*1 rep- overrule sole corporate veil is his evidence fails. We pierce seeks to judgment. jobs “going point fine.” of error. We affirm that the were resentation Holberg contends that Teal has made
showing any material that he made and/or
negligent misrepresentation of fact which personally him render liable.
would
Holberg misapprehends the nature individually
this Holberg being suit. is sued negligence misrepre
for his own and his own long It the rule sentations. has been GATHE, Jr., M.D., Appellant, Joseph C. individually corporate agents are Texas that for fraudulent or tortious acts commit liable corporation. ted while the service HEALTHPLAN OF CIGNA Anderson, Guilbeau v. TEXAS, INC., Appellee. writ). Thus, it for this court remains No. A14-93-00790-CV. supports the the evidence determine whether judgment. Holberg there is no first contends support the trial court’s evidence supports Looking at the evidence that Jordan, repre judgment, we find Lewis a Teal, Holberg spe that
sentative of testified
cifically suppliers paid. told him the had been
Thus, complete the record does not disclose fact, vital nor do rules of law
absence of this considering the court from
or evidence bar prove rep
this evidence offered to the what testimony Holberg made. The
resentation opposite:
also does not disclose the exact Holberg representa did not make Finally, testimony is more than
tion. prove
mere scintilla of evidence offered Holberg Consequently,
what told Jordan. sufficiency
Holberg’s challenge legal
the evidence fails. only Holberg
Rik testified that he stated jobs “going fine.” Jordan tes-
that the were suppliers had Holberg said the
tified Additionally, there is evidence paid.
been misrepresenting that all certifications paid been were submitted
suppliers had Finally, the
Simplex to Teal Construction. suppliers payment of showed that
evidence aspect this kind of work. very important against the
Clearly, judgment is not so of the evi-
great weight preponderance clearly manifestly unjust and
dence as to be standing it is too
wrong, or that alone weak Therefore, Holberg’s finding. sufficiency of the
challenge to the factual *2 terminating provider him as a of care to
from
4, 1993,
August
six HMO subscribers. On
trial court entered a
restrain-
order,
enjoining appellee
preventing
from
any
continuing
HMO subscriber from
appellant’s care. The court also set a hear-
Houston,
Lapin,
appellant.
Robert E.
temporary injunc-
on the
August
tion for
1993.
Stern,
Logan,
Karl S.
Andrew J.
Suzan
Houston,
Cardwell,
Franklin,
Ronald
G.
12, 1993,
Ap-
August
appellee filed an
On
appellee.
Stay
Compel
Arbitration and
Civ-
Proceedings,
sending
il
a letter de-
after
BROWN, C.J., and
Before J. CURTISS
manding
appellant
his claims to
submit
ELLIS,
MURPHY
JJ.
binding
Agree-
to the
two-day
court
hear-
ment. The trial
MAJORITY OPINION
13, 1993,
ing,
August
and on
entered an
MURPHY, Justice.
abating
the suit and
parties to
and media-
“commence arbitration
Gathe, Jr., M.D.,
Appellant, Joseph
ap-
C.
tion as set out
the contract between the
peals
from a trial court order
enjoined
parties.”
The order also
arbitration. Because we find the order com-
taking any
prevent
the six
action
pelling
unappealable
arbitration was an
inter-
patients
continuing
treatment with
..from
order,
locutory
juris-
we dismiss for want of
pellant. Appellant appeals only
portion
diction.
him to submit his
Appellee operates a health maintenance
binding
claims to
(HMO)
organization
provides
which
through
care to HMO subscribers
a network
public policy
which favors resolution of
of doctors and health care facilities affiliated
through
well-recog
arbitration is
Appellant,
physi-
with the HMO.
a licensed
nized
both Texas and federal courts. See
cian board-certified in internal medicine and
Trustees,
Sciences,
Volt
Inc. v. Board
Info.
disease,
specialist
infectious
was a
health
468, 476,
1248, 1264, 103
provider
oper-
care
affiliated with the HMO
Int'l,
(1989);
L.Ed.2d 488
McDermott
Inc. v.
by appellee.
ated
In order to become a
Lloyds,
Underwriters at
981 F.2d
provider, appellant
Specialist
entered into a
(5th
Co.,
Cir.1993);
Inc. v.
(“the
Agreement
Agreement”)
Provider
Tipps, 842
Pru
appellee.
Agreement provided
for ter-
Banales,
dential
Agreement by
mination of the
1993, orig.
time,
any
cause, upon
days’
without
writ-
proceeding);
Plaza
Hearthshire Braeswood
party. Additionally,
ten notice to the other
Partnership
Kelly
Ltd.
v. Bill
Agreement
contained an arbitration
clause.1
policy
This
the existence of
borne
both
Agreement,
Pursuant
on June
The Fed
and Federal arbitration statutes.
appellee gave appellant
days’
notice
(“the
Act”) pro
eral Arbitration
terminating appellant’s
that it was
contract
2, vides that an arbitration clause
a contract
Agreement,
August
under the
effective
valid,
4,1993,
involving commerce “shall be
irrevoca
August
1993.
filed suit on
ble,
§ 2
action,
and enforceable....”
