Gathright v. SmithGathright v. Smith
This is an appeal by defendants from a judgment declaring the marriage of their mother to plaintiff null and void and rejecting defendants’ claims to property acquired during the disputed relationship because of the bad faith of their mother in contracting the marriage.
Plaintiff, Louie Gathright, brought suit fоr a declaratory judgment against Margie Smith Lawrence and Talmadge A. Smith who are the only children and heirs of Clara Pearl Breland Smith (also known as Clara Gathright). He alleged that at the time of his marriage to Clаra Smith she was not divorced from either of her two former husbands and was not capable of contracting a valid marriage with him. Plaintiff alleged he was unaware of this incapacity until after her death on January 14, 1973. He further alleged the decedent was in bad faith in contracting the marriage with him, and under
Defendants denied the nullity of the marriage and sought to show that in any event their mother was a good faith putative wife entitled to the civil effects of the marriage.
The facts show that prior to decedent‘s marriage to plaintiff in 1942, she had contracted two former marriages. The first to Alexander F. Smith in St. Tammany Parish on April 20, 1920. Defendants were born of this marriage. Shortly after the birth of the second child, decedent and Smith separated. Smith did not obtain a divorce from decedent until March 13, 1963, in Orleans Parish.
On November 4, 1930, decedent purported tо marry John Turner in Arkansas and lived with him until 1933 or 1934 when they separated and decedent established her residence in Bastrop, Louisiana. The evidence clearly establishes that on August 12, 1942, when decedent married plаintiff both Alexander Smith and John Turner were living and neither was divorced from decedent.
In a comprehensive opinion, the trial judge held that decedent was in bad faith under
Defendants on this appeal allege five specifications of trial court error: first, in placing the burden of proving goоd faith on defendants; second, in upholding plaintiff‘s contention he was in good faith; third, in requiring an unconstitutional burden of proof; fourth, in holding that burden was not met; and fifth, in failing to recognize the Louisiana property was сo-owned by decedent.
I. APPLICATION OF BURDEN OF PROOF
Defendants contend that the trial court should have required plaintiff to prove their mother‘s bad faith instead of placing upon them the burden of proving their mother‘s good faith. Defendants contend that Lands v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U. S., 239 La. 782, 120 So.2d 74 (1960) places the burden of proof on the party attacking the validity of a marriage. In Lands the court formulated a burden of proof for the party attempting to establish the nullity of a marriage, but the court did not reach the issue of whether the civil effects should flow from the null marriage. In the facts before us, plaintiff has met his burden of proving a null marriage. However, once a null marriage is proven, the burden of proving good faith in a putative marriage situation shifts to the party who contracted the null marriage in contravention of a prior, undissolved marriage. See Succession of Choyce, 183 So.2d 457 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966), writ denied, 184 So.2d 735, and Succession of Davis, 142 So.2d 481 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1962).
II. PLAINTIFF‘S GOOD FAITH
Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot be in good faith under
III. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STRICT AND CONCLUSIVE BURDEN OF PROOF
The trial court held that because decedent was in bad faith, nо civil effects could flow in her favor under
IV. SATISFACTION OF BURDEN OF PROOF
Defendants contend that even if the strict and conclusive burden of proof is applicable, it has bеen satisfied. Defendants point out that in 1955, decedent and plaintiff moved to California where they acquired two pieces of real property as “joint tenants.” In late 1967, and early 1968, they sold the California properties, and from the money received purchased three pieces of property in and around Bastrop, Louisiana. Those properties were conveyed to “Louie Gathright, a married man whose wife is Mrs. Clara Gathright, nee Breland.” They moved back to Bastrop during 1968, and in 1969 acquired a fourth piece of property which was conveyed to “Louie Allen Gathright and Mrs. Clara Gathright, nee Brelаnd, husband and wife.” These properties are the subject of this litigation.
Defendants contend that the applicability of the joint tenancy rules under California law would define the funds used to buy the Louisiana proрerties as co-owned. Defendants theorize that the Louisiana properties are therefore co-owned since the properties retain the co-ownership nature of the funds used for thеir purchase. The rule is well settled that the status of real property is determined by the law of the situs. The jurisprudence of Louisiana holds that common law joint tenancy rules have no application in dеtermining ownership of real or personal property in this state. See Northcott v. Livingood, 10 So.2d 401 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1942); Dawson v. Capital Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 261 So.2d 727 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1972),
V. CO-OWNERSHIP
Defendants contend that under Louisiana law decedent owned a one-half undivided share in the property which was sold to “Louie Allen Gathright and Mrs. Clara Gathright, nee Breland, husband and wife.” Defendants’ contentiоn cannot be maintained. Jackson v. Hampton, 134 So.2d 114 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1961) presents a factual situation analogous to the present facts on appeal. In that case a paramour and concubine bought real property as “John Wright, Sr., and Louella Wright, husband and wife.” In Jackson the court reasoned that Wright attempted to buy the property as head and master of the community, and since one did not exist, deeds purporting to transfer property to а non-existent entity were of no avail to one claiming an interest therein. Since the bad faith wife has no greater rights than a concubine under Keller v. Keller, 220 So.2d 745 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1969), the Jackson rationale is applicable to the case before us. Therefore, the language of the Louisiana deed which purported to transfer the property to the decedent as “wife” of plaintiff and to a community of gains which did not exist, could not avail deсedent or those claiming an interest through her. Neither can defendants assert their ownership through the civil effects which flow from a putative marriage since their mother was in bad faith. The sole remedy left to defendants is to establish by strict and conclusive proof that decedent purchased an interest in the properties with funds obtained independently from the concubinage relationship. See Heatwole v. Stansbury, 212 La. 685, 33 So.2d 196 (1947).
We find no error in the finding of the trial court that defendants have not met the burden of proof in this regard. The judgment appealed is affirmed at defendants’ cost.