society regularly ap- of Jesus will be university co-educational and the oldest Ro- positions may pointed to such of those higher learning man Catholic institution of practical.” University The office of con- the United States. Its enrollment Chaplain was reserved for a Jesuit. 10,000 roughly sists of students in several *6 agree- Healy, of President the 1969 words undergraduate, graduate professional and understanding represented ment a “clear Georgetown University schools. also runs University keep continue to that the hospital sponsors institutes research very Society close affiliation with the of and other educational endeavors. Jesus, guarantee presence at the their Georgetown’s Religious B. Tradition meaning University guarantee and to Through growth, two centuries of University in that have Jesuit terms Georgetown University guided by has been up contract was existed until that formal founder, religious hope of its John Car- drawn.” presidents have forty-six roll. All of its through- Healy testified that President clergymen. four been Roman Catholic On Georgetown has invari- out its existence occasions, University has headed been Roman Catholic ably defined itself as a by bishop. particular, Georgetown In perception This is illustrated institution. relationship has with the continued a close opening under- by some of the words excep- Jesuits. Since about without graduate “Georgetown is commit- bulletin: tion, filled the members of that order have reality to a which reflects Cath- ted view presidential office. influences_ As an insti- olic and Jesuit Catholic, Georgetown believes trial, Healy, tution that is Timothy S. At Reverend God, to a life 5.J., that all men are sons of called Georgetown’s president and a defend- eternity.” case, Him now and “until 1969 of oneness with ant in this testified that engaged century, principally Society 18th it has been 3. The of Jesus was founded in 1534 generally Ignatius See J. Loyola. it has be- St. Since then Aveling, The Jesuits education. (1982); 1534-1921 Campbell, major in all come a order stationed T. The Jesuits: (1977). country, parts since the of the world. In this During a five- University, University quirement they Bulle- so. Georgetown be (1980-81) trial, made Undergraduate prior Schools Jesuits year period just tin— (hereinafter Bulletin”). “Undergraduate half of the up one third and one between bulletin, According to its Law Center must “maintain a Faculty board. members religious heritage “Georgetown’s is a cher- attitude towards Catholic be- sympathetic quality.” part of its distinctive ished Georgetown has practices_”4 liefs and University, Georgetown Law Center Bulle- largest ministers in resi- number of (1980-81) (hereinafter “Law Center tin colleges and uni- among dence the Jesuit Bulletin”). Faculty Handbook de- versities in the United States. “Georgetown University scribes some Roman Catholic doctrine influences American, Catholic, Jesuit institution of Georgetown’s policy decisions. Abor- higher learning,” seeking “uphold, de- proscribed procedures are tions and other fend, integral and elucidate the propagate, performed University hospital. in the heritage” Christian and American cultural newspapers may carry adver- Student through principles, “certain established clinics. Birth con- tisements abortion ideals, specific and definite traditions.” may not sold in the student trol devices be Georgetown University, Faculty Handbook stores. Cohabitation forbidden between Handbook”). (1971)(hereinafter “Faculty vi single students in the dormitories. principles” “the dem- The “established $750,- gift returned philosophical the na- onstrated truths about Libyan government due to the 000 to the man, God; the universe and ture teachings Roman Catholic conflict between truths of Christian revelation and their perceived links with ter- nation’s crystallization through the centuries....” considerations, activity. Religious rorist Among “specific “the Id. ideals” are found, George- the trial court influenced society through acqui- perfectability Recognition” town’s denial practice by sition and its members accompanying benefits to intellectual, theological, moral virtues and groups. their derivatives the value of service [and] C. Secular community expression as an Educational Role Christian democratic ideals.” Id. And “definite traditions” include “the Christian Despite its historical identification with having their source culture and conduct Church, Georgetown the Roman Catholic inspiration teachings and exam- pro- University's professed intention is to ple of Christ....” Id. education, one that is vide a secular albeit founder, Its informed Christian values. University is a member Carroll, very begin- insisted from the John of Roman Catholic edu- several associations college open to students of ning that the institutions. As a Pontifical Univ- cational *7 Religious every religious persuasion. be- ersity, American uni- it is one of two admissions, graduation, plays lief no role Pontificio, versities entered in the Annuario attendance, participation sports or class listing by Holy See of all an annual activities, eligibility for or other student throughout the world. such institutions facilities, aid, awards placement financial throughout prop- its Chapels are scattered Undergraduate programs. The or honors times offered several erties and Masses “impos- Georgetown declares that are Bulletin day. of its directors each Almost all . faculty mem- religious any creed on Catholic, re- es no although there is no formal integrity ty. Accordingly, of the Universi- "Religion Ethical headed and a section Norms,” Faculty shall ty requires members Faculty that all Handbook states: Cath- sympathetic towards a attitude maintain operated Georgetown University is While a practices, shall make and beliefs and olic regula- auspices, is no Catholic there under appreciate such beliefs sincere effort requires the Facul- all members of tion which Faculty who are practices. Members A ty of the Catholic faith. to be members good example expected set a Catholics are expected Faculty to maintain member is regular practice of Catholic duties. by the conduct consistent standard of life and objectives Id. at 12-13. philosophy of the Universi- student, expects spiritual ber or but it them to role and objec- ular educational its tives: respect religious convictions each

person.” University at 1. The Theology longer Id. motto is sway no has the in the had, “Making University Al- that it once nor can One—Jew and Gentile.” we any longer organiz- talk about it as the though undergraduate students must at- ing base of the other academic disci- Theology Depart- tend two courses plines. What we can talk about is a ment, taught neither need be from the religious years tradition which after 200 perspective. Faculty Catholic members are must condition what the University is required Catholic, they to be nor are Any university and does. is a creature propagate asked to Catholic faith of time and its nature secular. Our philoso- indoctrinate students with Catholic job impact is to discover what the habit phy- of belief in has reality God on the secular Relationship D. George- The between university, teaching, of a on its its learn- Religious town’s Tradition and its ing, its research and its service. Secular Educational Role Georgetown University, Report 2 Annual foregoing, George- From the and from (1979). report, Healy In a later President materials, published appears town’s thoughts: Georgetown voiced similar University perceives fulfilling itself as imperatives has the of its own secular be- a secular role educational without abandon- ing, reinforces, strength- but the Church ing religious heritage. its This view is ens, personalizes them.” expressed Undergraduate in its Bulletin. (1981). Also, University, Report Annual While reflects its Catholic and notes, “[ejducation principally he remains influences, business, Jesuit university secular and the is a entity job secular with a clear secular to do. expects neither wishes nor all its [i]t Church, however, deeply can influence Catholic, members to be but it does as- job is at 4-5. how that secular done.” Id. basic, sume that all of them share a widely accepted view of humankind. It Recognition E. The Criteria essentially equal, sees all men as as en- 13,1977, gay On October students dignity always dowed with a human to be Georgetown University public held a meet- arms, respected.... open It seeks to later, ing campus. in a room on Sometime ecumenism, in the fullest sense of name, group Gay People chose a those of all beliefs and all races. (GPGU), Georgetown University expressed by 1. A Id. at similar idea is forma- adopted a constitution.5 After its Law Center: “The Law Center welcomes tion, in- weekly, met its activities GPGU of all and does students .beliefs lectures, discussions, cluding film shows hand, proselytize. On the other and social events. religious heritage Georgetown’s is a cher- time, develop- Around the same a similar part quality.” ished of its distinctive Law There, a occurred at the Law Center. ment Bulletin, 31.' supra, Center group Gay known as the Coalition (GRC) in- Healy Georgetown University

President has described the Law Cen- constitution.6 terrelationship adopted sec- ter formed and between development provide purposes To 5. The of GPGU are: forum responsible with one’s *8 sexual ethics consonant (1) Supportive personal beliefs. atmosphere gay provide in which To an (4)Social pride, people develop a sense of self- can which program activities To establish a worth, community. awareness and purposes. the above reflect (2) Educational added). (emphasis Member- GPGUConstitution ship, regardless encourage provide To information and orientation, open to is of sexual understanding dialogue gay between and and students, faculty, and alumni. members staff non-gay people. (3) purposes are to: Developmental 6. The of GRC GPGU, SAC, undergradu- in Unfortunately, advisory body contrast regard relatively is barren with record ate student senate. The different levels origins subsequent and activities. GRC’s support are defined as follows: time, After a both student decid- Body “Student Endorsement”: SAC the formal status and attendant ed to seek grants recognition representing this enjoyed by many campus privileges other interest of the Student Government and organizations. campus, On the main where body. the entire student based, doing procedures is GPGU “University Recognition ”: SAC by guidelines. so were established written concerning makes recommendations recognition first initiated the When GPGU recognition. approval granted Final is during year academic process, through University’s Director of Stu- contained in these criteria were a document dent Activities. issued the Student Activities Commis- recognition (SAC) Funding”: sion under the name “What Your This document monetary Needs Know.” was in a form. Club another, superseded in the fall Id. guidelines specific more set of known as recognition The three tiers of are listed “Recognition Criteria: Student Clubs and declining accessibility. in order of (hereinafter Organizations” “Recognition accessible, Body most “Student Endorse- Criteria”). primarily This later document ment,” depend approval by does not expanded upon clarified and the criteria set University administration. It available one; in forth the earlier the two were not require- any group which satisfies basic Hence, although inconsistent. GPGU composition as to size and applications in ments fact made two unsuccessful years, academic under each scope successive one are “within the whose activities guidelines, set of we no distinction make concern, body the student interest applications between their and treat both educational, social, serving an or cultural though governed by “Recog- they were purpose.” Id. at 2. guide- nition Criteria.” Also because the “University Recogni- The more elusive conflict, reject lines do not we the student tion,” case, issue in this re- the status at groups’ “Recognition claim that Criteria”— University quires approval by the adminis- explicit the later and more of the two—is a may only sought by groups tration and document, “self-serving,” pretextual already Body that have obtained “Student adopted response appli- first to GPGU’s In order to “Univer- Endorsement.” obtain designed on its cation and to close the door Recognition,” organizations such have sity second one. They further satisfy two conditions. “Recognition Criteria” sets forth a tiered must: undergradu- system support available to (1) aiding the Univer “be successful support, in groups: ate student “This order sity’s mission in the tradition educational community, to reach all the members of the (as by its founders outlined established is offered on three different levels.” Id. at University’s Statement Education Applications initially submitted to al, cultural, (1) religious, social and medical ser- and research on the Foster discussion gay on lesbians and men in such effect of law vices. (3) areas as: exist- Disseminate information on the law a. criminal pro opportunities in the ence of bono work family b. law rights. gay area of immigration law c. d. (4) gay Cooperate law student with other security military law and national gay rights organizations law. in areas of employment law e. labor and (5) gay le- speakers seminars on Offer speech f. g. free and association gal appropriate Law Center issues for the rights gay students. community. legal (2) entering gay lesbians and men Provide paragraph (emphasis added GRC Constitution about Wash- the Law Center with information (2)). ington's including gay community, education- *9 Objectives[7])”; obtaining and al Goals and Id. at 3. Success in direct finan- support, discretionary by cial decision (2) “provide a broad service to the community University, group University the sense that elevates a student group may of the “University Funding,” highest the activities be tier es- special an immediate and/or interest.” “Recognition by tablished Criteria.” “Recognition at 3. Criteria” describes Id. guidelines “Recogni- No written such as Recognition” Georgetown’s “University tion Criteria” were issued at the Law Cen- “endorsement of the various co-curricular ter, where GRC was located. The Universi- by specific undertaken activities club.” ty’s treatment of GPGU’s and GRC’s re- at 1. Id. was, however, spective applications indis- “University Funding,” the third and least tinguishable. importantly, More the stu- recognition, may accessible tier of suggest dent do not alter- sought only by groups already that have native criteria were ever force at the “University Recognition.” obtained Such Law Center. We have no basis on which to however, right groups, have no automatic eligibility conclude that the factors to be support. to direct financial Id. at 4. Last- applied significantly to GRC are different ly, only implicitly, and a fourth tier exists guidelines from the written set forth in “Recog- by outside the scheme established “Recognition campus. at the main Criteria” occupied by nition com- Criteria” —that Groups’ Attempts F. The Student pletely unrecognized campus groups, oper- “University Recognition” Gain ating Body without even “Student Endorse- attempts gain ment.” GPGU made two “Univ- Recognition.” first was in aca- ersity More than status is at stake. The facili- year 1978-79 and the other immedi- demic a student ties and services afforded to following ately afterwards in the academic dependent group by University are year. On both occasions it obtained recognition within this upon its level of George- Body “Student Endorsement.” group scheme. A with “Stu- three-tiered grant refused to Rec- town Endorsement,” Body without dent but ognition” accompanying tangible or “University Recognition,” may: benefits. facilities; (a) University use

(b) privileges; fund apply for lecture approved considered and SAC first (c) counseling receive financial January 1979. application GPGU’s comptroller; the SAC following day, The same SAC issued (d) advertising; campus use and statement: (e) petition assistance from receive granted has a charter The SAC

Student Government. purpose providing a for the [GPGU] “University Recognition” en- Id. at 2-3. students of forum where all group titles to four additional benefits. concerns of may come to understand the They may Gay Students. (f) use a mailbox in the SAC office and for a charter does The recommendation Station;

request Hoya one making any not mean that the SAC Service; (g) Computer use the Label rightness wrongness statement on the services; (h) mailing homosexuality implying use or is that the making a statement. University is such (i) funding. apply for dignity Godly in a human con- Only description that celebrates is contained one item of this the value It is entitled "A Draft Statement 1. The statement stresses in the record. text." Id. at Objectives "George- of the light Goals and of the Educational education in of a liberal September Campus" prepared in Main and was per- of the whole the education [of] town ideal Vice Presi- the Office of the Executive Among Jesuit Id. the essentials son.” pages of sin- Affairs. In six dent for Academic education, "[tjheological reflection liberal "Georgetown, gle-spaced typeface, it notes that given pri- religious practice encouraged origins, has a of its and Jesuit virtue Catholic ority.” Id. at 3. reality, richly one special informed view of *10 age understanding dialogue a week the Student Senate ratified Within and between approving both the action of SAC gay people. non-gay and and the Government Charter”8 “Student (3) open expres- Allows for forums and accompanied it. statement opinions helpful develop- in the sion of following Schuerman, day The William C. responsible conso- ment sexual ethics Affairs, in- Associate Dean Student personal nant individual beliefs. with formed the Student Government (4) gather together Allows students to recognized GPGU would not be as an “offi- setting in an to share com educational activity .Georgetown University.9 cial” beliefs.[10] mon interests and He wrote: however, en- University, The will not recognizes The administration that the dorse the as an activ- [GPGU] “official” pastoral issue both an educational and ity Programs. its Student Affairs It is an issue University one. that the University The will not contribute understanding in an has addressed man- support organization: of this University The ner. has been and will (1) Through grant University continue to be sensitive to the concerns funds. gay problems of its students and the (2) By providing office subsidized they campus face on the and in our socie- service, space, telephone supplies, office ty.’. .. equipment. University acknowledged The has in a (3) By granting authorized use of the supportive way gay These students. Georgetown University. name may organize, students continue to Georgetown University private is a express opinions, publicize education- University history with a and tradition ally Gay may related events. students specifically University which is Catholic. University use educationally facilities for administrators must often make deci- purposes meetings, related such as dis- light sions in conscience and value groups, speakers, cussion etc. The of- system identified with this tradition. fice and services of the Director of Stu- University, responsi- in terms of this

dent gay Activities are available to stu- bility argument cannot concur help dents for in planning and assistance partic- of its Student Government in this educationally programs. All related aca- case, acknowledgment ular that official personnel support demic and educational imply endorsement. University open services in the gay available to students for assistance This situation involves a controversial and advice. teachings matter of faith and the moral position University

It is the of the of the Catholic Church. “Official” subsi- University by gay this access students to dy support gay orga- resources: many interpreted by nization would be (1) possible atmosphere positions Makes endorsement taken gay people which as members of this gay range movement on a full University community develop a can University supports While the issues. pride, sense of self-worth and awareness. the individual lives and and cherishes (2) rights of its students it will not subsidize Provides for the dissemination of educational information that encour- this cause. Such an endorsement 8.According Although expressly Dean Schuerman did not to "What Your Club Needs To so, Know,” say groups, University the student during the criteria in force that aca- the trial court all treated his letter as a denial of year, demic a "Student Government Charter" Recognition.” granted group recognition legit- as a "official activity body.” imate of the student Id. at 3. words, Dean Schuerman claimed 10. In other The term "Student Government Charter" does position University’s allowed GPGU Criteria," appear "Recognition but essen- most, all, purposes if not set forth achieve tially in "Stu- the same attributes are contained GPGU Constitution constitution. See in its Body dent Endorsement." 5). 0quoted supra note inappropriate

would be a Catholic in granting recognition group, to our it is *11 University. endorsing activity?” such Letter from GPGU to Kelley, Reverend A. Memorandum from Dean W. Schuerman to 9, 1979) (Apr. (“not” S.J. emphasized in (Feb. 6,1979) (em- Student Government original, remaining emphasis added). added). phasis meeting After representa- with GPGU appealed GPGU Dean Schuerman’s deci- tives, Kelley Reverend denied appeal. its Affairs, sion to the Dean of Student Wil- upon position He relied by taken Deans Stott, Jr., liam R. and met with him for that Stott, Schuerman and and then added: See purpose. letter from GPGU to Dean talked, As I explain tried to when we Stott, (Feb. 24, 1979). W. Jr. Dean Stott goals believe that our essentially upheld “den[y] the decision to endorsement same, but that the means to arrive at activity as an official of the [GPGU] them are different. will University’s Program.” Student Affairs support continue to show Gay for Stu- Stott, Jr., Letter from Dean W. to GPGU way dents but in a which is deemed (Mar. 5, 1979). He continued: appropriate for University. this You University The fact that has cho- mentioned that there be additional grant sen not to endorsement to the ways in which the Administration could approved as an activity, student [GPGU] supportive recognition short of official concern, does not indicate a lack of a lack suggested and I you discuss these sympathy of Gay par- for the Student with Mr. Schuerman. ticular, general. simply or students in It S.J., Letter from Kelley, Reverend A. means that after the facts have been 9, 1979). (Apr. GPGU considered and discussion has taken Kelley’s Reverend ap- denial of GPGU’s point there remains a place, dis- of peal attempt gain “University ended its agreement as to whether endorsement Recognition” year in academic 1978-79. as a student activity is [GPGU] early GPGU renewed its efforts in the appropriate a University. Catholic for following year. academic This time it decision, therefore, University’s The separate made request visits to SAC to judgment not a reflection on or a and, later, “Student Government Charter” personal members, choices of its but “University Recognition.” approved SAC represents judgment rather of what is request GPGU’s for a “Student Govern- appropriate as an insti- ment Charter” on November 13 and its tution. by decision was ratified the Student Senate Id. added). (emphasis accompanied November SAC again appealed, GPGU this time to Re- approval following with the statement: S.J., Aloysius Kelley, verend P. Executive SAC, convinced the [GPGU] Vice President for Academic Affairs. Tak- both their written constitution and their ing equation “recogni- issue with the presentation, they represent oral “endorsement,” tion” and wrote: GPGU group campus distinct students represent- whose existence we as student important emphasize We think it acknowledge. atives are bound to Fur- seeking that what we are the start thermore, by enumeration of their edu- endorsement, recognition, not Dean as (e.g. answering ques- cational functions response imply. Stott’s seems to It is classes, nursing enlightening tions in belief, our as well as that of the student RAs, etc.) as, depicted itself [GPGU] recognition government, that official criteria, positive to borrow from the “a organization our would not be con- community.” University force within the strued as an endorsement homosexu- activity. al Since this seems to be the happened previous year, As Dean had administration, major immediately concern of the we to the Stu- Schuerman wrote the ad- possible point ask: “Is it not out that the adminis- dent Government that, accept did not the action saying tration to issue a statement ministration giving recognition” appropriate. “official SAC as tion” was Dean Schuerman wrote: Memorandum from Dean W. GPGU. to the Student Government Schuerman my judgment, recognition official

(Nov. 21,1979). gave The reasons he were gay orga- University essentially interpreted by many borrowed from his letter nization would be endorsement, year. support, approval from Dean previous Memorandum positions gay move- Government taken W. Schuerman Student 1979) 19-21). range issues. This (Feb. 6, ment on a (quoted supra at full inappropriate for a Catholic would be Undaunted, again appeared be- GPGU *12 your dis- University. recognize IWhile requested weeks later and fore SAC two I agreement position, this was Recognition” “University to add to the argument by your dissuaded Body Endorsement” it had al- “Student grant University could on the one hand ready received. Both SAC and Student recognition (defined by official Student despite Senate voted in favor of GPGU recently updated criteria Government’s administration’s recent announcement that of the various co-curri- as “endorsement request. it would not accede to this At the specific cular activities undertaken 1979,therefore, awaiting end of GPGU was hand, club”) and on the other disclaim University’s reaction to the favorable major “endorsement” activities response it had won from the Student which, by definition, are associated Government. gay organization. with a 15, 1980, January On an effort University recog- ... does not [T]he clarify position, requested its GPGU activity official nize the as an [GPGU] administration to furnish it with a state- program and the Student Affairs will group’s ment as to the status. This was this subsidize cause. provided by the Director of Student Activi- Letter from Dean W. Schuerman to GPGU ties, repeating Debbie L. Gottfried. After (Feb. 21, 1980) added). (emphasis previous the administration’s reasons for Continuing pattern previ- set the denying “University Recognition,” she add- year, unsuccessfully appealed ous GPGU ed: to Dean Stott Dean Schuerman’s decision you As I have gay told and other stu- Freeze, S.J., Donald Vice and Reverend dents, my the services of office are avail- President for Academic Affairs and Prov- you help able to and assistance in Stott, Jr., ost. Letter from Dean W. planning educationally programs. related 14, 1980); (Mar. letter from Rever- GPGU you enough I cannot stress to the sinceri- (Mar. 31, Freeze, S.J., to GPGU end D. ty behind this offer. cannot offer 1980). appealed, suc- This time it without possibility University’s changing cess, way Healy. to President Let- all the position on its what it would be feels Healy, to President T. S.J. ter from GPGU interpreted as endorsement and offi- 1980); T. from President (Apr. letter support range cial issues full S.J., 29, 1980). (Apr. Healy, to GPGU associated with this cause. Healy’s ultimate denial day after President (Jan. Letter from D. action “University Recognition,” Gottfried GPGU 1980) added); (emphasis memoran- Superior see also filed in Court. was dum from Dean to D. Gott- W. Schuerman then, chain of events had By a similar (Jan. 16, 1980). fried Decem- place the Law Center. On taken applica- had ber GRC submitted

Both and the Student Government GPGU “recognized” student ac- reconsid- tion to become requested that this decision be Center Committee tivity to the Law from the Government ered. Letter Student (CSFL). peti- Its (Feb. 5, 1980). Faculty Life As Student to Dean W. Schuerman February approved by CSFL was year, GPGU tion happened previous had later, David J. Schuerman, 1980. Two weeks failed to met with Dean but Center, Jr., Law Recogni- McCarthy, Dean persuade him that “implement tion,” told CSFL that he would not together with the increased access to recognition funding either pro entails, facilities and services that status posed organization.” Memorandum from violated the Human Act. See D.C. Jr., (Feb. McCarthy, Dean D. to CSFL (1987) (quoted supra Code 1-2520 note § 1980). McCarthy’s Dean deny reasons for 1). Georgetown defended itself insist- ing recognition” GRC “official were ing that “University Recogni- its denial of couched terms almost identical to those tion” was not “on the of” basis the sexual given Dean Schuerman had GPGU. See students, orientation of the but rather on memorandum from Dean W. Schuerman to “purposes account of the and activities” of (Feb. 6, 1979) the Student Government particular organizations they had 19-21). (quoted supra at After this action formed. also asserted filed, Healy had been President informed if even its actions were taken on the basis McCarthy Dean that his earlier decision orientation, they protected sexual were denying “University Recognition” GPGU by the Free Exercise Clause of the First campus applied on the main equally and for Amendment.12 the same reasons to GRC at the Law Cen summary The student moved S.J., ter. Letter from Healy, President T. *13 judgment. On March the trial 8, 1980) (“The McCarthy (May to Dean D. granted partially court their motion. University’s decision is not a reflection on Judge George Leonard Braman found that judgment personal or a of the choices of its “University Recognition” town’s denial of individual members but rather reflects a violated the Human Act. On the judgment appropriate of what statutory Georgetown issue as to whether Georgetown institution”).11 as an A letter had discriminated on the of sexual basis to the same effect was sent to the Chancel orientation, held, he no material factual Center, Georgetown lor of the Medical genuine dispute issue was and the stu University’s remaining campus, one al groups judgment dent were entitled to as a though group sought no similar there had 56(c); Super.Ct.Civ.R. matter of law. See Recognition.” “University Letter from Bank, 432 A.2d Riggs Howard v. National S.J., Healy, President T. to Chancellor M. (D.C.1981). Judge or 8, 1980). 705-06 Braman McNulty (May dered that the issue set for trial would Thus, filed, at the time this action was University’s validity be the claimed Body GPGU had obtained En- “Student free exercise defense. Campus dorsement” at the Main and GRC apparent equivalent had obtained its at the Judge imma- doing, In so Braman found group Law Center. Neither had been suc- issue statutory terial to the discrimination attempts cessful in its to obtain “Universi- Georgetown’s grant of “Univ- claim that a ty Recognition” or the additional benefits Recognition” an un- ersity would constitute that status carries with it. willing “endorsement” of the student groups.

