82 Mass. 501 | Mass. | 1860
The line which marks and separates the respective duties and functions of the court and jury is certain and well defined. The difficulty arises in determining on which side of this line particular cases fall; that is, in deciding whether a case presents only a question of law, or involves an inquiry into facts and the inferences deducible from them. Certainly the court in all cases should be scrupulously careful not to invade the province of the jury by undertaking to decide on the weight or effect of evidence, or by refusing to submit to their consideration any question of fact, material to the issue, which may be in dispute between the parties. On the other hand, it is the clear duty of the court to decide on the legal effect of the evidence, and to say whether it is such as to entitle a party to a verdict; otherwise, the jury might be called on to decide a pure question of law. It may be said generally that it is the duty of the judge to decide whether there is any evidence ; of the jury to determine upon its sufficiency. This may be illustrated by an example. Suppose the facts of a case were stated in the form of a special verdict in favor of a plaintiff. This would be supported if the facts so found comprehended all the material averments necessary to maintain the
In the case at bar, there is no dispute about any of the material facts upon which the plaintiff rests her claim to damages. If there is any discrepancy in the statements of the witnesses, the points of difference do not change in any degree the legal aspect of the case. The plaintiff not .only failed to offer any evidence of ordinary care on her part at the time of the occurrence of the accident, but it appears on the estimony adduced by her in support of her case, that she was guilty of negligence, which contributed to produce the injury of which she complains. One of two facts is established by the proof. After the train had started and was in motion, the plaintiff either passed out of the door and was on the platform of the car for the purpose of attempting to leave it, or she actually stepped from the platform of the car upon that in front of the station. While thus situated, she was thrown down and
But it is urged in behalf of the plaintiff that the case at bar is distinguishable from the case just cited, because in that case the plaintiff at the time of the accident had no right to be in the cars, whereas in the case at bar the plaintiff was a passenger and was lawfully attempting to leave the train when she received the injury. The facts are so ; but we do not see that they at all affect the principle applicable to this case. There is no evidence that anything happened which ought to have excited the plaintiff, or that she was placed in circumstances which occasioned her any alarm, or disturbed her thoughts or distracted her attention. She knew that the cars were in motion, and persisted notwithstanding in her efforts to leave the train. If she had remained in the car she would have been exposed to no danger. But in trying to get off after the train was in motion, she took the risk on herself of the consequences which might follow from such an act of carelessness.
It was also urged by the counsel for the plaintiff that the fact of negligence is of such a complex nature that it cannot in any case be passed on by the court, but must necessarily be submitted to the jury for their determination. But we are unable to see any foundation for such an argument. If due