86 Ga. 132 | Ga. | 1890
Mrs. Gavin filed her petition for injunction and relief against the city of Atlanta, and alleged, in substance, that she was a tax-payer of the city; that the city was about to issue and sell bonds to the amount of $250,000 for the purpose of building a new system of water
The defendant by its answer practically admitted all the allegations in the petition. It admitted that the number of persons registered for the last general city election preceding the special election in question, were 2,755, and the number of votes cast in the general election were 1,633. The number of persons registered
. As we have seen, the plaintifi contended that the bonds had not received the constitutional majority because they had not received the assent of two thirds of the qualified voters of the city, the qualified voters being those who had registered for that special election. The defendant admitted that two thirds of the voters 'who had registered did not vote in favor of the issuance of bonds, but contended that under the code, §508(1), two thirds of the number of those who had voted at the last general election had assented to the issuance of the bonds, and they were therefore legal.
The constitution of 1877, art. 7, sec. 7 (Code, §5191), prescribes that no debt exceeding one fifth of one per centum of the assessed value of taxable property therein, shall be incurred by any county, municipality or political division of the State, “without the assent of two thirds of the qualified voters thereof, at an election for that purpose, to be held as may he prescribed by law.” The act of 1879, code, §508(1), declares that “In determining the question whether or not two thirds of the qualified voters in said county, municipality or division voted in favor of the issuance of said bonds, the tally-sheets of the last general election held in said county, municipality or division shall be taken as a correct enumeration of the qualified voters thereof.” The legislature, in granting the present charter of the
"We are aware that the Supreme Court of the United States, in Carroll County v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556, has
We think we have shown that both the convention which adopted the constitution, and the legislature, have clearly expressed the intention that the common law rule on the subject shall not prevail in this State, (1) by omitting it from the constitution, (2) by passing a general act prescribing a different test, and (3) by authorizing special registration in the city of Atlanta.
The reasons for the change of the rule and the benefit' accruing therefrom to counties and municipalities are so obvious, under the peculiar condition of affairs in this State, that we deem it unnecessary to state them.
Judgment reversed,.