209 Mass. 426 | Mass. | 1911
These are two bills in equity brought by the trustee in bankruptcy of the individual and partnership estates of William T. True and Charles F. Kappler, to set aside as fraudulent certain conveyances made by the latter through an intermediary to the defendant, his wife, the first suit relating solely to real estate and the second solely to personal property. Each is before us upon the plaintiff’s appeals from the order sustaining certain exceptions to the master’s report, from the findings of the judge of the Superior Court and the order for a decree, and from the final decree dismissing the bill with costs.
1. As to the first case. While the master has found that at the time of the conveyance of the real estate in June, 1906, there was no intention on the part of Charles F. Kappler or the defendant to hinder, delay or defraud his then existing creditors, he has made a different finding as to his future creditors. As to the latter his finding is that these conveyances from Kappler through Miss Hutchins to the defendant “ were made by him with intent to hinder, delay and defraud his future creditors.” This finding must stand unless shown to be wrong or inconsistent with some other finding by the master.
It is strongly insisted that the finding is not warranted by the subsidiary findings.
It is doubtless true, as contended by the defendant, that a finding of fraud as to subsequent creditors would not be warranted by the simple proof that the transfer was made with a design to settle the property upon the defendant so that it should
Some of the subsidiary findings are stated by the master as follows: “ Upon all the evidence I find that on June 1, 1906, when Mr. Kappler conveyed all his real estate to the defendant as aforesaid, he knew or had good reason to believe and did believe that the contracts for building the houses in Hudson had already been awarded or would be awarded to the firm of True and Kappler; that the business of the firm would be conducted to a considerable extent on credit; that Mr. True did not stand in good credit with the lumber dealers in Lowell and was of little financial responsibility; and that any credit which might then or thereafter be extended to the firm by those with whom they had business dealings would in all probability be given upon the strength of his (Káppler’s) being a member thereof. I further find that he intended that the Burnham and Davis Lumber Company and the Davis and Sargent Lumber Company should, and expected they would, extend credit to a considerable amount to the firm upon the strength of his representations made as hereinbefore set forth as to his financial ability, and in reliance upon their knowledge of and reasonable belief as to his ownership of property and financial standing from former dealings with him; that he intended that credit should, and expected that it would be given the firm by those with whom they had dealings upon the strength of his supposed ownership of property, and more particularly of real estate; that he intended and expected to contract debts as a member of the firm which he had good reason to believe in consequence of his conveyances of real estate to the defendant he might be unable to pay; and that in making said conveyances' to the defendant he intended to put all his real estate out of the reach of his future creditors.”
The master further found as follows: “ At some time during the latter part of February or early in March, 1906, Mr. Kappler
Other findings by the master are as follows: “ Between the time of his first trip to Hudson on or about May 20 and June 1, 1906, Mr. Kappler called at the office of the Davis and Sargent
He further finds that “Although the firm of True and Kappler was formed some time in March, 1906, it did not appear upon the evidence that they actually commenced any building operations or incurred any liabilities prior to making the contract for the construction of the O’Neil houses in Hudson,” and he also finds that “ The debts of the firm of True and Kappler, all of which were incurred subsequent to June 1, 1906, amounted on April 8, 1907, the date of the adjudication in bankruptcy, to about $13,000, and the individual indebtedness of Mr. Kappler to about $1,245. The Burnham and Davis Lumber Company was a creditor of the firm of True and Kappler at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy in the sum of $2,669, being the balance for lumber and building materials sold and delivered to the firm after June 1, 1906, and the Davis and Sargent Lumber Company was a creditor of said firm at the same time for lumber and building materials sold and delivered after June 1,1906, for use in the construction of the O’Neil houses to the amount of $5,200. I find that the managing officials of these two lumber companies gave credit to the firm of True and Kappler in reliance upon the statements made to them by Mr. Kappler, as hereinbefore set
These various findings, taken in connection with the undisputed facts, fully warrant, if they do not require, the general finding that these conveyances were in fraud of future creditors. Nor is it inconsistent with any special finding made by the master.
The master has found that the defendant was fully cognizant of this fraudulent intent of her husband “and participated therein and accepted the said conveyances with knowledge that they were made to hinder, delay and defraud his future creditors.” The evidence upon which the master reached this conclusion is not before us, and therefore the finding must stand.
Both grantor and grantee having participated in the fraud, the conveyances, whether voluntary or for valuable consideration, were void as to creditors. Wadsworth v. Williams, 100 Mass. 126. See also Bancroft v. Curtis, 108 Mass. 47, 49. It therefore becomes unnecessary to consider what, if any, equitable interest the wife had in the land before the conveyances. She can take nothing by the conveyances but must be relegated to such rights as she had before.
Of the eleven exceptions filed by the defendant to the master’s report the fifth, seventh, eighth and ninth are overruled by the Superior Court as being based wholly or in part upon evidence
In the second case, for similar reasons the same course should be taken with reference to the defendant’s exceptions to the master’s report, and the report itself and the final decree. There should be a decree for the plaintiff declaring the conveyance void in accordance with this opinion. In each case it is
iSo ordered.
The master was Frederic A. Fisher, Esquire. The findings, orders and decrees were made by Harris, J.