Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers

MINE WORKERS v. COAL CO. UNITED GATEWAY AMERICA OF et al. January 8, 1974 15, 1973 Decided Argued October 72-782.

No. J., Powell, opinion delivered the of the Court, in which BuRger, J.,C. BreNNAN, Stewart, White, Marshall, BlacicmuN, JJ., joined. Douglas, RehNQUIst, J., dissenting filed a opinion, post, p. 388. Leonard L. Scheinholtz argued the petitioner. cause With him on the briefs were Henry J. Wallace, Jr., and Daniel R. Minnick.

Joseph A. Yablonski argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Clarice R. Feldman and Daniel B. Edelman.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed Milton A.

Smith and Lawrence M. Cohen for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by Guy Farmer for the Oper- Bituminous Coal opinion delivered Mr. Powell Justice Court. over condi- involves a labor

This case Mine Gateway between Coal Co. and United Work- tions are of con- questions presented ers of America. The development policy of federal importance to siderable regarding disputes arbitration of and enforcement duty of a contractual not to strike.

I Gateway (the company) operates Co. owns and Coal a large underground Gateway coal mine known as the pro- Mine, County, Pennsylvania. Greene Some by and the com- workers, employed duction maintenance represented bargain- of pany, purposes are for collective ing (the Mine by union), United Workers America including its division, administrative District No. and 4, Local No. 6330. April shortly

On the morning 15, before daylight reported shift at mine work, shuttle operator car on departing midnight noticed an shift unusually low airflow his section of the mine. His foreman made an anemometer check and discovered an only airflow of 11,000 per cubic minute, feet less than half the normal 28,000 rate of cubic per feet minute.1 Myron Hill, Assn., Inc.; by ators’ Richard D. Godown and and G. Jr., for the National Association of Manufacturers.

J. Woll, Gold, Albert Harris, Stephen Laurence Thomas E. I. Schlossberg, George and filed a brief American for the Kaufmann Congress Federation Organizations of Labor and of Industrial al. et as amici curiae urging affirmance. undoubtedly While this reduced airflow increased the accumula gas

tion mine, of coal dust and flammable it still exceeded the requirement 6,000 state per minute, ventilation cubic feet Pa. Act, Mine (1961), Ann., Coal Pub. Bituminous L. Pa. Stat. Tit. (b) (1966), requirement 9,000 701-242 and the federal cubic The company evacuated the men from the mine and ordered the day-shift employees to by stand on the sur- face. An ensuing investigation revealed that the collapse of a ventilation structure had partially an- blocked intake airway. Immediate repairs restored normal airflow, and underground mining operations In resumed. the mean- time, however, some 100 of the 226 day-shift employees had disregarded the company’s instructions to by stand and had gone home.

The following morning the union requested reporting pay for those employees who did not stand as ordered on April 15, but the company refused. The union rejected the company’s offer to arbitrate this dispute, miners on all three shifts off walked job. April

On 17, pursuant ato union request, state and federal inspectors visited the mine to determine the adequacy of the repairs. The investigation revealed that, although collapse of the ventilation structure apparently occurred between and 4:30 on the morn- ing of April 15, records of the anemometer pur- checks portedly made three foremen sometime between 5 a. m. and 8 a. m. disclosed no reduction in airflow.2 inspector state impounded the book of entries notified the company that he press would criminal charges against the three foremen for falsification of the records. The company immediately suspended two the men but decided against suspension of the third because he reported had the trouble.

On Sunday, April 18, about-200 company miners attended special union meeting and voted not to work unless the company suspended all three foremen. The per feet minute, Federal Coal Mine Health Safety and Act 1969, (b), §303 767,' Stat. 30 U. (b). S. C. §863 2Section 303 (d)(1) of the Federal Coal Mine Safety Health and Act of 1969, 30 U. S. C. (d)(1), requires §863 inspections such within three hours immediately prior to the beginning shift. following and the in this company acquiesced demand, prose- miners returned to work. Criminal Monday the three foremen, the against were instituted cutions of Environmental Re- Pennsylvania Department the decertifica- possible consideration of sources undertook them. proceedings against tion pend- were still May charges while the criminal 29, On Department ing, company received word from the liberty it to return three foremen to was at if of the three work it so desired.3 One had retired but during suspension, company his reinstated the other two and them scheduled to resume work on the midnight shift on June 1. date, On that miners on protest struck to all three shifts the alleged hazard presence created of the two foremen in the mines. 8, company formally On June offered to arbitrate dispute, this but the union Subsequently, refused. pleaded two foremen nolo contendere to the criminal charges paid falsification of the records and fines of $200 each.

