129 Minn. 156 | Minn. | 1915
Certiorari to review a judgment entered in proceedings under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The facts are short, and as iollows:
At the time relator entered the employ of respondent, J. Neils Lumber Co., he was totally blind in one eye, having lost the. sight thereof by an accidental injury suffered some time prior to his employment with respondent. Within the compensation statute this was a permanent partial disability. While engaged in the work of his employment for respondent relator suffered another injury which totally destroyed the sight of his remaining eye, thus rendering him totally blind. Upon these facts, about which there is no dispute, the trial court awarded to relator the compensation provided for by the statute for a permanent partial disability, and judgment was entered accordingly.
It was relator’s contention in the court below, renewed in this court, that the injury suffered by him, the loss of his remaining eye, constitutes a permanent total disability and that within the proper construction of the compensation act he is entitled to compensation upon that basis. In this we are unable to concur.
“If an employee receives an injury, which, of itself, would only cause permanent partial disability, but which, combined with a previous disability, does in fact cause permanent total disability, the employer shall only be liable for the permanent partial disability caused by the subsequent injury.”
The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and clearly was intended to limit the liability of the employer to compensation commensurate with the injury suffered by the employee while in his service, and to relieve him from the consequences of injuries previously sustained, even though both resulted in permanent total disability. From the view point of the legislature, and the fact that the liability created is founded upon no wrong of the employer, it would seem fairly clear that this limitation upon the liability was deliberately made, and founded in justice and fairness. The employer accepts in his service a disabled employee, knowing of the disability and with the knowledge that under the compensation statute he is liable for accidental injuries to such employee while engaged in his service, but to couple the prior disability with one suffered while in his service and make the employer liable for both, would seem a hardship the legislature intended to avoid. At least we think the language of the statute clearly manifests that intention. The statute is too plain to admit of any other view, and there is no room for judicial construction. While it is true that the combined injuries result in total disability the statute declares that as to the last employer it shall be treated as a partial disability. That the legislature had the right to so' provide cannot
It follows that relator’s compensation is given by section 13 of the act, namely, “for the loss of an eye, fifty per centum of daily wages during one hundred weeks,” and the trial court was right in ordering judgment accordingly.
Judgment affirmed.