Gateplex Molded Products, Inc v. Collins & Airman Plastics, IncGateplex Molded Products, Inc v. Collins & Airman Plastics, Inc
In this molder’s lien case, plaintiff Gateplex Molded Products, Inc., appeals as of right a declaratory judgment in favor of defendant Collins & Aikman Plastics, Inc. We affirm.
I. FACTS
General Motors Corporation (gm) contracted with defendant to produce certain plastic parts for its automobiles. Gm owned the molds and allowed defendant to possess them, use them, or assign them for possession and use by third persons to produce the plastic parts. Defendant assigned the molds to Mexican Industries (Mexican) to do the production. Mexican then assigned them to plaintiff to do the production. Defendant is a “Tier I” subcontractor — subcontracting directly from gm. Plaintiff is a “Tier III” subcontractor — two steps further removed. Plaintiff produced the parts, but before plaintiff was paid in full by Mexican, Mexican filed for bankruptcy. Before filing for bankruptcy, Mexican was paid in full by defendant for the plastic parts produced by plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a molder’s lien against Mexican and refused to return the molds when asked to do so by defendant.
Plaintiff then filed this action requesting a declaration of rights in the molds. In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that Mexican issued a purchase order to plain *724 tiff for the production of plastic parts. Plaintiff also alleged that Mexican furnished or caused plaintiff to use certain tooling dies, molds, and other equipment in the process of producing plastic parts. Plaintiff further alleged that the parts produced by plaintiff were sent to Mexican, then to defendant, and finally were placed in gm automobiles. Plaintiff next alleged that Mexican included language in the purchase order indicating the molds belonged to Mexican:
[The molds] shall not be used by Seller [Plaintiff] for any purpose other than the performance of this order, shall be deemed to be personalty, shall be conspicuously marked “Property of Mexican Industries in Michigan, Inc,” by Seller [Plaintiff], shall not be commingled with the property of Seller [Plaintiff] or with that of any third person and shall not be moved from Seller’s [Plaintiff's] premises without Buyer’s [Mexican’s] prior written approval.
Plaintiff then alleged that on April 19, 2001, it filed a notice of molder’s lien against Mexican for the amount owed for plastic part production. Plaintiff additionally alleged upon information and belief that Mexican filed chapter 11, later converted to chapter 7, bankruptcy.
Plaintiff also sought a preliminaiy injunction to stop defendant from recovering the molds. Plaintiff relied on the reasons set forth in the complaint as the grounds for the court to grant the preliminary injunction.
The trial court denied plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction because: (1) it found that money damages would be sufficient to settle the matter if plaintiff won; (2) there was not a substantial probability that plaintiff would win; and (3) there would be a substantial injury to defendant if it had to *725 wait for the molds because it would not be able to make the parts necessary for the automobiles, which would shut down production on a number of cars.
Defendant answered plaintiff’s complaint with affirmative defenses, including that plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and that defendant did not proximately cause any of plaintiff’s damages. Defendant also filed a counterclaim for conversion, demanding return of the molds immediately.
The trial court decided the case for defendant. The court determined that plaintiff did not state a valid cause of action because it did not have a valid lien on the molds. The court concluded that the molds did not “belong to” Mexican under
n. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Questions of statutory inteipretation are questions of law, which are reviewed de novo.
In re MCI Telecom,
HI. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the words “belonging to” in
On appeal the parties agree that the “central issue to this appeal is the trial court’s inteipretation of
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature in enacting a provision. Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the statute. The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted, and courts must apply the statute as written. However, if reasonable minds can differ regarding the meaning of a statute, judicial construction is appropriate. [Rose Hill Ctr, Inc v Holly Twp,224 Mich App 28 , 32;568 NW2d 332 (1997) (citations omitted).]
A. STATUTORY LANGUAGE
An overview of the statutory language and scheme of the molder’s lien portion of the statute leads us to believe that the Legislature intended a molder’s hen to apply only against the absolute owner and titleholder to the mold.
1
The relevant statutory scheme is divided into three parts. Part one,
In sum, under the statute:
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a person who causes a molder to fabricate, cast, or otherwise make a die, mold, or form for use in the manufacture, assembly, or fabrication of a plastic product, or a person who causes a molder to use a die, mold, or form to manufacture, assemble, or fabricate a plastic product.
We believe that defining “belonging to” as anything less than “owner” undermines the usefulness of the notification and excess proceeds provisions,
However, under plaintiffs definition of “belonging to” the owner gets neither notice nor the excess proceeds. Mexican, who has a mere possessory interest in the molds would have to be notified of the lien and sale, as well as receive any excess proceeds of a sale of the molds. Gm, the owner of the molds, would not have to be notified, nor would it receive any of the excess proceeds from a sale. We find this argument contrary to common sense. Courts should not abandon common sense when construing a statute.
Proudfoot v State Farm Mut Ins Co,
Moreover,
However, if “belonging to” is understood to mean ownership, then all interested parties are notified. This makes much more sense.
Proudfoot, supra,
at 708. The language in
B. DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS
We believe that the definition of the words “belonging to” can be derived from its usage in the statute itself as shown above. Nonetheless, the statute does not specifically define “belonging to” and if the legislative intent cannot be determined from the statute itself, a court may consult dictionary definitions.
People v Stone,
The trial court did cite dictionary definitions and concluded that the connotation of the word “belong” was ownership. Both parties also cite dictionary definitions that show various meanings of the words “belonging to.” In sum, the dictionary definitions provided by the parties show that the usual meaning of “belonging to” relates to ownership, but that a meaning implying less than complete ownership also applies on occasion.
For example, plaintiff cites Black’s Law Dictionary, (4th ed), which defines “belong” as follows:
*730 To appertain to; to be the property of. Properly “belonging” to a person has two general meanings: (1) ownership; . . . and (2) less than ownership, i.e., less than an unqualified and absolute title, such as the absolute right of the user.
If something less than absolute title is considered for the definition of “belong,” Mexican’s rights in the mold were too limited for even this to apply. As defendant points out in its brief, Mexican’s rights in the molds were possessory for the purpose of accomplishing a particular job and were revocable without notice or delay. This does not constitute the “absolute user” rights noted in the second definition of “belong” above.
The trial court did not err in finding that “belonging to” in
The ordinary usage of the words “belonging to” connotes ownership. Finally, the potential negative effects of allowing a meaning that would permit the molds in question to “belong to” Mexican under the statute could substantially affect production and would give subcontractors a disproportionate amount of power in any payment dispute. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding for defendant here.
The trial court did not err in its determination that the words “belonging to” in
Affirmed.
Notes
Effective March 1, 2002,