36 Tenn. 497 | Tenn. | 1857
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The complainant, by her next friend, brings this bill for the purpose of setting aside two bills of sale made by her to Mrs. Mason for a female slave, one of which was executed on the 8th day of June, 1854, and the other on the 12th day of the same month.
The bill charges that in 1846 complainant was stricken
The alleged inducement to and consideration for these conveyances, was the promise and undertaking of the defendant John Mason to “maintain” complainant “with good and sufficient clothing and boarding in his family during her natural lifethat on the same day after the last conveyance was executed, she, with the slave in controversy, returned to her own home. Mason and wife afterwards requested her to return, which she refused to do. They then demanded the slave, which she refused to surrender to them; and thereupon they brought their action of replevin, under which writ the slave was delivered to them. To enjoin this suit at law, and have said
The defendants demurred to the bill, and, upon the disallowing their demurrer by the Chancellor, they put in their joint answer.
The answer admits the helpless condition of complainant, as charged, but denies that they persuaded her to come to their house; on the contrary, that she came of her own accord, seeking refuge and protection from her afflictions and misfortunes; that respondent Elizabeth had waited upon and-watched over her with unceasing diligence night and day for the first twelve months of her affliction, for which services complainant had often said she intended her to have the slave in controversy at her death; that she complained to them of the bad treatment she had received from her son Elliott, and represented her unhappy condition at home; that they “ offered her .the help of their hands, the pretection of their house, and the sympathy of their hearts, with that honesty of purpose and unceasing affection that they thought should always actuate the conduct of children towards an unfortunate parent.” “ Complainant agreed to live with them, and they told her, as she had often promised the girl to Elizabeth, and as she would now have no more use for her, to give her to Elizabeth, to assist her in cooking and doing the house drudgery, as she was weakly and in feeble health.” Complainant required a day to consider of this proposition, and, at the expiration of that time, gave her consent.
“ Respondents then procured R. A. Crawford, an attorney, Alexander Anderson, Robert Mason, and Thomas Lane, to attend and see that the whole transaction was
They deny that complainant was of unsound mind and unable to make a binding contract, though they admit that she was deprived of the power of speech; and they deny all fraud. These are all the material admissions and averments in the answer.
Upon this issue many witnesses were examined, and the proof is voluminous. However, without noticing it in detail, we may safely assume that it fully sustains the following conclusions: first, that although it does not establish that her mental faculties were entirely destroyed, yet it does most clearly appear that they were so much impaired as to render her an easy victim to gross imposition by importunities and undue influence; and, second, that that weakness, such as it was, was taken advantage of in procuring these conveyances. The proof shows that the defendant, John Mason, had expressed his intention to many persons to have a guardian appointed for her, upon the ground that she was not able to protect herself from the impositions of her son Elliott, whé, he alleged, was likely to cheat her out of every thing she had. In his answer, he admits that he had proposed to have a guardian appointed for her, but it was upon the ground that she was physically unable to attend to her business.
This explanation, we think, comes too late, as it was never made until after he had openly declared his intention to “take care of himself;” had got the complainant at his own house, and had induced her to believe that she was badly treated by her said son, and had procured from her a promise that she would convey the slave in controversy to his wife. Having all this arranged, he applied to
When this conveyance was presented for her signature, she declined to sign it, and held up two of her fingers, which Mrs. Mason interpreted to mean that she desired her two sons sent for. Her son John was sent for, but states in his deposition that he held no communication with her on the subject of the proposed conveyance.
It also appears in the proof that one great difficulty in the defendants’ way in procuring the conveyance was, that it would leave her two children, John and Rebecca, unprovided for. This, however, was obviated by making her believe that she owned the land upon which she lived, and that she also had a fund of some four or five hundred dollars coming to her from her deceased father’s estate, out of which provision could be made for them. This, however, turns out to be untrue. She did not own the land, as defendants well knew, and upon settlement with the administrator, there was but a small amount due her from her father’s estate. It also appears in the proof, that on the day she signed the bill of sale, she was reminded of her dissatisfaction with her son Elliott and the great difficulty she labored under in living at home, and she was advised by the attorney that “ the arrangement
It also appears that the facts stated by nearly all the witnesses in relation to this transaction were derived from Mrs. Mason, who professed to interpret the complainant’s signs, and without whose aid they could not understand her. ¡ In this state of the case, upon the application of the defendants, an issue of fact was made up and submitted to a jury: the jury, under the charge of his Honor the Chancellor, found the issue in favor of defendants, which verdict the Chancellor was asked to set aside. This he refused to do, but dismissed the bill; and complainant has appealed to this Court. The issue submitted to the jury was, “Were the bills of sale in the pleadings mentioned made by the said Hyla Gass knowingly, freely, and voluntarily, when she was of sound mind; or were the same executed when she was of unsound mind, or ignorant of their contents, or, by reason of false or fraudulent representations, made to her at or before the time of their execution ?”
