131 A. 247 | Pa. | 1925
On July 14, 1923, David H. Gausman was totally disabled by a stroke of apoplexy and, claiming it was the result of an accident sustained in the course of his employment by R. T. Pearson Company, defendant, presented this claim for compensation. The referee's award in claimant's favor was affirmed by the compensation board and lower court and therefrom defendant brought this appeal.
Claimant, who was seventy-four years of age and afflicted with chronic nephritis and arterio-sclerosis, accompanied by high blood pressure, was working as a carpenter, laying flooring, when he lost consciousness and was found wandering outside the building. He soon sufficiently recovered to care for his tools and, it being quitting time (Saturday noon), went home by street car, ate his dinner, changed his clothes and, while returning *351 from the barber shop that evening, was stricken with apoplexy. It was a typical July day, warm, without excessive heat, and claimant was working alone indoors at light work and was not subjected to any unusual temperature or extra exertion. About five days previously, while on his way to work in the morning, claimant was found in the street in an unconscious condition, similar to that which overcame him at the noon hour of the day in question, and from which he soon recovered. On regaining consciousness from the lapse at the noon hour claimant was bewildered, walked with difficulty and complained of pain in the head, also of pain and numbness in his right arm and leg, and the same condition continued during the afternoon to such an extent that his wife accompanied him to the barber shop on the occasion to which we have referred. His right side has been paralyzed since that day.
It is claimant's contention that while at work that Saturday morning he suffered an accident in the nature of a heat exhaustion or prostration which superinduced the apoplectic stroke and permanent disability. The proof of this contention is far from convincing. There was nothing present likely to produce such exhaustion. The similar attack on a previous morning was in no manner attributable to heat, and both may have been premonitory symptoms of the approaching apoplectic stroke.
Before one ailment can be attributed to another, the existence of the latter must be shown. Here claimant's case fails, for the finding of heat exhaustion is not sustained by the proof. The evidence relied upon to support this finding is that of Dr. Frederick and while he testified he diagnosed the case "as hemiphlegia [paralysis of one side], following a heat exhaustion," he did not see claimant until after the latter had been stricken in the evening and knew nothing of his condition at noon, except by report. The doctor further said, in effect, that claimant's entire affliction that day may have been of *352
apoplectic origin. As to that, he testified: "Q. In your opinion, was this a sunstroke or heat exhaustion, or stroke of apoplexy? A. The apoplexy very evidently followed it [the heat exhaustion] very promptly, or the apoplexy may have been right with it. It may have been the apoplexy, instead of heat exhaustion, that produced it." The doctor also mentioned the presence of certain symptoms as common to both and said he discovered no paralysis until the next day (Sunday). From his evidence, it is quite as probable that the disability suffered by claimant at the noon hour was apoplectic as that it was heat exhaustion and, from all the other evidence in the case, even much more so. Hence, as the burden of proof rested upon claimant, it cannot be found that he suffered a heat exhaustion or that such was the superinducing cause of the apoplexy. Where an injury may be the result of one of two or more causes, for only one of which defendant is liable, the burden is on plaintiff to individuate that one as the proximate cause of his damage (Sullivan v. Balt. Ohio R. R. Co.,
The referee states, inter alia: "We therefore find as a fact from all the testimony in the case that the claimant, on July 14, 1923, while working for the defendant, R. T. Pearson Co., sustained an injury by accident in the course of his employment with the defendant in the *353
nature of heat exhaustion complicated with an apoplectic stroke totally incapacitating him from the date of the accident up to the present time," and we are mindful of the rule that we are concluded by his findings (affirmed as was this) when based on sufficient competent evidence: Kuca v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.,
Again, it will be noticed, the referee did not find that the apoplectic stroke resulted from the heat exhaustion, but that it was complicated with it. Even if the fact of heat exhaustion was well found, it is difficult to see how it could be made the basis of compensation which rests on the permanent disability caused by the paralysis. However, as the proof of heat exhaustion failed, it is not necessary to determine its potency as a procuring cause of apoplexy. A heat stroke may be a compensable accident (Lane v. Horn Hardart,
Moreover, the testimony of Dr. Frederick, taken as a whole, does not meet the necessary standard of proof as stated in Fink v. Sheldon Axle Spring Co.,
The next question is, Can this claim be sustained on disability resulting from apoplexy? This must be answered in the negative. Treating what happened to claimant that Saturday noon as the beginning of the apoplectic disturbance and a part thereof, it was not shown to have been an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law. To constitute an accident there must be some untoward occurrence aside from the usual course of events. Such stroke will be treated as an accident when resulting from a shock, strain or other injury to the physical structure of the body (Samoskie v. Phila.
Reading C. I. Co.,
The judgment is reversed and the award of the referee is set aside.