{1} In this case, involving the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department’s (TRD) tax sale of a private landowner’s real property in response to his failure to pay property taxes for several years, two distinct issues have arisen. First, we must decide whether Rule l-041(A)(l)(b) NMRA permits litigants to stipulate to dismiss undecided claims remaining after a partial summary judgment in order to have a final order for appeal. Second, we consider the lengths to which TRD must go in order to comply with the requirements of constitutional due process when attempting to provide notice to deficient taxpayers before initiating public sales of their real property. We conclude that (1) although Rule 1-041 (A) only allows for the voluntary dismissal of entire аctions, the stipulated dismissal of two of four individual claims in this case was permissible under Rule 1-015(A) NMRA and (2) the State was not reasonably diligent in attempting to locate the reasonably ascertainable contact information of the deficient taxpayer before selling his real property at auction. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
{2} Plaintiff Ollie Gates is a long-time resident of Kansas City, Missouri, who owns dozens of pieces of property in the Kansas
{3} In May 1997, Plaintiffs primary mailing address in Missouri changed, but he failed to effectively relay his new contact information to Torrance County officials. Each year from 1998 to 2002 the Torrance County Treasurer mailed property tax bills to Plaintiffs pre-May 1997 mаiling address, and each year the bills were marked as “forwarding order expired” and returned by the postal service. During that period of time, Plaintiff failed to pay any taxes owed on the Property because he did not realize that any money was due.
{4} In July 2001, officials in Torrance County forwarded to TRD a list of delinquent property tax accounts, which included Plaintiffs aсcount. In early 2002, a TRD employee was assigned the task of locating Plaintiff in order to collect the back taxes. The TRD employee’s first attempt failed when he was unable to find Plaintiffs contact information in the Torrance County property records. Next, he attempted to physically access the Property in order to either personally notify Plaintiff or to provide him with notice by placing a “red tag” warning of the tax deficiency in a conspicuous place. During that attempt, he encountered a locked gate that denied access to the Property and, because he was unsure if the gate belonged to Plaintiff, opted not to affix the “red tag.” Shortly after, the TRD employee learned that Defendants owned a home on the land adjacent to the Property. He eventually contacted Defendant Ray Halderman by telephone and asked if he knew Plaintiff. Mr. Halderman indicated that he had never met Plaintiff and did not know his contact information. Next, the TRD employee called telephone operators in New Mexico and Missouri. The operators in New Mexico had no record of Plaintiff, but the operators in Missouri informed him that there were unpublished Missouri telephone numbers under Plaintiffs name. The TRD employee’s final effort in attempting to locate Plaintiff was to enter Plaintiffs name into two Internet databases that provide published telephone and address listings of people living in the United States. The twо databases did not provide him with any useful information. The TRD employee had previously used a free Internet search engine to locate deficient taxpayers when it was absolutely necessary, but he did not know whether he conducted such a search in this case.
{5} On July 31, 2002, after the TRD employee had given up his efforts to locate Plaintiff, TRD mailed a certified letter to the address that it had on record for Plaintiff, warning him that his property would be sold at a public auction in order to pay his tax debts. The letter was returned to TRD by the postal service marked with the words “forwarding order expired.” TRD then advertised the sale of the Property in a regional newspaper in a final attempt to notify Plaintiff of the impending public auctiоn. After the publication, Defendants learned that the Property was on the market. The auction took place on August 28, 2002, and Defendants made the winning bid of $22,000. Plaintiff did not receive actual notice of the sale of the Property until his tenant, Mary Jane Chavez, informed him that Defendants had purchased it at the tax sale.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{6} Plaintiff filed a civil complaint against Defendants on September 20, 2002, alleging four claims: (I) “avoid conveyance and void sale,” (II) quiet title, (III) unjust enrichment, and (IV) prima facie tort. Each claim stems from the assertion that the Property was wrongfully conveyed to Defendants. In January 2004, Plaintiff and Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the district court, which were both denied. On May 24, 2004, Plaintiff and Defendants filed a
{7} Unhappy with the district court’s decision, Defendants submitted an application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal to this Court, which was denied on September 9, 2004. Plaintiff and Defendants then continued preparing for trial on Claims III and IV. On March 31, 2006, Plaintiff and Defendants filed a “stipulation of dismissal without prejudice” under Rule 1 — 041(A)(1)(b), which indicated that the parties had reached an agreement to dismiss the remaining two claims. Defendants filed their notice of appeal with the district court on April 27, 2006.
THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
{8} Generally, a civil action may only be appealed to this Court if a “final order” or a “final judgment” has been entered by the district court. NMSA 1978, § 39-3-2 (1966); see also Rule 12-201(A) NMRA. In certain circumstances, this Court may also grant an interlocutory appeal after the district court enters an order that “practically disposes of the merits of the action.” Section 39-3-2; see also Rule 12-203 NMRA. As such, partial summary judgment orders are not appeal-able final orders when other claims are left unresolved but, rather, can only be heard by this Court in an interlocutory appeal. See Govich v. N. Am. Sys., Inc.,
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS
{9} Although neither party in this case advanced the issue of finality, we are able to raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte. Masterman v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep’t,
{10} In interpreting a Supreme Court rule of procedure, we look first to the rule’s plain language. In re Michael L.,
{11} There appears to be no New Mexico case law that is applicable to our discrete issue. As such, because Rule 1 — 041(A)(1)(b) is virtually identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(l)(ii), we turn to the interpretations of federal courts for guidance. See Benavidez v. Benavidez,
{13} We also note that our rule, in language that is identical to the corresponding federal rule, tends to indicate that an “action” and a “claim” cannot be considered one in the same. For example, Rule 1-041(B) states, “For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) The diffеrentiation between dismissing an action “or” a claim in this subsection intimates that the rule was drafted with the intention of avoiding the interchangeable use of the words. See Campbell v. Hoffman,
{14} Because of the plain language of Rule 1-041(A), we conclude that it allows for the voluntary dismissal of actions without the approval of the district court but that it does not allow for the voluntary dismissal of individuаl claims that make up an action. Our conclusion, however, does not suggest that our rules of civil procedure do not allow for the dismissal of individual claims. On the contrary, Rule 1-015(A) explicitly provides that “a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” (Emphasis added.) Following the requirements of this rule, parties may consent in writing to remove claims from a complaint. In the present case, even though Plaintiff and Defendants erroneously indicated that their March 31, 2006 “stipulation of dismissal” was permissible under Rule l-041(A)(l)(b), the practical effect of the agreement was equivalent to producing the “written consent of the adverse party” required by Rule 1-015(A).
{15} We see no legitimate reason to punish Plaintiff and Defendants for improperly, but inconsequentially, citing Rule l-041(A)(l)(b) in their stipulation of dismissal as the appropriate authority under which to dismiss Plaintiffs remaining individual undecided claims. By creating a written agreement that indicated Defendants’ consent, they effectively dismissed Claims III and IV pursuant to Rule 1-015(A). As a consequеnce, the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment constitutes a final order, and we have jurisdiction to address the constitutional due process issue raised by Defendants.
NOTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS
{16} As to the merits, Defendants argue that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and ruling that he is the rightful owner of the Property. Specifically, they assert that (1) TRD’s efforts in attempting to locate Plaintiff “exceeded constitutional due process requirements,” (2) Plaintiffs post-1997 contact information was not reasonably ascertainable, and (3) Defendants’ purchase of the Property at the tax sale was valid and legally conveyed title to them. We disagree.
{18} Although the issue of “reasonable aseertainability” is highly dependent on the specific facts of a particular case, it is ultimately a questiоn of law. Id. at 289-90,
{19} In Patrick, we recognized that “[w]hen [TRD] holds a tax sale, that is a taking of property by the government, [and] the notice of such taking must comply with minimum due process standards under the United States and New Mexico Constitutions.” Patrick,
{20} While we agreе with Defendants’ assertion that due process “does not require that every stone be unturned,” considering the facts presented in this case in conjunction, similar to our analysis of the facts in Patrick, leads to the conclusion that TRD’s efforts in attempting to locate Plaintiff fell short of the “reasonable diligence” standard. See id. at 289-90,
{21} Any method listed above could have led TRD directly to Plaintiffs contact information. Considered together, we conclude that Plaintiffs contact information was reasonably ascertainable and that TRD was not reasonably diligent in attempting to contact him before taking the drastic step of auctioning the Property to pay for his tax debts.
CONCLUSION
{22} We affirm the district court’s decision to grant partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.