9 U.S.C.A.
alleging
including
several causes of
(West Supp.1970). The
Arbi
wrongful termination
inflic-
Texas General
and intentional
Act”)
(“the
Additionally,
provides
tion of emotional distress.
he
tration Act
valid, enforceable,
injunctive
sought
prevent appellee
clause “is
relief to
lawsuit,
party disputes
con-
at issue in the
and whether
Neither
right to arbitration when it termi-
tains the arbitration clause. The
centers
terminated its
around whether the clause
to the claims
nated the
coverage
fall
statute which
within
and irrevocable....”
appeal,
unappealable
it is an
Supp.1994).
would allow its
art.
Bethke,
See
trial court made no deter-
In this
(holding
arbitra
Act was to control the
mination of which
*3
judgment);
appealable
is not an
and
tion
Appellant
proceeding.
arbitration
maintains
Citizens,
(holding appel
597
at 466
S.W.2d
Act
to the arbitration
that the Texas
jurisdiction over an order
late court has no
clause,
and
maintains that the Fed-
arbitrate).
parties
to
However,
applies.
we have no need
eral Act
B.
as
has cited Jack
applies to
to decide the issue of which Act
bring
authority
to
an
his
arbitration,
find that
the ordered
because we
compelling
the trial court’s order
arbitration.
compelling
is interlocu-
the order
arbitration
Supreme Court stat-
In that
the Texas
tory
unappealable under either the Tex-
and
permits appeal
ed that the Texas
or Federal Acts.2
as
interlocutory
granting
request
to
order
appeals
procedure,
Texas
Under
Anglin,
compel arbitration.
Jack B.
842
final
or
may only be had from
orders
However,
find that the
S.W.2d at 271-72.
we
dispose
legal issues
ments which
of all the
First, the
by
statement
the court is dicta.
parties.
Anglin,
B.
at
and
Jack
842 S.W.2d
proceeding,
a mandamus
not an
case was
Inc.,
431,
272;
Polyco,
730
Bethke v.
S.W.2d
Second,
at
in the
appeal.
the order
issue
writ);
1987,
(Tex.App.
no
434
Citi
— Dallas
denying
an
the relator’s
case was
order
Callaway,
zens Nat’l Bank v.
597 S.W.2d
Further,
compel arbitration.
we
to
1980,
465,
(Tex.App.
writ
— Beaumont
court’s
to find
for the
are unable
ref'd).
interlocutory
may only
An
order
be
statement,
language
in the
of the Tex-
appealed
permitted
if such an
court,
Act,
by the
as
or in the cases cited
272;
at
Anglin,
statute.
Jack B.
842 S.W.2d
denying arbitra-
which all state that an order
Ross,
363,
Cherokee Water Co.
S.W.2d
orders
appealable,
tion is
but do not address
Green,
Batton v.
801 S.W.2d
Therefore, we elect
compelling arbitration.
writ).
1990,
no
— Dallas
Anglin,
in
B.
not to follow the dicta
Jack
un-
an
arbitration
hold that
general
permitting
Texas statute
appealable.
the Texas Act is not
der
in
appeal of
orders does not
Next,
if the order
as
we must determine
clude an order
arbitration
one
appealable if the
may
appealed.
compelling arbitration is
of those that
be
See Tex.Civ.
51.014,
applies.
Texas courts
§
amended
Federal Act
When
PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann.
disputed
§
claims fall under
Leg.,
73rd
ch.
eff. must decide
Acts
(current
under the Fed
scope of an arbitration clause
Sept.
version at Vernon
Act,
Batton,
controls that de
procedure
Texas
Supp.1994);3
utory appeal grant- from a trial court’s order
ing arbitration. Id. at 272 n. 10. Given the
clarity Supreme of Court on this
issue, I appellant’s would not would dismiss jurisdiction. for lack of SEAWALL EAST TOWNHOMES ASSOCIATION, and Dennis INC. addition, appellant’s In I believe that claim Bishop, Appellants, Michael scope
falls outside the of the arbitration deciding clause. A court a motion to whether the arbitration must first determine GALVESTON, City Texas and CITY OF and, so, parties agreed to arbitrate Zoning Board Galvestion scope Lynch, Merrill Adjustment, Appellees. Pierce, Fenner v. No. C14-93-00912-CV. [14th Dist.] denied, n.r.e), writ ref'd cert. (1985). 811, 83 L.Ed.2d provision containing the resolution 16, 1994. contract lim arbitration clause disputes arising “per of the its itself to agree
formance or Appellant’s claim arises out of his