Upon the trial of this issue, the Chancellor charged the jury, amongst other things, that “ it is a distinct and valid ground of relief in a Court of Equity, where a person of weak intellect makes an improvident and rash contract, and the circumstances show that advantage was
It is most obvious that, by this charge, the validity of these conveyances is made to depend almost exclusively upon the adequacy or inadequacy of the consideration promised, rather than the state of complainant’s mind and the improper influences brought to bear upon that mind at the time they were procured.
The jury are instructed, that “if the purchaser give a full and fair price for the property, although the seller may be of weak mind, and much persuasion may have been used to induce him to part with it, the Court will
These principles have been fully recognized and their authority yielded to by this Court in the case of Craddock vs. Cabiness et al., reported in 1 Swan, p. 474, where relief was granted in a case not so strong as the one now before us; and we think they are decisive of this cause. We have already said that the proof does not show that the complainant was insane; yet it does clearly appear that such was her mental imbecility and her physical inability to communicate such ideas as she had, as to render her an easy victim to importunities, undue influence, and imposition, and that these were all resorted to and successfully used in procuring these conveyances. We have also said that the issue submitted to the jury on the application of the defendants missed the main question in the cause, and was an immaterial issue. The issue should have been, was the complainant, at the time she executed the conveyances, laboring under mental imbecility, and physically unable to communicate such ideas as she had; so much so, as to render her an easy victim to importu-nities, undue influence, and imposition, and were these conveyances procured through these influences ? If this issue had been submitted, and found in the affirmative, as we think it should, then the conveyances should have been set aside and the entire relief prayed for granted. And inasmuch as the party applying for the jury submitted an immaterial issue, we do not think it is proper to remand the cause to have a proper issue — such as the party applying for the jury should at first have tendered — submitted to another jury. But treating the facts as we would if
Rehearing
The same Case upon a Rehearing.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
SiNCE the opinion of the Court was announced in this case on a previous day of the term, the counsel for the defendants have presented a petition, in which they call the attention of the Court to that part of the opinion in which the Court say, “Treating the verdict of the jury just as we would if the facts had been found by the Chancellor himself, we order a decree for the complainant,” etc. And they insist that, as this Court find the facts different from the finding of the jury, we should merely reverse the decree, and remand the cause to the Chancery Court for another trial of the facts before a jury. This point, though not elaborated in the opinion, was at least well considered by the Court. According to the English Chancery practice, when the Chancellor, in his discretion, deemed it necessary, he would order an issue out of Chancery to be tried in a Court of Law; and on the coming in of the verdict, he had the power to set it aside if he thought it contrary to the evidence, and find the facts- for himself, etc. But the English practice is changed by the 14th section of the act of 1806, ch. 122, Nich. Sup., 125, which provides “ that, from and after the passage of this act, it shall be the duty of the Chancellors of this State, upon the application of either of the parties, to empanel a jury to try and determine any issue of fact involved in any case pending in said Courts; the finding of which jury shall be final and conclusive upon the Chancellor so far as the facts involved in the issue are concerned: Provided, the Chancellors shall have power to grant new trials under the same rules and regulations that the Circuit Courts now have power to grant new trials.” By force of this statute, it is
We have already said, in the opinion delivered, that we do not think that the issue of fact which was submitted to the jury in the Chancery Court was an issue involving the most material question in this cause. And, as we think, it would follow as a legal consequence that the Chancellor was not bound thereby, as the cause must be decided upon a wholly different principle, which was not submitted to the jury. And certainly this statute does not require that this Court should remand a cause to the Chancery Court to have an issue of fact made up to be tried by a jury when there is not a member of the Court that entertains any doubt as to what the facts are. “A repleader is not grantable (even at law) in favor of a person who made the first fault in pleading.” 1 Humph., 85. It is certainly the duty of the party applying for a jury, under this statute, to see that he submits a proper issue; and it is too late, after he gets into this Court, to have the cause remanded for that purpose. He has had his day in Court.
The construction of this statute contended for is, as we think, neither within its letter nor spirit; would be productive of great delay and expense; and is certainly against sound policy. And we can see no reason for giving a liberal construction that we may thereby produce such evils.
As to the case of Farnsworth vs. Arnold et al., we do not think it bears the most remote analogy to this case. In that case there never was a jury asked for in
It does not appear in the report, but in that case this Court ,was urged to remand the cause to the Chancery. Court to have an “issue of fact” tried by a jury, which this Court declined to do; and yet that case is relied upon to induce the Court to do in this cause what it refused to do in that.
We are satisfied that the opinion already pronounced is correct, and we cannot change it.