Lead Opinion
OPINION
Case Summary
Gаry Gallien appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We reverse and remand.
Issue
Gallien raises one issue, which we restate as whether he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel.
Facts
The facts, as stated in Gallien’s direct appeal, follow:
Early in the morning on April 15, 2007, Gallien and two cohorts drove a stolen vehicle to a Goodwill store in Floyds Knobs, broke into the store, and stole money and a moving dolly. The trio then drove to a tavern in Galena, broke in, and stole an automated teller machine, a сhange machine, and additional money. Gallien fled when Floyd County Police Officer Gene Perrot arrived, but was quickly apprehended.
Gallien v. State, No. 22A01-0712-CR-565, slip op. at 2,
In the 2008 direct appeal, Gallien’s appellate counsel raised one issue, whether the sentence was inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We held that the sentence was not inappropriate, but we remanded for the trial court to amend the sentencing order to make the sentence consecutive to any sentence remaining in a case for which he was on probation. Gallien, No. 22A01-0712-CR-565, slip op. at 3-4.
Galliеn filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which he later amended. Gal-
5. In the present case, the Goodwill and Sammy-O’s burglaries are not closely connected in time, place and circumstances. A complete account of one charge can be described without referring to the details of the other charge.
6. The Goodwill and Sammy-O’s burglaries were separated by approximately fourteen (14) to fifteen (15) minutes and two (2) to two and a half (2 1/2) miles. A complete account of the Goodwill burglary can be described without referring to the details of the Sammy-O’s burglary. Gallien broke in and entered Goodwill stealing Seventy-One Dollars ($71.00) and a hand cart. Gal-lien pried the door open at Goodwill to enter the store. Gallien rammed the stolen vehicle through the front entrance of Sammy-O’s where he stole an ATM and cash. The only remote detail that would relate the two burglaries is that the handcart stolen from Goodwill was used in the Sammy-O’s burglary to transport stolen items. The handcart being stolen at one plаce and used at the other does not make this an episode of criminal conduct.
7. Gallien had sufficient time between the two burglaries to stop and reflect on his actions. He could have stopped after the first burglary, but he chose to continue and burglarize Sammy-O’s.
Appellant’s App. pp. 62-63. The post-conviction court concluded that Gallien had not “established a reasonable probability that he would prevail under any of the single episode of 'criminal conduct articulated tests of the appellate courts.” Id. at 64. The post-conviction court concluded that the outcome of the appeal would have been the same even if Gallien’s appellate counsel had raised the consecutive sentencing issue. The post-conviction court noted that “[t]hese are separate and distinct acts to burglarize two (2) separate businesses with two (2) separate victims.” Id. Therefore, it concluded that application of Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-1(c) was not appropriate. Gallien now appeals.
Analysis
Gallien arguеs that the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition is clearly erroneous. A court that hears a post-conviction claim must make findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented in the petition. Pruitt v. State,
On appeal, Gallien argues only that his appellate counsel was ineffectivе. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate both that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Ben-Yisrayl v. State,
Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims generally fall into three basic categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (3) failure to present issues well. Reed v. State,
A. Deficient Performance
We first consider whether the consecutive sentencing issue was significant and obvious from the face of the record and whether it was clearly stronger than the issue raised on direct appеal. See id. at 1195. The statute at issue here is Indiana Code Section 35-50-l-2(c), which during the relevant time periods provided:
except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment, exclusive of terms of imprisonment under IC 35-50-2-8 and IC 35-50-2-10, to*308 which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the advisory sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been convicted.
The phrase “episode of criminal conduct” means “offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” Ind.Code § 35-50-l-2(b). Gallien was sentenced to sixteen years on the two burglary convictions, but the advisory sentence for a Class B felony, which was the next higher class of felony, was ten years. See Ind.Code § 35-50-2-5.
At the sentencing hearing, Gallien’s counsel argued to the trial court that the consecutive sentencing statute was applicable and that his maximum consecutive sentencе for the two burglaries was ten years, but the trial court rejected the argument. On direct appeal, Gallien’s appellate counsel, who was also his trial counsel, did not raise the consecutive sentencing issue. In fact, our supreme court had addressed this statute shortly before Gallien’s direct appeal in both Reed,
The consecutive sentencing issue was also clearly stronger than the issue raised on appeal. Gallien’s appellate counsel argued only that Gallien’s sentence was inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Given the significant damage done to the Goodwill and the tavern and Gal-lien’s extensive criminal history, there was little likelihood of success on that issue. At the post-conviction hearing, Gallien’s appellate counsel testified that if he “had to do it again,” he “would want to raise” the consecutive sentencing issue on direct appeal. PCR Hrg. Tr. p. 8. The consecutive sentencing issue is an extremely fact-sensitive analysis that would have been readily suitable for appeal. See Slone v. State,
B. Prejudice
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, .Gallien must also. demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his appellate counsel’s deficient performance. Gallien argues that, if his appellate counsel had raised the issue, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the appeal would have been different. The post-conviсtion court concluded that the two burglary convictions were not an episode of criminal conduct and, thus, the consecutive sentencing limitation of Indiana Code Section 35-50-l-2(c) did not apply. We reach a different result.
As we noted, our supreme court addressed this statute shortly before Gal-lien’s direct appeal in both Reed,
[Although the ability to recount each charge without referring to the other can provide additional guidance on the question of whether a defendant’s conduct constitutes an episode of criminal conduct, it is not a critical ingredient in resolving the question. Rather, the statute speaks in less absolute terms: “a connected series of offenses that are closely connected in time, place, and circumstance.” I.C. § 35-50-l-2(b). And as we have observed, “Tedlock emphasizes thе timing of the offenses” and “refers to the ‘simultaneous’ and ‘contemporaneous’ nature of the crimes which would constitute a single episode of criminal conduct.” Smith v. State,770 N.E.2d 290 , 294 (Ind.2002) (citing Tedlock,656 N.E.2d at 276 ).*311 State,810 N.E.2d 674 , 677 (Ind.2004); Bieghler,690 N.E.2d at 193-95 . To show that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal thus resulting in waiver for collateral review, the defendant must overcome the strongest presumption of adequate assistance, and judicial scrutiny is highly deferential. [Ben-Yisrayl v. State,738 N.E.2d 253 , 261 (Ind.2000) ]. To evaluate the performance prong when counsel waived issues upon appeal, we apply the follоwing test: (1) whether the unraised issues are significant and obvious from the face of the record and (2) whether the unraised issues are “clearly stronger” than the raised issues. Timberlake v. State,753 N.E.2d 591 , 605-06 (Ind.2001) (quoting Gray v. Greer,800 F.2d 644 , 646 (7th Cir.1986)). If the analysis under this test demonstrates deficient performance, then we examine whether, “the issues which ... appellate counsel failed to raise, would have been clearly more likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.” Bieghler,690 N.E.2d at 194 (citation omitted). Further, we must
We have considered the consecutive sentencing statute in the context of burglaries in two other cases.
Here, the circumstances are closer to those in Henson than Slone. At trial, the State proved that Gallien and two other men burglarized the Goodwill. That burglary began at 4:35 a.m. and concluded at 5:14 a.m. The burglary at Sammy O’s tavern began a few minutes later at 5:28 a.m. It was two to three miles between the Goodwill and Sammy O’s. Gallien and his cohorts used a cart stolen in the Goodwill burglary to load a change machine at Sammy O’s, and they cut telephone wires at both locations. Officer Perrot testified that, after receiving the Goodwill burglary report, he drove around the area and found the burglary in progress at Sammy O’s. He testified that there had been other burglaries in the area and that the “MO” was that the burglars “would hit one business and while [the police] were investigating that crime they would break into another business.” Tr. p; 200. During closing arguments, the State emphasized the similarities that tied the two crimes together. The State also emphasized that the timing of the two burglaries was “planned out” so that the police would be responding to one burglary while the men carried out another one. Id. at 395.
The post-conviction court placed much emphasis on whether the burglaries could be described without referring to each oth
Conclusion
We conclude that the post-conviction court’s denial of Gallien’s petition for post-conviction relief was clearly erroneous. Gallien’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an argument regarding the consecutive sentencing limitation of Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
. The post-conviction court also relied on Reynolds v. State, 657 N.E.2d 438 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). There, the defendant broke into three homes on the same day. This court found that "Each burglary took place as a distinct episode in itself; each can be described without referring to details of the others.” Reynolds, 657 N.E.2d at 441. However, Reynolds relied on the analysis advocated by Tedlock, which our supreme court has now discouraged. See Reed,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Because I do not believe that the trial court’s denial of Gallien’s petition for post-conviction relief was clearly erroneous, I respectfully dissent.
It is well-settled that post-conviction procedures do not afford the petitioner with a super-appeal. Williams v. State,
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature. Stevens v. State,
Whether the Post-Conviction Court Erred in Determining that Gallien Did Not Receive Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Gallien sought post-conviction relief claiming that he received ineffective assis
The standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as for trial counsel in that the defendant must show appellate counsel was deficient in her performance and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668 , 686,104 S.Ct. 2052 ,80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Bieghler v. State,690 N.E.2d 188 , 192-93 (Ind.1997). To satisfy the first prong, the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient in that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel committed errors so serious that petitioner did not have the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. McCary v. State,761 N.E.2d 389 , 392 (Ind.2002). To show prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors the result of the proceeding would have been differеnt. Id.
Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims generally fall into three basic categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (3) failure to present issues well. Fisher v.
consider the totality of an attorney’s performance to determine whether the client received constitutionally adequate assistance ... [and] should be particularly sensitive to the need for separating the wheat from the chaff in appellate advocacy, and should not find deficient performance when counsel’s choice of some issues over others was reasonable in light of the facts of the case and the precedent available to counsel when that choice was made.
Id. Ineffective assistance is very rarely found in cases where a defendant asserts that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue on direct appeal. Id. at 193. One reason for this is that the decision of what issues to raise is one of*312 the most important strategic decisions to be made by appellate counsel. Id.
Reed v. State,
Gallien claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal that his sentence should have been capped at ten years because his criminal acts constituted a single episode of criminal conduct. Indiana Code section 35-50-l-2(c) provides that:
except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment, exclusive of terms of imprisonment under IC 35-50-2-8 and IC 35-50-2-10 (before its repeal) to which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the advisory sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been convicted.
An episode of criminal conduct “means offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” Ind.Code § 35-50-l-2(b). Whether a series of acts constitute a single episode of criminal conduct is a fact-intensive inquiry. See Schlichter v. State,
It is of note that this сourt has issued a large number of seemingly inconsistent, opinions regarding what constitutes a single episode of criminal conduct, some of which would tend to indicate that Gallien’s actions might be found to constitute a single episode of criminal conduct on appeal. As such, I must agree with the majority that the question of whether Gallien’s actions constituted a single episode of criminal conduct, which would limit his potential sentence to ten years rather than the sixteen imposed by the trial court, was significant and obvious from the face of thе record. Further, in light of the damage caused by Gallien’s actions and Gallien’s criminal history, such an argument would arguably have been stronger, if not clearly stronger, that the appropriateness challenge raised by appellate counsel on direct appeal. However, even if appellate counsel’s failure to raise this issue on direct appeal amounted to deficient performance, I do not believe that the post-conviction record demonstrates that Gallien established that he was prejudiсed by the allegedly deficient performance.
In Reynolds v. State,
In the instant matter, Gallien and his companions broke into a Goodwill store in Floyds Knobs and stole money and a moving dolly. Gallien and his companions then drove over four miles to a tavern in Galena. After arriving at the tavern, Gallien and his companions broke into the tavern and stole an automated teller machine, a change machine, and additional money. These facts, similar to the facts presented in Reynolds, depict two completely separate thefts. Notably, this is not a situation where Gallien and his companions broke into neighboring houses or businesses. Instead, this is a situation where Gallien and