II Discrimination on the of sexual or- basis THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS found, having and ientation been a statu- established, tory violation therefore twenty gay groups The two student and proceeded nonjury trial on against case to a brought individual members suit Georgetown’s free exercise defense. After Georgetown University, president, alleged days testimony, Sylvia Ba- They seven dean its Law Center. unconstitu- “University Recogni- con held that the statute was the denial of afterwards, University" majority "Georgetown Shortly in their names. It has 11. a substantial meeting faculty appealed a Law Center voted to endorse from the trial court’s dismissal of approval petition "recogni- CSFL’s of GRC’s That issue is not before us the counterclaim. tion." expressly expresses opinion, Mack no thereupon. impliedly, prevent also counterclaimed to using groups words the student dorsement,” Recog- grant “University of this case: applied facts tional group nition” access to District of Columbia Human allows student “the yield guar- additional facilities and services. Act must the Constitutional religious freedom.” antee George- Judge Bacon also found that Recognition” “University findings town’s denial Judge Bacon made several view, on its one not without was based three levels of fact. She described the foundation, gay organiza- that “the organiza- recognition campus available tions, charters and as evidenced their groups tions and found the student activities, participating their were in and Body “Student had achieved Endorse- promoting styles,” homosexual life ment,” together tangible with its attendant religiously opposed was benefits, but had been denied activity. University type group to this Recognition” and the additional upon sincerely-held administrators acted accompany which that status. benefits recognition of official belief that “George- Judge Bacon also found that inconsistent with the two “would be University religiously town is a affiliated teachings normative and with the Church institution which serves both educational obligation nor- basic undermine the deny- purposes.” and secular sectarian teachings Finally, mative of the Church.” Recognition,” Judge ing “University Bacon Judge Bacon found that “Universi- without determined that administra- formed, Recognition” ty clubs applied the moral or normative tors had meetings campus, application held Church, teachings of the Roman Catholic funds, and that in the made for lecture through as these were established at trial there are other off- District Columbia testimony expert and Church documents. campus opportunities gay available to stu- Archbishop Quinn, John R. A Pastoral See *14 dents. 5, 1980); (May Homosexuality Letter on fact, findings Judge In to her addition Congregation for the Doctrine of Sacred of law. Bacon made several conclusions Faith, Ques- Declaration On Certain Georgetown University is not She held that (Dec. Concerning tions Sexual Ethics sepa- pervasively it cannot so secular that 1975). doctrine, sexual Under Catholic and sectarian activities and rate secular meaning function has its true and moral receipt that its federal funds secular marriage. only in rectitude heterosexual its required it to abandon purposes neither distinguished Homosexual acts—as put it in activities nor violation sectarian morally homosexual orientation —are of the First the Establishment Clause wrong “gravely and must be viewed as evil Moreover, its status as Amendment. faculty.” and disordered use the sexual institution al- educational church-affiliated Persons of homosexual orientation have1an rely on First Amend- it to raise and lowed obligation “try possible is reasonably religious guarantees of freedom. ment change they if find in such themselves sincerely religious issue are The beliefs conform orientation” and must event to the Roman Catholic held and central teachings on their conduct to the normative they impose affirmative com- faith and sexuality. affiliated human No believer Judge Bacon upon its mands adherents. may con- Roman Catholic with the Church the Human enforcement held that done, endorse, approve about or be neutral require Rights in this case would Act orientation, life- homosexual homosexual in a manner “inconsist- Georgetown to act style or homosexual acts. institution” its as a Catholic ent duties with major pmr- place a on the “the burden Judge Bacon found that would therefore religion. On the other [Recognition’ is offi- ‘[UJniversity pose of free exercise endorsement, policy “national” hand, there is no which cial an endorsement because re- in matters intervention requiring state University believes will conflict orientation, the Human teachings lating to sexual of the Church the normative any “compel- further However, Rights Act does not Judge Bacon homosexuality.” could which ling” governmental interest acknowledged that, the “en- in addition to outweigh the burden on presented exercise. case if only Judge this Bra- case, In the held, circumstances of she man correctly concluded that the statute Rights the Human Act is “a was Judge local violated. considering enact- Before ment of purpose imper- ruling well-motivated Bacon’s later but on the free exercise defense, missible Upholding Georgetown’s reach.” we ask must ourselves whether defense, Rights free exercise the Human Judge Bacon Act properly dis- was con- groups’ Judge missed the strued complaint. Braman. deeply rooted doctrine

Ill constitutional possi issue to be if avoided ble principles informs our statutory con THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT needlessly struction. We do not pit a stat VIOLATION against ute the Constitution. Insofar as its granting partial summary judgment, permits, language Rights Human Act Braman found that must be construed a manner pro which “University Recognition” denial of and the tects constitutionality. E.g., United attendant benefits violated the Hu- Locke, 84, 92, States U.S. v. 105 S.Ct. Rights man Act. At trial on the free exer- 1785, 1791, (1985); 85 L.Ed.2d 64 Ellis v. defense, Judge cise pro- Bacon therefore Clerks, Railway Brotherhood 466 U.S. premise ceeded from the of an established 435, 444, 1883, 1890, 104 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d statutory challenging violation. Without (1984); International Association of underlying finding of a Human Street, 740, 749-50, Machinists U.S. violation, Georgetown asks this court 1784, 1789-90, 81 S.Ct. 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 to affirm Bacon’s conclusion that the (1961); Coates, 68, 71 Moore v. 40 A.2d Human Act is unconstitutional as (D.C.1944); see generally Sutherland applied. Statutory 2.01, (4th 45.11 §§ Construction 1985) (hereinafter Sutherland). ed. More “If there is one doctrine deeply more over, read, be, it if should be it can so as to any other, rooted ought than is that we avoid difficult and sensitive constitutional pass questions not to of constitutionality questions concerning scope of the First adjudication ... unless such is unavoid- Amendment. Bishop NLRB v. Catholic Services, Spector able.” Motor Inc. v. Chicago, 99 S.Ct. McLaughlin, *15 1322, also, (1979); e.g., 59 L.Ed.2d 533 see 152, 154, (1944). Thus, 89 L.Ed. 101 “if a Albertini, 675, 472 United v. U.S. States case statutory be decided on either or 680, 2897, 2902, S.Ct. 105 86 L.Ed.2d 536 grounds, courts], constitutional for [the (1985); University v. Nova Educational reasons, jurisprudential sound inquire will Commission, Licensure 483 Institution question.” first into the statutory Harris 1172, (D.C.1984), A.2d 1179-80 cert. de McRae, 297, 306-07, v. 448 U.S. 100 S.Ct. nied, 1054, 1759, 470 U.S. 105 S.Ct. 84 2671, 2683, (1980); also, 65 L.Ed.2d see 784 (1986); L.Ed.2d generally 822 see Suther e.g., City Authority New York Transit v. supra, at 45.11.13 land, § Beazer, 568, 582-83, 1355, 440 U.S. 99 S.Ct. 1364, case, (1979); by 59 L.Ed.2d 587 v. On the facts of this as found Crowell 285, trial, Benson, 22, 62, 297, Judge particular 285 52 the U.S. S.Ct. Bacon after (1932). “University Recognition” operat- 76 L.Ed. scheme 598 A constitutional issue parties appropriate the even 13. While none of the has raised this would be course if it had issue, argues forcefully briefed, Spitzer Albertini, amicus Arthur B. not been United States v. su- Judge 679-80, Human 2902; Braman misconstrued the pra, U.S. at 105 at 472 S.Ct. Unit- Rights ignore argument Act. We cannot the 171, Grace, 175-76, ed v. U.S. States 461 103 dispositive potentially an amicus curiae on this 1702, 1706, (1983), S.Ct. 75 L.Ed.2d 736 or if it Cable, Crisp, Capital issue. Cities Inc. v. 467 court, had never been considered the lower 2694, 2699, 104 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 81 Cable, Capital Crisp, supra, v. 467 U.S. Cities Inc. (1984); States, 542, Fry v. 421 U.S. 580 United 697, 2699; Clark, at 104 S.Ct. at United States v. 5, 1792, 5, 545 n. n. L.Ed.2d 1794-95 44 899-900, 100 63 (1975). is- 363 Avoidance of constitutional (1980). L.Ed.2d 171 interpretation statutory sue the correct

17 religiously Georgetown ing Georgetown includes tenders accordance with teachings re- “endorsement” of normative of the Roman Catholic guided institutional groups. Contrary Judge “University Recognition” cipient student Church. also construction, gives group Human Braman’s earlier student access certain “clearly Rights require private tangible one errone Act does not benefits. Unless ous,” findings binding are actor to “endorse” the ideas conduct these factual appeal. interpretation upon purposes The trial court’s us for of this D.C. another. v. plain 17-305(a) (1981); see Chaconas language of the would defeat Code § (D.C.1983); Meyers, simultaneously A.2d 384 statute and transform 465 Investments, Inc. v. Blanken & Blanken Rights patent invasion of Human into a Inc., (D.C. n. Keg, A.2d the First Amendment. statute Cunningham, 1978); Cunningham practically legally rendered both (D.C.1959). the Human unenforceable. Because A.2d require Georgetown not Act does groups urge us Specifically, the student groups, denial of “endorse” the student disregard clearly erroneous Recognition” did violate “University “University finding Bacon’s factual the statute. Recognition” an includes They While the Human Act does point out that other “endorsement.” require any therefore Recognition” “endorsement” —and groups “University occu- require type does not py range political, a broad of the social and Recognition” by Georgetown argue spectrum, offered philosophical —it require equal does access to the “facilities Georgetown cannot claim that all of these upon status. organizations strictly services” attendant Roman Catholic (1987). 1-2520 In this case the particular, D.C.Code the student in outlook. § groups recognized have been denied four groups existence refer us tangible also come with a benefits that of such bodies as the Jewish Stu- diverse grant “University Recognition”: Association, Organization official- dents mailbox, ly approved Students, use of Young use Arab Americans Service, services, Computer mailing Freedom, Label Socialist Or- and the Democratic (but right apply and the not neces- ganizing Committee. receive) sarily funding. All of these trial, challenged At the student benefits, “endorsement,” unlike an concerning Healy President with evidence are “facilities services” within University’s willingness extend meaning Rights Act; Human organizations “University Recognition” to supports record Braman’s conclusion religions adhere to other members whose they sexu- were denied on basis of Healy re- President Catholicism. than Id. Tangible hav- al benefits orientation. sponded: ing upon impermissible been denied ba- understanding the Roman It is the *16 sis, affirm, we to extent only, that faiths other than that Catholic Church finding Braman’s that the Human are, it put to Roman Catholic Church the violated; holding Act was reverse we his terms, grace of carriers in the technical “University Recognition” that the denial of good. The Roman Cath- as such are and of statutory was itself a violation. they are in- that Church would feel olic that Finding Bacon’s Factual A. complex a in the of complete, context but Recognition” “University George- pur- and stated it is the clear university, an town Includes “Endorsement” that Roman Church pose of Catholic the receive the same of faiths those other

Judge Bacon as a found fact in intellectual sustenance pastoral and under scheme possible as as far it their faith Recognition” group benefits a student grant it, given multi- University to ways. major purpose “The of two ‘[U]niv- from receive students plicity, as Catholic ersity [Recognition’ official endorse- university. ment_”, which a Catholic an “endorsement” sought student also to under- “The most,” stopped statement that me mine claim of “endorsement” Healy, said President was GPGU’s stated by pointing to views on artificial con- birth commitment to “the development of re- trol, abortion, sponsible divorce and lesbianism asso- sexual ethics consonant with personal ciated with members of the Women’s one’s beliefs.” See Consti- GPGU (WRC) (quoted 5). Collective and the tution supra Women’s note Under Ro- (WPC). However, doctrine, Political Caucus man Catholic expert one of as testimony witnesses, established, their Mary Liston, responsible Sister K. stat- sexual ethics are WPC, question personal ed that campus group another belief. “The member, University which she was cannot make that had not and statement any morality about area of front could not take line with- pro-abortion position insisting upon out the objectivity of moral the stand of the Catholic “[b]ecause fact and that it strictly is not left Church individ- issue of abortion.” Sona ual Vandall, determination within context which WRC, representative Jean can reasonably read as Catholic.” Un- acknowledged formally stated doctrine, der Roman contrary Catholic purpose organization of that is the eradi- suggestion, GPGU’s sexual ethics are the policies cation practices which alien- subject of an and unyielding absolute moral ate against and discriminate women. She law, one laid down God. further testified contrary that views to Ro- man teachings Catholic were carried Healy President also testified that none published of WRC’s information and expressed GPGU’s intention to “establish a positions no such been had voted on program of activities which reflect membership. Referring to an occasion id., purposes,” above “open-ended was when posted organizations’ WRC other no- enough University involve a host concerning tices artificial birth control and positions together and activities which abortion, Healy President testified that he singly it would inappropriate.” find He referred matter to a committee “de- similar had reservations about GRC’s stat- termine whether incidents an [these were] provision ed commitment to the informa- [they isolated instance or whether gay were] tion to law lesbian students con- part essential activity.” the collective cerning “Washington’s gay community, in- After parties, educational, discussion with the various cluding cultural, religious, so- regarded he question as incidents cial medical services.” See GRC Con- “such minor activity (quoted supra 6). instances of as not to According stitution note be of University.” serious concern Healy, to President GRC’s association with concluded, basis, range He engaged in by that withdraw- activities Washington al of “University Recognition” gay community WRC’s would “involve Georgetown University appropriate. positions would not be publicly adopt.” would wish regard plaintiff With to the. teachings Roman Catholic establish groups, Healy President saw the matter prevent norms” “moral which believers differently. He testified that the Universi- conduct, recognizing homosexual as ty distinguish does not between students distinguished orientation, from homosexual on the basis of their sexual orientation than anything other sinful. President group said merely promoting activity Healy duty obey added that the these rights legal gay people norms” “moral present But, no conflict. accord- *17 ing institutions, George- binding upon to Healy President other would be more theologi- representatives, including publicly town its which have to act and where expert, purposes cal in the is an moral of the set forth there added consideration leading astray giving or organiza- GPGU an others scandal in Constitution described word, tion technical of “University Recognition” for which sense so that binding authority inappropriate would be a insti- of Roman Catholic for Catholic would, teaching tution. on an institution at least dimension, greater re- be than it ment.” administrators in that be on an they would that understood to peatedly [individual]. testified the outset its have that effect. From McCormick, S.J., Richard J. Reverend GRC, Georgetown dealings with GPGU theological expert, Georgetown’s testified equated “University Recognition” with an He said a to same effect. that Roman duty “Recognition Cri- university a act in a Neither Catholic “has “endorsement.” teachings way with consistent those at trial nor evidence adduced teria” poli- public them in its not to undermine “University Recognition” is indicates that Thus, pub- public policies “in its cies.” grant- right. an That status was automatic acts,” not University “ought lic University’s and some ed in the discretion explicit public policy a endorse- adopt application doctrine was of Roman Catholic of, implicit endorsement” for ex- ment or recognition process. in the involved intercourse, abortion, premarital or ample, required Judge deference to Bacon’s Our Georgetown should homosexual conduct. by George- finding is not undercut factual actions, decisions, public policies, not “in its willingness town’s “endorse” wide equivalently position that would es- take a extremely range groups with diverse lifestyle equally normative tablish another goals For those whose com- and activities. the one that is in normative valid with religious be- According Healy, mon interest is a non-Catholic position.” to President grant “University Recognition” lief “endorsement” system, and GRC would conflict with GPGU spirit appears granted in the have been duty Georgetown's not to undermine the others, WRC, including of ecumenism. For teaching Roman Catholic that “human sex- con- permitted Judge Bacon to evidence uality can be exercised within mar- no part that “essential of the collec- clude riage. ...” activity” tive Roman Catholic contravened precisely did The trial court not define doctrine, and that the administration would what it meant “endorsement.” For “University Recognition” if there withdraw “a Healy, position President that “isolated instances” of un- were more than approving or either neutral Church was those activity inconsistent with official range of homosexual activities was therefore teachings. The trial court (Emphasis added.) unacceptable.” This University entitled conclude statement reveals what we understand to or at least neutral adopted approving “endorsement,” as be at stake. An official existing groups all of the position towards symbolized by Georgetown’s grant of perceive it did not them because “University Recognition,” express religious obligations. incompatible with approval neutrality towards or understanding comports our This with groups. George- the student Under the in this case. means what “endorsement” scheme, “University Recognition” town usurp court appellate An reserved for do fundamen- label tally challenge the “moral norms.” role the factfinder. We cannot “en- Judge Bacon’s “clearly erroneous” “clearly erro- cannot characterize as We i.e., finding, dorsement” finding that neous” Bacon’s Georgetown contains an Recognition” at “University Recognition” of- scheme neutrali- expression religious approval type of by Georgetown includes the fered obtaining that group ty towards student “Recogni- just “endorsement” described. as an “endorse- status.14 tion described it Criteria” finding accepts but that factual Ferren appellate facts. It court cannot select its An implications. Post ignores its First Amendment found the facts deals with concrete cases and Judge Terry, on the & 129 note 15. at 112-15 set the of its decision. the trial court limits hand, agree the entire Here, appears to finding other fact is trial court’s a critical except Judge Human Ferren Georgetown’s particular “Univer- court Rights scheme of requires Post at no "endorsement.” Recognition" "en- sity an institutional includes group. recipient 166-67. dorsement" of the

20

B. The Distinguished “Endorsement” “endorsement” “University contained in Tangible Recognition” group assists the student Benefits only by giving Georgetown’s imprimatur it The distinction between the “en or, least, Quite at nihil obstat. different dorsement” and the other benefits con tangible are the benefits associated with in Georgetown’s tained scheme of “Univer “University Recognition.” Unlike the “en- Recognition” sity is fundamental. It is so dorsement,” tangible benefits are “fa- statutory from both a and a constitutional services,” cilities and D.C. Code 1-2520 case, perspective. § In this separateness (1987), and expression not an abstract of of the benefits issue is obscured the University’s moral philosophy. Their they fact are together bundled into a disguised distinct characteristics are single package known as Rec both because the “endorsement” and the ognition.” Because the “endorsement” tangible additional benefits included in tangible and the benefits contained package one known as package “University Recog- distinct, are fundamentally we nition.” must sever the artificial connection be analyze

tween them in order true As amicus The Governor’s Council on issues. and Gay Lesbian Issues of the State of points out, Wisconsin The “such a structure “endorsement” contained in unnecessarily “University Recognition” University’s religious ties intangible. is an To beliefs extension of group, a student no than benefits.” Brief it is more an expression agree. 5-6. approval of official We While or neutrali the “endorsement” ty, Georgetown’s may a statement of benefits tolerance be one for organizations pose towards purposes, no administrative funda challenge they mental eyes to the “moral are not so in the of norms.” the Human Act, symbolic The “endorsement” gesture, is a they eyes nor are so in the of form of speech by a private, religiously the First “The Amendment. constitutional- institution, statute,” entity ity affiliated educational of the as the District of Co- adopt free partisan public positions remarks, depend lumbia “cannot on the moral and In speaking [University's linkages.” ethical issues.15 out internal Reply sexuality, Georgetown guided on human open Brief up package at 3. We of along “University Recognition” mission undertaken and examine its separately.16 with secular educational functions. The contents 556, 559-62, denied, 995, public university may impose 15. A content- F.2d cert. 423 U.S. 96 422, (1975); speech, Spark based restrictions on 46 not use S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 369 v. Cath America, 56, body recognition process University U.S.App.D.C. its to com olic 167 of 80-81, 1277, (1975); Cover, upon rightness wrongness ment of 510 F.2d 1281-82 homo cf. James, 169, Supreme Healy Court 1982 Term—Foreword: No- sexual conduct. v. 408 180-84, Narrative, (dis 2338, 2345-47, (1983) mos and 97 4 S.Ct. 33 L.Ed.2d 266 Harv.L.Rev. also, (1972); obligation cussing fully justify e.g., courts to Gay see Student Services v. 1317, imposition legal University, forced norms that threaten Texas A & M F.2d 1326-30 (5th autonomy Cir.1984), communities cultural committed appeal cert. denied and dis missed, 1001, 105 1860, society). to alternative moral visions of 471 U.S. 85 L.Ed.2d (1985); Missouri, Gay University Lib v. 848, (8th Cir.1977); Gay stage litigation parties 558 F.2d 852-57 Alli At no of this have the Matthews, 162, requested tangi- ance v. F.2d that the Students "endorsement" (4th Cir.1976); Organiza separately. Gay 164-67 Students ble benefits be treated The case has litigated throughout University Hampshire nothing” tion ner, New v. Bon been on an "all or 652, (1st Cir.1974); Gay 509 F.2d 657-62 basis. The student nevertheless insist they Regents only equal tangible Activists Alliance v. Board demand benefits 1116, Oklahoma, University University’s "en- 638 P.2d 1119-23 and are unconcerned about the (Okla.1981). private university, A such as dorsement.” In the words District of Georgetown, gay and their is under no such re Columbia: “The students associa- constitutional See, e.g., equal strictions. Williams v. Howard Univer tions do ask for more than access to 87, 658, sity, U.S.App.D.C. 174 denied, the incidental facilities and services which the 528 F.2d discriminatorily cert. 50 L.Ed. trial court found had been de- nied; (1976); George Washington they university approval. Greenya do 2d 123 not seek ... fully university University, App.D.C. [Tjhey if 167 U.S. would be satisfied

21 Rights government power Human to Applying C. the Act to is without intrude the spirit “Endorsement” Element into the intellect or the domain of the regulated. “University Recognition” and that be only conduct Act Interpreting Rights Human so as the Rights require The Human Act does not require Georgetown to to “endorse” the private one actor to “endorse” another. thrust groups would be to the stat- “University Recog- denial of ute across set the constitutional boundaries nition” to the student did not vio- also, Speech the Free Clause and where late the statute. raised, religious objections sincere the why, There are two reasons as a Nothing Free Exercise Clause. the stat- construction, statutory Hu matter of suggests, requires, ute let alone such a read Rights compel man Act cannot be to result. regulated express religious party ap to impli- Because interests are often similar proval neutrality any group towards or or cated, Supreme Gourt has relied on First, prohibits only the statute individual. Speech both the and Free Free Clause discriminatory “facili denial access to govern- protect against Exercise Clause to provided by ties services” an edu ment the inner intrusion into domain. The institution. D.C. 1-2520 cational Code § has Court made clear state is (1987). An is “endorsement” neither. The power regulate without intellect or Rights provides legal Act mecha Human spirit; actions its rule is over and be- treatment, equality nisms ensure only. interpret- havior In its initial decision equality Although fer attitudes. we Clause, ing the Exercise Free Court vently hope nondiscriminatory atti opinion described the division between equal tudes result from access “facilities action as “the true distinction between services,” Rights the Human Act con belongs to the properly what Church and nothing suggest legisla tains that the Reynolds what to the State.” v. United discriminatory ture intended to make States, Otto) 145, 163, (8 25 L.Ed. U.S. state of mind unlawful less itself. Still (1878). adoption of the Free With does the statute reveal desire to force Clause, “Congress deprived Exercise was private express actor idea that legislative power opinion, of all over mere truly Human held. The was free to reach actions but left which action, demands not words. It was not or were violation of social duties subver- an instrument of con intended mind good The sive of order.” Id. at 164. Court trol. Braman’s construction quoted approval a statute drafted statute, requiring expres an insincere protect religious Thomas Jefferson to free- sion opinion, conflicts with its literal enough Virginia: dom in is time “[i]t meaning. rightful government purposes of civil Second, already pointed as we have principles for its officers to interfere when out, language unless the against peace the statute out overt acts break into plainly contrary, we it (quoting Hening’s must construe good order.” Id. constitutionality. so as To uphold (1784)). mag- the civil Stat. 84 suffer “[T]o require powers read Human into into the Act a istrate to intrude his [or her] private opinion, ment actor must “en field and to restrain the that one principles profession propagation dorse” be to render the stat or another would tendency, is ill a dan- supposition ute Amend of their unconstitutional. First gerous destroys at once all speech fallacy free which protects ment free and the both The Court religious liberty.” Id. conclud- religion.17 Its is that exercise of essence provides, in relevant permits equal privileges The First Amendment access to incidental ‘recognition."’ prohibit- university Supplemen- law ... without part: "Congress make no shall original). (emphasis religion]; abridging tal Brief at On ing [of free exercise hand, compelled is towards a “endorse- other speech_" amend. Const, the freedom Georgetown's objection is ment" that I. directed. ed, as a matter constitutional principle, es. “To compulsory flag sustain the sa- government are made for the lute,” “[l]aws Court, observed the required “we are *20 actions, they and while cannot interfere say that a guards Bill of which religious with mere opinions, belief and right speak individual’s his [or her] they may practices.” Reynolds, su- with open own mind left it public authorities pra, 98 U.S. at 166.18 compel him to utter what is not [or her] mind.” Id. at 634, in his 63 S.Ct. at [or principle her]

That has been emphatically 1183. The precludes Constitution such a reaffirmed in a later free exercise case: result: “the “the Amendment action of the concepts,— embraces two local authorities freedom to in compelling flag believe and freedom pledge to act. salute and but, The first is absolute in the nature of constitutional limitations on transcended] things, the second cannot be. Conduct re power their and sphere invad[ed] subject regulation mains protec for the spirit intellect and purpose which it is the Connecticut, Cantwell v. society.” tion of of the First Amendment to our constitution supra 18, 303-04, note 310 U.S. at 60 S.Ct. to reserve from all official control.” Id. at (citations omitted). at 903 principles The 642, 63 (emphasis added). S.Ct. at 1187 embraced within the “absolute” core of the “power The state has no to force an Ameri- clause, conscience, freedom of thought and publicly profess can citizen any state- expression belief, religious as “sacred 634, ment of belief.” Id. at 63 S.Ct. at interests, private basic in democracy,” Only 1183. one pre- member of the Court Massachusetts, Prince v. 158, 165, ferred to reach by emphasizing this result (1944), 64 S.Ct. 88 L.Ed. 645 can religious objections: nature of the “Of- jostle position be forced to compulsion ficial to affirm what is contrary regarded other values by the state as more religious to one’s beliefs is the antithesis of deserving. Id. at worship.” 646, freedom of 63 S.Ct. A speech number of free cases have ex- J., (Murphy, concurring). at 1189 panded government the idea that cannot In a later free exercise concerning case force one to repugnant philoso- embrace a Sunday closing challenged statute by Or- phy. Initially, implicated these decisions Brown, Jews, thodox v. 366 Braunfeld religious objections, Supreme but the Court 599, 1144, U.S. 81 S.Ct. 6 L.Ed.2d 563 since protection has made clear (1961)(plurality opinion),the Court careful- against speech forced also extends to mat- Barnette before ly distinguished upholding ters of a secular nature. Virginia West In regulation. It stressed that Barnette, State Board Education v. “[c]ertain 319 cannot, aspects religious any exercise 624, 1178, U.S. 63 S.Ct. 87 L.Ed. 1628 way, restricted or (1943), burdened either attending children public schools legislation_ federal or state The free- required were to salute the United States religious opinions dom to hold beliefs flag upon pain expulsion possible Braunfeld, supra, absolute." penalties against criminal 366 U.S. at parents. their 603, added). symbolic gesture (emphasis This 81 S.Ct. at 1146 A was an affront religious flag “compulsory requires beliefs of Witness- salute Jehovah’s affirma- early partly Supreme 18. As as one court at least not until 1940 that the Court made the 1813, anticipated Supreme be- guarantee Court’s distinction directly applica- federal free exercise religiously tween and the un- motivated actions through ble to the states the Fourteenth Amend- derlying expression beliefs or the of those be- Connecticut, ment. See Cantwell v. 310 law, Departing English liefs. from the common S.Ct. 84 L.Ed. 1213 The (1940). 900, a New York court held that the state constitu- Philips "Although court held: differ we from the protected priest against tion a Roman Catholic brethren, religious witness and his in our creed compulsion testimony to reveal in confidences [t]hey protected by ... the laws and consti- People he had v. received the confessional. country, tution of this in the full and free exer- (N.Y.Ct.Gen.Sess. Philips report- June 1813), religion, cise of their court can never ed in W. Sampson, Question The in Amer- Catholic application or authorize countenance of in- (New photo, reprint York 1813 1974). ica faith, sult to their or torture to their con- Amendment, upon The court relied First Sampson, supra, sciences." W. at 114. constitution, though well as the state even it was compelled pliance governmentally and an mind.” with a tion attitude of of belief (quoting plates bearing at S.Ct. at Id. exhibition vehicle license Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. at motto Die.” the state “Live Free or Woo 1183) (emphasis Braunfeld). added 705, 97 ley Maynard, 430 U.S. cases, flag how salute contrast (1977). question L.Ed.2d 752 The ever, statute did not outlaw may constitu there was “whether the State Braunfeld any opin holding religious belief “the participate tionally require individual to ion, anyone it force to embrace nor [did] ideological dissemination of an mes in the say belief or to or believe sage.” Id. 97 S.Ct. at *21 in conflict his reli anything her] [or more Speech may no. no answer was be 1146; 603, gious at at tenets.” Id. 81 S.Ct. prescribed may pro it be officially than 38, accord, 472 Jaffree, v. U.S. Wallace thought right “The of freedom of scribed. 2479, 48-55, 2486-89, 86 L.Ed.2d 105 S.Ct. against by the Amendment protected First (1985) (“the First was 29 Amendment right the state action includes both to power Congress to curtail the adopted freely right to refrain from speak the the freedom to interfere with individual’s 714, 97 S.Ct. speaking at all.” Id. at at believe, worship, express himself and to Wooley explained 1435. The Court dictates in accordance with the [or herself] expression is compelled freedom from conscience”); own his Wiscon her] [or society element of a dedicated to essential 219, Yoder, 205, 406 92 S.Ct. U.S. sin v. system speech. “A secures the free which (“under 1526, 1535, (1972) 32 L.Ed.2d 15 right proselytize religious, political, absolutely Religion Clauses beliefs are the ideological guarantee causes must also control”); free from the state’s v. Gillette right to foster such concomitant to decline States, 462, 437, 401 U.S. 91 S.Ct. United right right concepts. speak The and the (“the 828, 842, (1971) Free 28 L.Ed.2d 168 complementa speaking refrain from ‘governmental regula Exercise Clause bars concept ry components of the broader religious tion of or as such’ ... beliefs ” 714, at ‘individual freedom of mind.’ Id. with the of reli interference dissemination Barnette). A state (citing 97 S.Ct. at gious (emphasis original; cita ideas” forcing an instrument measure one to be omitted)); Verner, tions Sherbert v. fostering public repug to a adherence 402, 398, 1790, 1793, 83 S.Ct. 10 L.Ed. sphere point of view invades nant (“The (1963) 2d 965 First door spirit the First Amend which intellect against tightly Amendment stands closed from all official control. Id. ment reserves regulation government religious be any 715, at 1435. at 97 S.Ct. neither as such.... Government liefs compel repugnant affirmance of belief pro recent Supreme Court’s most The penalize against or ... nor discriminate against compelled right on the nouncement they hold individuals because speech came case with expression a free (empha views abhorrent to the authorities” Gas & overtones. out Pacific omitted)). original; sis in Similar citations Commis v. Public Utilities Electric Co. 488, 81 ly, Watkins, in Torcaso v. 367 U.S. 1, 106 sion, 89 L.Ed.2d 475 U.S. S.Ct. (1961), the Court 6 L.Ed.2d 982 utility (1986) opinion). public A (plurality requiring that a statute a declaration held California company was ordered public office of belief in God as test to include Commission Utilities Public The violated the Free Exercise Clause. par third envelopes speech of a billing “unconstitutionally in regulation state disagreed. utility The ty with whom religion appellant’s freedom vade[d] regulation Gas & Electric state Pacific enforced and therefore [could not] to voice require utility did at 1684. against him.” Id. at 81 S.Ct. “endorsement,” merely to serve as a but ratepayers’ orga for the views of speech vehicle relied on free The Court broader 911 n. Fur at Barnette, nization. Id. principles, as it had in when thermore, objections were not utility’s challenge Witness- upheld the of Jehovah’s based, only the Free so that religiously com- religion es whose forbade them Speech Clause and not the Free (1974)), Exercise L.Ed.2d 730 “[cjorpora- because Id. at 908-10. Fi- implicated. Clause was associations, tions and other like individu- nally, utility engaged primarily in com- als, ‘discussion, debate, contribute to the speech relating mercial to its business in- and the dissemination of information and terests, although its newsletter also carried ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to recipes, stories about wildlife conservation foster,” id. First National at (quoting Id. public other matters of concern. Bellotti, Bank Despite 907-08. limitations, these (1978)). 55 L.Ed.2d 707 “The upheld Court utility’s objection essential thrust of the First Amendment challenged regulation. degree of in- prohibit restraints on the vol- improper upon utility’s trusion First Amendment untary public expression ideas.... rights was doubtless considerably less than necessarily There is ... a concomitant free- Judge Braman’s construction of the Hu- dom speak publicly, one which man impose upon serves the same ultimate end as freedom of Georgetown. heavily regu- contrast to a speech in Id. aspect.” its affirmative public utility, lated stock-in- 909 (quoting Harper Publishers, & Row ideas; trade is in private, as a nonprofit, *22 Inc. v. Enterprises, Nation 539, 471 U.S. religiously affiliated educational institution 559, 2218, 2230, 105 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d 588 seeking implement to its own vision of edu- Hemingway (1985) Estate cation, (quoting v. it is particular entitled to favor House, Inc., Random moral, ethical, views on philosophical, 341, 348, polit- 23 N.Y.2d ical and social issues. 771, 778, 296 250, N.Y.S.2d 244 N.E.2d 255 (1968) (emphasis original)). The Public corporations individuals,” “For as for Utilities Commission therefore could not Gas & Electric wrote the plurality, Pacific compel public the utility to “assist dis- speak “the choice to includes within it the seminating speaker’s message” id. at 912 choice of what or to say,” (citing not to Tornillo, Miami Publishing Herald Co. v. speech “associate pub- with with which [the 241, 258, Id. at 911.19 94 S.Ct. utility] may disagree.” lic unspoken respect, 19. In one Gas & Elec Finally, Human Act. Id. at 908-10. Pacific tric Barnette/Wooley differs from the line of Gas & Electric Court was divided as to Pacific upon cases which it legal weight relied. The Gas & utility’s to be attached to the Pacific plurality, having Electric 909, found a burden on the Compare commercial nature. id at utility’s speech, government regu J., held that the (plurality (Marshall, opinion) with id. at 917 lation narrowly could still be J., valid "if it were a concurring); (Rehnquist, id. at 920-22 dis serving compelling tailored means of (Stevens, J., a state senting); dissenting). id. at 922-24 interest," 913, 106 S.Ct. at but found no such Georgetown, private, We believe that as a reli present interest in that case. In Bamette/Woo- giously university, affiliated whose existence is seen, ley, protection against as we have generation devoted to the of ideas rather than compelled speech was absolute. The cases profit, considerably greater has an interest than reconciled, however, by focusing be on three public utility being that of a in not forced to factors, puts Georgetown each of which factual publicly positions embrace moral with which it ly Bamette/Wooley closer to than to Gas disagrees. Publishing Pacific Miami Herald Co. v. Cf. & Electric. Tornillo, supra, 418 U.S. 94 S.Ct. First, (no balancing applied L.Ed.2d 730 test no strik "endorsement" was threatened ing right-of-reply burdening utility required down statute Gas & Electric. The news was Pacific another, paper’s rights). to act as a vehicle First Amendment This for the views of but is not a express question government approval regulating speech by not to its of them. tolerance Thus, corporation, 106 S.Ct. at 911 n. 11. the burden on business as in Gas & Elec Pacific utility’s tric, rights imposing orthodoxy First Amendment was of a but of official on con moral, degree considerably religious, less intrusive than it is troversial issues of ethical and J., (Marshall, concurring); philosophical importance, upon entity here. See id. at 915 whose J., (Rehnquist, joined by inquire id at 917-20 is White and role into such matters. The First Stevens, JJ., (Stevens, dissenting); questions id at 922-24 Amendment not ensures that J., Second, asked, dissenting). although express topics we no difficult social will be it also for significance government dictating view as to the constitutional of this bids from the answers. distinction, religious objections accordingly no were at issue shielded from a Electric, by Gas pro- & so that the Free Exer- threatened "endorsement” the absolute Pacific implicated Bamette/Wooley, by cise Clause was not as be it would tection of rather than qualified protection here the trial court’s construction of the Gas & Electric. Pacific Gas & Electric Supreme though compelling may jus- In state interest Pacific compelled regulation religiously line con- tify Court clarified the between motivated duct, expression nothing penetrate mere of an accommodation can the constitu- Prune distinguished against speech. protecting It shield official other’s tional Robins, Shopping Yard Center coercion to renounce a or to belief 74, 100 (1980),in principle opposed 64 L.Ed.2d 741 to that endorse belief. shopping very purpose of a center set Bill of is to which owner “The of a public up required by as a forum was state from subjects withdraw certain the vicissi- “Notably ab pamphleteers. political controversy, law to admit to place tudes of them PruneYard,” Court, sent said beyond majority the reach of and officials legal principles and to establish them as to this area was concern access Barnette, su- applied the courts.” shopping might affect the center owner’s pra, 319 U.S. at 1185. right 63 S.Ct. at speak: did not own owner Georgetown’s right express opinions allege objected he to the con- even teachings in- right Catholic pamphlets; tent of the nor was based Roman PruneYard right by way grant- to do so access content-based. cludes proposition ing Recognition” groups thus not undercut the does pro- sys- regards that forced associations that burden as with that consonant belief speech impermissible. agree tected are not always tem. Individuals will with choices to what Electric, supra, Gas & Pacific deserving approval, of its but sharp contrast to threatened right freely express its is none- views here, the PruneYard “endorsement” Court protected by the First Amendment. theless pam that the had stressed the unlikelihood phleteers’ views would be identified right expression Freedom *23 shopping of those the center owner claim, lay of equal irrespective we all which specific message emphasized that no also message. easily content of This is the our being by government was dictated the the Suppose Gay illustrated. Universi- 74, 100 at 2037. that case. 447 U.S. at S.Ct. (GUA) America is established as a ty of “University Georgetown’s But scheme of its educational institution. Part of private a Recognition” analogized cannot be to understanding accept- mission is to win forum, public campus equat can its nor gay persons in an of and bisexual ance is ed with “a business establishment that Although society. open to intolerant open go they public the to come and orientation, regardless of sexual everyone, please.” Id. expect faculty, staff stu- does its GUA sympathetic a attitude required Far from accom- dents maintain PruneYard's gay practices philosophies and the speech, case modation of another’s this towards has, trial support them. GUA as the compelled expression of specter raises finds, Recog- system “University of A a First court violation of the Amendment. ap- through expresses its by which grant “University Recognition” of nition” of various student proval of or tolerance includes an “endorsement” desiring But the GUA groups that status. broadly com- groups student it considers grant “University To refuses administration patible with Roman Catholic doctrine. Recognition” to Roman Catholic Sexual extent, “University Recognition” (RCSEA). In that situa- Association compulsion grant Ethics speech. Government Rights Act’s on dis- tion, ban the Human “University Recognition” threaten would religion not on could based exercise crimination speech and free both free group, for the student Al- the Catholic avail guarantees the First Amendment. of government-fa- conformity to Legacy: risk of forced Harpaz, Flag ious Salute Justice Jackson’s Cf. requiring by directly individuals ideas” Supreme Struggles Intellec- vored Protect The Court will"; against engage speech their in such Individualism, 902-12 "to 64 Texas L.Rev. tual (1986) cases, justification government suffice (first analysis no proposed two-tiered tier encourage particular "purpose a is to if its idea"). compelled expression those cases concerns compulsion ser- government "in which creates 26