Faced with a continuing and a refusal strike to arbi trate, the company invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court under 301 Management the Labor Act, Relations Stat. C. § It argued that the broad arbitration clause of the collec tive-bargaining agreement governed and re quested injunction against continuance of the strike. In a temporary restraining order later converted into a preliminary injunction, the District Court required the union to end strike and the_ to submit the dispute to an investigation, After its Department concluded that: “In satisfactory view of the good performance record and of these past foreman pending legal action, [sic] we feel that no further action should be taken in this matter. The coal com- pany liberty is at (3) return the three assistant foreman [sic] work if it App. so desires.” 16a-17a.

impartial umpire delay.4 without The order further providéd for suspension of the two foremen pending umpire's decision and prospectively required parties both by abide his controversy. resolution

On appeal, the Appeals Court of Circuit, for the Third with one judge dissenting, reversed judgment Court District preliminary injunction.5 vacated the 466 F. 2d 1157 (1972). The court intimated that special provision of the collective-bargaining agreement involved here might be safety construed to remove dis- putes from the coverage of the general clause and reasoned that, in any event, the usual policy federal favoring arbitration of labor relations disputes did not apply questions safety. Id., at 1159-1160. concerning Relying in part on 502§ of the Labor Management Act, Relations 29 U. S. C. § the court found that public there was a policy disfavoring compulsory arbi- tration of safety disputes. Since it was particu- “neither larly stated nor unambiguously agreed the labor contract parties shall submit mine disputes to binding arbitration,” the Court of concluded that the union had duty no contractual controversy submit to arbitration and hence no implied obligation not to strike. 466 F. 2d, at 1159. Perceiving no wrong enjoin, the court found it un- necessary to consider injunctive whether relief in this case was appropriate under the traditional considerations of equity set forth by this Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. 4The District Court found that the present work stoppage was occasioned dispute over the reinstatement of the sus pended foremen rather than economic reporting over pay April 15. appeal While the was pending prior to the Court Appeals’ decision, impartial umpire rendered his decision in favor company and determined; alia, inter that the two foremen should be permitted to return to work. 466 F. 2d granted Union, (1970). 235 We Clerks 398 U. S. Retail (1973). certiorari, did col- First, the questions. three presents This case between in force these lective-bargaining agreement then duty compulsory to submit impose on them a parties umpire? by impartial an safety disputes to arbitration an d'uty arbitrate rise to give if did that Second, so, issuance of a implied obligation supporting no-strike Boys injunction? Third, Markets did the circumstances the considera- satisfy equitable of this case traditional availability injunctive tions the relief? controlling questions We answer all three the affirmative judgment reverse the below. accordingly

II solely obligation No to arbitrate labor arises by operation compels party The law sub- law. mit grievance only his to arbitration if he contracted has to do all parties so. At times to this case, material by were bound National Wage Bituminous Coal Agreement (the of 1968 agreement). The section the agreement entitled “Settlement of Local and Dis- trict Disputes” provides for by resolution of grievances provides, This section part: relevant

“Should opera- differences arise between the Mine Workers and the tors meaning as to the application provisions of this agreement, or should specifically differences arise about not matters agreement, mentioned in any any or should local trouble of kind mine, arise at the an earnest effort shall be made to settle such immediately: (The differences parties represented by will be legal counsel steps below.) at aggrieved party “1. Between management. and the mine Through management “2. of the mine and the mine committee. Through representatives “3. district of the United Mine Workers of America and representative (where a commissioner employed) of company. coal By consisting “4. a board members, of four be two of whom shall designated by the Mine operators. Workers and two Neither direct negotiation between the parties and ultimately, should such negotiations fail, impar- umpire tial “mutually agreed upon by the operator operators affected and . . . the United Mine Workers of America.” The section further states that the “decision of the umpire shall be final.” This arbitration clause governs disputes “as to the meaning and application of provisions this agreement,” disputes “about matters not specifically mentioned in this agreement,” and “any local trouble of any kind aris[ing] at the mine.” Paragraph 3 of the “Miscellaneous” section of the agreement7 states that both parties “agree and the Mine Workers’ representatives on the board nor operators’ the representatives on the board shall be the persons same par- who ticipated steps in (1), (2), (3) or of procedure. this “5. Should the agree board fail to the shall, matter twenty within (20) days after by decision board, the be referred to umpire to be mutually agreed upon by the operator or operators affected and by the duly designated representatives of the United Mine Workers of America, and the umpire agreed so upon shall expeditiously and without delay decide said case. The decision umpire be shall Expenses final. and salary incident to the services of an umpire shall paid be equally by operator operators affected by and the Mine Workers.

