Gary L. Mock v. Bell Helicoper Textron, Inc.
196 F. App'x 773
11th Cir.
2006
Check Treatment
Docket

Gary L. MOCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-11161

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 23, 2006.

773

Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.

Non-Argument Calendar.

payment and ordering that any remaining funds, including those returned from Bank Atlantic, be refunded to Laurent, did not meet the criteria warranting leave to file an interlocutory appeal. The order did not present any issue of controlling law over which there is disagreement among courts, but rather, it resolved the practical issue concerning to whom the Trustee should pay the funds she still held. Moreover, the order does not materially advance the outcome of the litigation. At the time of the order, the bankruptcy court had closed the case and discharged the Trustee, and Bank Atlantic, for whom the contested funds had been ear-marked, had rejected the funds. Finally, as noted by the district court, resolution on the merits of an appeal of the order to redirect funds would not grant Laurent the relief he sought: title to the guardianship property had already passed to the guardian, making the guardian the legal owner. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying leave to proceed with an interlocutory appeal.

AFFIRMED.

Hal K. Gillespie, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David Finn Pressly, Kevin Douglas Zwetsch, Hala A. Sandridge, Fowler White Boggs Banker, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

PER CURIAM:

This is an age-discrimination-in-employment case. Gary Mock claims that Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (“Bell“) terminated his employment on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA“), 29 U.S.C. § 623. The district court granted Bell summary judgment, and Mock appeals. He contends that material issues of fact exist as to whether Bell‘s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination was a pretext for age discrimination.

In addressing Bell‘s motion for summary judgment, the district court properly considered the evidence under the framework because Mock was attempting to establish his claim with circumstantial evidence. Where, as in this case, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, which means that the plaintiff has created a presumption of unlawful discrimination, the employer must respond with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment decision. . If the defendant so responds, the presumption of discrimination collapses and, to avoid dismissal of his claim, the plaintiff must come forward with evidence (which, of course, includes the evidence that established the prima facie case) sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that the reason the employer gave was not the real reason for the adverse employment decision, but, instead, was a pretext for discrimination, i.e., was “a coverup for a discriminatory decision.” . If the plaintiff fails to do this, the employer is entitled to summary judgment.

We are satisfied that Mock presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bell‘s reason for his termination was a pretext for age discrimination. There is a dispute as to when Bell informed Mock of the reason for his termination. At the time Bell informed him that he was being fired, he insisted that it give him the reason for its decision. Bell refused to do that. It was not until later, in a letter, that it told him that he had been terminated for unacceptable performance. In light of Bell‘s refusal to tell Mock—at the time it fired him—why his employment had come to an end, a trier of fact reasonably could find that the letter constituted a pretext for discrimination.

In sum, we agree with Mock that a genuine issue of fact remains as to whether Bell‘s announced reason for his termination was a pretext for discrimination. Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.

VACATED and REMANDED.

Notes