simple reason that does require Georgetown grant statute not does not give require expressions approv- GUA to Recognition” accompa- and its intangible al or tolerance. nying Insincere statements of “endorsement” stu- opinion are not Rights what the Human dent groups. requires. hand, Act On the other the stat- D. Applying Rights Human Act to require equal ute would distribution Tangible Contained in Benefits tangible attendant benefits if GUA’s denial “University Recognition” religion of these was based on the Although the student were Georgetown’s protec- RCSEA members. summary judgment entitled to against compelled expression tion is no ground denial of “Univ more and no less. ersity Recognition” including “en — trial court’s construction of the Hu- Rights dorsement”—violated the Human Rights

man Act would transform stat- Act, require Georgetown does statute ute into a violation of First Amend- distribute, to equally regard without to sex compel It would ment. “en- orientation, tangible ual con benefits the student groups despite dorse” the Su- package. tained in the same If discrimina preme warning religious Court’s ac- appears record, tion from the court may not be “say anything tor forced to ... statutory ruling sustain the “on a in conflict with tenets.” ground adopted by different from that [its] supra, Braunfeld, Holtzman, trial court.” Max 366 U.S. at Inc. v. K & T Co., at 1146. This see (D.C.1977); construction of the Human A.2d n. 6 Liberty also Mutual Insurance Rights required by Act is its lan- v. Dis neither Co. Columbia, guage by purpose ensuring (D.C. trict equal nor 316 A.2d 1974); Wynn, concretely treatment —treatment mea- Wells 311 A.2d 829 n. services,” (D.C.1973). access sured to “facilities Our review of the record genuine tangi educational ex- dispute institution’s reveals no that the pressed approval “purposes and ac- were ble benefits denied on the basis recipient groups.20 tivities” sexual orientation. The Human was violated to that extent.21 Georgetown’s obligation under the stat- express point depend ute is not to particular The Human Act cannot regulated view. It to make avail- for its actor’s benefits enforcement *24 regard purely sincere, to its students to their subjective, able without albeit evaluation Rights prejudice sexual orientation. The Human Act of its own motivations. “Bias or course, does, Rights guar- 20. The Human record Act of on the before us we have no knowl- endeavours, edge proportion equal of if apart by what those antee status conferred from that any, advocacy specific case, is devoted to of theo- expression. compelled In the student objects. ry Georgetown of ethics to which sexual groups “University Recogni- would be entitled to applied, Even if it would mean at most Abood tion,” orientation, regardless of sexual if that tangible up benefits that the could be withheld unwilling did status not include an "endorse- only. extent that undetermined ment." Similarly, assumption the unfounded that the groups exclusively engaged advo- student cacy Georgetown tangi- does not contend that Georgetown repug- idea which of the finds subsidy ble benefits constitute of a forced Judge Judge Belson nant blinds Nebeker See, speech opposed. e.g., to which it is Abood Georgetown’s the existence of orientation sexual Education, v. Detroit Board Along with amicus Arthur B. discrimination. Spitzer, (1977). Judge S.Ct. 52 L.Ed.2d 261 Bel- they unambiguous recognize fail son, Nebeker, by argues joined Judge therefore text, Georgetown signs, discussed an issue that it is not before at 67-72 & us. Post composi- predominantly took the homosexual 14; Ferren, by Judge joined Judge see also note groups deny- student tion of the into account in post Terry, if it were 51-52 & 67 note 9. Even ing tangible Contrary to the them benefits. presented, propo- Abood Nebeker, nowhere stands for views of Belson and always sition forced subsidization is uncon- Georgetown’s objection an idea simultaneous unwilling stitutional. That case concerned the morally enough to re- it finds offensive is not speech. finding The student subsidization offensive of discrimination under lieve it from engage Rights groups range of Act. here in a wide activities the Human ly separate inquiries the stu- an elusive condition of the mind be two is such —are difficult, if for the impossible, groups qualified” it is most “otherwise dent existence_” so, Craw recognize seek, and, its always tangible they if did benefits States, v. United 29 Georgetown deny tangible those benefits ford (1909). 53 L.Ed. 465 It is of their mem- due to the sexual orientation recognize difficult to one’s own particularly Here, because the answer to both bers? Apart orga discriminatory. from acts as by questions is determined those distinct purely techni nizations that failed to meet “purposes objective reference to mem requirements cal such as a minimum groups, what are activities” of the student Georgetown bership, the record shows that separate inquiries collapse normally two “University Recognition” to a never denied into one: did the homosexual orientation mainly com group student that was not treat- group members cause them to be posed persons with a homosexual orien differently applicants? ed from other here, Where, possessing as those tation. by Georgetown’s We are not bound by legislature characteristics identified perception “purposes subjective as irrelevant to individual merit are treated objected. George activities” to which it others, favorably less than the Human “purposes must view the and activi town reg imposes upon the a burden group way in a which is ties” ulated actor to demonstrate that the irrele upon impermissible reliance free played part vant characteristic no in its Ac factors unrelated to individual merit. Georgetown present decision. failed to cordingly, if the homosexual status could was uninfluenced facts that show it group entered into members by tangi in denying sexual orientation “purposes and activities” assessment ble benefits. groups, unconsciously, of the student albeit nondiscriminatory One reason asserted was itself the denial of benefits Georgetown tangi- by for its denial of the orientation. Put different based sexual “University ble benefits contained in Rec- ly, it would be irrelevant that ognition” give its was it could not doing nothing ap more than saw itself accompanying “endorsement” to the stu- guidelines plying neutral established violating groups dent without “Recognition if sexual orientation Criteria” Act, principles. But as the Human those standards had in fact influenced how direct, construed, properly requires no in- applied. were tangible “endorsement,” Georgetown can- application finding denying not avoid a of discrimination on GPGU’s ground. remaining Recognition” Georgetown ad- nondiscrimi- natory group’s expressed purpose reasons asserted to that verted “pur- (one four) be summarized as follows: the “provide a forum for poses and activities” of the student sexual ethics development responsible by “Recogni- fell outside the boundaries set personal one’s beliefs.” consonant Criteria,” rendering ineligible tion them supra note (quoted *25 See GPGU Constitution tangible they sought the and not benefits 5). Roman purpose That is at odds with meaning qualified” “otherwise within the teachings. constitu- But GRC’s Catholic (1987); statute, D.C. 1-2520 Code statement; § comparable no tion contained and, event, tangible any of the denial objection was to Georgetown’s stated “purposes and benefits was based on the “[pjrovide to much broader intention GRC’s groups, not on the activities” of the student entering the Law gay and men lesbians members, so homosexual status of their Washing- information about with Center the students that the orientation of sexual including community, education- gay ton’s part played involved no in the decisionmak- cultural, religious, social and medical al, ing process, id. (quoted See GRC Constitution services.” 6). purposes GRC’s supra note Because case, nondiscriminatory the rea- In this serving to commitment an asexual ef- include by Georgetown have the sons asserted experienced by range of needs the broad together normal- fusing of what would fect students, no homosexual but statement as automatically others assumed be a to nec- propriety conduct, to essary the of homosexual attribute their of homosexual orien- Georgetown’s objection organiza- to that tation.

tion to must some extent been have Other George- conclusive evidence that prompted by the of sexual orientation its town took homosexual into orientation ac- members. recognition procedures count its is sup- by Georgetown’s plied the day

That fact that as he gay treatment of the same “University Recognition” denied to was not GRC at exclusively influ- Center, the Law specific Healy enced President wrote an by objection “purposes to essentially identical letter to and the Chancellor activities” inconsistent with Roman Center, despite of the Medical dogma the fact that by Catholic was further evidenced no homosexually oriented Gottfried, students there University’s Debbie Director applied had ever for such status. Presi- of clarifying Student Activities. Healy dent wrote: GPGU’s status after it had obtained “Stu- Endorsement,” Body dent but had I am sure you failed are aware that the Recognition,” obtain “University Gay Campus Students Gottfried on Main have University change appealed wrote that the Father Freeze’s would not decision me. position appeal recently its “on That has been denied.... what feels would be you presented interpreted as Since a sim- endorsement be with and official Center, ilar situation support range Medical of issues associ- full of point ap- want to out that this ated decision with this Letter D. cause.” from plies equally to the Medical (Jan. 1980) Center. (empha- Gottfried GPGU added). sis At no time has S.J., Healy, Letter from President T. by range defined what it meant “the full 8, 1980). McNulty (May Chancellor M. issues” gay associated with the student This action amounted to an adverse deci- groups, despite its insistence that Roman sion without on the mer- any consideration Catholic provision doctrine favors the its, light criteria neutral sexual equal political rights civil orientation, to homosexu- “purposes and activities” ally persons oriented that its group might of whatever be formed some- objection pro- was directed explicable only time in future. It is if motion of homosexual conduct. Gottfried’s Georgetown predominantly considered repeated was by statement later Dean homosexual orientation some future stu- Schuerman, Center, University group who wrote dent at the Medical and not activities,” endorsement, support just specific “purposes would not lend its or approval positions by gay to “the taken to be factor of intrinsic relevance ” grant Recognition.” That a range movement on a issues full which, predominantly major “the homosexual orientation activities and issues tangible be definition, would fatal to a benefits bid gay orga- associated beyond at the establishes Medical Center Dean nization." Letter from W. Schuer- Georgetown was not oblivi- doubt that (Feb. 1980) man to (emphasis GPGU application in its ous to sexual orientation added). McCarthy Similarly, Dean when “Recognition Criteria.” application turned down GRC’s at the Law Center, University he wrote that the apparent correspondence, It is subsidy support lend its official Braman all of which was before a gay organization law student because granted summary judgment when he many interpreted by issue, “would discrimination positions endorsement taken closely denial benefits was *26 gay range movement issues." specific “purposes and activities” of tied to full of Jr., McCarthy, Letter from Dean D. to GRC groups promoting the the homosex- student (Feb. 1980) 26, added). George- (emphasis by ual conduct condemned Roman Catholic town groups inescapable thus ascribed to the student The is doctrine. conclusion “purposes predominantly gay not of only composition and activities” which that the had, groups played at some they may have also of the student least but a host Council, Georgetown. in treatment by By City explained role their Rule to Council objecting groups’ to the regula- assumed members that the District because connection, definition,” “by range Rights Act,” to a “full “parallels tion the the Civil “gay associated the public of issues” move- could look to the federal model to ment,” than specific “purposes rather concerning many questions answer of their inconsistent with its Roman activities” the of the administration and enforcement tradition, Georgetown engaged in Catholic Rights Act. of Human District Columbia stereotyping the unrelated to indi- kind of Council, City Report on Committee Title by vidual merit that forbidden the Hu- Law,” (Oct. 15,1973) Rights “The Human short, In Rights man Act. the record re- (available (herein- Building) in the District genuine veals no doubt II”); Report after “Parker see also District nondiscriminatory asserted basis its ac- City Council, Committee Re- Columbia by preconceptions in fact tion was tainted Rights Law,” port on Title “The Human gay persons. Georgetown about not did 7, 1973) (available (Aug. the District apply “Recognition equal Criteria” on an (hereinafter I”). Building) Report “Parker regard basis all without to the Report specifically The Parker II cited sexual orientation their members. Griggs “upheld appli- noted that it the cability Rights of the Civil cases of finding that Braman’s discrimination.” at 3 unintentional Id. on the discriminated basis (emphasis original). supported by sexual orientation is further bill, express During passage provision his reliance on the of the the Coun- another despite Rights oppo- the cil retained the effects clause Human Act. The effects clause A provides “[a]ny practice employers. sition from local submission which has the violating Metropolitan Washington consequence any effect or the Board provisions Telephone Compa- and the C P chapter of this shall be Trade & ny preparation in the discriminatory deemed resulted a memo to be unlawful practice.” (1987). reaffirming members Code 1-2532 distributed Council D.C. Un § section, Report’s interpretation: despite “The der that the absence of Parker discriminate, Supreme practices Griggs intention to Court v. Duke Power are un held they lawful if that unintentional discrimination disproportionately bear Rights just under Act as protected independently as liable the Civil class are not District of justified for some intentional discrimination.” Co- nondiscriminatory rea Council, City Memorandum on Pro- legislative history son. As the lumbia demon strates, posed Title at 5 Draft Clarifications: imported the Council into the Hu 1973) (available (Oct. 11, Act, in the District Rights man way of the effects clause, (emphasis original). The Building) concept impact dis disparate dis- “[wjhile memo unintentional developed Supreme crimination added by the Co., crimination would be unlawful Griggs Court in [under Duke Power finding Rights Act], a of such Human 28 L.Ed.2d 158 judgment of (1971). prevent any probably against perpetrator.” Id. damages shortly Hu- Griggs, decided before the only inconsequential made Council Rights original man Act was in its passed wording of the effects changes to municipal regulation, form as a the Su- originally proposed. clause as preme interpreted Court the federal Civil Rights estab- A Act violation was Human not prohibiting Act of 1964 regard Georgetown’s denial discrimination, practic- lished with also intentional but The evidence be- benefits. prejudice protected groups es which permit Braman fore independent, supported by are some consciously de- justification. conclusion nondiscriminatory Griggs sexual orientation due nied benefits drafters expressly upon was relied It is none- groups involved. of the student original Act when Human University allowed that the theless evident Marjorie regulation adopted. Dr. Par- was of the individu- orientation ker, homosexual of one of the committees chairwoman “purposes and just the pre-Home als involved—not proposed law *27 30

activities” organizations— of their student empts it from the Rights Human Act’s creep to decisionmaking. By into its fail- tangible edict distribute the benefits ing objections to confine its “purposes equally regard without to sexual orienta- and activities” which it found offensive for disagree. tion. We reasons independent of the orienta- sexual students, tion of Georgetown discrimi- court, In the trial due to position organiza- nated. The gay “a prior construction; statutory Braman’s “by tion” is definition” associated a premised Bacon free her exercise “full range of issues” reveals that sexual analysis on the compli mistaken belief that Georgetown’s orientation was a factor in Rights ance with the Human Act would tangible denial of benefits. That statement require Georgetown provide religious established an intentional violation. D.C. tangible “endorsement” as well as benefits. (1987); and, event, Code 1-2520 § The true issue is a much more limited one. under Rights the effects clause the Human It is whether the forced distribution of prohibits Act also unintentional discrimina- tangible regard various benefits without tion, id. Finally, 1-2532. of the none § orientation, sexual severed from the direct Human narrowly Act’s ex- drawn required by compelled “endorsement” ceptions Georgetown avails here.22 grant “University Recognition,” imposes having Human vio- been George an unconstitutional burden benefits, respect lated with to the religion.23 town’s exercise of The answer proceed we free exercise is no. defense.

IV A. The Free Exercise Clause GEORGETOWN’S FREE provides The Free Exercise Clause EXERCISE DEFENSE “Congress pro shall no law make ... hibiting religion. the free Georgetown claims that Exer- exercise” of the Free Const, cise Clause of First ex- Amendment amend. I. This terse check on 1056, l-2503(b) (1987) Religion, (permitting § 22. See D.C.Code tion 91 HarvJL.Rev. 1083-89 religious organizations, political (same). hand, (1978) or order to they argue On the other promote religious political principles, their or asserting barred from give preference persons religious of the same free exercise defense the Establishment l-2503(a) political persuasion); or see also id. § Again, Clause of the First we Amendment. dis ("business necessity” exception of unin- in cases agree. ica, University v. Catholic Amer Granfield discrimination); 1-2513(a) (ex- tentional id. § 183, 191-93, U.S.App.D.C. 174 530 F.2d ception employment practices for bona fide 1035, (no standing assert 1043-45 Establish seniority systems); employment id. benefit seeking only ment claim "incom Clause when 1-2513(b) (exception police § officer plete transitory prohibi of the enforcement firefighter programs cadet for minimum making the clause” tions of and without limits); (exception age maximum id. 1-2518 § litigation), government party responsible official leasing practices in rental or for owner-occu- 68, denied, t. 97 S.Ct. 429 U.S. 50 cer accommodations); l-2521(a) pied (excep- id. § (1976). reject 81 L.Ed.2d We also student practices single-sex tion in education for schools University’s groups’ accept contention that the level); graduate (exception below id. 1-2524 § funding on ance of certain condition federal approved plans). for action affirmative worship “religious that it not be used for or a contend, 23. The on the one 1132e(c) (1982), activity,” sectarian 20 U.S.C. § hand, secular functions operates right as a to raise a waiver of its free educational institution meets none Murphy exercise defense. v. Villanova Universi established criteria education (E.D.Pa.1982), aff’d, F.Supp. ty, 547 520-21 permit which would it to invoke the Free Exer- (3d Cir.1983) (no standing to sue 707 F.2d Richardson, disagree. cise Tilton v. Clause. We pri of federal statute in absence of for breach 403 U.S. action); Club, vate cause of Sierra California (1971) (institution may both L.Ed.2d 790 have 287, 292-93, characteristics); secular see also 14-6, and sectarian (1981) (setting forth L.Ed.2d standards L. (1978) (definition -7 Law §§ Constitutionai. Tribu, American private implying under federal cause of action religion under more liberal statute). Free Exercise than under Clause Establishment Clause); Note, Towards Constitutional Defini-

31 power given pulsion grant tangible has rise to num benefits with- government controlling principles. “University Recognition.” who in ber of One out This case nothing” Free in order to litigated vokes the Exercise Clause “all or has been on the gain exemption govemmentally from a im basis the trial court's construc- reflected obligation initially posed must establish Human Act. is never- tion of the It regulation compliance that forced with Georgetown has undisputed that theless impose religious or her will a burden on his consistently refused to furnish the addition- Although burdens on reli exercise. not all groups, tangible al benefits to the student unconstitutional, gious an ex exercise its throughout has linked refusal religious prac emption accommodating the teachings. Georgetown is Roman Catholic govern granted tice must be unless extending opposed apparently the addi- compel it has a ment can demonstrate that tangible tional benefits because its belief ling overriding enforcing or an interest establishing life- another normative so, challenged regulation. If the court conflicting style norms” with “moral promotion must assure itself that obligations as violate its a Roman governmental objective compelling out objection This is not institution. Catholic imposed upon the weighs prac the burden bizarre, nonreligious clearly so in na- “so moreover, and, religion tice protection to be ture as not entitled challenged regulation is the least restric under the Free Exercise Clause.” Thomas government tive which the can means Board, supra, v. 450 715- Review U.S. at See, e.g., Bob compelling attain its end. 16, Thus, at 1431. 101 S.Ct. while States, v. University 461 Jones United of a direct “endorsement” has been threat 2017, 2034-35, 574, 602-04, 103 U.S. S.Ct. defused, Georgetown’s primary reli- States v. (1983); United 76 L.Ed.2d 157 accordingly, it gious abated would be fear Lee, 1051, 252, 257-60, 102 455 S.Ct. U.S. exclusively on that inappropriate dwell 1055-56, v. (1982); Thomas 71 L.Ed.2d 127 fact conclude that no burden had been Board, 450 707, 718-19, Review 101 U.S. record, particularly shown. From 1432, (1981); 624 S.Ct. 67 L.Ed.2d groups, with the student correspondence Yoder, supra, v. 406 U.S. at Wisconsin reli- Georgetown’s sincere we conclude that 219-21, 1535-36; Sherbert v. at 92 S.Ct. direct, in- go gious objections beyond Verner, 402-09, supra, 374 U.S. at S.Ct. and extend to dis- tangible “endorsement” at 1793-96. tangible benefits of the contested tribution grant Recog- “University even without Georgetown’s B. The on Burden nition.” Religious Exercise circumstances, given especially In these stage inquiry is to The first of our nothing” manner which the “all or compulsion to decide whether state distrib litigated, accept that the we case has been orientation, ute, regard without to sexual the Human of enforcement threat tangible various with benefits associated regard to the Rights Act with Recognition” of a mail —use on imposes burden benefits Service, box, Computer Label access to the for it to invoke religious practice sufficient facilities, ability apply mailing and the Exercise the Free Clause. receive) (but funding necessarily Inter- Compelling Governmental C. The Georgetown’s prac —would interfere Orientation Eradicating Sexual est in See, religion. tice of Roman Catholic Discrimination e.g., Alamo Foundation Tony and Susan Labor, 305- Secretary George Next, if the burden L.Ed.2d 278 105 S.Ct. is not to render religious practice town’s Lee, supra, (1985); States v. United Rights Act unconstitutional the Human 1054-55. whether must determine applied, we compelling has of Columbia District developed the parties fully have not in the governmental interest overriding imposed would be extent of the burden that discrimina- orientation sexual eradication by com- Georgetown's exercise Unemployment Appeals tion. Hobbie v. when we recall the reasons and the ne- — Commission, U.S.-, founding cessity for the of our nation (1987); 94 L.Ed.2d 190 Bob Jones place. the first At this time in our histo- *29 States, University v. supra, United ry, greater and doubtless to a in extent 603-04, 2034-35; U.S. at 103 S.Ct. at Unit future, population our is diverse be- Lee, 257-58, supra, 455 ed States v. U.S. at yond describing. day long past, The is 1055; 102 S.Ct. at Thomas v. Review if, fact, existed, in it ever when we could Board, 718-19, 101 supra, 450 U.S. at identify groups people supposedly who “[0]nly at 1432. those interests of the attitudes, characteristics, share common highest order and those not otherwise is, then, abilities or limitations. It in this legitimate served can overbalance claims to spirit through regulation and this religion.” the free exercise of Wisconsin attempt support rights we of indi- Yoder, supra, diversity poten- viduals in all their and at 1533. We conclude that the District of tial. Columbia’s stake in the eradication of sexu I, Report supra, Parker at 2. al orientation discrimination one such is person’s The Council determined that a interest. orientation, person’s sexual like a race and outset, At the we note that the District sex, example, nothing for tells of value unmistakably of Columbia Council is of this characteristics, attitudes, about his or her opinion. enacting Rights In the Human abilities or limitations. It is a false mea- Act, placed the Council sexual orientation worth, sure individual one unfair and among category discrimination of social concerned, oppressive person one traditionally occupied by evils discrimina- harmful to others because discrimination race, color, religion, tion on based national grave recurring injury upon inflicts a sex, See, origin, age, e.g., and so forth. society as a this put whole. To an end to (1987). In D.C.Code 1-2501 the Council’s § evil, the Council outlawed sexual orienta- view, all forms of discrimination based on in employment, tion discrimination D.C. anything than other individual merit are (1987), Code 1-2512 in real estate trans- § equally injurious, to the victims immediate actions, -2517, public 1-2515 id. §§ society and to as a whole. accommodations, 1-2519, in edu- id. § driving adoption force behind institutions, and else- cational id. § legislation necessity this for was re- where, comprehensive 1-2511. Such id. § membering, appropriately, what is embod- necessary to ensure that measures were respect ied in our Bill of —the equal op- “[ejvery individual shall have dignity population. individual in a diverse participate fully in econom- portunity to legislative history original As the of the ic, cultural and intellectual life of the Dis- regulation reveals: trict, equal opportunity to and to have an emphasize that our intent [W]e aspects participate all of life....” Id. regulation far-reaching. this We are is Only by eradicating discrimination based principle committed to the basic orientation, along with all other on sexual every person seeking each and access to of discrimination unrelated to indi- forms opportunities in the District facilities and merit, could the District eliminate vidual right to considered of Columbia has a personal injustice and build a so- recurrent on the basis of individual such access encourages expects full ciety which right expect merit and a reasonable of the com- every contribution of member made, in accommodations to be so consid- diversity potential. munity in all their unique- ering, in deference to individual legislative power In armed with Somehow, country, have ness. we Rule, by Home newly granted to it develop people tended to as a nation regulation its earlier onto elevated among very Council who find the differences us 1- footing. D.C.Code statutory See discomforting. especially This is ironic §§ (1987).24 doing, to -2557 compelling governmental so interest. That is question emphatically reaffirmed its belief that enforcement of of law and “[i]t province judicial department the Human a matter of vital of the say importance Marbury to the District. The what the law is.” v. Madi committee (1 son, Cranch) 2 L.Ed. 60 report original notes that enactment (1803). Here, question presented is a rights regulation human as a statute would Although novel one. it is well settled that “affirmatively forcefully convey to the government compelling has a interest agencies executive and administrative the eradication of other forms of discrimi importance the District Government the nation, race, such Bob e.g., based places vigorous which Council en- States, University supra, Jones v. United provisions.” forcement of its Council of *30 604, 2035, sex, 461 at 103 at U.S. S.Ct. Columbia, Report the District of Committee e.g., Jaycees, Roberts v. United 468 States Rights on Bill “The Human Act of 609, 625, 104 3244, 3253, U.S. S.Ct. 82 L.Ed. 1977,” 5, 1977) (available (July at 3 in the (1984), appellate 2d 462 no court has had to Building). District Enactment of the Hu- question in answer that the context of sex Rights man Act intended was to “under- ual orientation discrimination. score the Council’s intent that the elimina- tion of discrimination within the of District task, therefore, approach We our with highest priori- Columbia should have ‘the trepidation. society more than a little Our ty’_” Among Id. at 3. the statute’s upon is built a heterosexual model. We are purposes basic is “reinforcement of the met the outset with centuries of attitudi- at Council’s view that the Human thinking, by sincerely nal often colored among important our most and is to laws beliefs, held that has obscured agencies be vigorously by enforced all and appraisal growth scientific and stunted the officials of the District Government....” legal protecting of theories homosexual legislative at 1. From the history, Id. persons from invidious discrimination. We there can be no doubt that the Council know one basic fact—that homosexual and regards the eradication of sexual orienta- part society bisexual citizens have been of tion compelling govern- discrimination as a orientations, from time immemorial. These mental University interest. v. Howard heterosexuals, like that of have cut across Cf. Best, (D.C.1984) (sex 484 A.2d 978 race, sex, all diverse na- classifications— discrimination); Washington Greater origin, religion, and to name tional but Business Center District Columbia reflection, few. After careful we cannot Commission on 454 A.2d Rights, Human conclude that one’s sexual orientation is a (D.C.1982)(same). 1337 reflecting upon individual characteristic merit. disregard

