68 Neb. 832 | Neb. | 1903
Although the numerous points urged upon our attention present nothing which has not been passed upon in this court more than once in like cases, the diligence and ingenuity of counsel in endeavoring to give some of them new phases, or put them in new lights, require us to pass upon them in some detail. The points going to the merits relate to the constitutionality of the bastardy law, under which this proceeding is prosecuted, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Every possible objection to the constitutionality of the statute has been presented in prior cases. Ex parte Donahoe, 24 Neb. 66; Stoppert v. Nierle, 45 Neb. 105. See, also, In re Walker, 61 Neb. 803. Moreover, the construction of the statute upon which counsel base their argument in large part was rejected in State v. McBride, 64 Neb. 547. As to the sufficiency of the evidence, we need only say that to our minds the verdict is not only supported by the evidence, but is clearly right. Bearing in mind that the defendant did not see fit to testify, which is a matter proper to be considered in such cases (Ingram v. State, 24 Neb. 33), we do not see how any other conclusion could have been reached.
Most of the other errors assigned, have to do with mat
Several rulings upon the admission of evidence are complained of. The prosecutrix testified, and it was not denied, that she and the defendant were engaged to be married. It appears from her testimony and that of other witnesses that, except while the defendant was away at school, he had been calling upon her, taking her out riding, and going with her to dances and other entertainmentswith more or less regularity during two years. Her relations with him for some .four months of this period are testified to positively, circumstantially and repeatedly* by the prosecutrix, and not denied by the defendant. The latter, relying on the expert evidence of a physician as to the probable date of conception, attempted to show an alibi as to certain particular occasions, without taking the stand himself. It is admitted, substantially, that the statements of the prosecutrix are true, except as to these particular occasions. On cross-examination she was asked if she
Other assignments of error relate to the admission of evidence as to an alleged offer to compromise. If the circumstances testified to amounted fairly to an attempt at compromise, counsel’s points might be well taken. But we think they must be considered as admissions on the part of the defendant, and were provable as such. In Robb v. Hewitt, 39 Neb. 217, this court held that “an offer made by the defendant to the father of the prosecutrix to contribute money for the purpose of ‘sending the prosecutrix. away’ is not an offer to compromise, and is admissible in evidence.” In the case at bar it is shown that the defendant, when the prosecutrix became pregnant, and he was asked to marry her, pursuant to his promise, offered to take her to a physician in Omaha for the purpose of “getting rid” of the child. The evidence was received properly.
A large number of errors are assigned upon the charge of the court and its rulings on requests for instruction. We are of opinion that we need not consider them in view of the conclusion we have reached upon the evidence. Jeffres v. Cashman, 42 Neb. 594. But we have examined the instructions given and refused, and think the objections
-Finally, it is urged that the award made by the court is excessive. The amount of the judgment in such cases is largely in the discretion of the district court, and will not be reduced unless such discretion has been manifestly abused. Clark v. Carey, 41 Neb. 780; Wurdeman v. Schultz, 54 Neb. 404. That court has a clear advantage over this one in that it sees the parties, and is able to form a better opinion as to their circumstances, and the expense of suitably maintaining the child in view thereof. In the case at bar, we see no reason to think that any wrong has been- done.
It is therefore recommended that the judgment be affirmed.
By the Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.