“A decision any reached at stage of the proceedings above outlined shall be binding on parties both hereto and shall subject not be reopening by any other party or branch of either association except by agreement.” mutual App. 13a-14a. 7Paragraph provides: “The United Mine Workers America operators and the agree and affirm that they will maintain the integrity of this contract and that disputes all and claims which are not by settled agreement shall be settled the machinery provided in the 'Settlement of Local and District Disputes’ section of this agreement unless national in character in which event parties shall settle such disputes by free collective bargaining as practiced heretofore industry, it being the purpose of provision this provide for the settlement of all such disputes and claims through the machinery in this provided contract and by collective bargaining without recourse to the courts.” App. 15a. are which disputes claims all . . that affirm . machinery by settled be shall by agreement settled Dis- District of Local in the 'Settlement provided arbitration from the excepts It . . . putes’ section character.” “national disputes only those obligation broad to sufficiently appears provision This arbitration obliga- contractual The dispute. instant encompass at aris[ing] kind trouble “any local reaches tion Gateway Mine presence continued mine,” and On issue. a local plainly foremen particular of two only one admits of language contractual face, its this union required agreement that interpretation: by an for resolution to arbitration submit this umpire. impartial this conclusion avoided

The Court disfavoring public policy an assumed reference to of that disputes. majority arbitration en- policy the usual federal recognized court disputes reasoned of labor but courages only arbitrability applies presumption vacations “wages, hours, over disagreements seniority, 466 The 2d, F. at 1159. and other economic matters.” safety disputes, should treated as thought court that be “reject any generis, sui and concluded that it should labor requiring contract avoidable as construction safety disputes by disposition of arbitration.”8 final Id., disagree. at We finding public policy disfavoring arbitration of dis In

putes, the court reasoned as follows: peace

“Considerations of economic favor arbitration ordinary disputes weight have little Men not wont to here. are enlightened or death submit matters of life and no society encourages, requires, employees If much less them to do so. adding unnecessarily that correctible believe circumstances are no dangers employment, the normal of their there is hazardous requiring judgment them sound reason for subordinate their policy federal favoring arbitration of labor dis- putes is firmly grounded in congressional command. Section 203 (d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, C.S. 173 § (d), part: states in adjustment

“Final by a agreed method upon by parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes over the arising application or interpretation of an existing collective- bargaining agreement.” In the Steelworkers trilogy, this Court enunciated the now well-known presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes:

“An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said posi- with that of an arbitrator, impartial however may he be. The arbitrator is not staking his life on impartial his decision. It should not be policy of the law to force employees to stake theirs on his judgment.” 2d, 466 F. at 1160. We analysis find this unpersuasive for the reasons stated this section of our opinion. The Court also relied on 502 of Manage- the Labor § ment Act, Relations 29 U. S. C. 143. provides Section 502 § “the quitting of labor employee or employees good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work” shall not “be deemed a strike under this chapter.” On face, its this appears section to bear more directly on the scope of the obligation no-strike on than the arbitrability disputes. Indeed, nothing there is legislative history to suggest that 502 was intended § as a limit on arbitration. See 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Act, Relations 1947, pp. 29, 156, 290, 436, 573, (G. 1948). P. O. For reason, this we reserve our discussion of 502 until Part III of opinion. To the extent that might 502§ be relevant to the issue of arbitrability, we find that the considerations favoring arbitrability outweigh the ambiguous import of that section in present context. 9 United Steelworkers America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers America v. Warrior & Navigation Co., 363 U. Gulf S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 (1960). U. S. 593 is not clause the arbitration that assurance

tive the as- covers interpretation of an susceptible favor be resolved should dispute. Doubts serted v. America Steelworkers coverage.” United 574, 582- Co., U. Navigation & Warrior Gulf (1960). It policy. basis for this elaborated the also The Court arbitration and labor arbitration noted that commercial case, In the former objectives. different have latter “arbitra- while place litigation, takes the Id., at for industrial strife.” substitute tion is the define collective-bargaining agreement A cannot rela- complex continuing and aspect of the every minute provides Arbitration parties. tionship between resolving disagreements the unforeseen method disputes, such inevitably resolving And arise. resort necessarily appropriately has labor arbitrator and to the courts: foreign to considerations con- of law is not labor arbitrator’s source “The as express provisions contract, of the fined to practices of the the industrial common law—the industry shop part of the col- equally —is expressed bargaining agreement although lective usually in it. The labor arbitrator is chosen because in his of the parties’ knowledge confidence shop per- common law of the trust in their his sonal considerations which judgment bring bear expressed in judg- are not the contract as criteria for parties expect ment. The judgment that his of a particular only will reflect not grievance what says contract but, insofar as the collective bargain- ing agreement permits, such factors as the effect of a upon productivity particular result, its conse- quence to the morale of the shop, judgment his

whether tensions will be or diminished. heightened parties’ objective For the in using the process primarily to further goal their common uninterrupted production under the agreement, make the agreement specialized serve their needs.” Id., at 581-582.

