This аppeal presents an issue concerning subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court to modify an executed sentence. On March 21, 1996, appellant, Darren Gates, was chargеd with possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver, a class Y felony. On December 16, 1996, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced by the Crittenden County Circuit Court to five years’ supervised probation. Appellant was further ordered to pay $3,500.00 in fines, court costs, a public defender’s fee, and a probation fee. Thе fine and fees were to be paid monthly at $100.00 per month, beginning on February 1, 1997.
On October 30, 1997, after a probation hearing was held, appellant’s probation was revoked based upоn a finding that he failed to report to probation, failed to pay his fines, costs, and fees, used illegal drugs while on probation, and possessed a firearm as a convicted felon. Based upon these findings, appellant’s sentence was modified to six years in the Arkansas Department of Correction with an additional consecutive sentence of fifteen yеars suspended sentence. He was also fined $4,078.00, the unpaid balance of the fines and the costs previously assessed.
A second revocation hearing was held on February 2, 2002. On February 8, 2002, the trial court granted the State’s petition to revoke appellant’s sentence, finding that appellant violated the terms and conditions of his suspended imposition of sentеnce. The trial court further found that he violated his probation by possessing cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, fled from the police, resisted arrest, and possessed paraphernalia. Appellant was sentenced to eleven years in the Arkansas Department of Correction.
It is from these revised sentences arising out of his original convictiоn that appellant brings his appeal. On appeal, appellant argues that because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify his original sentence in either 1997 or 2002, the additional sentences were not valid sentences.
At the outset, we note that the trial court sua sponte requested arguments from counsel on the issue whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to sentence appellant at the February 2, 2002 hearing. Although appellant did not move to dismiss the revocation petition or specifically argue that the triаl court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke his probation, subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. Bagwell v. State,
For his sole point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify his sentence in 1997 and in 2002. Specifically, he argues that his 1996 sentence of five years’ probation, plus a fine, court costs, and a fee, is an executed sentence constituting a judgment of conviction.
I. Act 1569 of 1999 does not apply.
Prior to Act 1569 of 1999 (“Act”), a trial court lost subjeсt-matter jurisdiction to modify or amend an original sentence once it was put into execution. A sentence is put into execution when the trial court issues a judgment of conviction оr a commitment order. See Bagwell, supra (citing Pike v. State,
Prior to the Act, 3 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-301 (d) (Reрl. 1997) was in effect. That statute provided in pertinent part:
(d) When the court suspends the imposition of sentence on a defendant or places him on probation, the court shall enter a judgment of conviction only if:
(1) It sentences the defendant to pay a fine and suspends imposition of sentence as to imprisonment or places the defendant on probation; or
(2) It sentences the defendant to a term of imprisonment and suspends imposition of sentence as to an additional term of imprisonment.
Id.
In 1999, the Act amended Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-301(d) and now рrovides in pertinent part:
(d)(1) When the court suspends the imposition of sentence on a defendant or places him on probation, the court shall enter a judgment of conviction only if:
(A) It sentences the defendant to pay a fine and suspends imposition of sentence as to imprisonment or places the defendant on probation; or
(B) It sentences thе defendant to a term of imprisonment and suspends imposition of sentence as to an additional term of imprisonment.
(2) The entry of a judgment of conviction shall not preclude:
(A) The modification of the original order suspending the imposition of sentence on a defendant or placing a defendant on probation following a revocation hearing held pursuant to § 5-4-310; and
(B) Modifications set within the limits of §§ 5-4-303, 5-4-304, and 5-4-306.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-301 (d) (Supp. 2001).
We have held that the Act does not apply retroactively to offenses committed prior to April 15, 1999, the effective date of the act. Moseley v. State,
In the present case, the Act was not in effect at the time the original crime was committed, and cannot be invoked by the State to apply to the facts of this case. See Moselеy, supra. On October 16, 1996, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the original crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver or sell and, on December 16, 1996, appellant was sentenced to five years’ probation and a $3,500.00 fine. Appellant committed the offense, and his sentence was put into execution prior to the effеctive date of the provisions of the Act. For that reason, the Act does not apply because the original charge was committed prior to April 15, 1999. Under Pike, supra, apрellant’s plea of guilty, coupled with a fine and probation, constitutes a conviction, thereby depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction to amend or modify his original sentence that had been executed.
II. The trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the original sentence.
The State argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke aрpellant’s probation in 1997 and his suspended sentence in 2002, but the State’s argument is unavailing. We have said that a sentence must be in accordance with the statutes in effect on the date of the crime. State v. Ross,
Here, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation on October 30, 1997. The 1997 order reflects that the trial court found appellant in violation of his probation and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. The trial court also imposed a fifteen-year suspеnded imposition of'sentence to run consecutively to the six-year sentence. Appellant was also fined $4,078.00, the unpaid balance of the fines and the costs previously assessed.
Under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(f), the trial court could have imposed a term of imprisonment of ten to forty years or life for a class Y felony. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(1) (Repl. 1993). Here, the trial court imposеd a term of imprisonment, but exceeded its authority by modifying the terms of the original executed sentence when it entered an additional fifteen years’ suspended sentence. These tеrms imposed an additional condition to the original executed sentence, and the trial court lacked authority to modify the original sentence. Harmon v. State,
Our case law is clear that before the Act, once an original sentence is put into execution, an attempted modification of the original order is erroneous. See Harmon, supra. Based upon these well-established principles, as well as the plain meaning of § 5-4-301(d), we hold that the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the sentenсe by imposing an additional term of fifteen years’ suspended sentence.
Accordingly, under Harmon, supra, and Bagwell, supra, we reverse the 1997 order adding a fifteen-year suspended sentence and the 2000 order revoking the suspension of that sentence and imposing additional penalties. We remand for further action consistent with this decision.
Reversed and remanded.