While not lightly to be ed, strong feelings the Council’s do Modern research on sexual orientation began investigation resolve the Alfred issue whether its ban on sexual C. represents Kinsey orientation his associates into human sexu- discrimination way pioneering paved Civil Since the District Columbia’s sures which federal area, legislation statutory protec- seq. in this similar 42 U.S.C. 2000e et §§ Act of Rosen, tions have been enacted in the State of (1982). 1982 generally, e.g., The Law and See Wisconsin. See codification in sec- scattered Employment, 53 Racial Discrimination in Calif. (listed tions of in West General Wis.Stat.Ann. Sutin, (1965); Experience 775-76 The L.Rev. Index under “Discrimination —sexual or- 1986 Employment Com- State Fair Commissions—A ientation"). Many other states have executive (1965); Study, parative Vand.L.Rev. cf. prohibiting discrimi- orders sexual orientation Liebmann, York State Ice Co. v. New addition, public employment. nation in (1932) 262, 311, 52 76 L.Ed. 747 growing of cities considerable and number J., ("It (Brandéis, dissenting) happy is one of the gay counties nationwide have some form of rights single system the federal that a incidents of Gay generally National ordinance. See choose, courageous may, State if its citizens Gay Rights Force, Task Protections United laboratory; try novel social and serve (1985). mounting re- This States Canada experiments risk to the rest without economic may sponse problems gay people to the face country”). compared to the local mea- antidiscrimination Weinberg From study disproved. al behavior. his twelve A. M. & S. Bell, males, largest thousand white still the Hammersmith, Sexual De- Preference — Its kind, Kinsey reported had velopment 50% in Men and Women 210-11 psychic expe- nor neither overt homosexual (hereinafter (1981) Sexual Preference — Its after the A. riences onset of adolescence. Development Some Women). in Men and W. PomeROY Kinsey, Martin, & C. Sexual posit researchers that sexual orientation HUMAN MALE 650-51 IN THE BEHAVIOR multiple gener- have It is roots. Id. (1948). Another had at least some 37% had ally agreed, however, that individual sexual experience point overt homosexual develops orientation at least ado- orgasm between adolescence and old lescence, 186-87, 211, 222, id. if not age, remaining while the reacted erot- 13% Saghir childhood, during id.; M. &E. Rob- ically having physi- to other males without Homosexuality 17-31 ins, Female Male & contacts. Id. half of his sam- cal Almost (1973); Marmor, Multiple Overview: ple had both homosexual heterosexual and Behavior, in Roots Homosexual Homo- experiences point during their some Reappraisal sexual Behavior: A Modern Kinsey’s findings challenged lives. Id. (J. 1980); Storms, 19-21 Marmor ed. popular assumption ma- that the vast Orientation, Theories Sexual 38 J. Per- people jority exclusively heter- either sonality Psychology (1980); & Soc. sug- exclusively osexual or homosexual and *31 Warren, Stigma, Homosexuality and gested that instead sexual re- individual Reap- A Modern Homosexual Behavior: sponses and be- behavior fall somewhere earlier, supra, at praisal, or even these tween extremes for some 46% Boy Girl, supra, at Woman, Man and and population. stressing See id. While 235. continuum, existence of for convenience study It was found one of almost scale, Kinsey adopted seven-point fifteen hundred and homosex- heterosexual denoting exclusively zero homosexual men and that homosexual ual women six the exclusively and heterosexual. Id. typically experienced adults sexual had Kinsey at 636-50. The continues to scale feelings years in that direction about three afterwards, upon today. Shortly relied be engaging before in intimate homosexual Kinsey diversity found a of sexual similar Develop- activity. Sexual Preference — Its responses among and A. behavior women. supra, at 187-88. Women, W. P. Kinsey, ment in Men and Martin & Geb- C. Pomeroy, adult There is no reliable evidence that hard, Sexual in the Human Fe- Behavior attempt homosexual orientation —the minimum, (1953). male 473-74 Kin- At a opposite made in the direction—can never sey’s complexity and research revealed the 217; Churchill, be “cured.” Id. at W. diversity and of human sexual orientations Among Males 283- prompted inquiry. considerable further Homosexual Behavior Coleman, (1967); Changing Approaches agreement yet, As there is no scientific Homosexuality: A Treatment heterosexual, origins bisexual as to the Psycho- Homosexuality: Review, in Social Although vari- or homosexual orientation. Biological logical 81-82 (W. and Issues biological, social psychoanalytic ous Marmor, 1982); & J. Weinrich eds. Paul advanced, learning none theories have been in Ho- Aspects Homosexuality, Clinical J. Mon- acceptance. has won common See Reapprais- mosexual Behavior: A Modern Boy ey Woman, & A. Ehrhardt, Man and Kinsey at 277. Alfred C. supra, al, (1972) (hereinafter Man and and Girl has concluded for Sex Research Institute Boy Acosta, Etiology Woman, Girl); empirical from its studies 4 Ar- Homosexuality, and Treatment deeply ingrained [Homosexuality is as 9,13-18 (1975); Mac- Sexual chives Behav. heterosexuality_ ho- Waddington, [Exclusive Culloch & Neuroendocrine in- mosexuality deeply is so probably Aetiology Male Mechanisms attempt or one grained that should 139 J. Brit. Homosexuality, and Female Rather, it would Psychiatry change (1981). expect to it. On the other simply hand, make far more sense popular probably have been several theories recognize component ple’s it as a basic proclivities. sexual homo- Too often person’s identity_ core Neither ho- simply sexuals have been viewed with ref- mosexuals nor heterosexuals are what erence to their sexual interests and activi- Homosexuals, they by design. are in ty. Usually psycho- the social context and particular, per- cannot be dismissed as logical experience correlates of homosexual simply sons refuse to conform. who largely ignored, making highly for a There is no reason to think it would be image persons constricted involved.” any easier for homosexual men or wom- Study Diversity Homosexualities —A en to reverse their sexual orientation Among 24-25; supra, at Women, Men and than would for heterosexual readers Paul, see also Social Issues and Homosex- predominantly exclusively become Taxonomy Categories ual Behavior: A homosexual. (dis- Anti-Gay Argument and Themes in Development Sexual PREFERENCE—Its cussing stereotypes affecting gay false swpra, Women, Men and Homosexuality: Psycho- people) in Social, logical Biological homosexuality The idea that is a form of supra, Issues, widely mental disorder has been aban- 46-52. doned. See Resolution of the House of Despite its irrelevance to individual mer- Representatives Psycho- of the American it, a homosexual or bisexual orientation (1975); logical Association Resolution No. ongoing prejudice invites in all walks 7514 of the American Public Health Associ- life, ranging employment to edu- (1975); ation Resolution of the American cation, and for most of which there is cur- (Dec. 15, 1973). Psychiatric Association judicial Dis- rently remedy no outside the Rejection upon of this notion stud- followed trict of Columbia or the State of Wisconsin. revealing ies that heterosexual and homo- Rivera, Queer generally See Law: Sexual performed equally sexual men and women in the Mid-Eighties Orientation Law *32 psychological on standard tests and were Dayton (Part II), (1986) 11 U. L.Rev. 275 similarly psychopathology. E.g., free of M. Dayton cases); (Part I), (citing id. 10 U. Psychologi- Homosexuality Freedman, and (1985) (same); Rivera, L.Rev. 459 Recent Functioning (1971); Hooker, The Ad- cal Law, Developments in Sexual Preference Homosexual, justment the Male Overt (1980-81)(same); 30 Drake L.Rev. 311 Riv- Projective (1957). 21 J. 18 Techniques era, Straight-Laced Judges: The Le- Our Gay people experience particular psy- do gal Position Homosexual Persons in stresses, chological however, preju- due to Hastings States, 30 L.J. 799 the United against dice settings. them social A. See (1979)(same). Illustrative is a 1950 Senate Weinberg, Bell & M. Homosexualities —A investigation employment into the of homo- Study Diversity Among Men Wom- and perverts” persons sexual and “other moral (1978)(hereinafter en 195-216 Homosexual Study Diversity Among government. It in the concluded federal ities—A Men government pervert one “sex in a that even Women). have a corrosive influence agency tends to impossible typecast Just as it is heter- employees_ homo- upon his fellow One (or, osexually persons oriented for that pollute government office.” sexual can matter, racial minorities or members of Expenditures in the Senate Committee on women), gay neatly pi- people cannot be Employment Departments, Executive geonholed any recognizable category. into Perverts Homosexuals and Other Sex tells passim. Id. A homosexual orientation 241, Cong., 2d 81st Government, No. S.Doc. nothing abilities or commit- reliable about (1950). As a result of this rea- 3-5 Sess. work, personal religion, politics, ments in the feder- soning was not until 1975that activities, relationships, and social or social employ- ban on the government lifted its al many areas the except to the extent that gener- workers. See ment of homosexual people frequently condi- gay lives of Slovenko, Homosexual and Socie- ally tioned the attitudes of others. Id. Day- Perspective, 10 U. ty: A Historical forgotten that “homo- 139-216. It is often 445, (1985). Erupting into 451 peo- sexuality encompasses far more than ton L.Rev. 36

violence, prejudice social sometimes cy” challenge takes sodomy applied statute as unprovoked defendant); the form of attacks gay on those Gay Law Students As- Gay perceived gay. to be See National Telephone sociation & Pacific Anti-Gay/Lesbian FORCE, Co., 458, 474-75, Telegraph 24 Cal.3d 595 Task Victimiza- (1984); Harry, 592, 602, 14, Derivative Cal.Rptr. (1979) Deviance: P.2d 156 tion Extortion, Fag-Bashing, (equal protection The Cases guarantee of state consti- Men, Gay Shakedown 19 CRIMINOLOGY by public utility’s tution violated exclusion (1982); Humphries, Russo gay people & Homosex- of employment opportuni- Encyclopedia Crime, ties). uality and in 2 866, (S. 869-70 Kadish CRIME Justice If we were to measure these characteris 1983). ed. against tics as these standards we would persisted Such discrimination has find that scientific literature characterizes throughout history. most of generally See sexual orientation as a status which is “de Homosexuality: History Bullough, termined causes not within the [individu V. A Gay/Lesbian (1979); control,” J. Katz, Lucas, see Mathews v. al’s] A Almanac: Documentary Gay (1983); 495, 505, 2755, 2762, J. Katz, U.S. 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed. New History (1976); (1976) 2d 651 (discussing illegitimacy), and American Historical Per- spectives Homosexuality (S. Licata & R. generally subject one not change, see 1981) Petersen eds. (reprinting 6 J. Homo- Richardson, Frontiero v. sexuality (1980-81)). perhaps its most 1764, 1770, 93 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d 583 form, prejudice against gay virulent people (1973) sex, (plurality opinion) (discussing led to the Nazi camps. concentration origin); race and national Parham v. There, prisoners homosexual were distin- 347, 351, Hughes, 441 U.S. 99 S.Ct. guished, fellows, by like their unfortunate (1979) (plurality opin L.Ed.2d 269 badge, a cloth in their case one which sin- ion) (same). Obviously, one is no less het gled them out for unusual atrocities. See erosexual, merely bisexual or homosexual Lautman, Triangle The Pink Perse- because he or she is celibate. Homosexual —The cution Homosexual Males in Concen- ly bisexually persons oriented have Camps Germany, tration in Nazi in His- “subjected been unique disabilities on Perspectives Homosexuality, torical the basis of stereotyped characteristics not supra, at 141. truly indicative of their abilities.” See Massachusetts Board Retirement v. Although by prerequisite no means Murgia, compelling governmen- conclusion of a our *33 2567, (1976) curiam) (per 49 L.Ed.2d 520 interest, parenthetically tal we note (discussing elderly). Sexual orientation appears possess sexual orientation most ability no “bears relation to the individual’s per- or all of have the characteristics that participate society,” in and contribute to Supreme apply suaded the Court to strict Lucas, supra, see Mathews v. 427 U.S. at heightened scrutiny leg- or constitutional 505, 2762, and 96 S.Ct. at Equal under islative classifications Pro- “[discriminations Democracy supported by merely are not to be tection fanciful Ely, Clause. See J. and Harrison, (1980); conjecture,” v. 301 Co. Distrust 162-64 L. Tribe, American Hartford 459, 462, 838, 840, 15-13, 57 S.Ct. 81 L.Ed. n. 17 944 § Law Constitutional (1937). (1978); Note, “long country 1223 This has a and The Constitutional Status of history” unfortunate of discrimination Homosexuality Sexual Orientation: as a Suspect Classification, 98 Harv.L.Rev. on sexual orientation. See Frontie based Richardson, 682, (1985); Note, supra, 411 Argument ro v. U.S. at 1285 An 684, (discussing Equal Height- 93 S.Ct. at 1769 sex dis Application Protection crimination); Scrutiny to Based on see also Massachusetts ened Classifications supra, Murgia, 57 So.Cal.L.Rev. 797 Board Retirement v. Homosexuality, 2566; (dis Hardwick, (1984); 427 96 Bowers v. 478 U.S. U.S. at S.Ct. cf. discrimination); 186, 2841, 8, cussing age San Antonio 106 S.Ct. 2846 n. 92 L.Ed.2d (1986) (no Rodriguez, v. Equal Independent 140 District Protection Clause School “right priva- claim raised in unsuccessful

37 1, 28-29, 1278, 1294, normal, perpetuating. Many seemingly 411 U.S. 36 (1973) (discussing neutral, operations society L.Ed.2d 16 wealth dis of our create crimination). Finally, legal due to the and stereotyped expectations justify un- penalties commonly triggered by results; social equal unequal in results one public acknowledgement homosexuality inequalities opportunity area foster bisexuality, persons may so oriented others; accomplishment in lack and constitute “discrete and insular minorities” opportunity accomplishment and con- traditionally whose interests have been ne original engen- prejudices firms the or glected by operation political “the of those oper- ders new ones that fuel the normal upon processes ordinarily to be relied generating unequal ations results. protect minorities.” See United v. States process of in- ... discrimination [T]he Co., 144, Products 304 U.S. 152 Carolene many aspects society. volves of our No 58 n. 82 n. S.Ct. 783-84 L.Ed. single sufficiently explains factor dis- (1938); see also Massachusetts Board crimination, single and no means will suf- Murgia, supra, Retirement v. 427 U.S. of at fice to eliminate it. We must continuous- (discussing elderly); 96 S.Ct. at 2567 ly society examine such of our elements Richardson, 365, 372, Graham discrimination, history jure as our of de (1971) L.Ed.2d 534 deeply ingrained prejudices, inequities aliens). (discussing class, on economic and social and based interests, therefore, compelling

The the structure and function of all our eco- eradicating nomic, social, state has in discrimination political and institutions in against homosexually bisexually or ori- part order to understand their in main- fostering ented include of individual taining countering discriminatory pro- dignity, the creation of a climate and envi- cesses. in which

ronment each individual can utilize identify precisely It difficult potential his or her to contribute to and aspects discriminatory processes all society, equal protection benefit from assign parts appropriate those their life, liberty property weight. understanding But discrim- how Founding guaranteed Fathers to us all. ination works starts with an awareness process, Speaking of in other ar- it is a and that to avoid discrimination eas, it, perpetuating carefully we assess the United States Commission on Civil must consequences has noted that discrimination hurts the context and of our subtle, society everyday actions. ways that are and often unseen: Rights, U.S. Commission on Civil Affirma- Discriminatory actions individuals Dismantling tive Action in 1980s: organizations only pervasive, are not (1981); 12-14 of Discrimination Process occurring society, every sector of but Brest, Supreme see also Court cumulative, limited nei- also with effects the Anti- Term—Forward: Defense of particular ther to the time nor the struc- Principle, 90 Harv.L.Rev. discrimination they This tural area which occur. (“Decisions (1976) assump- based *34 discrimination, therefore, process of ex- worth and selective indif- tions of intrinsic across, generations, orga- tends across stig- psychological injury by ference inflict nizations, in and across structures social matizing their victims as inferior. More- self-reinforcing cycles, passing the disad- over, tend to acts of discrimination because generation in

vantages by incurred one patterns, their victims pervasive occur generations many one area to future frustrating, especially cumulative suffer related areas. debilitating injuries”). and

[******] “As long as homosexual men and wom- en, groups people who well as other interlocking as process of discrimina- [The ma- as ‘different’ tion, events, simply seen now routine- by past started citizens, continue to be of American penal- jority ly privileges on some and bestows thinking, our stereotypical through process This is also self- viewed ties on others.] 38 price

society pay inevitably case, will exacted In this compelling equal access to ignorance.” by fear and tangible benefits, requiring without Homosexuali Study Diversity Among ties —A intangible Men “endorsement” contained in 25; supra, Women, also see EEOC “University Recognition,” imposes a rela- and 477, Mississippi College, v. 626 F.2d 489 tively slight burden on reli- (5th (“the Cir.1980) government has a com gious practice. Georgetown As itself con- pelling eradicating interest discrimina cedes, only tangible plain- benefits “[t]he forms”), denied, tion in all cert. 453 U.S. tiffs grant could receive of official 912, 3143, (1981); 69 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 994 recognition are relatively insignificant— College, Russell Belmont 554 F.Supp. mailing such computer labeling ser- 667, (M.D.Tn.1982)(“this nation has a Supplemental vices.” Brief at 2. It then strong public policy against discrimination argues perquisites minor can- “[s]uch only not on the basis of sex but all outweigh the substantial burden on the forms”); address Melvin Boozer to cf University’s religious liberty that would (“I 1980 Democratic National Convention compelled recognition flow from of the stu- nigger, know what it means be called a groups.” dent argument Id. But its fails I know what it means be called a because the “substantial burden” to which faggot, up and can sum the difference compulsion grant intangi- refers — none”), Pearson, one word: quoted in Ho ble “endorsement” contained in Rights mosexual Activist Melvin Boozer Recognition” required by the Hu- —is Post, Washington Dies at Mar. Rights By Georgetown’s man Act. own 1987, B6, col. I.25 admission, Rights what the Human Act consider that We the Council of the Dis- actually require equal does distribution of — press- trict Columbia acted on the most tangible considerably benefits—is less ing of incorporating needs when into the burdensome. Human Act its view that discrimina- grave tion based on sexual orientation Our conclusion that the on reli- burden damages society evil that as well as its gious liberty outweigh does not the Dis- immediate victims. The of sex- eradication compelling trict’s interest receives addition- compel- ual orientation discrimination support al from the facts that ling governmental interest. voluntarily gives groups the student Balancing Compelling D. Govern- fewer benefits that come with against mental Interest the Burden Body “Student Endorsement” and that it Religious on Exercise objected groups has never to the student meeting campus. Without interference Given that the District of Columbia administration, from the compelling governmental has a interest in are an active force in the eradicating sexual orientation discrimina GPGU, university community. for exam- tion, we must determine whether that inter ple, meetings campus has held almost outweighs est the burden enforcement of discussions, speakers, weekly, hosting impose Human Georgetown’s religious Finally, the exercise. educational and social events. (state holding child labor law Bacon erred in 88 L.Ed.2d 645 policy against "national" based compelling governmental discrimination furthered interest compel- on sexual orientation could burden); constitute outweighed First Amendment see also ling governmental interest. See Roberts v. Unit- Co., Thompson District Columbia v. John R. Jaycees, supra, ed States 104 S.Ct. 100, 109, 1007, 1012, 73 S.Ct. 97 L.Ed. U.S. (state against 82 L.Ed.2d 462 law sex dis- (1953) (District of Columbia has same crimination, more extensive than its federal "legislation pro- power as state to enact which counterpart, governmen- compelling furthered Roe, discrimination’’); hibits Whalen v. cf. outweighed tal interest and First Amendment 869, 875, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 *35 burden); Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. (1977) (“we frequently recognized have that in- (state Sunday closing 6 L.Ed.2d 563 experi- dividual states have broad latitude in compelling governmental law furthered interest problems menting possible with solutions to burden); outweighed First Amendment concern"). vital local Massachusetts, supra, Prince v. 321 U.S. imposed upon Georgetown’s burden reli- doing orientation and in so violated the gious Rights exercise is further diminished Human Act. The University’s free representations parties’ exempt that exercise defense does GPGU has al- it from given mailbox, compliance statute, ready been with the one of the because the tangible compelling District of theoretically dispute. benefits in interest Columbia’s eradicating sexual orientation discrimina- Rights Human E. Enforcement of outweighs any equal pro- tion burden that Act is the Least Restrictive tangible vision of the benefits would im- Means Available pose Georgetown’s religious exercise. Finally, though even the District of statutory On rather than constitutional compelling Columbia’s interest eradicat grounds, we therefore affirm the trial ing sexual orientation discrimination out holding Georgetown court’s that is not re- weighs compliance the burden that with the quired grant the student “Univ- Rights Human impose Act would on ersity Recognition.” We reverse the trial Georgetown’s exercise, the stat ruling court’s the Free Exercise ute can be enforced if it is the least Clause relieves from its statu- attaining goal. restrictive means of tory obligation provide tangible ben- Board, supra, Thomas v. Review regard efits without to sexual orientation. 101 S.Ct. at 1413. We order the trial judgment court to enter Here, that condition is met. To tailor the accordingly. Rights require Human Act to less of the So ordered. University equal than access to its “facili- services,” ties and regard without to sexual PRYOR, Judge, concurring: Chief orientation, compel- would be to defeat its adopt I holdings Mack’s ling purpose. The District of Columbia’s opinion, briefly write but to make clear overriding eradicating interest in sexual or- perceive what I to be the effect of our discrimination, ientation if it is ever to be decision. converted from aspiration reality, re- Initially, we are met with the threshold quires Georgetown equally distribute question of whether we can reconcile the tangible groups. benefits to the student Rights Act, District of Columbia Human compelling Other than equal provision (1981), competing D.C. Code 1-2520 § benefits, tangible there are no available protections declaring constitutional without eradicating means of sexual orientation dis- Although inevitably the Act invalid. we crimination in educational institutions that must invoke principles constitutional or- would be less restrictive of questions, agree der to decide critical I religious exercise. legitimately accomplish we our task here Act, by a construction of the which does

V it, it, require any part us rule invalid. CONCLUSION require Balancing governmental

The Human Act does not interest grant “University Recognition” be- unlawful institutional discrimina- deterring cause, particular George- practices, against University’s in the tory scheme at own University, rights town under the free exercise clause of the that status includes reli- amendment, conclude, giously recipi- present based first “endorsement” circumstances, nothing ent in the re- group. student But the Human University, quires Act does demand that make over its constitution- equally objections, publicly its “facilities avail- al associate itself or and services” support goals or regard affirmatively able without orientation. activities to sexual gay organizations. There Those “facilities and services” include the tangible require the Univer- compelling benefits that come with no reason “Universi- unlawfully ty is it discrimi- Recognition.” Georgetown sity denied to do so. Nor do so. University to fail to natory sexual for the benefits on the basis of *36 it, differ holding necessarily holding I understand and to of this as consequence (au- opinion approach the of the lead Georgetown’s refusal to allow with means that Mack) analyzing the by Judge its name is not student to use thored discrimination. For the same rea- free exercise claim. unlawful sons, groups cannot demand the student University funds for the advo- grant of I. circumstances, In the cacy of its causes. I court’s decision to- As understand the support compelled financial amounts part in part and reverses day, it affirms support. Again, the compelled affirmative upholds of the trial court. It decisions constitute unlaw- failure to so act does not finding Judge Braman’s of discrimination does not violate the ful discrimination and Rights Act to the of the Human violation Act. on the finding that was based extent course, remains, question of There withholding bene- University’s of material University may tangible facilities the what gay groups. To the fits from the deny. Conceptually there is a grant or ruling had en- Braman’s extent premise that between the critical difference intangi- compassed the denial whatever compelled to Georgetown should not be “University are connected with ble benefits adopt support the activities publicly today opinion re- Recognition,” the court’s allowing the groups, as contrasted holding matter of statu- as a verses use, groups, of as is so with other student today’s decision Finally, tory construction. to other members basic facilities available Judge Bacon’s determination reverses Thus, the University community. of the Rights inAct enforcement of the Human related meeting halls and

fair access to case would work circumstances of this not, in- my opinion, needs would basic infringement of the unconstitutional rights. upon University’s unduly trude free exercise University’s rights under the of the first amendment. clause Human I that our Lastly, would observe comprehensive. It Rights Act is broad and requires edu- The Human possible discrimina- range of covers a wide provide “facilities institutions to cational Necessarily decisions tory practices. our equal without services” on an basis dis- of the asserted will reflect nature per- regard various characteristics crimination, his- presence or absence of served, including orienta- their sexual sons ques- which surround toric conditions “facilities and services” That these tion. tion, intent, precedent. and case legislative tangible should be only items can include me, instance re- decision in this For language of the plain apparent from the not, and does considerations flects those notes, statute, and, opinion lead the lead pur- weakening of the signal a any way, to construe obligation op. at from our to serve. intended poses the Act was constitu- as to avoid in a manner statutes Benson, questions. Crowell tional concurring, NEWMAN, Judge, Associate L.Ed. MACK, FER- Judges with whom Associate Therefore, the consti- (1932). analyzing TERRY, to Part VI: join as REN and claim, concern ourselves we need tutional that ac- those benefits with conclusions join I the court’s group’s elevation from company a student violated University has Body Endorsement” “Student byAct one with Human District of Columbia Recognition.” “University We with one associated tangible benefits denying the of: offi- consist told that these benefits stu- Recognition” mailbox; use of of a cially approved use People of groups Gay dent Service; mail- use of Computer Label Rights Coali- (GPGU) Gay University apply services; opportunity ing and the ground of (GRC) prohibited on the tion ser- funding. these facilities That orientation, the Univ- and that sexual their in this plaintiffs denied to vices were is of no avail. defense ersity’s free exercise of their basis impermissible on the court’s case clarify the separately write

41 sexual orientation seriously cannot lenged be dis- grounds on First Amendment is far puted on this record. more deferential than constitutional review regulations designed of similar laws or II. (free society”) clause). civilian exercise As for free exercise de- There be sound why reasons courts fense, I opinion believe that the lead wres- defining have avoided explicitly particular unduly question tles with the of whether standard of legislative deference to find- the District’s in enforcing interest its anti- ings assessing when a constitutional claim. discrimination statute “compelling” is a Supreme The recognized Court has interest, governmental required for it to degrees leg- of ‘deference’ to “[announced withstand scrutiny. first amendment See judgments, just islative as levels of ‘scruti- Board, 707, Thomas v. Review 450 U.S. ny’ which this ap- Court announces that it 718, (1981). 101 at 1413 legisla- S.Ct. plies particular by classifications made ture of the District of spoken Columbia has legislative body, may all too readily become clarity impor- unmistakable of the facile abstractions used to justify a result.” regards tance with which it the eradication 57, 69-70, Rostker v. 453 Goldberg, U.S. of discrimination on the basis of sexual 2646, 2654, (1981). 101 S.Ct. 69 L.Ed.2d 478 inappropriate orientation and other criteria. My quarrel opinion with the lead simply is enacting legislation, the Council that it recognize any fails to measure of sought to “underscore intent that the [it’s] deference at all. elimination of discrimination Dis- within the trict of Columbia highest should have ‘the (citations omitted). priority’” Council of III. Columbia, the District of Report Committee There are two why reasons the courts do 2-179, on Bill “The Human Act of super-legislatures not sit as to divine the 1977,” 5, 1977). (July 3 While the lead importance governmental interests. The opinion recognizes expressed interest government first is that the bears bur Council, the District of Columbia see proof den of in seeking uphold the con 67-71, op. lead appears give it statute; stitutionality of a when a funda legislative determination no deference stake, right mental is at the burden whatsoever, engaging instead in its own de government to show the existence of a novo importance evaluation of of the compelling interest. First National Bank interest, id. at 71-82. Bellotti, 765, 786, Boston v. 435 U.S. 98 of S.Ct. While the ultimate ques constitutional 1407, 1421, (1978); 55 L.Ed.2d 707 is, course, tion judiciary alone Burns, 347, 362, Elrod v. 427 U.S. 96 S.Ct. decide, legislative-like weighing kind of 2673, 2684, (1976). 49 L.Ed.2d 547 There of interests opinion revealed the lead fore, infringement of a free exercise inter inappropriate here. For even in constitu justified est can be “only by proof by the tional adjudication “a lightly court cannot compelling State of a interest.” Hobbie v. dispute a political determination — Commission, Unemployment Appeals branches that the ... interests at stake are U.S.-, 1046, 1049, 107 94 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. compelling....” Barry, Finzer v. 255 (1987). 190 If com a court could substitute 19, 28, U.S.App.D.C. 1450, 798 F.2d 1459 state, pletely judgment for that of the (1986), granted cert. sub nom. Boos v. proof nugato would render this burden of — -,

Barry, U.S. S.Ct. Thomas, ry. supra, 450 U.S. at See (1987) (free clause). L.Ed.2d 141 speech 1432; Verner, 101 S.Ct. at Sherbert While pre courts have not delineated the 398, 407, 10 L.Ed. deference, cise they contours of this have (1963)(refusing to credit state inter 2d 965 recognized, implicitly, sometimes that some supported by the record ests that were not See, measure of deference is warranted. below). not raised e.g., Weinberger, Goldman v. (1986) why we owe some The second reason 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (“Our government’s review military regulations chal- measure deference Columbia, Bill Report of Committee importance of its in- trict of

determination expertise (noting recognition supra, at 1 that twelve terest is a making such as- political co-spon- branches had the thirteen Council Members sug- second reason As this bill). legislative sessments. We owe that sored question of deference on the gests, our degree of deference. some assessment *38 “compelling” governmental inter- is a what “The necessarily of a limited nature. est is IV. govern- is not to the deference we owe judgment that the statute legal ment’s of deference courts measure Whatever constitutional, to their factual discus- but that legislative judgment, may give to depth of the ... sion of the nature where, appropriate especially deference Finzer, su- interests that are involved.” here, of record that the there is evidence as 29, F.2d at pra, U.S.App.D.C. 255 798 competing claims legislature was aware original). (emphasis in 1460 Rostker, magnitude. See of constitutional 72-74, 101 at 2655- Hence, considering supra, a consti- 453 U.S. at S.Ct. court in exemption religious Congress’ exclusion (constitutionality claim for a tutional 56 not to narcotics laws military supported from the from draft “cho[]se of women appellant’s suggestions that bal- accept revealing that the exclu legislative record interests, take into ancing competing we legislative choice and a considered sion was ” “ dangers from minimizing account evidence ‘unthinkingly’ or as the not enacted “ abuse,” marijuana and reasoned way byproduct of a traditional ‘accidental judg- substitute its court will not “[t]his ”) (citations thinking females’ about legislature....” the ment omitted). 1018, States, 471 A.2d v. United Whyte deci- free exercise Supreme Court’s (D.C.1984). Similarly, in v. 1021 Wisconsin may give the Court suggest sions 1526, 205, Yoder, 32 92 S.Ct. legislative choice to the more deference Court, (1972), Supreme L.Ed.2d exemption objector seeks religious when free exercise claim upholding a while already ad- statutory scheme from a for ex- parents their Amish children and religious adher- exception for mits of some com- emption aspects from of Wisconsin’s example, in United States ents. For requirements, cautioned pulsory education 1051, Lee, 71 L.Ed. 102 S.Ct. 455 U.S. circum- great that “courts must move (1982), to extend refused 2d 127 Court exemptions religious creating spection” exemption for security tax’s the social requirements generally applicable self- employers Amish Amish to other employed legis- are not school boards since “courts doing, the Court In so employees. latures, to determine ill-equipped are accommodated, “Congress of a has aspects ‘necessity’ of discrete noted comprehen- compatible education.” with a program compulsory extent State’s legislatures, practices If program, at 1543. Id. at sive national courts, exper- have distinguished from of their it a violation who believe those drug and the dangers security abuse tise in the social participate faith children, certain- then educational needs of the courts have Congress and system.... warranting judicial ly they expertise have flowing from to the needs sensitive been necessity of antidis- deference on the social Clause, every person but Free Exercise legislation. crimination from all the burdens be shielded cannot aspect of exercising every incident to was of Columbia Council The District Con- religious —beliefs right practice and non- “importance of both the confident line_” 260-61, 102 Id. gress drew a Human of the character” controversial 1057.1 Dis- S.Ct. at Rights purposes. Council Act’s objection religious States, espoused a to those who Similarly, United in Gillette v. particular but form" 28 L.Ed.2d to "war in (1971), the Selective refused to extend the Court wars. objector exemption Service Act’s conscientious Act, importance of the assert- enacting Rights Human assessment of the In interest, ig- a court risks governmental ed Council included a sec- District of Columbia judicial task of noring the more traditional religious permits institutions to tion that ap- to determine the comparing like cases co-religionists in favor of discriminate instant one. so propriate outcome doing designed so is to further when forget very “the essence of doing, it would religious principles.2 Political institution’s upon attend- judicial method to insist similarly to dis- organizations permitted [the] 15. A ing cases.” Id. at to such other of those of the same criminate favor free Supreme Court’s brief review of By incorporating political persuasion.3 that the jurisprudence assures us exercise exceptions into the Human these its burden of demon- government has met Act, sig- the District of Columbia Council enforcing strating interest in that its special awareness of the role that naled its outweighs Human political plays in our belief *39 religious exemption. University’s claim for time, order. At the same constitutional however, prohibiting in discrimination variety of Supreme has held a Court religion political grounds other than or af- to sus- governmental interests sufficient filiation, any or in circumstances other than regulations facially neutral laws or tain by the terms of these ex- those embraced challenged religious objectors under the by ceptions, plain made that no the Council Goldman, supra, clause. In free exercise exception should be tolerated. In further 1314, 106 at the Court held that S.Ct. view, legislature implicitly taking this our permit- military’s “uniformity” in interest importance determined that the of outlaw- regulations to ted it to enforce its dress ing on the basis of discrimination serviceman prohibit sexual an Orthodox Jewish outweighs religious competing orientation duty. wearing yarmulke from a while deter- Lee, 260, claims. This least restrictive means 455 at 102 S.Ct. at supra, In U.S. mination, along 1057, assess- public with Council’s interest in main- the “broad gov- importance prevented ment of the overall of the ex- taining system” a sound tax interest, ernmental is entitled to at least a emption Security tax for an from Social modicum of this court’s deference.4 Amish. employer employing Amish other Brown, 599, 603, In v. 366 U.S. Braunfeld

V. 1144, 1146, (1961), L.Ed.2d 563 81 S.Ct. 6 “improving the ground interest in By failing to “middle the state’s walk that health, general well-be- safety, morals and judicial a House of Lords and the between permitted enforcement ing of citizens” any of limitation on the other ... abandonment closing against merchants branches,” Sunday laws likely forget “what a court is to Saturday In law, a Sabbath. qualities its who observed surely the main 165, 158, Massachusetts, Wechsler, neutrality.” its Prince generality and 438, 441-42, (1944), L.Ed. 645 88 64 S.Ct. Principles Neutral Constitu- Toward society protect the wel- “interests Law, tional 1, (1959). 16 73 HaRV.L.Rev. state to permitted the fare of children” legislative-like in ab initio By engaging a 2, supra. l-2503(b) (1981) provides: See note 3. 2.D.C.Code § Nothing provisions of this contained in the any chapter suggest bar reli- re- shall be construed to that the least Some commentators 4. orga- any gious political organization, or or means/compelling interest assessment strictive operated or education- Note, for charitable nization al Exemp- Religious single inquiry. See is a supervised or purposes, operated, which is A Exercise Clause: Model Under the Free tions by reli- with a or in connection controlled 350, Authorities, 359 n. Competing 90 Yale L.J. limiting organization, gious political from or against equating (1980). caution Others 55 sales, housing employment, accommodations, or rental of or exemption denying to a interest state’s giving to or or admission generalized interest objector religious with its religion or preference persons same program, underlying L. maintaining rule or by such political persuasion as is calculated at § Constitutional Tribe, Law American polit- organization promote or (1978). 855 or principles which it is established ical maintained. 44 Id. 230, plication a 92

apply its child labor law bar Jehovah’s the law. at S.Ct. at supra, distributing religious Whyte, 471 A.2d Witness from litera- at 1021 Cf. (refusing grant religious exemption ture on the streets. “plainly since enforcement of the CSA contrast, By in those cases which oper- directly Substances Act] [Controlled upheld challenge free Court has exercise public protect dangers ates to government to required make ex- drug repurcussions”). abuse its ception general its scheme order to Moreover, the Court was mindful that it religious objector, has accommodate dealing “way of life was with ... government presented made clear that the rights no interferes with interests support of interests to the weakest others,” Yoder, 224, supra, 406 U.S. refusal to make such an accommodation. Virginia also See West at 1537. Thomas, supra, 719, 450 U.S. at Barnette, Board Education v. State Sherbert, supra, S.Ct. at 63 S.Ct. 87 L.Ed. U.S. at Court (1943) (“The freedom asserted found that the states' asserted interests bring appellees does not them into these or had support were without the record rights with asserted other collision in- raised below. These cases been individual”). contrast, By particu- what unemployment compen- volved denial governmental larly compelling about the employees sation who left their em- had in this case is it di- interest asserted ployment comply job rather than rights against pits of others rectly the civil *40 task, Thomas, schedule, Sherbert, work or religious objector. the claims the religious that conflicted with beliefs. The compel government reli- While cannot argued granting compensation states Braunfeld, supra, belief, gious or other lead to and dilu- fraudulent claims 1146, Cantwell 603, at 81 S.Ct. at 366 U.S. 718-19, fund. See tion of the 450 U.S. at 303, Connecticut, v. 296, 60 S.Ct. 310 U.S. 407, 1432; 83 101 at 374 U.S. at S.Ct. S.Ct. 900, 903, (1940), 84 1213 it can re- L.Ed. at 1795. comport quire persons and institutions Yoder, supra, In the Court determined to secular moral norms. their behavior uphold the free exercise claim because States, Otto) (8 v. 98 U.S. Reynolds United reject do little to serve those it “would 145, 164, (1878) (refusing 244 25 L.Ed. in state had advanced interests” the anti- exempt application from Mormons favor of enforcement of its law. 406 U.S. statute). Nondiscrimination polygamy Bellotti, su 222, 92 at 1536. S.Ct. Cf. Atlan- Heart See secular norm. such a 787-88, pra, 435 U.S. at at 1422 98 S.Ct. States, Motel, U.S. ta Inc. v. United 379 (“However interests weighty [the state’s] 348, 357, 257, 258 241, 13 L.Ed.2d 85 S.Ct. ..., implicated not they either are (1964) laws are de- (public accommodations by or at all ... this case served and social the “moral signed to combat omitted). (footnote prohibition_”) the discrimination). In a series of wrong” of way Amish Taking into consideration the decisions, has Supreme the Court recent life the fact that the Amish were will the enforce- any doubt that extinguished requirements ing comply the state’s compel- is a laws ment of antidiscrimination up grade, the through eighth Court poised interest when governmental ling that “Wisconsin’s interest concluded In objection. against amendment a first attendance of Amish compelling school States, University v. United Jones Bob emerges age children to 16 somewhat 2017, 2035, 574, 604, 76 103 S.Ct. 461 U.S. requiring such attend less substantial than (1983), recognized 157 Court L.Ed.2d Yoder, su generally.” ance for children “fundamental, over- government’s pra, 406 U.S. at at 1540. 92 S.Ct. eradicating racial discrim- riding interest in outweighed free education” Yoder The Court in was also ination confident religious private school safety, claim of public “harm to the exercise that no ... tax-exempt challenged the denial order, peace, from that welfare” would result Jay- v. United States Roberts religious ap- status. exempting objectors

45 cees, 609, 626, U.S. 104 S.Ct. enforcement of the Human Act’s (1984), 82 L.Ed.2d 462 the Court held ban on discrimination on the basis of sexual that Minnesota’s “[assuring law women signify orientation does not endorsement equal goods, access to ... privileges, by government byor entity covered advantages clearly compelling furthers any particular doctrine of sexual ethics. state permitted interests.” Roberts Wooley 705, 717, Maynard, v. Cf. state public to enforce its 1428, 1436, accommodations (1977) 51 L.Ed.2d 752 require private (“State’s law to organization to interest to disseminate an [wa]s admit women members in the Barnette, face of a ideology”); supra, 319 U.S. at freedom of association (state claim. Most recent- 63 S.Ct. at 1182 action involved ly, in Board Rotary Directors “compulsion belief”). Inter- ... declare — Duarte, national Rotary Rather, Club simply recognizes it as irrelevant a U.S.-, person’s 95 L.Ed.2d provision sexual orientation in the (1987), by confronted a similar chal- of facilities and services an educational lenge application of a California stat- institution.

ute, the “public Court reaffirmed that ac- VI. ‘plainly

commodations laws compel- serv[e] ” ling highest order,’ state interests of the Finally, Belson, note that concur- quoting Roberts, supra, ring part and dissenting part, has 104 S.Ct. at 3253. determined that there is a constitutional distinction between the Human Finally, Supreme Court has indicated against Act’s stricture sexual orientation compass that the right to free exer against discrimination and its bar racial religion cise of only by measured discrimination. While expressly acknowl- importance governmental interest edging evaluating the District of “[i]n but the nature of imposed the burden governmental Columbia’s interest in eradi- See, objector. e.g., Braun cating discrimination based on sexual orien- feld, supra, 366 U.S. at 81 S.Ct. at tation, is appropriate give great (cautioning against down, “strikpng] *41 weight judgment to of the District of without the scrutiny, legisla most critical Council,” Columbia op. J. Belson’s at tion imposes only which an indirect burden he ignore nonetheless chooses legis- i.e., on the religion, exercise of legislation judgment. lative He contrary to the finds— which does not religious make unlawful the law’s text history it is “reason- practice itself”). —that I do not understand postulate” able to that the Council did not argue that discrimination grounds intend the various of discrimina- against any persons groups or is a tenet of tion regarded equally. to be Id. at 161. Rather, its faith. providing claims that assumption goes From this he on to con- disputed facilities and services to the clude that the in District’s interest eliminat- gay student organizations infringes the ing sexual orientation discrimination is a University’s religious embracing interest in compelling governmental less than interest. particular doctrine of sexual ethics. Judge Belson would therefore have the Therefore, require University University prevail on its free exercise make available its facilities and services in claim. most,5 an works, even-handed manner at an infringement view, indirect Judge of its In inter Belson’s “it cannot be just est. For as prohi goal eliminating enforcement of the that the said discrimina- against bition discrimination on the basis of tion on the basis of sexual orientation ... political signify high affiliation does not priority pub- en has attained same as particular dorsement of any political party, policy, lic in the District of Columbia or Arguably, given requirements bringing of the threshold for court's construction a free exer- Act, infringement Tony there has been no of a reli- cise claim. See & Susan Alamo Founda- Labor, gious willing Secretary interest in this case. 1 am tion v. assume, however, Lee, (1985); opinion, with the lead see lead L.Ed.2d 278 31-32, 256-57, op. University supra, that the has met the 455 U.S. at 102 S.Ct. at 1055. eliminating include nationally, goal as has the chosen to sexual orientation dis- The Council’s discrimination.” Id. of those racial crimination within ambit forms however, actions, baldly this as- contradict it deems anathema of discrimination that in public policy as to the of the (evolu- sessment jurisdiction. generally See id. this his is of Columbia. Whether not District legislation has in- tion of antidiscrimination national an accurate observation about broadening scope progressive volved no to our consideration policy has relevance protected). facilities covered and case; question plainly, this an of the Act’s provision, no than the more This less scope need not be to be interest national the defer- prohibitions, deserves traditional note 25. compelling. op. See lead at 82 court. ence of this Moreover, identical an interest need be weight compelling interest to some other VII. compelling itself. Postscript legislature of of Colum- The the District priorities regarded as one its first bia light Judge opinion, con- Ferren’s attaining anti- home rule to enact an after dissenting curring part, in the result in sexual statute that includes discrimination reemphasize part, I that the issues ground prohibited co-equal as a orientation first, Hu- are: does the in this case what In- 69-70. of discrimination. See id. at and, second, require; does Rights Act man observes, deed, himself Belson George- enforcement the Act violate language he nor statutory “neither [the rights? The an- first amendment town’s legislative indicates whether history Act’s] question first is that the Hu- to the swer assign any hier- the Council intended to Rights Act educational insti- compels man archy proscribed to the several bases pro- in the tutions District Columbia op. at 160-61. discrimination.” J. Belson’s equal “facilities and services” on vide fact, i.e., this the Council precisely It is regard sexual orienta- without basis pro- among no distinction the various made facilities persons Such tion served. grounds time it while at the same hibited only tangi- necessarily include and services that the elimination of discrimi- emphasized ques- items. answer to the second ble see “highest priority,” was of the nation the Act as thus is that enforcement of tion citing of the District Council ante in- unconstitutionally does construed Columbia, of Bill Report Committee rights under the fringe University’s concluding that provides the basis I reject Ferren’s first amendment. governmental here interest asserted ought to decide that which is view that compelling one. case, specifically, us not before *42 statute, public like Minnesota Our the gay University’s by the of the name use by the Su- act accommodations scrutinized groups. Roberts, jur- in “reflects preme Court th[is strong to commitment historical isdiction’s] FERREN, Judge, with whom Associate assuring its eliminating discrimination and TERRY, concurring Judge, joins, Associate available equal publicly access citizens to part dissenting part: in in and in the result 624, 3253. goods and services.” 468 U.S. to ex I continue subscribe to the views Rights Human District of Columbia The opinion in the of the division vacat pressed “pro- states Act and those the various court, en banc by Gay Rights ed the Coali protecting primary means vide[] George Georgetown University v. tion historically disadvan- rights of the the civil (D.C. University, 496 A.2d town fails government taged” the federal when Thus, 1985) I). I to (Gay Rights continue role (noting the protection, such id. to offer Georgetown University may believe rights in the protecting civil of states plaintiff lawfully refuse accord the to 1957). of Co- District period before recogni rights groups gay Council, pioneer determining to lumbia (1) tion,” equal means which status government, indeed and where the federal recog formally not, other student has many governments, have state including permis rights, Judges university, nized whereas Belson and Nebek- name, (2) university to use the sion application er believe that no of the Act uniformly available to tangible Georgetown on this record can survive benefits recognized groups such as office other constitutional defense. None of these telephone, supplies equipment, space, analyses persuasive. services, mailing stu computer label and show, I, propose why Judges I in Part advertising coun privileges, dent financial Mack, erroneously dis- Pryor, and Newman opportunity apply seling, and the intangible tinguish tangible and between privileges fund and for other fund lecture evaluating of the Hu- benefits the reach concur, goes, ing. I as far as it therefore sustaining Rights man Act and in the con- Mack, proposed by Judge in the result stitutionality only of the Act as to Judge joined by Judge Pryor and Chief Next, II, Judge reject I former. Part Newman, university make requiring contention, adopted by Belson’s Ne- category (tangible) the second benefits beker, Rights although the Human gay rights groups. But I available to the enjoins “pref- discrimination based on respectfully dissent from the views of Judges reach dis- colleagues, practice,” well as erence or it can never those three Nebeker, deny Belson and who “speech” directed or “advo- crimination (intangible) category plain first relief can, speech is an cacy.” It since one’s requested.1 tiffs have part person essential of who one is as a practice. preference thus reflects one’s Georgetown cross-appealed the has not Furthermore, assuming validity of even ruling university has trial court’s that the distinction, the Act can ex- Rights Act. None- Belson’s violated the Human theless, colleagues speech, ad- my five of have directed at tend to discrimination Mack, Judges Pryor, behind, dressed the statute. depending on the motive or the distinguish between two Newman accomplishing, means of the discrimination. types impact: agreeing while issue, As to the constitutional which Georgetown has violated the Act case, only Gay in the believe is the issue George- “tangible” respect, they justify I, 568,1 A.2d at address in Part “intangible” discriminatory conduct town’s why III free exercise clause of the first it. by saying the Act does not reach does not accord amendment Nebeker, contrast, Judges Belson and right, derogation of the Human accepting dichotomy, doubt while not Act, gay rights withhold from the Act in has violated the recogni- complete “University groups the any respect a remand would but conclude intangible, official status tion”—the their necessary to determine whether they seek. attendant benefits— possi- They open surmise is true. leave Georgetown does not have Basically, motivated, that, George- bility improperly if right to withhold absolute first amendment failing town has violated the Act and, recognition, on this aspect of such tangible, accord not facilities bene- record, otherwise university does not recognition intangible, fits sta- but also gov- compelling right because have that issue, Judges tus. As to the constitutional substantially outweighs interest ernmental Mack, Pryor, and Newman conclude that *43 George- places on the Act burden Act, reaches, whatever does not the as far as it religious beliefs. Georgetown’s town’s exercise violate first amendment Constitution, requires by opinions the plethora in unhindered 1. As I understand the complete plaintiffs case, grant Georgetown the to judges agree exercise this five that the free i.e., tangi- recognition,” the "University not the first amendment does not stand in clause of intangible benefits of a also the way Rights requirement ble benefits but Act the of a Human recognized officially rights equal that of other Georgetown permit plaintiff gay status to the the Finally, understand groups. as I university groups so-called to use facilities—the case, plain- the opinions in this record and the tangible other benefits —on the same basis that using the from legally barred groups are not University-recognized groups permitted to tiff university's Act, note 3. See name. judges that the do so. Two would hold infra 48 IV, why Judge in I unconstitutional

Finally, Part discuss under the exercise free effort, Judge Nebeker, clause of the first amendment. joined by Belson’s protect Georgetown first to on amendment Mack, however, Judge citing “deeply the grounds having grant plaintiffs from to rooted doctrine that a constitutional issue tangible altogether is access to the benefits is possible, to avoided” to the extent misplaced. Judge As Belson acknowl- first attempts to decide the case under the edges, university expressly the waived at and, consequence, purports Act not to as a argument any objec- oral first amendment question as reach the constitutional insofar (called providing tion to such “rel- benefits pertains intangible, status element brief). atively insignificant” in its His 16, Ante “university recognition.” therefore, altogether analysis, gratui- is argues compelled & 13.2 She n. event, Supreme tous. In the Court recognition” rights gay Judge actually on relies cases which Belson compelled speech groups would constitute position. support plaintiffs’ values, endorsing univ- groups' the that the first amendment

ersity has an absolute right any way, to in speak be forced to I. Act, therefore, the and that Human require properly cannot be construed A. speak derogation of its university to banc, appeal, On and en both division Because, however, religious principles. Georgetown ques- never University has nondiscriminatory expressly mandates ruling univ- tioned the trial court’s that the services,” Judge access to “facilities and ersity’s “recognize” gay the two refusal first squarely Mack finds she must face the rights groups organiza- as official student problems forcing the univ- amendment Hu- tions violates the District of Columbia provide tangible benefits. She ersity to prohibition against dis- man Act’s that the District of concludes Columbia’s by as crimination an educational institution enforcing the Act compelling interest to use of its “facilities and services” based first substantially outweighs upon withholding D.C. Code “sexual orientation.” interest facili- amendment fact, 1-2520(1) (1987). Georgetown gay rights support ties from student § result, according Judge has in its desire “not As a groups. stated brief a gain ruling” Mack, plaintiffs appeal separately that and thus has are entitled litigation no sought appeal solely itself benefits from but to defend Act, acknowledged ground applied, is status.3 statutory supporting statutory have on the issue parties issue brief we 2. When have not raised it, upon appeals passed or a Supreme curiae court has was volunteered amicus commonly has addressed the response Court Spitzer. Appellants filed Arthur issue to "'ascertain whether a construction reply brief. their fairly possible by is which the [con statute ” question may be avoided.’ United stitutional] States v. Although that the student 3. Mack holds Grace, 171, 103 S.Ct. 461 U.S. "University right groups no to the status have 1702, 1706, (1983) (quoting Cro L.Ed.2d 75 736 university has recognition," that the she notes 285, 297, Benson, v. U.S. 52 S.Ct. well 285 prevent plaintiff dropped its counterclaim (1932)). invariably, 76 Almost how L.Ed. 598 university’s Ante at groups’ name. use ever, parties to Court has asked the brief indicating no By that this issue 14 thus n. See, statutory tini, e.g., States issue. United v. Alber alive, necessarily implies longer Mack 675, 679-80, 2897, 2902, U.S. litigation preclude plain- does not that this (1985); Cable, Capitol Cities Inc. 86 L.Ed.2d 536 identify continuing them- tiff 691, 697-98, Crisp, S.Ct. reference to their affiliation with selves (1984); University L.Ed.2d 580 Cali e.g., "Gay People of university, 265, 281, Bakke, Regents v. fornia agree. my University.” own Inherent (1978) (opinion 57 L.Ed.2d 750 Terry, joined by Judge analysis, a conclusion Powell, Grace, J.). see But 461 U.S. at groups may plaintiff continue to use the that the (statutory apparently 103 S.Ct. at 1706 issue *44 nothing University name. I see argument time at raised for first oral but opinions, aside Chief any of the other did not resolve case and Court reached constitu case, Pryor’s, otherwise. issues). only Judge indicate present that would In the tional

49 however, Mack, reality, Judge denying “University as the status of rec- well Judge Pryor Judge ognition” as Chief Newman does not violate the Human her, join do address and resolve the Rights inadequate who to the task. As Act are constitutionality tangible below, of both the the Human Act elaborated intangible “University recogni- elements nondiscriminatory ac- demands more than construing apply tion.” In the Act not to benefits; and, event, tangible any cess to plaintiffs’ requested to the status as a “rec- tangible and the distinction drawn between group, Judge rely ognized” Mack does not intangible to en- benefits does serve ground exclusively statutory for deci- on constitutionality hance the of the Act. As sense sion the classic that constitutional (and agree I see it this extent I addressed, e.g., concerns need not be when Nebeker), Judges compelled Belson and exclusively plain on the court relies lan- “University recognition” either is constitu- guage, legislative history, or on a dis- altogether aspects tional in both its or is See, legal positive e.g., Capitol doctrine. unconstitutional; middle there is no Cable, Crisp, Cities Inc. v. ground. (1984) (fed- 580 L.Ed.2d preemption doctrine need to eral obviates B. issue). Rather, reach first amendment she Judge If colleagues Mack and her are “recognition” require- find a declines to rights gay groups correct—if must have primarily in the Act of her ment because equal access to benefits to that of expressed “protect[ desire to its constitu- ] may lawfully other but be excluded

tionality” applied. at 16.4 This Ante officially “recognized” from the list of stu- desire to save the statute from constitu- groups having dent access to the same infirmity quite tional reflects a doctrine permits “separate benefits—then the Act favoring different from the doctrine stat- equal” university but access to facilities utory ground over deci- a constitutional for justification and services reminiscent of available; independently sion when both are buses, permitted public that once blacks on Mack, analysis a constitutional protections in the Act’s but back. The statutory analysis. determines the Accord- not so narrow. ingly, whether this court that the concludes Act, stops requiring short of The Human D.C.Code (1987), part: recognition” provides 1-2520 in relevant preserve in order to its consti- § tutionality, or were to hold instead that the discriminatory prac- is an unlawful It Act does extend status but is unconstitu- tice, subject exceptions applied, tional as the result would essential- l-2503(b), for an educational institu- § ly approach depends be the same: either tion: lengthy analysis. constitutional As a restrict, (1) abridge or deny, or to matter, therefore, practical seeking to, of, access condition the use or “ ‘ascertain whether a construction of any person services to its facilities and fairly possible by statute is which the [con- qualified, wholly partially, otherwise ” avoided,’ question may be stitutional] reason, discriminatory upon for a based Grace, 175- United States v. race, color, religion, origin, national L.Ed.2d sex, age, personal appear- marital status (1983) (citation omitted), Judge Mack has orientation, ance, respon- family sexual provided a clear “no.” answer: sibilities, affiliation, political source of Moreover, handicap any indi- physical income or the theoretical tools vidual_ colleagues [Emphasis employ Mack and her to show added.] state, university Although Judge their use of Mack does in one con- tion" in connection with services; paragraph, meaning” "con- clusional that the trial court’s "literal facilities and struction of the statute ... conflicts with its help with the statute has to be derived meaning,” apparently literal ante at she con- analysis. pages Ante at of constitutional ten statutory language cedes that the itself does 21-25. plainly plaintiffs' request “recogni- foreclose

50 Judge agrees clergy Mack trial the with the court that who once offered de a Biblical Georgetown University has denied slavery,5 facilities recently fense of or to the more gay rights services student and to the expressed University,6 of Bob views Jones groups on the sexual basis of orientation. sought limit groups to black student to the however, stating, the Act not By that does tangible of benefits student activities status, require university the to accord the that, stressing infe because their racial benefits, tangible in contrast with the riority advocacy inter and/or their of racial “University Judge ig recognition,” Mack officially “rec marriage, they could be interpretation, nores the fact that her own ognized” college equal par the on a clearly, just as result discrimination will chapter of groups, other such as a student that violates the Act: it will “restrict... or lodge. Or, suppose Masonic local to, of, access condition use or ... facili college self-ac the same local admitted upon ties and based sexual services ... degree- knowledged homosexuals to all result of orientation.” As a this court’s granting programs but them on all carried today Judge incorporating decision Mack’s rosters, college including the com official result, supra gay note proposed program, mencement under the exclusive groups’ tangible rights access to benefits imag heading of students. I cannot “evil” upon will be restricted to and conditioned anyone seriously ine would contend receiving University same citi their prohibit Act Human does not zenship rights every inherent other second-class, such to col restricted access group’s use of the same facilities and ser lege the Act facilities services—that me, vices. To conditional access is an tolerates such a “hostile environment.” dignity, obvious affront to human amount Bank, at-, Savings Meritor 477 U.S. ing a form of discrimination at least as 106 S.Ct. at 2409. as facili intolerable the denial me, therefore, It appears to that because Savings Meritor ties services. Cf. expressly bars discrimination Bank, Vinson, FSB 477 U.S. 106 as of sexual orientation as well basis (1986)(actionable L.Ed.2d race, sex, age, specified and other charac- Title VII of sexual harassment under Civil say it teristics—and because does not Rights Act of limited to “econom 1964 not less one form of discrimination “tangible” in ic” or discrimination but well). clear- as unlawful than another —the Act thus cludes “hostile environment” concluding aspects ly proscribes no that withhold all difficulty have significant citizenship rights ing non-recognition gay such a form of student university community proscribe similarly results in a de groups, just as it would conditional, meaning, and thus access groups.7 discriminatory treatment racial plain facilities and that violates the services no perceive I therefore basis language of the statute. trial disturbing opinion Mack’s Georgetown’s refusal to ruling court’s analogy An similar form of discrimi- to a such, recognition,” accord helps point. Sup- nation underscore the Again, the Human Act. violated pose, hypothetically, private that a local question is only substantial college follows: religiously wedded views Thus, See, even if e.g., motive its decision irrelevant. J. 5. J. Slavery; Studies Fletcher, Slavery university acted out of were claim it String- ...; Priest, Bible Rev. T. Defense History; homosexuality, out of a rather than Slavery, hatred for fellow, Origin, Its Nature Its Society, institutionally religious obligation not to be as- Government, to True Relation Slavery Ordained Rev. F.A. Act, God, plaintiff groups, Religion; Ross, ac- with the sociated cited in all A. Coming Civil Craven, analysis, equally cording Judge Mack’s would (2d 1957). ed. 162-63 & 453 n. War right grant protect Georgetown’s “Univer- not to Similarly, sity recognition.” under such reason- States, University v. United See Bob Jones 6. way ing, racial hatred in no a motive of (1983). 76 L.Ed.2d 157 right university's Act not under the undercut a simply Hispanic the Act does Mack’s view that "recognize” or a black Asian "recog- Georgetown’s decision not to not reach organization. student university’s nize” the makes *46 office, telephone, the free exercise clause of such as an whether benefits protects any aspect services, advertising privileges mailing first amendment Georgetown’s discriminatory policy.8 any university be financed would require- evidently an unconstitutional less

C. support particu- ment. Forced financial is, required Judge general, no less a Just as Mack’s distinction between lar ideas sup- tangible, intangible help- is not compelled benefits endorsement than verbal defining circumstances, the reach of the Human com- port: depending ful on the Act, provides enlightenment it little pelled support may financial well constitute resolving question the constitutional protec- infringement an of first amendment Judge that is at the heart of Mack’s statu- Edu- Abood v. Detroit Board See tions. tory analysis. Judge distinguishes Mack cation, 209, 236-36, intangible tangible from benefits because (1977). Judge 52 L.Ed.2d 261 compelling university she believes that ignores con- analysis virtually Mack’s this intangible give equal access to the bene- reality. stitutional “recognition” speak would force it to fit of (2) tenets, in conflict with its whereas Furthermore, contrary Judge Mack’s government-ordered tangible access to ben- premise, “recogni- if even one views forced conduct, compel only efits would compelled speech, tion” as a form of it is critical, speech. Judge The difference is automatically not for that reason unconsti- contends, Mack because the first amend- equates “recogni- tutional. Mack government absolutely ment forbids the tion” with “endorsement” and “endorse- compel speech necessarily but does not bar “speech,” ment” she asserts the which compelled burdening religious conduct government compel cannot even when its practice. Consequently, says, only she compelling grounded actions are in a state provide demand status “Universi- ending interest such as discrimination ty recognition” automatically violates the analysis Her based on sexual orientation. clause; requiring free exercise the mere glides crucial simple, is too for it over a tangi- giving equal “conduct” of access to question: assuming “recognition” is a benefits, burdening Georgetown’s while ble “endorsement,” exactly what is form of rights, free exercise is nonetheless consti- group’s student val- an endorsement tutionally permitted justified by if a com- of—a or, instead, right merely group’s ues See ante pelling interest. at 20-22. state campus and to advocate its values? exist on (1) may speech; the latter The former Gay Rights I and later As elaborated in be. opinion, I either do not believe that “recognition” Judge Mack states that intangible or the benefits “endorsement,” meaning “reli- constitutes recognition,” required, “University if gious neutrality towards the approval of or would free exercise violate groups.” Ante at 19. She treats student But, rights. if correct Mack were question as a factual issue settled compelled “recognition” verbal clearly subject only to the the trial court compelled reli- would be a the con- erroneous standard of review. On gious of the first amend- stand violation however, trary, the nature of the “endorse- ment, comprehend how enforce- do not “recognition” represents is ulti- visible, tangible ment” that ment of student access to purely legal rather than a mately right to discriminate. a constitutional Theoretically, possibility that asserts there is a possibility I need not address— But that scrutiny of discrimination level of constitutional —which bearing Act would make no on whether the less strict has sexual orientation based on issue, rather, unlawful; the scrutiny applicable the discrimination to discrimi- than the level of race, unlawful discrimination government's would be whether nation based on when another, sort, be excused one but not enforcing the Human interest in weighed against grounds. party who on constitutional interest of a and, case, Thus, question, factual the trial inquiry. Judge Mack’s deference supply finding only court did not the answer. the trial court’s serves to responsibility avoid a that this court must It should be obvious that the constitu- through squarely argue face: to the con- act, significance of tional such as the problem “recognition” troversial of what recognition,” giving is a constitutionally analysis means —an question appeals of law which the court *47 position this is in as good court a as the must in The evaluate detail. constitutional is, make, question trial court to the since significance “speech” of an act as or as fundamentally, one of law.9 particular a “endorsement” of moral or ide- therefore, Furthermore, ological position, must be under- if the trial court’s even objective question. “recognition” If stood as an the ac- characterization of as “en- fact, view an act subjective purely finding tor’s of what means dorsement” were a of compelling simply were to determine whether the the trial court did not the kind make unconstitutional, every Judge is private finding act then of claims it made. In Mack Judge upholding George- all actor would hold veto over our civil Bacon’s order laws; defense, rights employer, example, judge an for town’s free exercise the purpose of interpret having major could to hire members of stated that ‘univer- “[t]he endorsement, sity recognition’ is equal footing all an as a official an races on statement University which approval of their endorsement the believes equality of moral —a which, teachings will with normative Judge conflict the statement under Mack’s homosexuality.” of on This the Church analysis speech of free or free exercise finding not specify does what kind of moral immunity, employer com- could be position “recognition” ideological or such is simple legal pelled to make. is no There Moreover, an trial “endorsement” of. translating standard for the constitutional provides no basis court’s order for believ- concepts speech into of and endorsement ing finding court itself understood its empirical question comparable, of fact constitutional to be of fact or even of one person’s example, question for to the of a significance. The trial constitutional motive act of for an discrimination. order, therefore, provide cannot court’s given constitutionality compelling of act Mack’s Judge foundation constitutional suggests intimately up questions bound too argument “recognition” that means en- a history Supreme opinions with of Court absolutely of the dorsement sort forbidden addressing great variety demands by the Constitution. private ordinary as an actors to treated (3) in factual issue for the trial resolution court. question it- Turning to constitutional self, therefore, regula- case, agree Judge with Mack that present

In we compelling speak finding literally tions someone to accept of fact that the trial court’s ideological directly Georgetown “recognition” or sincerely moral statements views “endorsement,” extremely upon the individu- only begins intrusive as but that ment, granting just Judge concluding such is gives and the benefits Mack two reasons for "recognition” university finding discretionary grant- the trial court’s that as is the clearly intangible means "endorsement” is not first, erroneous: ing "recognition.” benefit of "recogni- itself viewed Moreover, persuasive ground neither reason endorsement, speech; tion” thus of as a form “recognition" Judge assumption that Mack’s and, second, "University recogni- granting spoken endorsement homosexual- amounts discretionary by the tion” is a ty. decision universi- ity reciting pledge sense that of alle- in the applied con- Ante at 19. Neither reason giance flag spoken endorse- to the amounts opinion, apply sistently in the for both factors patriotic As elaborated in the ment of values. tangible resulting equally to the benefits above, significance of text constitutional recognition.” Judge "University Mack con- George- "recognition" determined cannot be provision cludes forced benefits and, act, subjective interpretation of that town’s prohibition does not violate constitutional case, court never stated trial endorsement, compelled it- but precise Mack finding terms as in such having give self made clear tangible it views requires justify her conclusion. compelled also endorse- benefits as a expression; prob- though highly freedom of belief and such activities are ide- al’s union). ological countervailing could to some members ably no state interest compulsions render such constitutional. argues premise Mack from the Virginia West State Board Edu- See of 63 give “recog- requiring Georgetown Barnette, cation v. constitutionally the same as re- nition” is (1943) (holding 87 L.Ed. 1628 states quiring pledge school children to recite say pledge cannot force schoolchildren to (Barnette) allegiance flag Watkins, allegiance flag); Torcaso v. state office-holders to affirm their belief 6 L.Ed.2d (Torcaso). Only way can she God (1961) (holding government require cannot that, case, conclude in this a sim- we have as condition of declaration belief God ple example compelled speech absolutely office). contrast, holding public how- But, forbidden the Constitution. ever, regulations requiring one actor to equating compelled “recognition” with the for, provide way forum and in this ideological issue in forced statements at *48 subsidize, speech may prove Torcaso, Judge of another Mack has Barnette and pulled far less intrusive on first amendment one sentence about “endorsement” from the trial court order and made it the rights regulation forcing person than a a to therefore, linchpin sophisticated a voice; constitutional speak his or her with own theory did on which the trial court itself may a state interest well exist sufficient to fact, however, rely. court trial compelled support justify such of someone finding perfectly is consistent with the else’s views. See Gas & Electric Pacific I, expressed Gay Rights view 496 A.2d Commission, 475 Co. v. Public Utilities “recognition” that on this record 1, 903, (1986) 106 S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d 1 most, represents, at official “endorsement” (“Notwithstanding protect- that it burdens groups’ right orga- gay student speech,” requiring public ed law utilities pursue campus nize on their own moral billing envelopes re- include statements Thus, agenda. requiring Georgetown to garding by others energy prepared issues gay rights groups may “recognize” the narrowly if it tai- “could be valid were a compelled to no more than “toler- amount serving compelling lored means of state entity of the beliefs and by ance” one interest”); Lee, 455 U.S. United States (the kind of forced toler- speech of another (1982) 102 S.Ct. 71 L.Ed.2d our very ation that is at the heart of all (mandatory contributions to Securi- Social and, laws) rights to the extent such civil ty, despite objections, did not vio- benefits, brings “recognition” compelling late first amendment because compelled another’s subsidization reli- justified state interest that burden on speech.10 gion); Shopping PruneYard Center v. “recogni- Robins, Judge assumption that Mack’s recognized (1980) (state of a requiring means “endorsement” L.Ed.2d 741 law tion” values, then, slides over the central group’s shopping permit center to distribution of “recog- legally compelled question whether pamphlets property did not violate on its express- Abood, speech forced nition” constitutes rights); first amendment owner’s neutrality anoth- ing of or toward approval manda- supra (although public employee’s values, required merely or amounts to not, er’s tory dues consistent with union speech. pre-A else’s amendment, toleration of someone support “ide- first be used question is essential to this cise answer ological unrelated to collective activities has Supreme Court decisional law may be because bargaining,” mandatory dues such Cases like this distinction. bargaining even created support used to collective Pacific combatting government’s dis- interest interesting court did It is to note that the trial gay rights theory against develop rely upon of com- or crimination was, circumstances, justi- pelled "speech" absolutely the Con- forbidden sufficient under the Instead, accepted that com- stitution. the court it was fy trial court concluded the burden. pelled recognition gious "contrary reli- to Catholic not. proceeded inquire beliefs" and whether Electric, Lee, Abood, long on which lesson I draw from the line of Su- Gas & relies, along preme Judge Mack herself with Court decisions on which PruneYard, attempts to distin- which she Mack relies is that no formal distinction that a com- guish, beyond doubt establish tangible benefits, intangible and between can, in some circum- pelling state interest “conduct,” “speech” can between stances, forcing private actor such justify constitutionality requiring resolve provide forum and Georgetown to grant and the Georgetown to the status speech support for someone else’s related recognition.” benefits of agree I agree. it does not with with which D. Braman) (Judge the trial court Despite Judge purported Mack’s reliance clearly protects the stu- Human part of her statutory construction for right groups’ equal treatment dent I analysis, have tried to show that her Georgetown’s claim campus. accept I also Act is interpretation of the reach too “recognizing” gay rights groups, show, toleration, limited. I have also tried to compelled even to the extent event, interpretation entirely her religion. Contrary its exercise of burdens taken, governed analysis how- the course Mack has constitutional conclude, ever, the trial court “recognition” as did or “endorse- fails to define Bacon), (Judge that there is supra note precision ment” sufficient and that bar on such com- no absolute constitutional inconsistency further suffers from internal Instead, “recognition.” as elabo- pelled meaningful attempting to create a dis- below, state interest compelling rated intangible tangible and as- tinction between *49 that offi- may specific overcome the burden Thus, recognition.” pects of (rather merely the cial toleration than de only to a fresh look at the we need take practices toleration now George- appeal: issue on “whether real facto endorsement) body by permitting student ‘recognize’ gay the unwillingness town’s to university. impose on the rights groups concept is to be that —as (4) the excused on understood —must be Act, Rights ground the Human that sum, making constitutional dis- In with the applied, impermissibly interferes tangible intangible tinction between and right to the free University’s constitutional benefits, why Judge Mack does not discuss I, Rights religion.” Gay of exercise for compelled provision tangible benefits ques- this central 568. I return to A.2d at group is not with an announced cause however, First, I to wish in Part III. tion compelled constitutionally equivalent to that, to show Judge Belson’s effort address Judge Mack support.11 Nor does verbal although he a remand would believes such as satisfactorily explain why cases university’s mo- clarify the necessary to Abood, on Electric Gas & Pacific tives, Act would not bar the Human relies, support do not explicitly which she gay Georgetown’s actions toward “recognition” groups’ the student claim by de- solely rights groups if motivated status, eradicat- given her conclusion that advocacy of homosexual suppress sire to on sexual orienta- ing discrimination based conduct. state interest. compelling tion is a

11. tangible compelled provision bene- university embrace Judge has not ar- Mack notes the that, legal requirement pro- Part gued appeal any is true as noted in on that a kind. It fits services, tangible expressly in contrast argument Georgetown facilities and infra, vide at oral IV “endorsement," intangible "recognition" with or argument com- that reliance on disavowed rights. See ante at first amendment violates 26 n. 21. tangible at issue provision benefits pelled of the supplemental brief In George- But the first amendment. violated only argument, find such state- for en banc any separate first waive decision to town’s case involves much more than ments as “this simply tangible providing bene- defense amendment question to facilities" and of access sharp dis- way theoretical saves the in no fits plaintiffs few additional benefits ”[t]he relies, tinction, Judge heavily soMack on which recognition grant of official could obtain compelled compelled endorsement between best." I find no concession that are minimal at speech. another’s subsidization of university’s does not free exercise defense Act, thus, says, improper- he court ii. ly granted summary judgment for the stu- Mack, Judge Judge Bel- contrast with Judge statutory dents Belson on issue. way son reads the Human however, suggests, further this court proscribe George- can the appropriateness evaluate of sum- discriminatory argues He town’s conduct. mary judgment under the Act reference that the Act’s reference to “sexual orienta- findings by Judge additional Bacon only tion” forbids discrimination based on George- her connection with evaluation or “preference practice,” sexual not dis- town’s free exercise defense. Post at 66- “advocacy,” meaning on crimination based acknowledges Judge 67. Belson then “promotion of ideas activities.” Post at Judge findings do not Bacon’s warrant only Georgetown engaged If in the summary judgment university un- discrimination, says, he did latter sort of Act; they der do not establish that disposition the Act. But for his violate university’s basis for the discrimina- grounds, on constitutional on appeal promotion groups’ tion was the student assumption has violat- Accordingly, ideas or of activities. he con- Act, Judge ed the Belson would remand for cludes, the appropriateness but for of dis- proceedings clarify further the universi- posing solely the case on constitutional ty’s motives. grounds, he would remand the trial problems Judge There two Bel- findings court “for fact conclusions First, analysis. given trial son’s court specifically of law addressed to the statu- findings he which are on which relies—and issues,” tory post particular supported by the record—no remand is nec- the university’s motives. essary university’s to determine the mo- noting, Judge post Belson is correct in evaluating tives purposes whether 67 n. found “the Presi- Bacon Georgetown has violated Human Georgetown University, dent of the Dean Indeed, Rights Act. the basis of the Center, expert of the Law and defendants’ findings by trial in the judges both statu- justify George- attempting witness”—in tory phases pro- and constitutional discriminatory town’s actions ceedings sug- himself Belson —which *50 grounds applied teachings with Catholic — gests rely on purposes we can ana- gay in mind: two realities “[t]he lyzing all issues in this case—the student organizations, by their char- as evidenced groups prevail entitled to on the statu- activities, participat- ters their were Second, tory Judge issue. Belson incor- ing promoting homosexual life in and rectly never, argues that the Act can con- added.) styles.” (Emphasis We thus have Constitution, sistent with the interdict dis- express finding of discrimination based “speech” directed at or crimination “advo- advocacy (“promoting”) on but cacy.” also, words, Judge post at Belson’s A. protected of a on “status as member Belson, According Judge Georgetown to group” life- (“participating” in homosexual “University recognition” claims it denied clear, therefore, why styles). It is not disagreed gay ideas because it with the the Judge acknowledge fails that Belson to rights groups propagating, were not be- supplied supplementary Judge Bacon groups composed primarily cause the were Judge Bra- finding sufficient to sustain Judge perceives, university homosexuals. Belson violated ruling man’s that the (Judge however, Judge Bra- that the trial court Mack’s Act. the Human man) record, mistakenly the Human 26- analysis understood ante at lengthy finding against Act to forbid discrimination validates unquestionably group advocacy. university motivated not on account of Post was that gay rights Judge Consequently, merely by at 65. Bel- aversion to suggests activities,” son, or groups’ “promotion of ideas appears trial court to have conclud- ed, by disdain their also erroneously, post that own but “preference status, i.e., sexual or their stated reasons for its violated the actions practice.” 1-2502(28) (1987) D.C.Code findings augment con’s Judge that Bra- § (definition quoted of “sexual orientation” man’s, may not have violated the Act. And Belson, 65). by Judge post at yet, shifting to analy- his constitutional sis, adopts working “premise” he as a what my colleagues’ emphasis Given on statu- findings, the record and the trial court’s tory analysis, important emphasize it is to best, university: establish for the that, if grips the full court were to come to recognition denied to the stu- question summary with the whether judg- large dent “in part,” but not exclu- appropriate ment or a remand the more sively, groups’ sponsorship “because avenue for statutory resolution of the issue promotion of ideas and activities.” record, unanimously we would at 67. premise, Post That record-based agree, benefits, tangible at least as to findings drawn from sound court trial university judgment. is not entitled to university discriminated reference Moreover, required, if a even remand were advocacy lifestyle, both and to clinches only practical purpose, according argument has violat- Judge analysis, Belson’s would be to deter- denying “University recogni- ed the Act in Georgetown’s only mine whether motive in necessary tion.” No remand would denying “University recognition” was to establish that violation. advocacy; block if the motives were mixed—if one of reasons for the univ- ersity’s discriminatory withholding of rec- B. ognition was an aversion homosexual general, though There is a more funda-

preference practice Judge or Belson —then Judge analy- mental weakness of Belson’s himself, gather, agree I the Act has unqualified proposition sis—of his that the violated, been since the dis- statute bars sup- Act cannot be construed to forbid the if “wholly partially” crimination or based pression “speech” “advocacy.” upon “sexual orientation.” 1-2520. Id. § distinction between discrimination based

Finally, advocacy understand Belson to and on status will not work. if, agree remand, is, upon person the court were Part of he or she who is what university’s says; deny right speak deny to find that the motives were is to mixed, university aspect person. then the would have vio- an essential of one’s In this sense, therefore, by withholding intangible right lated the Act an asserted to dis- (status), (facilities), against advocacy as well as the criminate someone’s benefits; join homosexuality clearly right he does not Mack’s a claimed reading against person of the Act that would exclude a discriminate on the ba- requirement nondiscriminatory, “preference” verbal sis of one’s sexual and thus recognition 1- from the reach of the Act. “sexual orientation.” D.C.Code §§ *51 2502(28), Thus, -2520(1) (1987). judges four of the on this case seven (Belson, Nebeker, Ferren, Terry) agree Assume, however, true, Judge is it as motivated, part, that if in was contends, for- Belson that the Act does not groups’ ho- plaintiff an aversion to the solely by discrimination motivated a bid preference practice mosexual or —as prevent speech the desire to activities Mack, Newman, Ferren, Judges Pryor, First, group. Two caveats are order. Terry agree university’s it was—then the against to the means chosen discriminate status, recognition failure to accord as well (here, non-recognition advocacy the support, as facilities violated the Human plaintiff groups) necessarily prove does not Rights Act. underlying merely to that the motive propagation repugnant

Judge findings prevent of fact the of a Bacon has made motives, university’s indicating campus. doctrine on ac- mixed and the record Belson, may solely speech directed supports findings. Judge tion be activi- those (let is), however, reality; ties us assume it but that action up does not face to that illegal under the Act if possi- may for still be moti- inexplicably, he leaves room the vated, part, by Ba- even in dislike for those bility Georgetown, despite Judge that prefer practice homosexuality. condemn, I require Georgetown who or to approve, agrees.12 Belson express believe or even the neutrality toward homosexuality, moral value of but the Act Second, university if the moti- even were does, require constitutionally may, and by a solely vated desire to shut down offen- Georgetown tolerate others in the universi- activities, speech means to sive the chosen ty espouse environment who that moral repugnant speech might counter none- value; and, given the nature of universi- theless the Act. Even if the Act violate ty, presupposes such toleration forbid discrimination were construed recognition” I now shall elaborate. ideas, —as against unquestiona- it homosexual bly against does ho- forbid discrimination III. mosexuals because of their ideas. Discrim- goes beyond question ination that the ideas to the is: The fundamental whether person no matter plaintiffs’ request “University recogni- violates Act what (1987)(any motive. D.C.Code 1-2532 meaning citizenship See full as student § tion”— practice having consequence” “effect or groups Georgetown University may — violating unlawful). Accordingly, Act is denied, though in even violation of the Hu- context, censorship if even in this when Act, Rights man because of motivated, lawful, properly an act were rights. developed my first amendment I excluding degrading group or accom- argument why why the answer is “no”— plish censorship would not be lawful. Georgetown’s constitutional defense fails— opinion years ago, in the division over two indicated, As I dis- believe effort to I, I Gay Rights A.2d at tinguish legal under Act between dis- repeat will not it all here. But against illegal crimination ideas and dis- indeed, concep- principal crucial issue— against persons crimination fails to take divides court—I tualization that want into advocacy account that ideas—and —are record, emphasize again that, on this part person. an essential of the But even “University recognition” or “endorsement” made, if the is not distinction could be plaintiff groups student does draw, easy part capa- because means mean, explicitly implicitly, a statement achieving may ble of former amount approval neutrality even I has latter. believe Belson —or —toward rights, homosexuality, gay or related mat- overlooked, analysis both in in its his ters. Because of the nature of univer- application, George- possibility way sity, the Human Act no recognize plaintiff town’s refusal compels Georgetown position to take a groups, if of an because aversion right violation of its to free exercise indeed, advocacy, their is likely to inev- be— religious beliefs. itably university is in the context of a —an overly response effectively dis- broad critically im- In context—and context against persons in criminates violation only requires Georgetown portant —the the Act. against not to discriminate court, views express wish to their own every Because member call, fear of another, without proceeds one reason or to decide what believe we contradiction, university typical private premise the case Human ideas, violated, inherently marketplace more which Act has been no expression. That analysis for freedom of the Act useful. stands itself would be *52 analogous, for marketplace constitution- I to issue. is therefore turn the constitutional in it, shopping to the center constitutionally purposes, I As see the Act al cannot orthodoxy those who Judge findings, ly condemns As that Catholic 12. Bacon’s buttressed clear, course, record, Judge analysis lifestyle. Of that practice Mack’s of the make a homosexual Georgetown's grounded motive group people cannot be characterized is hostility to a one’s solely speech; to univ- as a desire frustrate objections religious less makes it no moral or in ersity clear has made that the ultimate reason Rights Act than illegal the Human under advocacy approving does to be as not want seen hostility animus. in mere emotional founded dignity homosexuality precise- of the is moral PruneYard, There, reply in supra. Supreme (required newspaper inclusion rights that the first amendment by political Court held candidate whose character and justi- shopping center owner did not assailed). newspaper record had exercising barring pamphleteers from fy recognized There is a constitutional dis speech rights in the common their own free others requirement tinction a that between legal require- A open public. areas permitted express clearly be to what university- that make its ment forum, you in when your their own ideas forum available a nondiscriminato- wide (Prune- forum manifestly provide public ry to all student citizens the univ- basis Yard), requirement you that must and a not, view, my imply any ersity does (Wooley; Tor express the ideas of others university corporation/admin- way that the caso; Barnette) spread, and thus or must reasonably identified itself can be istration affirm, implicitly your ideas in own those particular student any views of with the forum, private a dissociative statement absent such, university, as organization or that the (P Electric; Tomillo). Gas & acific con, or neutral —on position pro, has a — division, Gay For reasons elaborated at group any particular message a student I, Rights A.2d I believe Rights spread. The Human happens to PmneYard analysis controlling is here.14 Act, therefore, George- require not does obviously are differences be While there or to intimate espouse any view town private private university and a tween a opinion.13 a neutral even center, each, for shopping the fact demands, as The Human Act’s reasons, entirely has become different Georgetown University, stand they bear on expression for the of di traditional forum have com sharp contrast with laws that verse, conflicting provides a often ideas particular to utter pelled individuals that, compelling a conclusion context 705, speech, Wooley Maynard, 430 U.S. v. pro definition, even a private university (com (1977) 97 S.Ct. 51 L.Ed.2d reasonably associated prietor cannot be pelled ideological message on state license em affirmatively any with idea it does Watkins, supra (re v. Torcaso plate); therefore, most, “University rec brace. At in God for notaries quired oath belief implies no gay rights group ognition” of a Ed Virginia State Board West public); university’s “official toler more than Barnette, supra (compelled ucation v. I, Gay Rights ance,” A.2d at allegiance flag), or to dissemi pledge of plu organization still another message in a “hitherto nate a of others to be ex tolerance ralistic environment—a Electric, &Gas forum,” private Pacific granted, pected, indeed taken 910 n. 8 U.S. at 12 n. 106 S.Ct. at open to free purports to university (1986) (compelled inclu (plurality opinion) ideas, thus a tolerance expression of organization ratepayer’s flyer sion of university position whatso implies no Her customers); Miami utility with bill any group stands Tornillo, ideas ever about Publishing ald Co. values (1974) To tolerate another’s for.15 41 L.Ed.2d 730 facilities, willing expand manifestly interesting has to note that 13.It mission, help with purposes, thus its educational accepted for various federal funds statute, money. public no representing, required by as project ever be those funds shall assisted with efforts Mack’s and Belson’s activity.” 20 U.S.C. used for "a sectarian are, me, unpersuasive 1132e(c) distinguish (1982). statutory PruneYard re- Even if this § they such, primarily not deal with because do direct sponsibility, does not have a university. recognize bearing nature of a refusal to reasons, do the student "recognition" equates university university’s acceptance 15. The of federal believe the pre- meaning "approval.” I have repre- "endorsement” amounts to funds under this condition sentation, finding that viously trial court's reasonably noted that the can be on which students recogni- "university purpose major rely, expected ”‘[t]he concerns will that sectarian 'clearly is “not is official endorsement'” points tion” derogate of all of view from the tolerance ” I, omitted.) (Citations Gay university erroneous.’ expected com- reasonably in a to be *53 noted, But, finding this as also authority A.2d at 572. governing 496 munity especially a —

59 approve them; it is ideological theological is not to of nor is or reasons speech making university It a about express neutrality. indifference or is statement making its own ideas and thus expressed willingness group’s to let simply an position known.17 indicating a say someone else have without you think about it.16 This distinction what Act does Obviously, the Human (or, toleration and endorsement between way in first get not generally, and tak- more between toleration right any to make statement amendment sort) of some lies at the heart ing position of a condemning the to make views wants first demand that of the amendment’s But, more group of its own students. even government tolerate beliefs and dissident recognizing the officially in importantly, equally civil speech; it is essential to our not, rights groups, Georgetown would gay Conceptually, perhaps, rights statutes. effect, posi- forced its own in to make quibble govern- could about whether one responsive by issuing clear such a tion ment-compelled amounts toleration student condemning gay statement but, for speech; conduct or forced forced Electric Gas & In groups’ aims. Pacific purposes, point is the salient constitutional Tomillo, had forced conver- law that, context, recogni- in such forum, private public forum into a sion of a suggest university not is tion” does prerogatives proprie- overriding the taking position group on the that it toler- agendas to restrict communication to tors Thus, “recogni- ates/recognizes. required a conse- opinions of their own. As not run the absolute proprietors likely tion” does afoul of to feel quence, the were against pro- ac- protection compelled compelled respond, utterances to withhold or Wooley, Barnette, and Torcaso. messages altogether, to assure corded vocative it, therefore, refusing only their audiences would not confuse As see anyone views those of recognize group expressly proprietors’ a student suggests speech ambigu- compelled "purpose” recognition about the ous; 17. requires burdening religious it thus an of both the to the evaluation beliefs is more odious meaning[s]” "practical "endorsement," violating compelled speech [the] normative than Constitution analysis did the trial court appears non-religious Judge beliefs. Mack provide. Id. at 573. the constitu- not tionality Because distinguishes present agree, case for she Act, applied, the Human as & Utilities Gas Electric Co. v. Public from Pacific required "recognition” or “en- turns on whether 1, 903, Comm’n, 1 89 L.Ed.2d 475 106 S.Ct. amounts, effect, dorsement” to a coerced (1986), part ground the latter on the neutrality— religious vexpression approval speech a free defense rather than involved something meanings of those or to else—the weightier) (presumably claim. free exercise precisely possible terms must be defined as as however, Georgetown, n. 19. has at 24 Ante ultimately matter of law and thus defined as a authority religious provided no to indicate that earlier, by this court. As discussed greater protection rights such speech receive for the mean- Mack’s deference trial court fact, non-religious speech rights. than "endorsement,” therefore, wrong ing suggest no in the level of precedents difference provide a reasons: the trial court did not two compelled-speech cases on protection. The definition, event, and, meaningful Georgetown princi- both Mack and which interpreter that has court must be the of a term rely speech violation pally concerned forced factual, constitutional/legal, primarily a beliefs, religious these person’s but two of aof above, I As indicated in the text definition. government actions struck down the decisions recognition/en- University "the would define grounds applicable solely speech equally on free no more than dorsement here ... mean [to] religious be- implicating specifically no to cases Id, groups.” gay rights ‘official tolerance’ of 705, Wooley Maynard, 430 U.S. v. liefs. See 574. 752 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. (1977); Virginia Education Board West State argues Georgetown, Judge Belson Barnette, 319 U.S. v. permitting body student endorsement (1943); L. see also L.Ed.2d 1628 Tribe, American groups, fully plaintiff "has the activi- tolerated (1978). The third Law 864-65 Constitutional place of ties of the student in the market religious as a condition oath down case struck university.” n. 12. is a Post at 68 ideas that gave but no indication public office true; body simply endorse- That is “student great- deserved conscience is, freedom “University recognition,” a ment” relative gener- of conscience freedom protection than er inherently less reflects second-class status that Watkins, ally. See Torcaso plaintiffs’ than of toleration of the activities (1961). 1680, L.Ed.2d 982 groups. of other activities *54 contrast, er, Georgetown University agree meaningful else. In there can be no is, nature, very a forum for its by its constitutional distinction enforced between students, teachers, administrators, and intangible “recognition” compelled and public alumni. It is akin to a forum in that tangible agree But I do not benefits. that variety groups of constituent has auto- Judge legitimate for Belson has a basis access, matic there is a tradition of wide court, circumstances, asking this under the debate, thus, open given very na- provide Georgetown not to order to the university, implication ture of a there is no tangible majority half loaf of benefits a corporation/administration that the —the required. the en banc court believes See proprietor reasonably academic —would supra note 1. with, compelled and thus to feel identified appeal, Georgetown On has chosen to from, dissociate itself the views of student solely right defend on its asserted to with- as the as diverse Jewish Students “recognition.” Although Georgetown hold Association, Organization the of Arab Stu- provide has not conceded that it must the Freedom, dents, Young the Americans for tangible narrow set of benefits inherent in Organizing Com- the Democratic Socialist recognition,” supra note Collective, mittee, Rights the Women’s university separate raised a has not Gay People Georgetown University. compelled provision tangi- defense to I, Any Gay Rights 496 A.2d at 573-74. See fact, George- In ble benefits. its brief disassociation, in such statement of con- tangible characterized the benefits as town text, gratuitous. would be insignificant,” “relatively and at en banc short, Rights require- the Human Judge recognizes, argument, oral Belson Georgetown officially “recog- ment that 14, Georgetown post specifically n. gay rights groups does nize” its student any argument compelled disavowed that “speak” in university not force the to viola- provision tangible constituted a benefits rights. tion of its free exercise subsidy speech in itself forced which university’s first amend- would violate the IV. therefore, rights. appeal, ment On That should end the matter but for sought play to university has down Judge persuade the court Belson’s effort to tangible significance of the benefits and Georgetown con- permit to withhold on pinning prevent the court from its constitu- grounds tangible even the bene- stitutional tangible analysis tional denial plaintiffs Judge fits the student seek.18 accompanies the denial of benefits that Judge Belson takes Mack to task con- “recognition.” Georgetown cluding be ordered Perhaps university considers such a rights gay provide benefits to legally insignificant it al- subsidy because violating university’s groups without ready willing provide some of that rights. earli- first amendment As indicated analysis depends upon a judgment Belson’s constitutional Judge Belson would affirm large part" by Georgetown university he resolves the consti- because motivated "in desire Georgetown’s favor. It is inter- tutional issue in esting suppress speech, if he is not sure on this that, although Judge Belson to note large part played that motivation record how the univer- for determination of would remand (obviously large enough to avoid violation motive, sity’s evaluate whether in order to law), Human Act as a matter violated, he is will- Human Act has been required presumably then a remand should ing here on to "discuss constitutional issues is, fact, any rea- there to determine whether recognition premise denied addressing defense. son for that constitutional large part be- groups at least in to the student dealing directly obvious with this Rather than promotion groups’ sponsorship cause of the analysis, applying his constitutional deterrent ac- Post at 67. He of ideas and activities." knowledges, Judge that a diluted states in a footnote Belson however, Georgetown’s "free George- speech not affect free defense "would extent, speech if would be diluted to the defense Id. He does not free exercise defense.” town’s any, findings can be read to Bacon’s greater why receive explain the latter would imply basis of the acted on the former, do not protection and I under- than at 68 orientation of individuals.” Post sexual supra clear, therefore, See note 17. that it does. appears stand that if n. 10. It

fil (in per- that financial contributions connection with the Court stressed subsidy anyway *55 charters) of collec- government by compelled al- in furtherance could be mitted 236, meeting access to at lowing plaintiffs at 97 S.Ct. bargaining, 431 U.S. tive calendar, rooms, activities may very to the student 1800, though “employee an even Director of services of the Stu- to the a wide ideological objections to have well funda- perhaps, Or more Activities. dent un- by the variety of activities undertaken university simply does not mentally, the representative” in of exclusive ion its role high principle to dimin- a matter of be want reli- —including, example, “moral or for ished, and the courts dis- parties and the desirability of abor- gious about the views tracted, relatively legal haggling over by square with the tion ... [which do] money. Alternatively, small amounts negotiating a medical ben- policy union’s ap- Georgetown, anticipating the perhaps 222, at 431 at 97 S.Ct. plan.” efits Mack, sought by Judge to proach proposed Electric, 1793. And Gas & Pacific advocating an all-or- by result avoid that “the Com- careful to note that Court was university analysis in nothing which if it were a order could be valid mission’s in a bifurcated greater confidence than had serving means of a com- narrowly tailored reasoning, one. Whatever 19, 106 pelling state interest.” 475 U.S. not to address university has elected at 193. and, dichotomy intangible/tangible therefore, case, present applied As it, any separate waived see has therefore Electric would Gas & Abood going specifically bene- Pacific defense of, way the consti- support, not stand fits. nondiscriminatory plaintiffs’ tutionality of event, I Abood In believe that both recognition,” includ- access to support plain- Electric Gas & Pacific university. from the ing tangible benefits intangible right tangible, as well as tiffs’ recognition related financial Required Abood, Supreme In Court benefits. (which, organizations support of student representing public noted that a local union university institutionally, are central impose compulso- employees may lawfully case, life) analogous, purposes of this is ry on whom the service fees non-members support of collective compelled dues bargaining represents union in collective ideological disagree- despite bargaining: shop arrangement, pursuant agency to an support ment, compelled to employee that, the first provided consistent with university is bargaining, and a collective amendment, on such not be used fees nondiscriminatory access required give employee for “ide- any objecting behalf of benefits, public activity because to student to collective ological activities unrelated bargain- such put premium on 236, policy has 97 S.Ct. at bargaining,” 431 U.S. at nondiscriminatory student 1800, political ing views and on such expression such as In first amend- political programs. candidates. Because activity or contributions to Court, however, Electric, relying implicated, Gas & ment interests Pacific Tomillo, public a state heavily “compelling held that state government must have utility requiring Electric, utilities commission order 475 U.S. interest,” Gas & Pacific ratepayers’ flyers of a companies to send 913, such a 19, justify 106 S.Ct. at along with organization customers to their must imposed the burden premium, and the first amend- utility bills violated id., tailored,” to achieve the “narrowly 475 ment, compelling interest.” “absent a “substantially must objective and state’s at 912. U.S. at 106 S.Ct. placed burden” outweigh[ whatever ] rights. first amendment the exercise & Elec- Although Abood and Gas Pacific States, University v. United Bob Jones utility employees and public tric held that 103 S.Ct. not be respectively, could companies, exercise); (free see (1983) L.Ed.2d finance, in effect and thus forced to 252, 257-58, Lee, 455 U.S. States United objectionable, they found sponsor, any idea (1982) 71 L.Ed.2d to demonstrate the Court was careful I, 496 A.2d at exercise); Rights (free Gay Abood, the opinions. limits on those 576-77, (discussing Supreme rights 581 & n. 19 secured the Constitution cases). against rights Court those created the District Act,1 of Columbia Human and is not

V. deprecatory of the efforts of the District of prevent Council to earlier, Columbia discrimination length For reasons elaborated at I, on the basis the several factors that the Gay Rights A.2d at I am Council has identified in the Human expressed satisfied that “the District’s in- ruling Act. I would affirm the trial court’s eliminating terest discrimination edu- *56 Georgetown University favor on con- cational institutions on the basis of sexual grounds. join Judge stitutional I Mack in ‘compelling’ ‘overriding’ orientation concluding Rights that the Human Act as it is in the more traditional areas of race George- applied require should not be (citations omitted). and sex.” Id. at 576 In grant recog- University “university town connection, agree I with Part YI of nition” and its concomitant endorsement to Judge concurring opinion. Newman’s Gay People Georgetown University Moreover, District of Columbia’s in- “[t]he (GPGU) Gay Rights and the Coalition enforcing Rights terest in the Human Act’s (GRC). however, disagree, I with her con- prohibition of discrimination based on sexu- clusion, ruling, and this court’s that outweighs ‘substantially al orientation requires university provide statute places whatever burden’ the Act on groups. facilities and services to those ‘exercise of be- [its] ” concluded, upon appro- Even if it should be Jones, (quoting liefs.’ Id. at 582 Bob fact, priate findings of statute so 2035). U.S. at 103 S.Ct. at That in- requires, religion exercise the free intangible cludes not the burden of speech free clauses the first amendment earlier, “recognition,” as discussed but also prevent application George- would facili- the burden of the benefits of town this case. Georgetown ties and services which has not which, expressly questioned analytical- but aspects Judge opinion Two Mack’s present I ly, Accordingly, give partial disagreement. the same issue. my rise to One requires Georgetown procedure. opinion believe the law Univ- relates to The over- that, ersity grant granting summary and its Law “Univer- fact Center looks the recognition,” full, Gay People judgment against Georgetown University sity had Georgetown University Gay and to the on the issue whether it violated Act, Rights Judge Braman mistak- Georgetown University Human Coalition of genuine enly that there was no Center, concluded respectively. Law actuality, material facts. In issue as to BELSON, Judge, Associate with whom issues concern- there were obvious factual NEBEKER, Retired, Judge, Associate withholding ing university’s reasons for dissenting in joins, concurring part recognition groups. from the One central part: university issue was whether the withheld orienta- recognition because of the sexual appeal requires This the court to evalu- groups, or of the tion of the members rights Georgetown ate the constitutional groups’ advocacy of instead because of the University speech to free and the free exer- life-styles, conduct inconsistent homosexual religion statutory right of cise of and the Georgetown to which religious beliefs with Georgetown and their or- certain students opinion, suggest, I Judge Mack’s adheres. ganizations discrimination to be free from by going Judge Braman’s error compounds On the based on homosexual orientation. findings of fact to make its own on to below, analysis basis of the I set forth university’s that the support its conclusion that, rights conclude to the extent those discriminatory. purpose was us, George- conflict in the context before Judge disagreement My second with rights paramount. town’s constitutional law. opinion relates to substantive balancing of Mack’s This conclusion results from a (1987). 1. D.C.Code 1-2501 to -2557 §§

fiS correctly concluding the first decide this case After on the basis of whether the protects amendment Universi- requires Constitution certain result. In ty against being required to endorse interpreting statute, course, we appellant groups, Judge Mack’s attempt should to avoid a construction that opinion reaches the inconsistent conclusion bring it into would conflict with the Consti- Georgetown can be forced to subsidize tution. I would hold that Braman those activities that offend the entering summary judgment erred in university religious beliefs which the the basis that had violated the view, my adheres. if the Act cannot discriminating Human Act require endorsement, require it cannot sub- against groups. the student sidy require either, either. If it should summary judgment first reason that abridge George- this record statutory inappropriate on the issue was rights first free town’s amendment asserted, GPGU and GRC never religion speech. and free exercise asserted, could not have there was no disagreement My Ferren’s genuine concerning issue facts that control *57 opinion2 principally arises from its consist- important, the of Most outcome their suit. short-weighting ent first dispute concerning sharp there the was rights in amendment the constitutional bal- recognition Georgetown reason that denied urges ancing process. Judge Ferren that groups. to those statement of their university requires the Act that the exer- facts, undisputed groups the student set regard cise with the student “tolerance” to they forth the facts that asserted entitled being “an groups, “tolerance” defined as including summary judgment, the them expressed willingness let someone else Georgetown recogni- fact that denied them say indicating you have a without what but, time, recogni- granted tion at the same think about it.” Ante at 58. Georgetown range to wide tion other cultural indisputably permitting already is such ex- most, organizations. political At such facts pression by groups. the What student permitted may have an inference that Georgetown is has declined to do to en- Georgetown discriminatory out of acted groups’ promotion dorse or subsidize the motives, such an inference cannot be but of ideas and activities antithetical to the against to form the resolved Georgetown es- doctrines that Murphy See judgment. summary basis pouses.3 Found., Inc., Army v. A.2d 458 Distaff (D.C.1983). Therefore, George- even if I. not opposed town had GPGU’s and GRC’s notes, ante Judge opinion As Mack’s summary judgment, Judge Bra- motion for 16, although Georgetown appeal did not granting have erred in it since man would Judge ruling Braman’s that it had allege groups student did not facts the the violated District of Columbia Human they that were entitled sufficient show denying Act in recognition to the judgment as a matter of law. See Mil- groups, we must consider a statu- student Newby, Properties, Inc. ruling ton tory undertaking A.2d basis for before Ferren, 47-48, opinion Judge opinion, fudge 2. See 55, ante In his Ferren has included positions my My position numerous reformulations the Act does not 56. Many accept. former, various issues. I cannot It would but reach the latter. reach the lengthen opinion unduly all of this to address say my positions It them. should suffice to respect Ferren's reference 3. With opinion. One recurrent are as stated by university’s use of the name the student theme, however, brief mention. With merits ante, p. point groups, at n. I out that this Act, respect to the reach of the Human out, point us. also how- issue is not before I opinion repeatedly blurs dis- Ferren’s ever, university’s would that the use of name action, (1) taking an tinction draw between appear to be an assertion of endorsement recognition, as the because such denial ruling. this court’s denied (2) speech advocacy, content blocking one’s or speech advocacy, because another’s other, impermissible, possibly reason. some (D.C.1983); Burch v. Amsterdam Roman Catholic Church human sexu- Corp., 366 A.2d (D.C.1976). 1983-84 ality, teachings which are central to the beliefs of Roman Catholics. Moreover, papers filed Georgetown in opposition to the motion manifestly pre- (R. 346) Schuerman, Affiant William C. summary cluded judgment. Georgetown Assistant Vice-President and Associate presented competent, sworn evidence—affi- Affairs, Dean for provided Student a sim- davits from those responsible officials ilar account: the decision to deny recognition to GPGU ... I concluded that endorsement of such provided GRC—that more ample than organization by the University basis for finding the university’s through recognition official would in- decision resulted from its determination consistent with teachings of the Ro- objectives and activities of those man Catholic Church. recognition Such groups conflicted with teachings lending mean the University’s (R. Roman Catholic Church. 354- organization name to an espoused which 55, 540, 542-44) example, For the affidavit the legitimacy and acceptability of the of Timothy Healy, S. George- President of life-style, homosexual necessarily which University, town included following ex- includes orga- homosexual conduct. An planation for university’s decision to nization goals with such objectives deny recognition to the groups: in direct my conflict understanding I determined that it would be con- teachings of the Roman Catholic trary to the role of Universi- Church on the issue homosexuality. ty as a Roman Catholic and Jesuit Univ- (R. 540) These affidavits sup- would have ersity for the University officially to rec- ported finding it was groups’ *58 ognize and organizations. endorse these promoting activities conduct antithetical to This decision part upon was made in my teachings Catholic sexuality human understanding organizations that the at Georgetown led deny recognition. Thus, embody issue beings idea that human Judge because Braman had before him con- should be identified and their essential flicting concerning facts the central issue nature classified in terms of their sexual case, i.e., in the whether had a preference. addition, In my decision was discriminatory denying reason recogni- upon my based understanding that the GRC, tion to GPGU and see D.G.Code organizations approved, at issue by and 1-2520(1) (1987),Judge Braman erred in § approval such encouraged, necessarily granting summary judgment appellants homosexual conduct. my It was further statutory question. See, on the e.g., Re- understanding organizations that the two Motors, Inc., liance Ins. Co. v. Market among issue would foster students a (D.C.1985); A.2d 573-74 Word v. belief University approved that the and Ham, (D.C.1985) (per A.2d 751-52 accepted homosexuality merely as an al- curiam). way ternative of life. completing Before this discussion of the upon 9. understandings, Based these grant summary judgment, I acknowl-

*61 I University’s concluded that the official edge possibility Judge Braman dis- recognition and or- endorsement these agreed premise with a my basic ganizations last contrary would be to and conclusion, granted summary judg- and conflict with the traditional and consist- appellants ment to teachings theory ent the mistaken of the Roman Catholic proffered that the question by Georgetown Church on reasons of human sexual- ity. Organizations discriminatory were themselves such within the as those at is- sue, meaning Rights which are of the Human based on a human Act. Be- view of nature emphasizes granting which cause the order summary judg- the sexual as- pects terse, of human ment I colloquy nature as dominant was turn to the values, the exclusion of other between court and counsel for an indication which encourage and foster homosexuality, approach. of whether this was the court’s totally incompatible (R. teachings 857) with Although of the is not entire- record clear, Judge ly Judge appears religion. Braman to have the free exercise of Mack provisions interpreted those of the Human interprets prohibit public the Act to prohibit Rights Act that educational institu- private by educational institutions covered discriminating per- against any from tions engaging types it from of con- certain son on the basis of sexual orientation but, attempt duct in an to avoid conflict prohibiting against individu- discrimination amendment, the first she construes groups promote als and homosexuali- the speech the Act not reach activities of ty regardless preference sexual or private opin- a institution. Mack’s practice of the individuals or the members ion, Mack ante concludes (R. 867, 887) groups. of the Under that require that the Act therefore one does Act, a Rights of the Human construction private actor to “endorse” another. Id. private like would be actor analysis I use a different to deter- prohibited treating promotion of from mine whether denial of rec- disagreed or it ideas activities with which ognition groups to the student outside falls differently or promotion from the of ideas scope Act. Human agreed. with which it Presum- activities interpret prohibit the Act to adverse action private such ably, actor would also against persons taken on the basis of their prohibited treating person group or protected status as members class. promoted ideas or activities with which purport prohibit does ac- disagreed differently person it from a or against persons tions taken because group promoted ideas or activities promotion (here, ideas or their activities agreed. with which it example, promotion and con- of ideas Act, plain by The Human lan- teachings). duct antithetical Catholic guage, prohibit does not discrimination Thus, view, entity my by if an covered against persons upon or their based grant fails to facilities and services the Act Rather, advocacy. prohibits discrimina- to an individual because of his or her status against persons upon tion based their “sex- protected group, of a the Act as member which, in ual orientation” the words of the contrast, entity if an cover- violated. statute, “means male or female homosexu- provide ed the Act fails facilities heterosexuality ality, bisexuality, his individual or services to an because preference practice.” D.C.Code *59 activities, promotion ideas or that 1-2502(28)(1987).4 her Judge It follows that § Further- conduct does not violate the Act. granted judg- Braman erred if he summary below, against more, II, Georgetown theory developed ment Part a recogni- denying prevent that it violated the Act Act construction that would groups’ advocacy tion because of the differentiating among private actor from a life-styles. homosexual of their the basis of the content others on unconstitutional, at be least speech would II, below, a As discuss Part construc- compelling a state inter- in the absence of prohibit pri- tion of the Act that would Thus, imposed require- statutorily est.5 differentiating among per- vate actor from promotion neutrality toward ment advocacy of sons based on their ideas viz., idea, morality of homosexual Act, an only be untrue would abridge first amendment life-styles, would abridge also amendment’s would the first case, imposed duty either guarantees and, rights. Similarly, an speech free in this interpretation be Judge opinion the Act would inconsistent Mack’s reaches no conclusion amendment, prohibits Rights Act as to whether the Human of the first with the dictates against groups Act, persons or that discrimination D.C.Code clause of the so-called "effects” homosexuality. It finds that advocate Georgetown instead (1987), interpreted pro- cannot be § 1-2532 orienta- in fact took homosexual Section conduct here. scribe deny recogni- deciding tion into account in prohibit interpreted to con- 2532 should not be Judge opinion, tion. Mack’s ante 27-29. though stitutionally protected even conduct impact have an adverse such conduct Rights 5. For the same reason that the Human group. protected require Georgetown or cannot to endorse i.e., groups, that subsidize the student such position to endorse or to subsidize a on that but has no more authority findings to make abridge rights.6 issue would also those on disputed issues of fact than has the trial court. Hannan, See Holland v. 456 A.2d An analogy is illustrative. It could not (D.C.1983). 814-15 least, very At the seriously suggested be that the Human Georgetown disputed raised a issue of fact private, Act could force a church-af- respect with to whether it withholding was filiated school to lend its endorsement or recognition of the groups student for a subsidy group to a pur- advocated or proscribed reason by the statute. See posely facilitated fornication adultery. RAP, Inc. v. D.C. Comm’n on Human group, however, Such a argue could Rights, (D.C.1984). 485 A.2d 177-78 those activities reflect group members’ orientation, heterosexual an orientation Normally, grant where a summary triggers protection the Act’s judgment was erroneous genuine because same extent as does homosexual orienta- facts, issues exist as to material we should tion. There can be no doubt that universi- remand for a trial of disputed facts. ty authorities in such recog- a case could Remand to determine whether nize purposes that the and activities of an violated the Human Act would be organization type of this would foster or here, unnecessary however, Judge if Ba- promote acts that the Church deems im- findings con’s upon the trial of the free moral. While Catholic doctrine deems all exercise require defense the conclusion homosexual acts immoral and some groups recog- denied the immoral, heterosexual acts the principle is nition for reasons other than the sexual the same. Both this hypothetical group orientation of its members. The determi- groups and the before us properly can nation of simple, this issue is not principal- denied subsidy by endorsement and a reli- ly course, because the judge, trial struc- gious institution because of sponsor- their findings tured her of fact and conclusions ship promotion of acts that the institu- of law to deal with the free exercise issue immoral, tion considers rather than on the rather statutory than the par- issue. It is basis of their members’ status as homosex- ticularly difficult apply statutory uals, heterosexuals, or bisexuals. Tr. See definition of sexual orientation of an indi- (Georgetown would not subsidize activ- vidual, (28) (1987), D.C.Code 1-2502 § club); ities of “playboy” Tr. 628-30 findings made in the free exercise frame- (Georgetown support group would not concerning work and university’s deal- distributes information about abortion clin- ings rather than individuals. students). ics to degree The result is a ambiguity against lack of focus that counsels what In its review of Braman’s conclu- be, effect, summary judgment sion that the university violated statute favor of Georgetown. I reach law, this conclu- as a matter of opinion Mack’s though Judge sion even Bacon made no grievously accepted precepts at odds with *60 explicit finding Georgetown that denied summary judgment of procedure in that it recognition because of the and, sexual orienta- undertakes a review of the evidence individuals, effect, any though tion of and even I finds as a matter of fact that the reading Judge think that the group better of Ba- “homosexual status of members en- findings con’s is Georgetown’s primary, tered into that the if not assessment of the sole, ‘purposes Georgetown’s reason for and activities’ of the student denial of rec- ognition groups, Judge was unconsciously.” groups sponsored albeit that the opinion, promoted Mack’s ante at 60-61. In re- activities and ideas antithetical to viewing grants summary judgment, of Catholic the doctrine. But for the fact that appellate novo, Georgetown prevail court reviews the record de appeal should on that, record, values, point 6. I private out as I view the this or beliefs. This case involves a actor, appeal present statutory Georgetown, does not the issues of that asserts that it treats the appellant groups differently construction and constitutional law that would because of their private adversely promotion arise if a actor treated another of ideas and conduct antithetical to ideas, merely personal by Georgetown. because of the latter’s the views adhered to address, I constitutional issues here on constitutional defenses next discuss the Georgetown recog- premise that denied course circum- appropriate under the groups to the student at least nition findings be to remand for of stances would part groups’ sponsor- of the large because of spe- and conclusions law addressed fact promotion ship of ideas and activities.8 cifically statutory issues.7 Although yet determined it has not been en- whether sexual orientation factfinder II. motivation, Georgetown’s it tered at all into finding if Even there were valid Judge the record and is clear from from Georgetown the Human had violated findings Georgetown’s con- Bacon’s Act, prevail should groups’ advocacy speech cern over the litigation permeated this on the basis of its constitu- of the activities consideration rights speech grant recogni- question tional under the free and free of whether to them Therefore, Georgetown’s right of I tion.9 of exercise clauses the first amendment. 7. 8. I ren relies of fact Georgetown had proscribed by the Act. gay should be word contained in the phasis in and sizes. See concern was have ly, more try “sexual orientation” that of the statute. Georgetown’s leadership concluded that "the the "sexual orientation of which what al of of law are at R. 1687-1698. Judge We need town pointed and defendants’ Catholic denced were not to mative tions would be inconsistent with Church and 393. sexual life 10.In ter alia that: do not statutory to stretch groups. satisfy student a. The b. Georgetown denied no Church. fully recognition, is added), promoting University, Bacon's participating Recognition of Ferren’s "sexual orientation" within the undermine 88, teachings applying Bacon’s out, D.C.Code the statute. applied in footnote 9 Church], upon Judge engage organizations 90, gay issue, with their charters and their styles. Judge Moreover, Judge Testimony reach the issue following: findings 91, more than one motive opinion, part statute expert homosexual but these the Dean and with the basic findings if in sexual and Tr. § the normative Bacon’s PLEx. 21 in and there organizational Bacon made no 1-2502(28) (1987). They of her Organizations, statutory one recognition teachings witness, below. proscribes. Judge Bacon’s Judge organizations, as evi- President ... of ante at 55-56 would coat fact Among 85-86, 145-146, was evidence that of the Law Father were student promoting homo- such motive was findings plainly ”practice[s],’’ findings does not fit. As life and conclusions and Ferren But that does concluded definition of participating finding how [those individuals,” teachings her McCormick, styles" 25, because of actions of obligation the thrust activities, organiza- meaning for deni- obvious- findings George- empha- Center, finding Def.Ex. quote cover (em- Fer- nor- 385 in- of ognition” as follows: W. Schuerman 36]; and findings Cleary, Georgetown’s correspondence with the student Government pose Memorandum from ty ings Dean ings e.g., randum from (Nov. town’s reasons Judge note dorsement, an endorsement which the Universi- cally liefs. ... science and value must make responsibility, which the This situation ply endorsement. tradition. out recognition ment that dy complex dorsement ings Tr. at movement tion would individual 11.There was no evidence that the beliefs on believes will 474; S. are Letter Letter omitted). and University D. foundation, 21, 1979) Bacon also found that "[t]he of the Catholic Church. Riel, the Church [******] President of 280; Testimony Catholic. ‘university amply supported history McCarthy support Testimony matter of faith and the moral which it advised them of from Dean W. from President T. University official lives and (Feb. fact, Judge of the on a full GPGU Dean W. Schuerman to S. Ozmun University be conflict decisions in (R. 1693). Judge Bacon’s find- [Pl.Ex. and and tradition cannot J. involves a of University, denying interpreted by many as en- or otherwise sincerely-held religious 6, 1979) "recognition" would not im- Ryan a (May positions taken recognition’ system identified with this Dean W. Schuerman University (March its Law Center rights of its gay acted were with Father Undergraduate Student homosexuality.” range 33]; concur with an is a (Feb. Bacon law student 8, 1980) Stott, Jr., them Dean [PI.Ex. the normative find- light Letter from Dean controversial and private university Healy, in terms of issues. which is "Official” subsi- Healy, "university 1979). not entitled to administrators McCarthy, students, they quoted bizarre, record. 1980) of the 28]; Memo- [Pl.Ex. official en- cherish the major pur- to J. Tr. organiza- George- S.J., specifi- In her [Pl.Ex. (Foot- teach- While Ryan argu- with- con- 605. See, 24]; rec- gay be- Tr. P. speech free strongly play.10 comes Judge into with Georgetown Mack that cannot constitutionally required respect exercise, Judge With to to free Ba- endorse an organization with the views which it findings firmly con’s established that disagrees.12 Judge See opinion, Mack’s Georgetown recognition denied “because part ways ante at 20-26. I Judge with recognition would be inconsistent with its opinion, however, Mack’s with respect to (R. 1694) duties as a Catholic institution.” the constitutionality requiring George- Georgetown has a free speech defense provide town to tangible benefits to the right based on its not to or subsi- endorse groups.13 Any student forced such subsidi- promotion dize groups’ of ideas and groups abridge zation of these George- will disagrees.11 agree activities with which it I free speech town’s free and exercise 10.While the contains governmental Thus, out gent upon amendment findings L.Ed.2d 601 tal encroachment freedom ment’s free exercise clause and establishment forbid alleged tale, ed to the in footnote beliefs on which clause beliefs. acted on tled to (R. individuals, as an institution. ment judgment vidual grant The fact that the activity, does not cern, Georgetown" er Georgetown” remains a ply means decision, therefore, is not a ate for a Catholic cause rights Church. al in sidered and discussion has taken and the moral cannot harmony, assert acting single one of these 1690 [1643]— endorsement particular, while the first amendment endorsement two "may violation of the Act which recognition of what a lack of involving can be read to to become an Accordingly, Georgetown [******] members, endorsement the basis several although fully upon allow one’s extent, quite speech guarantees. of the such free point (1962) (although each has a reach of its own. supra, in some instances free exercise defense. As conduct, as a as a student those or students in ability different 91) speech free guarantees against after the sympathy Georgetown controversial matters of faith and and freedom of if but rather appropriate personal University upon religious University. University approved teachings Judge demonstrate a lack deep respect reading disagreement any, guarantees exercise defense inappropriate subsidization of a to invoke all other first sincerely first amendment one’s imply defense See, sexual orientation kinds of Bacon facts have been con- activity for the choices of its indi- "Gay would not affect reflection ability represents has chosen not to e.g., Engel v. Vi acted general. beliefs. “Gay People Judge found held guarantees of overlap, they for individual first sprung was religion Students of toas wheth- Georgetown governmen Georgetown gay place, is University’s freedom''). institution- were appropri- intrusive religious be dilut Catholic Bacon’s that the amend entitled on or contin I student student quoted invoke It sim- group point itself judg- there enti con- any A a 13. 12. In 11. pouse. town sity, Mack’s would have Mack’s cial endorsement. "separate” equal” status to lowed these is to endorse or subsidize them. whether has beliefs, them_” campus. What use the sense: “to not interfere ary the market Ante at nary view, tolerate ed Mack’s conclusion that tion that sues. endorsement, Judge tion free placed principal reliance correctly I defense. ever, mental conduct is in no freedom See, (1972). sertion assert the former without reference to the latter. Yoder, In the fully undisputed meaning; permitted has e.g., United States v. 1051, his arguing 406 U.S. approach, GPGU groups of a free approach, heresy]," it can be the free the activities of the student 51-52, 53-54, 57, refused to endorse the views recognition word point speech principles practices, trial Ferren It relied in from other student (2d in that analysis gives access to think, place religion Id.) groups gay groups, "to ed. L.Ed.2d 127 court and provide tangible fact out, however, but would not "tolerate” here his of ideas that is speech speech decided required Georgetown, a Without recognize 1982), Webster’s describes as student Judge Ferren's to function and to under which facilities afforded defense 92 S.Ct. disagreement actually Ferren etc.) part recognition Georgetown with; defense. rather area, insufficient Lee, way to take here, Georgetown to do government raising the on (1982); and 58-59. has declined to do New signifies develops without that under allow; 455 U.S. dependent precedents, grant its free analyzing intrusive GRC would be than its has so, respect benefits to the private into "separate university. World opinion, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 A Judge Georgetown its Wisconsin v. thereby amounts to has tolerat- litigant them offi- permit considera- groups weight tolerance. by Judge speak his primary they issue of 252, George- exercise sharing second- (others’ univer- govern- the is- Dictio- on as- Mack, Judge grant how- ante posi- but has my can es- [to al- (I

69 rights.14 quiring employee] contrib non-union [a support ideological ute the of an cause speech free defense is not holding oppose he as a condition a its dependent on status as a insti- Catholic 235, job public as school at a teacher.” Id. private ordinarily tution. No actor can be 1799; 97 Pub S.Ct. at Miami Herald compelled speech to subsidize with it which cf. Tornillo, 241, 256, lishing v. U.S. Co. 418 disagrees. The Supreme recog- Court has (1974) 41 94 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 730 principle long nized this in a line of cases. recently, (Florida’s right reply Most statute interfered Gas & Electric Pacific Commission, 475 rights Co. Public Utilities newspaper’s first amendment 1, 903, (1986) 89 U.S. 106 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1 requiring print replies, it to that it oth Supreme (plurality opinion), the Court ad- print, newspaper’s erwise would not to the first challenge dressed a amendment to a editorials). togeth Gas and Abood Pacific regulatory ruling required pub- state that a er clear when make it that the first amend utility company billing lic to include in its proscribes requiring subsidy, ment a it mat envelopes flyers organiza- ratepayers’ a subsidy ters not whether the is form Id. 106 at 905-06. tion. at S.Ct. The Court money.15 or services government may impose held that the not a The a principle private that individual grant private content-based of access to cannot be forced either to endorse or to property compelling state absent interest. a view he dis- subsidize with which or she 16-17, at 106 at 912. Id. S.Ct. Since agrees long-established first is amendment interest, compelling no Court found it held Supreme The doctrine. Court unmistak- requirement unconstitutional the ably out ruled such endorsements in West utility company, private corporation, Virginia Board State Education v. mailing make its services available to 624, 1178, Barnette, 319 63 S.Ct. ratepayer group. at Id. S.Ct. at (1943). Barnette, L.Ed.2d 1628 In 913. Court held that students could not com- be Similarly, in Abood v. Detroit Board of pelled loyalty affirm their United Education, States consistent with the dictates of the (1977), Supreme L.Ed.2d 261 de- Court speech first free amendment’s clause. Id. shop any cided that a union not could use symbol at 63 S.Ct. at 1187. The in- portion of the service fees collected from volved, flag salute to the of the United non-member employees po- to contribute to States, to be an utterance that was held express litical candidates political views compelled, could not because these not unrelated to the union’s role as the exclu- religious beliefs conflicted with students’ bargaining agent sive collective for (although that was the for the salute basis 234, 235-36, members. at at Id. flag), refusal to salute the the students’ Supreme 1799-1800. The held Court government pow- lacks but because principles “prohibit that first amendment any to profess Detroit re- to force citizen belief Board of from er [the Education] argue litigated throughout Although specifi been on an ‘all or 14. case has does cally providing tangible Judge opinion to the stu nothing1 benefits basis.” Mack’s n. subsidy groups dent forced amount to a split analysis It 16. was until Mack’s speech opposed, appro which is I find it it compo ‘‘University Recognition” into the two priate to reach issue three reasons. this nents endorsement and "facilities and servic First, squarely presented by it of this the facts separate subsidization became a issue es” that fact, case. gave one of the reasons groups’ of endorsement of the student recognition time it GPGU denied provision Previously, views. of facilities inappropriate and GRC found it for a was included under the rubric of and services was give support Catholic institution to financial “university recognition.” groups. the activities of these Second, Def.Ex. 102. forcefully argued by it has been amicus specific tangi- interesting It to note that the Spitzer, Esq., curiae B. been Arthur and has seek, mailbox, ble benefits the student Third, appellants' addressed in briefs. services, labeling mailing computer notes, servic- litigation stage Mack no have "[a]t es, directly resources that would increase parties requested ‘endorsement’ disseminating capability separately. their ideas. benefits be treated their *63 engage any or to ceremony of assent to objection moral aspect to one of the union’s 1183; one. Id. at 63 S.Ct. at see bargaining multifaceted position, e.g., medi- Wooley Maynard, 705, also 430 U.S. covering cal benefits abortions. To re- be 714, 97 S.Ct. 51 L.Ed.2d 752 quired to support process such a differs (1977) (“A system which secures right the being required support to group a proselytize religious, political, and ide- organizing whose principle is advocacy ological guarantee causes must also of a life-style incompatible homosexual right concomitant to decline to foster such with religious be, one’s beliefs. It would concepts”); Int’l Ass’n Machinists v. least, argue far-fetched to that such Street, 791, 367 U.S. 81 S.Ct. advocacy enjoys plays a status or a role (1961) (Black, J., L.Ed.2d 1141 dis- remotely comparable to that of collective senting) (“[T]he Amendment, First fairly bargaining in city the affairs of our or construed, deprives the Government of all Rather, nation. it is obvious that the stu- power any person to make pay out one groups’ dent analogous activities are more single penny against his will to be used in promotion political which, views any way to advocate doctrines or views he Abood, under workers cannot be forced to against, economic, is scientific, whether po- contribute. litical, religious other”). any Supreme The Court's decision Prune Although Judge opinion Mack’s discusses Shopping Robins, Yard Center v. many Supreme of the Court cases that hold 74, 85-88, 2035, 2042-44, 64 L.Ed. government that the compel pri- cannot (1980), 2d 741 suggest does not vate institution support speech Georgetown can be forced to subsidize the disagrees, which it opinion away backs speech of groups speech whose is" implications from the of this line of authori- at odds with tenets to which the ty as it relates to the case at hand. It is university PruneYard, subscribes. that, clear for the same reason the Detroit Supreme upheld Court a California state Board of Education or the California Public provision constitutional construed to re Utilities Commission cannot constitutional- quire privately-owned shopping center to ly compel private corporations citizens or permit pamphlets individuals to distribute fund the op- dissemination of they views signatures petition collect for a on the pose, the District of Columbia Council can- shopping grounds. 76-77, 88, center Id. at require private not university, such as rejected 2044. The Court Georgetown, speech to subsidize the of stu- argument shopping of the center owner groups dent speech whose is contrary to that he had right “a First Amendment university’s religious creed. to be forced proper State to use his opinion Ferren’s over falters ty speech as a forum for the of others.” issue, same but for a different reason. It Id. at 100 S.Ct. at 2043. first takes the view that the activities Georgetown, burden on if it is re- homosexual student here are quired to endorse speech and subsidize the analogue relating the matters groups, substantially of the student bargaining collective discussed in Abood. greater shopping than that on the center goes argue It public policy has significant owner in PruneYard. Several placed comparable premium col- on both differences their relative burdens arise bargaining lective non-discriminatory directly from the fact This, submit, is a treatment. the rele- religiously-affiliated First, Rather, university. comparison. vant it is relevant to shopping since compare normally centers do not en- bargaining, collective the means particular views, settling unlikely dorse it is labor-management disputes long preferred endorsement of the policies, the nation’s laws and diverse views of persons distributing pamphlets with the advocacy of a homosexual life- style. bargaining pro- shopping Collective is a broad be attributed to the center owner. cess required sup- apprehension George- that a worker can An part on the port town, though even university the worker have a as a with the affiliated Church, subsidy trary

Catholic to Catholic doctrine. This defense *64 groups viewed as an endorsement applies would be with force not to the full 9, supra. is not unrealistic. See footnote speech-related activity groups, but Second, in the state did not PruneYard groups also to all other activities of the particular message a to be dis- dictate that are antithetical to Catholic doctrine. shopping id. at played the center. See to Bacon It was this defense contrast, 87,100 S.Ct. at 2044. as findings directed her of fact and conclu- statute, opinion the Mack’s construes the law, they fully support her sions of and requires Georgetown to Human ruling Georgetown. in favor of provide support and a facilities services to leading Supreme The invok Court case viz., message, a particular morality the of Lee, ing principle this is United States v. Third, life-style. Georgetown homosexual 252, 102 1051, 127 455 71 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. easily as a with cannot disavow connection (1982), Amish in which a member of the student the multifaceted activities of payment social faith contended that the of required it would be to subsidize religious security taxes would violate his shopping the PruneYard center could Lee’s Supreme accepted Court beliefs. signs posting pam- in the areas the where religious interpretation of his own Amish standing. As a phleteers were id. See tenets, acknowledged accordingly university, Georgetown just is than more compulsory participation in social se mortar; presence bricks and it has be- curity system exer interfered with the free confines, yond physical its must be 257, rights of Amish. 102 cise Id. at relationship concerned its several with with however, held, at 1055. The Court S.Ct. categories persons physical- of who are not given government’s strong inter ly present campus, e.g., potential at its ensuring vitality est in the fiscal of potential students benefactors. security system, imposed social burden Fourth, shopping owner center (as op employ on those Amish who others allege objected PruneYard did that he Amish, self-employed to the who are posed Here, pamphlets. to the content of the se exempt participation from the social Georgetown specifically objects the con- to curity system) Id. is not unconstitutional. groups’ tent of the moral speech student 1055-56, 1057; 258-59, 261, 102 at at S.Ct. Gas, religious grounds. See Pacific 221, Yoder, 406 Wisconsin v. cf. supra, 475 at 910 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. 1526, 1536, 1542, L.Ed.2d 32 PruneYard, (distinguishing “does which (state’s (1972) of system interest 15 its proposition not undercut that forced right did not compulsory education override protected speech associations that burden at Amish to their children of educate (footnote omitted). impermissible”) Fi- home). being nally, shopping center was required grant recognition official long country’s of part has It been affirmatively pamphlet- to subsidize the an indi- jurisprudence that first amendment eers; rather, merely being required it was compelled fund the cannot be vidual permit activity property, their on the of others. views dissemination something vol- already has Madison, first drafter of the James tolerating unteered results amendment, “Who not see ... wrote: does government endorsement authority force a which can the same [t]hat Thus, groups. the burden on his pence only of three citizen contribute being subsidize required to endorse and estab- support any one property advocacy particular view lishment, to conform to may force him than disagrees is much heavier which in all cases whatsoev- establishment other shopping that on the center. PruneYard Madison, Memorial er?” J. and Remon- Against Religious Assessments, re- rights, speech In addition its free strance Edu- v. Board in Everson rights printed Georgetown’s free exercise cation, app. 67 330 U.S. infringed required also be if it were (1947). Thom- app. at 91 L.Ed. con- 504 subsidize ideas or activities that are expressed agreement as Jefferson his when appropriate give great weight Virginia he drafted the Bill Religious judgment of the District of Columbia Coun- Liberty, preamble which stated in its cil. The proscribed Council identified and compel “to a man to furnish contributions number of bases for discrimination. The money propagation for the opinions Human Act forbids an educational disbelieves, which he tyranni- sinful and institution discriminating Virginia cal.” Hening, Statutes race, upon color, based religion, na- (1823), Everson, quoted supra, sex, origin, age, status, tional marital 67 S.Ct. at 510. personal appearance, orientation, sexual *65 private,

Since is a family Catholic- responsibilities, political affil- affiliated iation, institution and since pro- source of physical income or hand- motion of homosexuality incompatible is icap any of individual.... doctrine, with Catholic infringe it would (1987). D.C.Code 1-2520 While neither § Georgetown’s right to the free exercise of statutory language legislative nor its

religion required if it were to subsidize history indicates whether the Council in- promote that foster and assign any tended to hierarchy to the sev- life-style. Georgetown’s homosexual inter- proscribed discrimination, eral bases for in being compelled est to subsidize ac- is postulate reasonable to that it did not tivities antithetical to Catholicism must be equal. doubt, intend them to be One must given great weight under our Constitution. example, the eradication of dis- Barnette, 633, 642, supra, See 319 U.S. at upon crimination based source of income or J., 63 (Murphy, S.Ct. at 1189 personal appearance was meant to as be concurring). compelling an interest as the eradication of It can argued Georgetown’s free upon discrimination based race. speech and free exercise defenses are abso event, In any it cannot be said that the subject balancing lute and not goal eliminating of discrimination on the countervailing state interests. See Tornil orientation, basis of sexual as undesirable lo, supra, 418 U.S. at 94 S.Ct. at 2839 be, may as such discrimination has attained (statute compelling newspapers print re high the same priority public policy, as in plies unconstitutional; to editorials is no the District of nationally, Columbia or as balancing used); Barnette, test see also goal eliminating has the racial discrimi

supra, 319 U.S. at 63 S.Ct. at 1187 nation. emphasis This difference of is (grave danger necessary immediate be manifested in many ways. One is the fore first amendment freedoms be in equal protection jurisprudence clause fringed). Because Supreme other Court Supreme United States Court. Under precedents apply balancing tests to deter it, example, a racial classification lead mine whether a first amendment burden is ing to different treatment has been identi unconstitutional, however, proceed I will fied scrutiny— as one that demands strict balancing such a here as well. Under this scrutiny but no such has been demanded of approach, a violation of free sexual orientation discrimination. See Pa speech rights and free exercise would be Webster, U.S.App.D.C. dula v. 822 justified only accomplish if it is essential to (1987) (homosexuals suspect F.2d 97 not a overriding governmental interest. Hob quasi-suspect equal protection class for Comm’n, bie Unemployment Appeals purposes); 2 R. J. Nowak & J. Rotunda, — -, 1046, 1049, 94 Young, Law; Treatise on Constitutional (1987); Lee, L.Ed.2d supra, 455 U.S. at 18.3, at 325 Procedure, § Substance 1055; Thomas v. Re (1986) (suspect equal classifications under Bd., view 101 S.Ct. at race, protection analysis include national (1981). origin, alienage). very statistics evaluating opinion, in the District of Columbia’s cited Mack’s which indi governmental eradicating interest dis- cate that one state and the District of orientation, adopted legislation crimination based on sexual it Columbia have here, being interpreted importance type make the same Council’s determination of n. point. Judge opinion Mack’s at 69 governmental eliminating interest orienta- upon discrimination based sexual say, legis- Needless to the act a state tion. lature, or of the District Columbia Coun- cil, identifying governmental interest Weighing in- the District Columbia’s it, cannot, legislation adopting to serve eradicating terest sexual orientation dis- itself, is establish that the interest so crimination, every I observe too that not compelling competing to override consti- application equally of that com- interest rights.16 tutional Nor can such an enact- Indeed, pelling. deciding weight what ment, force, give of its own each identified interest, assign pertinent to that the most goal same stature as the interest question simply is not whether the Dis- eliminating racial In the discrimination. proscribing trict’s interest in sexual orien- end, complete judiciary must the task is, abstract, discrimination in the tation determining particular gov- whether a Rather, compelling. important it is how compelling policy sufficiently ernmental application of the Human Act is right. to override a claimed constitutional accomplishment *66 the of that interest. Cf See, e.g., Rotary Int’l v. Bd. Dir. of Robel, 258, 263, United States v. 389 U.S. — U.S.-, Duarte, Rotary 107 Club of 419, 423, (1967) 88 19 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 508 1940, 1947, (1987) 474 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed.2d (“the power’ phrase ‘war cannot invoked be (state’s eliminating in discrimina- interest support any as a talismanie incantation against compelling despite tion women congressional power exercise which can slight infringement expressive on associa- ambit”). brought Therefore, be within members); right tion of service club Rob- weighing in competing the interests in- Jaycees, erts v. United States volved, in one can consider that addition to 82 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 462 petitioners seeking only are endorsement (1984)(same); Thomas, supra, 450 U.S. at mailbox, mailing the of a benefits 709, 718-19, _ at services, services, computer labeling and (Indiana’s interest in fiscal soundness of right apply university and also unemployment compensation scheme not This does denial funds. case not involve sufficiently compelling justify denying aspects higher fundamental education unemployment compensation to Jehovah’s university, such as admission to the course job participation Witness who left to avoid selection, by physi- or use tanks); Yoder, in military manufacture of university.17 cal facilities of the Nor does 221, 233-34, supra, 406 at deprivations it involve such as discriminato- (state’s compulsory interest in discharge ry employment or exclusion system sufficiently compel- education public place from a accommodation ling infringement of justify free exercise orientation, Amish). here, doing based sexual elimination rights of In so compelling.18 may In- weight must to the of which well be court accord substantial Council, course, (e) programs, programs, participate or in athletic 16. The did not discuss (f) weigh competing programs, participate concerns at issue this in awards and honors Indeed, (R. 909) adopting (g) placement § case. (1987), D.C.Code 1-2520 use the service.” [and] express finding students, individuals, no Council made have been denied No elimination of discrimination edu- that the facility any university service reason of or appear- personal cational institutions based ance, sexual orientation. orientation, family responsibilities, sexual any of other enumerated there factors decide, vacuum, impossible to in a 18.It compelling was a state interest. on the whether eradication discrimination be, could in other basis of sexual orientation significant that and acknowl- 17. It is GPGU GRC circumstances, compelling I state interest. edged undisputed in their statement of facts groups’ merely conclude that the student claim summary judgment support of their motions for endorsement, facilities, and services at Georgetown (including that all students homo- sufficiently inadequate to create a bisexuals) "(a) issue here permitted to re- sexuals and (b) compelling degree, interest override participate in student activi- ceive ties, (c) classes, (d) rights. participate in loan constitutional attend deed, Georgetown permits these student sum, the facts of this case did not organizations to conduct their justify entry activities summary judgment hinderance, without merely requiring that had violated the Human they respect do so without university to homosexual stu- subsidization Georgetown. dents Instead, or endorsement. On this case point, Judge Ba- represents an attempt by appellant con found that “the George- interests of groups to use power the coercive town students in gay issues and their needs government compel private university can be served without ‘university recogni- to endorse cause, and subsidize their plaintiff tion’ of the organizations.” (R. fostering promotion of homosexual 1693) She specifically noted that “[with- life-styles, a cause which Univ- ‘university recognition,’ out clubs ersity has incompatible found with the formed, meetings may be campus held on Catholic doctrine to which it adheres. application may be made for lecture Since I believe way that the best protect funds.” Id. legal rights of homosexuals pro- is to On the balance, other side of George- tect the rights constitutional persons, of all claiming town is constitutional rather than including those institutions and individuals statutory rights, they are the funda- who, religious reasons, disapprove of rights mental speech freedom of and the practices, homosexual I would affirm. free religion. Moreover, exercise of TERRY,

burden on Georgetown Judge, Associate concurring be direct part compulsion, i.e., dissenting injunction part: ordering the university to violate its beliefs.19 Although agree with a considerable *67 Therefore, upon considering the constitu- part Judge of what Mack has written in her tional issues balancing opposing the opinion especially part III-D, ante at — interests, I would find the District’s inter- join 26-30—I opinion cannot in that be- in preventing est the asserted sexual orien- cause it go does not enough. far I see tation discrimination regarding endorse- meaningful no difference between the ment and tangible limited benefits is out- intangible benefits which weighed by Georgetown’s appellants interest these seeking are from the univ- endorsing ersity. To subsidizing granting sustain the activities and an of the for- ideological be, mer without the Judge latter would message repugnant as to its reli- suggests, Ferren regression a gious creed. unla- This is Judge the conclusion days “separate mented of equal” but ac- upon Bacon reached weighing George- public cess to willing facilities. I am not town’s rights against free exercise the stat- give appellants only the half a loaf when right utory petitioners to receive the they are entitled to a whole one. question. benefits in sup- That decision is ported by by the applicable record and the Furthermore, I find no basis case law. record for concluding that “University Rec- Although the record imposed bears out New- burden that would be here. The Su- against preme man’s observation that discrimination although Court said in Bob Jones that faith, homosexuals not a inevitably is tenet the Catholic ”[d]enial tax benefits will have a 45, disagree ante at impact with his operation private conclusion that substantial on the providing schools, religious facilities and services to prevent will not [it] those is, therefore, observing religious an indirect burden on schools from their tenets." Georgetown's religion. Forcing contrast, free exercise Id. at 103 S.Ct. at 2035. In Georgetown to subsidize the dissemination of a burden on would constitute direct by compulsion doctrine of sexual ethics deemed immoral violate its tenets sub- sidizing group purposes Catholic Church is a on direct burden its whose are antithetical rights. Furthermore, respect, free exercise In this case Catholicism. Bob Jones Univ- differs States, University ersity from Bob public policy against Jones v. United ran afoul of the 574, 2017, discrimination, 76 L.Ed.2d racial which has constitutional (1983). underpinnings, There the burden on that universi- see id. at 103 S.Ct. at ty’s religion free exercise of from the denial of while the "state” interest at issue here is the tax-exempt lighter its status statutory provision. was much than the enforcement of a includes, (1986). by implication, generally ognition” any even L.Ed.2d See Cain v. States, (D.C.1987). of the 532 A.2d 1001 kind of “endorsement” views and United recipients. Anyone of its who activities analysis respecting a bal- Belson’s “University Recognition” is considers ancing the “sexual orientation” between granted simultaneously to “such diverse expressed in District right Columbia Association, the Jewish Students bodies as first amend- Human Act and the Students, Organization of Arab (ante at ment assertions of Freedom, Young Americans for and the 72-74) an additional prompts me to add Organizing Democratic Socialist Commit- assumes, If, as he bal- observation. tee,” “occupy range groups which broad if no ancing appropriate, test bal- philosophical social and political, all, ancing is needed it is interests rationally spectrum,” ante at cannot important recognize that the homosexual university conclude that is somehow orientation, by one’s sexual as defined “endorsing” goals any group 1-2502(28)(1987)), practice D.C.Code {see § “recognition.” such If which it bestows inconsistency issue stark here has a university this is believes not self-evi- The conduct in- established criminal law. dent, may accompany grant of “life-style” is feloni- herent homosexual “University Recognition” public with a I find no Accordingly, ous. factor Id. position, statement its but it favoring interest under Act state grounds “recognition” on which withhold against George- which can be balanced law, are orien- forbidden such sexual rights. Indeed, every there rea- town’s university’s tation. violation son law to hold absolute Human Act is clear. Because rights. first amendment any- compel does not it to “endorse” has to look at three of the One but thing, Recogni- and because attached, exhibits, to see record which tion” does not constitute an “endorse- holding is on how our asserted intrusive ment,” free exercise defense is unavail- protections. and clear first amendment ing. University See Bob Jones v. United by plaintiff, produced These exhibits were States, 461 by the Gay People, demand defendants (1983). L.Ed.2d 157 *68 examples They for documents. I therefore hold that Human would to announce dances and propaganda used grant requires Act (one gay for the “benefit for gatherings appellants “University Recogni- to these University”) in the people benefits; tion” as well as accord- Washington, They are ex- D.C. area. also ingly, separate I join Ferren’s promotion court’s amples the sort opinion. part I join also VI religiously holding require a affil- opinion. Newman’s might One university to subsidize. iated holding a whether our

ask Retired, relations group to heterosexual NEBEKER, dedicated Judge, Associate age girls of sixteen would part: with under concurring part dissenting “sexual orientation” bene- likewise derive thoughtful join Judge opinion. Belson’s in the face of first fits under the power Today the court uses state’s amendment assertions. contrary religious body, force to its basic holding against Surely this court’s tenets, provide services facilities first Georgetown University raises amend- proselytize those advocate and abnor- who warranting closest review ment issues practices. See mal criminal sexual meaning (1981); adjudicators of the ultimate 22-3502 Bowers v. D.C.Code § important provisions. these most Hardwick, *70 GIBSON, Roy H. Robert a/k/a Gibson, Bobby Appellant, STATES, Appellee.

UNITED

No. 84-1379. Appeals.

District of Columbia Court

Argued April

Decided Dec. 1987.*

* opinion typed prior This printing. was released in form

Case Details

Case Name: Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Nov 20, 1987
Citation: 536 A.2d 1
Docket Number: 84-50, 84-51
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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