We think these are applicable remarks to labor dis- as putes safety touching employees the of the as to other varieties Certainly of disagreement. strife industrial may easily as result from unresolved controversies on safety matters as from those on other with the subjects, same unhappy consequences of lost pay, pro- curtailed duction, and economic instability. Moreover, special the expertise of the labor arbitrator, with knowledge his of the common important law the shop, is as to the one case as to the other, need consider such as factors productivity and worker morale readily apparent. is as of Appeals Court majority feared that might arbitrator be too grudging appreciation his of the workers’ interest safety. their own seeWe little justification for the assumption, court’s especially since parties are always free to choose an arbitrator whose knowledge and judgment they trust. disagree We also with the implicit assumption that the alternative arbitration holds greater promise for the protection of employees. Relegating safety disputes to arena economic combat offers no greater assurance that ultimate resolution will employee ensure safety. Indeed, workshop would then depend on the relative economic strength parties than rather on an informed and impartial assessment of the facts.

We therefore conclude the “presumption of arbi- trability” announced in the trilogy Steelworkers applies disputes, and in the instant parties’ covered case is arbitration clause collective-bargaining agreement.10

Ill question The second is whether the District had Court authority enjoin the stoppage. to work The answer depends on whether union under was a contractual Markets, In Boys Inc. v. Retail duty not strike. to Union, Clerks 398 (1970), U. S. 235 the Court considered the proper accommodation between the of literal terms 4§ of the Norris-LaGuardia Act11 and subsequently Appeals The Court support also found for its refusal to order (e) in arbitration of the collective-bargaining agreement. Section § (e) provides employee safety empowered mine committee inspect to equipment mine facilities and report findings to its management. If the danger,” committee finds an “immediate it may binding make a recommendation remove from all workers the unsafe area. Although the Court of (e) did not state that anwas §

express exception clause, to the evidently arbitration it believed the section an ambiguity created agreement had which to be against arbitrability. resolved However, as the Court in United stated Steelworkers America Navigation v. Warrior Co., supra, & Gulf should be resolved in coverage.” S., “[d]oubts favor 363 U. at 583. Thus, any express absence of provision excluding particular “[i]n grievance arbitration, from only we think the most forceful evidence purpose of a to exclude the claim from arbitration prevail, partic can ularly where, here, as the exclusion vague clause is and the arbitration quite Id., clause broad.” at (e) 584-585. clearly Since not does con § express stitute an exception to the arbitration clause, it follows that dispute in the instant case must be deemed fall within the broad arbitration clause. The dissent maintains that the Federal Coal Mine Safety Health and Act of 83 Stat. seq., S. C. 801 pre-empts et the field “displace agreements all [s] to arbitrate Post, conditions.” Respondents at 394. have not made contention, and a fair reading of the Act congressional discloses no intention, express either or implied, accomplish such a drastic result. 11“No court the United jurisdiction States shall have to issue any restraining order or temporary permanent injunction

enacted provisions of § 301 (a) of the Labor Manage- ment Relations Act.12 The Court noted shift in con- gressional emphasis “from protection of the nascent labor movement to the encouragement of collective bargaining and to administrative techniques for the peaceful reso- lution of industrial disputes.” S.,U. at 251. It con- cluded that § (a) empowers a federal court to enjoin violations of a contractual duty not to strike.

Although the collective-bargaining agreement in Boys Markets contained an express no-strike clause,13 injunc tive relief also may be granted on the basis an implied undertaking to strike. In Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962), the Court held that a contractual commitment to submit disagreements to final and binding gives rise to an implied obli gation not to strike over such disputes.14 Indeed, case involving or growing out of any labor dispute prohibit any person persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: “(a) Ceasing or refusing perform any work or to any remain in relation of employment . . . .” 47 Stat. 29 U. S. C. 104. 12“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or regard without to the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U. S. C. (a). 185§ S.,U. at 239 n. 3. 14Lucas Flour involved a damages action for breach of implied no-strike obligation, while present injunctive case involves relief. The policy reasons favoring the availability injunctive relief, how ever, are equally compelling. As the Court Boys stated in Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. (1970) : “[A]n award of damages after a dispute has been settled is no sub- stitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike. Furthermore, an action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor dispute would of labor dis- arbitration favoring policy federal strong Boys reasoning in Court’s linchpin of this was the putes for breaches relief equitable Denial of all Markets. “devastating carried have would obligations no-strike agree- arbitration enforceability of for the implications As at Justice S., Brennan ments.” 398 TJ. Mr. in that case: Court for the stated is implied, express or obligation, no-strike “[A] employer an quo undertaking for quid pro arbi- process of disputes to the grievance to submit enter employers Any incentive tration. . . . if dissipated necessarily is arrangement into such an by which expeditious method and most principal elimi- is can be enforced obligation no-strike omitted.) Id., (Citation at 248. nated.” linked with usually agreement Thus, an arbitration the two issues obligation, but a concurrent no-strike depends each analytically Ultimately, distinct. remain be It would contracting parties. on the intent parties to certainly for the permissible, but unusual, yet provision mandatory broad agree to a any implied no-strike Such expressly negate obligation. commonly exist- contract would reinstate the situation an ex- ing Boys before our decision in Markets. Absent however, plicit expression intention, of such duty not to strike should agreement to arbitrate and application. be having construed as coterminous identified In the Court of present case, safety excepted disputes two provisions thought which it (e) from The first is obligation. no-strike general provides which collective-bargaining agreement, for a committee at each mine. As union mine early only delay resolution aggravate tend industrial strife and an employer and union.” difficulties between this section was thought central to the outcome of this case, we set forth the relevant provisions in full:

“The mine may committee inspect any mine development or equipment used producing coal. If the committee believes conditions found endanger the life [sic] bodies the mine workers, it shall report its findings and recommendations to the management. In those special instances where the committee believes immediate danger exists and the committee recommends that the manage- ment remove . all mine workers from the unsafe area,

the operator is required to follow the recommenda- tion of the committee.

“If the safety committee in closing down an unsafe area acts arbitrarily and capriciously, mem- bers such committee may be removed from the committee. Grievances that may arise aas result request for removal of a member of the safety committee under this section shall be handled in accordance with provisions providing for settle- ment of disputes.” App. 12a.

The union contends that this- provision reserves to the workers right to strike over safety disputes and also that the committee’s determination of “immediate danger” may be wholly subjective and without foundation in fact. In short, safety committee may object to any aspect operation mine as an “immediate danger” and call the workers off the job to force whatever changes it proposes. The union further argues that since the exercise of this option cannot constitute a breach of the collective-bar- gaining agreement, the District Court had no wrong to enjoin. We need not decide whether (e)§ is subject to such

an expansive reading, for, as the District Court found, that section was never invoked in this controversy. The safety committee did inspect the mine to determine the 384 no show- was there but failure, ventilation the of

cause recommenda- made or findings reported it ever that ing any there was Nor management. company to the tions dangerous conditions found committee the that showing which, workers” mine of the bodies and “life [sic] the to the in belief requisite the formed members of its any, if danger.” immediate “an of existence believed apparently majority Court The body superior the membership, by the local vote that the substantial constituted committee, union the to and (e)§of intent and purpose the with compliance pro- formal the with compliance need any obviated interpreta- contractual simple matter As a cedure. the Under doubtful. proposition that think tion, we good-faith the committee’s (e), §of construction union’s no matter danger, immediate of an existence the belief manage- conclusive. view, is that unfounded how capricious arbitrary and against only recourse ment’s the removal seek committee by the decisions procedures Circumvention members. offending mem- committee by the vote a formal including (e), §of unreasonable only deterrent the bers, removes thus circumstance, one this Given committee. action follow failure assume lightly would de is somehow (e) in § outlined procedures specific properly union whether event, minimis. In con- question ais substantial provision invoked collective-bargaining and interpretation, tractual impar- by an to resolution commits explicitly agreement meaning “as disagreements all umpire tial agreement.” of this provisions application 1 of the “Miscellaneous” Paragraph argue also Respondents impose a no-strike any intent to agreement disavows section of provides: duty. Paragraph Wage Joint Appalachian provisions either Any all “1. The Court of also based Appeals its denial majority injunctive of relief Management § on of the Labor Relations Act, provides part: U. S. C. in § which shall by employee the of labor an quitting

“[N]or employees or good abnormally faith because of dangerous conditions for work at place employ- the of ment of employee employees such be deemed a strike chapter.” under this This provides section a limited exception express to an or implied no-strike obligation. The of Appeals Court held “a refusal to work of good appre- because faith hension of physical danger protected is activity and not even enjoinable, where have employees subscribed to a comprehensive no-strike clause their labor contract.” 466 F. 2d, 1160. at We agree with the main thrust of this statement —that a work stoppage solely called protect employees from immediate danger is authorized by 502§ be the cannot for damages basis either a award Boys aor Markets injunction. Court of majority erred, in eon- however,

