29 Cal. 514 | Cal. | 1866
This is an appeal from an order of the Probate Court of the City and County of San Francisco, denying to Joseph Garwood the right to appear and contest the settlement of the first annual account of Henrietta M. Garwood as administratrix of the estate of her husband, Joseph S. Garwood, deceased.
The facts of the case are substantially as follows:
On the 22d of February, 1863, Joseph S. Garwood died intestate, seized and possessed of real and personal property in this State of considerable value, leaving him surviving his wife, Henrietta M. Garwood, the respondent in this case, but leaving no issue then born.
On the 10th of March, 1863, letters of administration upon the estate of the said intestate were issued by the Probate Court of'the City and County of San Francisco to the said Henrietta M. Garwood.
At the time of her husband’s death Henrietta M. Garwood was pregnant, and afterwards (on the 18th of March, 1863) gave birth to a male child, called in this case Joseph M. Gar-wood. This child, if born alive, died immediately, or soon after his birth. Assuming that the child was born alive, and that he died seized and possessed of real and personal property, his mother applied to the Probate Court for letters of
Upon the issue thus formed, as to whether Joseph M. Gar-wood was alive when born, a trial was had in the Probate Court and witnesses were called and examined, both parties appearing by counsel, and thereafter, on the 23d of September, 1863, all parties being present, in person or by counsel, the Court filed its finding of facts and conclusions of law, to the effect, among other things, that the child Joseph M. Gar-wood was born alive and died seized and possessed of real and personal estate, and that the respondent, Henrietta M. Gar-wood, was entitled to the administration of said estate; and it was ordered that the appellant’s objections to her appointment as administratrix be held for naught and that letters of administration be issued to her, which was accordingly done. All of which appears of record. Ho appeal was taken and the time for such a step had passed prior to the institution of the proceedings at bar.
Subsequently, on the 5th day of September, 1864, Henrietta M. Garwood filed her first annual account as administratrix of her deceased husband, Joseph M. Garwood, and a day was appointed for its examination and settlement; at which time the appellant, Joseph Garwood, appeared, and by petition in writing, asked to be allowed to contest the account, alleging among other things that he was interested in the estate of the said Joseph S. Garwood, deceased ; that he was the father and heir-at-law of the said Joseph S. Garwood; that the said Joseph S. Garwood died without issue except that a posthumous child was born to him but was not born
This application of Joseph Garwood to be allowed to appear and file exceptions to and contest the account of the said Henrietta M. Garwood, was resisted by her, who pleaded, in bar of his alleged right, the finding and judgment of the Court in the matter of her application for letters of administration upon the estate of her son, Joseph M. Garwood, above referred to, specially alleging that the fact as to whether Joseph M. Garwood was born alive, was directly in issue and litigated between the present parties in that proceeding. Upon the issues thus formed a trial was had. Upon the question as to whether Joseph M. Garwood was born alive, the respondent offered in evidence the record in her application for letters of administration upon his estate, and claimed that the same was conclusive upon that question. This evidence was objected to by the appellant, but was admitted by the Court and held to be conclusive of the question as to whether the child was born alive, but as having no further effect. The respondent then offered evidence of her marriage with the intestate and that the said child was the lawful issue of that marriage, (which last fact was admitted by the appellant,) and also evidence of the identity of the parties concerned, which was also excepted to by the other side. No evidence was» introduced by the appellant. The Court found that the appellant had no interest in the estate of Joseph S. Garwood; and so his petition was denied and hence this appeal.
Contesting account of an administrator.
It is first claimed that the Court below erred in allowing the right of the appellant to appear and contest the correctness, legal or actual, of the account, to be questioned at all by the administratrix, because, as it is alleged, the sworn petition of the appellant was of itself sufficient to establish his right to do so without further inquiry.
It is the duty of the Court to carefully scrutinize the accounts of executors and administrators and correct all errors founded in law or fact; and it is the right of all the creditors and distributees of the estate to be present and, if so disposed, contest the same; but the right so to do is expressly restricted to them. There is in this respect no distinction between this and like cases and other suits or legal proceedings. The rule is universal in all legal proceedings that parties not interested have no concern in them and cannot be allowed to intermeddle. If, then, a party seeks to interpose and participate in or originate a judicial controversy, and his right to interfere is denied, the first duty cast upon the Court is to determine whether such person has any interest whatever in the subject matter pending before it, and if it turns out he has none, he must be declared an intruder and excluded from any further participation.
Suppose the administratrix in this case had denied the right of the appellant to intermeddle, upon the ground that he was not the person whom he represented himself to be, but was an impostor, falsely representing himself to be the father and heir-at-law of the intestate—could there have been any doubt as to the power and duty of the Court in the premises ? We think not. A contrary rule might lead to gross abuses, without any corresponding advantages, and would entirely subvert
Doubtless, in a case like the present, which is to a certain extent a preliminary proceeding, the question rests very much in the discretion of the Court, and any doubt as to the question of interest ought to be resolved in favor of the petitioner; and however remote or contingent his interest may be, or, in other words, if he has the appearance of an interest, his right to contest ought not to be denied. (Dayton on Surrogates, 452.) But the Court undoubtedly has the power to determine the question of interest, if controverted, and is not bound to accept as conclusive the ex parte statement of the party claiming the right to contest. The Court may therefore not only take testimony for the purpose of determining the question, but in our judgment is bound to do so. Whatever discretion the Court may have in the premises ought not to be exercised until after the evidence is in. If then it be doubtful whether the party is interested, the Court should allow him to appear, but not otherwise.
