25 Ind. App. 584 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1900
—Appellant was plaintiff below. Her complaint was in a single paragraph, to which a demurrer for want of facts was sustained. She refused to plead further and suffered judgment to be rendered against her for costs. The complaint avers that appellant was a married woman living with her husband on a farm; that on July 14, 1898, she gave birth to a child; that prior to and on July 26, 1898, appellee knew that she had recently been confined and knew her physical condition; that on July 26th, she had so far recovered as to be able to be up; that she was convalescent but unable to stand any excitement or mental strain or nervous shock; that on said July 26th, the appellee went to appellant’s and upon the lands of appellant’s husband, and quarreled with her said husband; that he refused to leave said premises when so notified to do, “but unlawfully remained and refused to depart from plaintiff’s home and from the lands of plaintiff’s husband * * * •when so notified to depart therefrom, and there in a rude and insolent manner, wilfully and purposely remained and quarreled with plaintiff’s husband, knowing that plaintiff was home and within hearing of said quarrel, and well knew that said quarrel, as well as his refusal to leave plaintiff’s home would greatly excite the plaintiff and cause a nervous
Appellee has not filed any brief. The complaint gathered from its various allegations proceeds upon the theory, if we rightly construe it, that the acts of appellee were wrongful, and that such wrongful acts greatly frightened and excited appellant, so that she was nervously shocked, and thereby sustained injury. Appellant’s counsel has called our attention to but one case in support of his contention that the complaint states a cause of action, viz.: Newell v. Witcher, 53 Vt. 589. That was a case where
We had occasion in the recent case of Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, to discuss the question of liability for fright growing out of the wrongful and negligent acts to a third party of the party occasioning such fright, and reached the conclusion that the action could not be maintained. In that case, the appellee, with her husband and two daughters, attempted to take passage on one of appellant’s trains. One of appellee’s daughters had taken hold of the hand-rail of the car and was in the act of getting on when the train started. She held to the hand-rail and was dragged a short distance along the platform. Appellee was on the platform and witnessed the danger to which her daughter was exposed. She was in feeble health and became greatly frightened, resulting in nervous prostration, etc. She sued the appellant to recover damages resulting from such fright. It was held she could not recover. In that case many authorities were cited, and from which copious excerpts were quoted. The same principles and rules of law as announced in that case are of controlling influence here.
That appellee was guilty of a wrong there can be no doubt, but as was said in Kalen v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., 18 Ind. App. 202, 63 Am. St. 343, Black, J., speaking for the court: “But not every injurious effect of wrong can form the basis of damages. Many ill consequences follow from wrongs as proximate effects for which the law can not afford redress, because of the inadequacy of the methods and means of courts to reach just and adequate results with sufficient certainty. * * * It would seem- that such injuries are among those which courts can not remedy by means of any practicable methods at their command which can be applied generally so as to secure justice to both the plaintiffs and defendants and so as best subserve the interests of the community, whose instruments the courts are in
In the case of Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. McGinnis, 46 Kan. 109, 26 Pac. 453, the court said: “A person who is placed in peril by the negligence of another, but who escapes without injury, may not recover damages simply because he had been placed in a perilous position. Nor is mere fright the subject of damages. Fright must be accompanied by some actual injury caused thereby, and traceable directly thereto, to be the subject of damages. Mere fright unaccompanied by any injury resulting therefrom, can not be, the subject of damages.” See also Jock v. Dankwardl, 85 Ill. 331.
The law as declared in Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Stewart, supra, is decisive of the case now before us, and further discussion would be useless. The court correctly sustained the demurrer to the complaint.
Judgment affirmed.