Agreement of 19, 1941, June or the Wage National Coal Bituminous Agreement April 11, 1945, containing any ‘penalty’ 'no strike’ or clause or any clauses or ‘Illegal clause Suspension denominated hereby rescinded, Work’ are cancelled, abrogated and null and made App. void.” 14a. paragraph This effectively rescinds certain no-strike in two clauses prior agreements. not, however, It purport negate does duty no-strike created present agreement. noted, As have we agreement makes arbitration compulsory exclusive and finally means for disputes. resolving Under Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., (1962), 369 U. S. 95 provision this arbitration gives rise implied an duty. no-strike We do not think that Paragraph 1 can be fairly exception construed as an to that duty. no-strike v. Cf. Lewis Benedict Coal Corp., (CA6 259 F. 2d 346 1958) J.), (Stewart, affirmed equally Court, divided sub nom. v. Mine Workers Benedict Corp., Coal (1960). S. 459 unjustified, how matter no belief, honest that an eluding conditions dangerous “abnormally existence in the If protection necessarily invokes work” condi that such evidence objective no require courts wholly speculative they face actually obtain, tions Judge As the workers. the motives inquiry into judgment from the in his dissent out pointed Rosenn especially by this view difficulty occasioned below, not some concerns claim where, here, as apparent employees’ threat to the existing presently identifiable, competence doubt generalized rather safety, but Any employee supervisors.16 company integrity and incompetent or fellow worker supervisor who believes a may he future time that at some honestly and fears who a creating mistake unspecified commit some walk and colleague’s discharge could demand his hazard not to do agreement contractual job despite off the statutory command, we explicit most so. Absent Congress intended conclude unwilling are resolution peaceful arbitration public policy favoring a by so slender be circumvented disputes of labor may honest it subjective however judgment, thread as seeking that a union Judge with Rosenn agree be. We under contractually stoppage work justify prohibited a 16 wholly Judge justification with that a sub Rosenn contended jective in labor rela open test “new and hazardous avenues would and strikes.” He stated: tions unrest require accept the naked assertion of an “This test will a court to employee presence employees plant in a of one of his fellow may employees constitutes a hazard. If label another employee working stoppage thereupon engage risk and in a work which, safety strike, because of its unreview- characterization as is stability court, employer expect able no can Moreover, labor employee possible relations. each victim of Unions, attitudes, employees. fancies whims of his fellow ” themselves, mercy 2d, will be at the 466 of 'wildcatters.’ F. at

387 present 502 must “ascertainable, objective evidence its supporting conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists.” 466 F. 2d, at 1162. find We this reading of the statute consistent both with common sense and with previous its g., e. Phila application. See, delphia Marine Trade Assn. NLRB, v. 330 F. 2d 492 cert, (CA3), denied sub nom. Longshore International men’s Assn. NLRB, v. 379 U. S. 833 and 841 (1964); NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Co., Construction 330 F. 2d 885 (CA8 1964); NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., F. 2d (CA6 1957), cert. denied, 357 U. S. (1958); Red wing Carriers, Inc., 130 N. L. R. B. 1208 (1961), enf’d as modified, sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, U. App. D. C. 84, 325 F. 2d 1011 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U. S. 905 (1964).

IV On the facts of this case, we think it clear that § 502 did not deprive the District Court of authority to enforce the contractual obligation. no-strike The union inferred from the foremen's failure to record the reduced airflow on the morning April 15 that their return to job created an abnormally dangerous working condition. may One doubt whether this assertion alone could suffice to invoke the special protection of § 502. In any event, the District Court resolved the by issue con- expressly ditioning injunctive relief on the suspension of the two foremen pending decision by impartial umpire.

For similar reasons, it is also evident injunctive relief was appropriate in present case under the equitable principles set forth in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S., at 254. The District Court found that the union’s continued breach of its no-strike obligation would cause irreparable harm to the petitioner. It eliminated issue suspend- ing the two foremen pending a final arbitral decision. say In we cannot District circumstances, these discretion. Court abused its judgment

The Court of

Reversed. Douglas, dissenting. Mr. Justice

I hourly in this labor not involve case does pension like. wages, benefits, It involves the life and death of the dangerous occupa- the most workers history tion in America.1 The of the coal miner is a history of catastrophes, prompted fatal which have special protective legislation.2 Nor was the mine involved here It exception. is classified United “especially States Bureau of Mines as hazardous,” special inspection triggering procedures to insure the safety of the men who work it. Federal Coal Mine Health and Act Safety of 1969, (i), § 103 83 Stat. 750, (i). S. C. 813 Congress has received testimony safety problems about at this mine in which the work- year before this complained ers, dispute, of the super- visors’ negligence safety matters, particularly their practice of “not testing for gas.” At those hearings Senator Harrison Williams, principal author of the 1969 mine act, commented that the enforcement performance of the United States Bureau of Mines was “outrageous just . . . plain unbelievable.”4 Statistics, Injury by Industry, 1970, pp. 3, Bureau of Labor Rates (Report 406, 1972). No. Rep. 91-411, 2 S. No. pp. 3-6; 91-563, pp. Rep. H. No. 1-3. R.

3 Hearings Safety on Health and Mines before the Coal Subcommittee on Labor of Labor and the Senate Committee on Welfare, Public Cong., (1970). 91st Sess., 27, 2d 4Id., at 191.