Judgment of Probate Court on appointment of administrator as evidence., and as a bar on the issues there tried.
But the more important question involved in the case relates to the admissibility of the record in the matter of the estate of Joseph M. Garwood, for the purpose of proving that he was born alive.
So far as the admissibility of the parol evidence offered in connection with the record for the purpose of establishing the identity of the parties named in that record with those named in the record in the case pending before the Court, there can be no doubt, although in our judgment such evidence was not needed, for the identity of the names was prima facie sufficient to establish the identity of the persons. (Carleton v. Townsend, 28 Cal. 219; People v. Thompson, 28 Cal. 214.) The effect of the evidence was not, as suggested by counsel, to add
We are of the opinion that the finding and judgment of the Court in the matter of the application of the respondent for letters of administration upon the estate of her son Joseph M. Garwood were competent evidence upon the question as to whether he was still-born, and that the same, never having been reversed, were conclusive upon that question, upon the well established principle that matters which have been once judicially determined cannot be again drawn into controversy between the same parties.
The judgment of a Court having jurisdiction directly upon the point in controversy is, as a plea, a bar; and as evidence, competent and conclusive as between the same parties and their privies; not only where the subject matter is in all respects the same, but where the point comes incidentally in question in relation to a different matter. (Gray v. Dougherty, 25 Cal. 272; Caperton v. Schmidt, 26 Cal. 493.) This rule, however, is restricted to facts directly in issue, and does not embrace facts which may be in controversy, but rest in evidence and are merely collateral. A fact or matter in issue is that upon which the plaintiff proceeds by his action, and which the defendant controverts in his pleadings, while collateral facts are such as are offered in evidence to establish the matters or facts in issue; and notwithstanding they may be controverted at the trial, they do not come within the rule. (King v. Chase, 15 N. Hamp. 16.)
This doctrine of res adjudicata applies to the judgment and” decrees of the Probate Court as well as to those of any other judicial tribunal. (2 Smith’s Leading Cases, 522, et sequens; Blackham’s Case, 1 Salkeld, 290.)
That the fact whether Joseph M. Garwood was born alive or not was directly put in issue, tried and found in the matter
This case is readily distinguishable from Blackham's Case, 1 Salkeld, 290, cited by counsel for appellant. That was trover. The plaintiff proved the goods to have, been in his possession, and to have been taken away by the defendant. The defendant, proved the goods to have belonged to one Jane Blackham in her lifetime, and that he had taken out letters of administration on her estate, and so was entitled to the possession of the goods. Thereupon the plaintiff proved that some few days before her death Jane Blackham was actually married to him. The foregoing is a full statement of the case as reported. So, whether the fact of the plaintiff’s marriage with Jane Blackham was put in issue, tried and determined in the Spiritual Court on the application of the defendant for letters of administration, did not appear; The defendant, however, insisted that the grant of letters to him was conclusive that no such marriage had in fact taken place, because the Spiritual Court could not have granted letters to him except upon the supposition that there was no such marriage. But Holt, C. J., said: “A matter which has been directly determined by their (the Spiritual Court) sentence cannot be
The case of Bouchier v. Taylor, 4 Brown’s Cases in Parlia
In Barrs v. Jackson, 1 Young and Collyer, 585, 20 Eng. Ch. R. 585, Vice Chancellor Knight Bruce doubted whether the question of the conclusiveness of the sentence of the Prerogative Court was the point upon which the House of Lords decided Bouchier v. Taylor, claiming that their judgment could be sustained upon other grounds, andü did not therefore necessarily embrace that question. But the Lord Chancellor, in the same case, on appeal from the decision of the Vice Chancellor, came to the opposite conclusion. (Barrs v. Jackson, 1 Phillips, 582, 19 Eng. Ch. R. 581.)
Barrs v. Jackson, supra, was like in facts the case of Bouchier v. Taylor. One Harriet Martindale Smith died unmarried and, intestate. Suit was instituted in the Prerogative Court for administration upon the estate. The defendant Jackson claimed the administration on the ground that he was the second cousin and next of kin of the intestate, and Mrs. Barrs, the plaintiff, claimed it upon the ground that she was the niece and next of kin of the intestate. The Prerogative Court decided in favor of Jackson, and the sentence was that administration should be granted to him as next of kin. Afterward, the suit in question for distribution was instituted in the Court of Chancery, in which Mrs. Barrs claimed the residuary estate of the intestate as her niece and next of kin. The defendant Jackson, in his answer, pleaded in bar the sentence of the Ecclesiastical Court, and alleged that the question in issue was the sole question in that Court and was there decided in his favor. The Vice Chancellor held, however, that the judgment of the Ecclesiastical Court was not conclusive, having first come to the conclusion, as already stated, that that point was not decided in Bouchier v. Taylor. But on appeal the Lord Chancellor held that the point had been decided in Bouchier v. Taylor, and that he was bound by that decision, whatever his individual opinion might be, and that the sentence of the Ecclesiastical Court was therefore conclusive upon the question as to which of the parties was next of kin to the intestate.
Order affirmed.
Mr. Justice Shafter, being disqualified, did not participate in the decision of this case.