442 N.E.2d 72 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1981
This is an appeal of a judgment rendered by the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County in favor of defendant-appellee Thomas H. Brewer, M.D. On November 5, 1974, plaintiffs-appellants, Willie and Helen Gates, filed a complaint in the court of common pleas alleging medical malpractice against Dr. Brewer.
During the course of the trial, Charles Turner, Administrator of defendant-appellee, St. Anthony Hospital, was served with a subpoena duces tecum ordering him to testify at said trial and ordering him to bring the following:
"All records concerning the performance of Dr. Thomas H. Brewer as a physician at St. Anthony Hospital, including but not limited to reports of conduct and restrictions implemented by the hospital on his medical practice there."
In response to that subpoena duces tecum, counsel for St. Anthony Hospital appeared before the trial court and moved that the subpoena duces tecum be quashed and that a protective order be issued preventing plaintiffs from obtaining access to the requested materials, pursuant to R.C.
"1. The trial court erred by quashing a subpoena of a hospital administrator to produce certain records relating to the performance of the defendant/physician by relying upon Sections
"2. The trial court erred by quashing a subpoena of a hospital administrator to produce certain records relating to the performance of the defendant/physician by relying upon Sections
Plaintiffs present three arguments in support of the first assignment of error. Plaintiffs argue that R.C.
R.C.
"No member or employee of a utilization review committee or tissue committee of a hospital or of a community mental health center or of a utilization committee of a state or local society composed of doctors of medicine or doctors of osteopathic medicine and surgery or doctors of podiatric medicine or of a peer review or professional standards review committee of a state or local society composed of doctors of medicine, doctors of osteopathic medicine and surgery, doctors of dentistry, doctors of optometry, doctors of podiatric medicine, psychologists, or registered pharmacists shall be deemed liable in damages to any person for any action taken or recommendation made within the scope of the functions of such committee, if such committee member or employee acts without malice and in the reasonable belief that such action or recommendation is warranted by the facts known to him after reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter as to which such action is taken or recommendation is made.
"This section shall also apply to any member or employee of a nonprofit corporation engaged in performing the functions of a peer review or professional standards review committee and shall apply to any member or employee of a hospital board or committee reviewing professional qualifications or activities of its medical staff or applicants for admission thereto."
R.C.
"Proceedings and records of all review committees described in section
An examination of the above statutes reveals that members of the medical profession are accorded different treatment concerning the admissibility of any evidence in a civil action of the proceedings of a medical group or organization charged with the responsibility of review and discipline. We know of no other profession in which the proceedings of a disciplinary organization are inadmissible. Under traditional equal protection analysis, where the statutory classification does not affect a fundamental interest and when said classification is not based on "suspect" criteria, the classification will be upheld if there exists any conceivable set of facts under which the classification rationally furthers a legitimate legislative objective. McGowan v. Maryland (1961),
Plaintiffs contend that the statutes in question are unreasonable, having no fair and substantial relation to the admitted legitimate purpose of improving the quality of health care administered to the public. We disagree. After examination of the statutes in question, we find that a legislator could rationally believe that by conferring a privilege from discovery upon the proceedings of a medical disciplinary committee the quality of public health care would increase. By placing a blanket of confidentiality over such disciplinary and review proceedings, the legislature has provided for a manner in which a hospital or medical association may take remedial measures for the improvement of the care and treatment of patients. If said proceedings were the subject of discovery, the candid and conscientious opinions or evaluations necessary to the success of such a review would remain hidden for fear of their use in a civil action brought against a hospital or colleague. In essence, hospital and medical review or discipline committees would not be encouraged to evaluate a practitioner or clinical method for disciplinary measures or improvement until the close or settlement of a civil action or the passing of a statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that the purpose of tort law and litigation is to allow the injured party to recover damages and to achieve a desirable social result. However, one cannot argue the "rationality" of allowing for the immediate improvement of health care accorded the public through an investigation conducted by experienced medical professionals, in addition to the long-range improvements achieved through legal proceedings. In no other professional area is the need for immediate remedial measures as essential or important than in the health care profession.
Based on the foregoing, we find that R.C.
The test to measure the validity of the statutes in question, under the Due Process Clause, is whether said statutes have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose without being arbitrary or discriminatory. State, ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co., v.Bowen (1936),
Plaintiffs additionally contend, in support of their first assignment of error, that R.C.
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
This court encountered a similar argument in the case ofHearing v. Delnay (Dec. 21, 1976), Franklin App. No. 79AP-493, unreported, in which it was alleged that R.C.
"It is well recognized, and we concur, that this provision of the Modern Courts Amendment, giving the Supreme Court the major rule-making function, was a salutory [sic] one. We also endorse the thought that, in the main, the Supreme Court should be the body that prescribes rules of practice and procedure in all courts of the state. However, we hasten to point out that the empowering words of the Constitution are not words singularly granting the rule-making power to the Supreme Court. There is no specific language excluding the legislature from this field. We feel that this court should not supply such exclusionary language to the Constitution.
"Further, the language of Article
We adopt the above statements and, accordingly, find that R.C.
We find that R.C.
Plaintiffs' second assignment of error raises the issue of the trial court's application of R.C.
It should be noted that the language of R.C.
In this case the record consists of the transcript of the proceedings in the trial court, when counsel for St. Anthony Hospital appeared before the court and moved to quash the subpoena and to grant a protective order. The trial court granted said motions without an in camera inspection. An examination of the record reveals no indication as to the information, records and documents which plaintiffs subpoenaed or as to the nature of the testimony of Charles Turner, the Administrator of St. Anthony Hospital.
In reviewing the language of the subpoena served upon Mr. Turner, it should be noted that plaintiffs requested all records concerning the performance of Dr. Brewer. As we construe R.C.
(1) Any records or transcript of proceedings of a review committee defined in R.C.
(2) Any evidence produced or presented at such proceedings, unless said evidence (information, documents or records) became available to the subpoenaed witness (in this case, Mr. Turner) in any other capacity besides as a member of said committee;
(3) Any finding, recommendation, evaluation, opinion, or other action of said committee.
In addition, we note that the testimony of Mr. Turner must be limited to matters within his personal knowledge and not include information he received or opinions he has formed as a result of being on a review committee which considered the professional conduct of defendant.
Plaintiffs' second assignment of error is, therefore, well taken and is sustained. The trial court erred by its failure to conduct an in camera inspection of the records subpoenaed by plaintiffs. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for an in camera inspection of the records subpoenaed by plaintiffs and a determination as to whether any material should have been admitted. The trial court must also determine whether the failure to admit such material was prejudicial. If so, plaintiffs should be granted a new trial.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
MOYER and NORRIS, JJ., concur. *352