It was in the context history this the workers discovered that three of their foremen had negligently failed to check and record the airflow in the mine before the daylight shift began, as was duty. their Instead they made false entries in log their books. As a result, they had not discovered that the airflow in the mine 11,000 was cubic per feet minute rather than the normal 28,000. Reduced airflow can result buildup methane gas, creating conditions explosions accidental resulting from operation of normal mining equip- ment. The workers walked job off the and refused to return unless the foremen were removed. majority passes off the workers’ concern here only as “a generalized doubt in the competence and integrity of company super- as visors” if there only were unfounded fears about a few men in an operation with an exemplary safety record. Yet the foremen in question pleaded nolo contendere to state charges of falsifying the records involved in this incident, their admitted misfeasance is precisely the kind of reckless disregard for thé miners’ safety which permeates the history of this industry.

In response to this history, the union obtained, collective-bargaining agreement in force during this inci- dent, provision for a union “mine safety committee” with the authority to present operator mine with a binding “recommendation” that all workers be removed from an unsafe mine area. The agreement provides no recourse for the operator in disagreement with com- mittee’s determinations, although he may subsequently seek removal from the committee of members he believes to have acted arbitrarily. itYet is clear from pro- vision that the union reserved to itself the authority to determine that a mine be closed because safety hazards. Although there an explicit provision that a dispute over whether a committee member should be removed is arbitrable, there is no such provision for arbitration 390 committee’s the with disagrees operator mine

if the absent inference, inescapable The recommendation. subject is question this that is contrary presumption, a to be appears clearly in what And arbitration.5 to no- all matter, in this authority union’s the to buttress explicitly were contracts prior from provisions strike which here, question in agreement the from excluded union. the of part the on commitment such no contains employer the in which context contractual is the This Manage- Labor 301§ under action, brought this 185, §C. 29 U. S. 61 Stat. Act, 1947, Relations ment the enjoin the of compel arbitration to that clearly established course, is, of It stoppage. work of favoring arbitration policy congressional of because in found as provision, arbitration general a disputes, labor broadly construed. question, here is agreement the v. America Steelworkers trilogy (United Steelworkers of 5 provisions agreement’s strengthened the This inference by federal objected recommendations to operator the if arbitration would agreement. There (b) (2) the of inspectors. mine coal provision if special arbitration obviously need for be no through the be handled safety questions could parties felt machinery. regular history support long a question here has provision in Indeed Krug- as agreement, known 1946 ing this construction. of Truman’s seizure arising from President agreement, and Lewis America, Mine Workers States v. United 1946, United

the mines of to initiate safety committees permitted 258, expressly union U. S. Administrator Coal Mines although the Federal safety stoppages, stoppage. authority halt such a Collisson), given to was (Capt. N. H. resulting death disaster, following mine hearings the Centralia At mean Secretary Krug of the Interior testified miners, complete give mine committee ing provision “was they mine was mine, if felt the out of authority get the men Special pursuant 98 before S. Res. Hearings . .” unsafe . . Lands, Cong., on Public 80th of the Senate Committee Subcommittee appeared in provision predecessor to current Sess., 312. The 1st deleted Wage Agreement which Coal the National Bituminous authority override the miners. Collisson’s American Co., Mfg. 363 U. S. 564; United Steelworkers America Warrior v. & Navigation Co., Gulf 574; United Steelworkers America v. Enterprise Wheel & Corp., Car 593). S.U. This policy is grounded, as points the majority out, in the expression of policy by the Labor Management Relations Act. once And dispute is determined to be arbitrable, there is implied an agreement by union not to strike, Teamsters Local v. Flour Co., Lucas U. which 95, is enforceable federal court injunction under the principles enunciated Markets, Boys Inc. v. Retail Union, Clerks 398 U. S. 235, because of the close relationship between the duty to arbitrate and the duty not to Flour, strike. Lucas supra, at 104-106; Boys Markets, supra, at 247-249.

Yet whole this scheme, grounded it as is on congres- expression sional of policy, must allow any for congres- sionally indicated exceptions to that policy. In a § 301 suit the federal are courts apply federal law “which the courts must fashion from the of policy our national labor laws.” Textile Workers v. Mills, Lincoln 353 U. S. 448, 456. Although the “presumption of arbitrability” might be sufficient in the ordinary case to overcome the con- trary implications in the collective-bargaining agreement involved I here, find that presumption seriously weakened in the area of safety disputes by § 502 of the Labor Management- Relations Act, 29 U. S. §C. which expressly shields walk-offs by workers concerned for their safety: That section in part: reads shall “[N]or of quitting labor an employee or employees in good faith of because abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or be employees deemed a strike under this chapter.” Al- though there is nothing in the legislative of history section to shed light on its purpose, the words of the section are themselves fairly clear. They recognize in the law what is in any case unavoidable principle of Hastie Judge As preservation. self behavior: human are “Men Appeals: of Court majority said arbitra- death or life of matters to submit wont not 1160. F. 2d .. tion . express penumbra “the involving an area is This at looking “by solved to be mandates”

