Gary SISTRUNK, Appellant (Defendant below) v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below)
No. 49S05-1410-CR-654
Supreme Court of Indiana
July 30, 2015
36 N.E.3d 1051
Court Disciplinary Commission and Respondent have submitted for approval a “Belated Statement of Agreement for Discipline” stipulating agreed facts and proposed discipline as summarized below:
Stipulated Facts: On or about March 7, 2011, Respondent and his now ex-wife had a confrontation at the conclusion of a therapy appointment for their minor child. Respondent was convicted after a bench trial of Domestic Battery, a Class A misdemeanor, on May 26, 2011. Respondent failed to report his conviction within 10 days to the Commission. Respondent‘s conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Adewopo v. State, No. 41A05-1107-CR-380, 2012 WL 439417 (Ind.Ct.App. Feb. 13, 2012). The parties point to facts recited in that opinion indicating that Respondent pulled or pushed his now ex-wife to the ground, knocked her to the ground a second time, and then kicked her while she was on the ground.
The parties cite the following facts in mitigation: (1) Respondent has no prior disciplinary history; (2) Respondent was cooperative with the disciplinary process; (3) Respondent timely and successfully completed the terms of his probation; and (4) the underlying incident does not involve conduct taken in the course of Respondent‘s practice of law.
Violations: The parties agree that Respondent violated
Discipline: The parties propose the appropriate discipline is a suspension of 60 days with automatic reinstatement. The Court, having considered the submissions of the parties, now approves the agreed discipline.
For Respondent‘s professional misconduct, the Court suspends Respondent from the practice of law for a period of 60 days, beginning August 27, 2015. Respondent shall not undertake any new legal matters between service of this order and the effective date of the suspension, and Respondent shall fulfill all the duties of a suspended attorney under
The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. With the acceptance of this agreement, the hearing officer appointed in this case is discharged.
All Justices concur.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Stephen R. Creason, Deputy Attorney General, Andrew A. Kobe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A05-1211-CR-567.
RUCKER, Justice.
Gary Sistrunk challenges his convictions for robbery and criminal confinement as class B felonies contending, among other things, they violate Indiana‘s constitutional ban on double jeopardy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
On February 5, 2012, Gary Sistrunk entered a gas station in Marion County and purchased a cigar. As the attendant was returning Sistrunk‘s change, Sistrunk produced a handgun, pointed it at the attendant and demanded money from the cash register. The attendant complied. Sistrunk then demanded money from the safe. The attendant responded that she
A Crime Stoppers’ tip led police to focus on Sistrunk as a person of interest. Thereafter the attendant positively identified Sistrunk from a photo array as the man who robbed the gas station. On February 14, 2012, the State charged Sistrunk with robbery and criminal confinement, both as class B felonies. Thereafter Sistrunk, represented by private counsel, filed a motion asserting his indigence and requesting public funds to pay the expenses of an expert witness on the subject of eyewitness identification. After conducting a hearing the trial court agreed Sistrunk was indigent for purposes of the motion but denied the request for public funds.
Sistrunk waived his right to trial by jury. A bench trial was conducted on October 4, 2012, at the conclusion of which the trial court found Sistrunk guilty as charged. Thereafter the trial court sentenced Sistrunk to two concurrent six-year terms of imprisonment. Sistrunk appealed contending the two convictions violated Indiana‘s prohibition on double jeopardy because the force used to support the robbery conviction was coextensive with the force used to support the confinement conviction. Sistrunk also contended the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for public funds to retain the services of an expert witness. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the trial court‘s decision on this latter point. However in a divided opinion the court determined Sistrunk‘s convictions for robbery and criminal confinement did not violate Indiana‘s constitutional ban on double jeopardy, but it sua sponte determined that the same evidence, namely, Sistrunk‘s act of being armed with a deadly weapon, was improperly used to enhance both of his convictions from class C to class B felonies. See Sistrunk v. State, 11 N.E.3d 925 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), vacated. We disagree with our Court of Appeals colleagues on this point, and we previously granted transfer to explore the issue. In all other respects, we summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals. See
Discussion
In the case before us, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that “[t]he repeated use of a weapon to commit multiple separate crimes is not ‘the very same behavior’ precluding its use to separately enhance the resulting convictions.” Sistrunk, 11 N.E.3d at 931 (quoting Miller v. State, 790 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind.2003)). However, relying on the concurring opinion in Miller the court concluded that unlike the defendant in that case, here Sistrunk did not repeatedly use his handgun or use it more than once in committing the offenses for which he was convicted. Thus, his use of the handgun was in fact the very same behavior precluding its use to enhance both of his convictions. Sistrunk, 11 N.E.3d at 932.
We first observe that it is not apparent the majority in Miller endorsed the view expressed by the concurrence. Indeed the Miller Court expressly declared that “the use of a single deadly weapon during the commission of separate offenses may enhance the level of each offense.” 790 N.E.2d at 439 (quotation omitted). More importantly, this rule predates Richardson by several years and thus cannot be said to be included in the “very same behavior” category of examples precluding enhancements. See, e.g., Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 945 (Ind.1994) (rejecting assertion that defendant‘s convictions for robbery and confinement cannot both be aggravated to class B felonies by the same “use of a deadly weapon” aggravator); Carrington v. State, 678 N.E.2d 1143, 1147-48 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (no double jeopardy violation where defendant‘s rape and robbery convictions were enhanced because defendant was armed with a knife during commission of both crimes), trans. denied; Peterson v. State, 650 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (no double jeopardy violation where defendant‘s robbery and rape convictions were enhanced based upon his possession of a single deadly weapon during the commission of the offenses); Brown v. State, 633 N.E.2d 322, 324 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (no double jeopardy violation where defendant‘s robbery and confinement convictions were enhanced because he was armed with a knife during commission of the crimes), trans. denied. And post-Richardson this Court decided Gates v. State, 759 N.E.2d 631 (Ind.2001). In that case the defendant threatened his victim with a knife during the commission of rape, criminal deviate conduct, and criminal confinement, all of which had been enhanced to class B felony offenses because the defendant had been armed with a knife while committing the offenses. Affirming the defendant‘s conviction we observed in a footnote: “It is well established in Indiana that the use of a single deadly weapon during the commission of separate offenses may enhance the level of each offense.” Id. at 633 n. 2.
In sum, our jurisprudence teaches that committing two or more separate offenses each while armed with a deadly weapon—even the same weapon—is not within the category of rules precluding the enhancement of each offense based on “the very same behavior.” Stated somewhat differently, our recognition in Richardson of the common law rule establishing that enhancements cannot be imposed for the very same behavior could not have included use of a single deadly weapon during the commission of separate offenses. And this is so because no such common law rule existed. Instead the opposite was true.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
RUSH, C.J., and DICKSON, DAVID and MASSA, JJ., concur.