delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal and cross-appeal involve exceptions by the landlord, appellee and cross-appellant, to the ratification of sale by a trustee in a proceeding for foreclosure of a chattel mortgage covering property of a tenant. The chancellor decreed the payment to the landlord of $1200, the amount of his rent in arrears, out of $1377.85, the proceeds of sale, but that the costs of the sale were to be deducted from the proceeds before payment to the landlord. From that part of the decree giving the landlord priority, the mortgagee has appealed, and from that portion ordering payment of costs out of the proceeds before payment of the past due rent, the landlord has cross-appealed.
On November 15, 1960, Eden Corporation purchased a tavern business from Dominic Frasca, located at 216 South Eden Street, Baltimore City. On the same day, Eden executed a chattel mortgage to appellant, the Gay Investment Company, in the amount of $4200, the proceeds of which were used as part of the purchase price paid to Frasca. Also on the same day, a lease was executed by the appellee, Comi, the owner of the premises, to Eden for a term of five years, beginning November 15, 1960, providing for a monthly rental of $200, payable in advance on the 15th day of each month. A bill of sale from Frasca to Eden, the chattel mortgage, and lease were all executed simultaneously in the office of the landlord’s attorney. Eden made only the November 15, 1960, rental payment. Foreclosure proceedings were instituted by
Judge Cullen heard testimony and on February 16, 1962, filed a memorandum opinion holding that the landlord had priority to the chattel mortgagee, and upon the payment to him of his rent in arrears that the sale would be ratified. In accordance with the opinion the court entered its decree on
The principal questions presented in this case may be summarized as follows: (1) Is the claim of the appellee and cross-appellant (the landlord) entitled to precedence over the claim of the appellant and cross-appellee (the chattel mortgagee) either through the landlord’s right to distrain or by the provisions of the Statute of 8 Anne, Chapter 14, and (2) should a judicial sale, not held in strict conformance with the decree of sale, be confirmed?
A landlord’s right to distrain upon property located on the premises he has leased in order to secure his rent in arrears is not in the nature of a true lien, it is a right that must ordinarily be perfected by seizure. In re
Chaudron & Peyton,
Thomson v. Baltimore and Susquehanna Steam Co.,
On the basis of the
Thomson
case, we hold that the land
Code (1957), Article 53, § 18 designates property exempt from distress. In part, it provides that if the property dis-trained upon is being purchased by means of a purchase money mortgage under the terms of Code (1957), Article 21, §§ 41-51, it shall be the duty of the landlord to ascertain such fact and if he finds the property to be so mortgaged, to pay the chattel mortgagee the balance due under the mortgage or to release such property from the distraint. Appellant contends that there is such a purchase money mortgage involved in this case but we disagree.
In
Heuisler v. Nickum,
Appellant also contends that since the property in question was in
custodia legis,
it was exempt from distraint.
Mears v. Perine,
However, in considering the cross-appeal of the appelleelandlord in which he contends that he should be allowed the full amount of his rent in arrears without deduction of the expenses of the sale, we must consider the fact that the trustee allowed the chattels sold to be delivered to the purchaser before the ratification of the sale, in direct contravention of the terms of the decree for sale. This prevents the landlord from obtaining his alternatively requested remedy of having the sale set aside. We, therefore, determine that the landlord is entitled to the full $1200 rent in arrears without any deduction for the expenses of sale, and that the deficiency in funds available for their payment must be borne by the appellant.
Decree affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded for the passage of a decree in accordance with this opinion, with costs in the lower court and in this Court to be paid by the appellant.