statutory remedy that fashioning legislation policy at Mills, supra, Lincoln policy.” that effectuate will arbitration, favoring policy general is a Although there that extend intended Congress that find not I do arbi- “presumption Application here. policy But dispute. every labor not inevitable is trability” own their protect to act determination miners’ Absent elsewhere. as disputes in labor inevitable as was here find I that cannot any presumption, duty under union was arbitrable found, Court as the then, It follows to strike. remedy. wrong to no was there II administrative up pervasive set in 1969 Congress with conditions and environmental working over controls a more for need 742. The 83 Stat. mines,6 the coal R.H. in was described scheme regulatory effective findings and in its states Act The 1969 91-563. No. Rep. in the all and concern priority first that “the purpose and be health must industry mining coal 6 work health of working to the conditions various hazards of The being Act Congress, its latest great concern been of ers have 1590, 1970, 84 Stat. Act of Safety and Health Occupational coal- are in the employees who exclude does which terms quality increasing the toward looks The Act mining business. improving- and work employees in which environment of the they protected. are system which under compensation the workmen’s 19, Yorker, Nov. New Workplace, of the Brodeur, Casualties See works complexthat industrial-medical 1973, 87, an account p. for dangerous owners profitable keep plants .to workers.

393 its most precious resource —the miner.” 2§ 30 (a), U. (a). S. C. Ease of investigating § 801 mines was in- provides sured. The Act representative when a the miners believes that a violation aof mandatory standard danger exists and an imminent exists, right inspection given immediate the Federal Govern- ment. 30 U. 813 The (g), (g). Secretary § § 103 S. C. may of the Interior a spot make of a investigation mine days five when he working believes hazardous con- (i), ditions 103 30 (i). § exist. U. S. C. §813 Once a hazardous condition is found the can Secretary order that all be evacuated from the pro- miners area and hibited from entering it. 104 30 (a), § § U. S. 814 (a). C. The Secretary can mining potential abate in incipient or mining 105, § U. C. § S. orders are areas, 815; his within subject limits judicial review the miners as well as the operators. § 30 U. C. § S.

Detailed ventilating requirements placed are Act, § 30 U. C. 863; § S. and examinations of each mine be must within “three hours immediately made. preceding the beginning of any shift.” 303 (d) § (1), U. C. (d)(1). § Examinations for hazardous con- ditions be must made at least once a week, § 303 (f), 30 U. S. C. 863 (f); § and weekly investigations of venti- lating conditions must be made and various monitors which dangerous detect gases must be installed, (1), § 863 (l). S. C. regulatory scheme covers the subject matter minute detail. run against

Penalties operators of mines and also against miners who violate in specified ways “mandatory safety standards.” Compensation of miners laid off closed is mines provided, 110 § (a), U. S. 820 (a); § C. and miners are protected against discharge or other dis- by protests crimination they have against made operations by testimony they given. have § 110 (b), 30 U. C. (b). §820 S. disability payments treats IV of the Act

Title bolsters state of miners. It for the death payments the owners laws and makes compensation workmen's liability insur- through through self-insurance or liable, 423, exist, § law not adequate where an state does ance, fed- with the 933. laws inconsistent § S. C. State provide more but state laws which suspended; eral act are controls 30 U. S. C. stringent survive, § standards or of convinces me that it must reading A close this Act to arbitrate conditions. displace agreements all Bulk respect It is in that a more extreme case than U. Arguelles, v. Carriers 400 U. S. where we held that remedy specific judicial giving federal statute seamen displaced by was arbitration. it comes to not When health, safety life, of or determination of environmental mines, Congress pre-empted conditions within the has field. An arbiter part paraphernalia is no of the described An in the Act. arbiter seeks a compromise, adjust- ment, an accommodation. There no mandate in is arbi- specific tration to apply a law. Those named in the present Act who construe, apply, and formulate law are the Secretary and the courts.

Moreover, arbitration might compromise awards admin- istration of the Act. Rulings arbiters might jibe rulings Secretary. with Rulings the arbiters might even color compensation claims for or damages negativing very basis liability either in work- compensation men's Acts or in state lawsuits for damages. I Hence, though disagree with the inway which the particular Court reads this I arbitration clause, conclude that even though the collective-bargaining agreement read to authorize arbitration, the 1969 Act precludes it. The 1969 Act specifies the arms of the law which handle these matters mines. Congress given has arbiters no share of power.

Case Details

Case Name: Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Jan 8, 1974

Citation: 414 U.S. 368

Docket Number: 72-782

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS