125 F. Supp. 729 | E.D. Okla. | 1954
The defendant in both of these cases,
However, in the instant cases, the judgments entered by the Court dismissing two of the alleged joint tort-feasors were not judgments on the merits wherein settlement agreements were approved by the Court and incorporated into final judgments in favor of plaintiffs, but were judgments entered sustaining plaintiffs’ motions to dismiss, without regard to the merits, and which technically amounted to judgments in favor of the dismissed defendants and not the plaintiffs.
Defendant’s motions for summary judgments should be overruled.
. These two companion cases Nos. 3737 and 3788 arose out of the same accident.
. The order of dismissal in case No. 3737 (other than party plaintiff is identical with the order in case No. 3788) provided : “Now on this 22nd day of June, 1954, the same being one of the regular judicial days of this Court, this matter comes on for hearing upon the motion of the plaintiff for an order dismissing this action, only as to the defendants Clyde Osterhaus and Arlene Osterhaus, dba Return Courts, Madill, Oklahoma; the plaintiff appeared by one of her attorneys, Thomas E. Shaw, Madill, Oklahoma, and no other appearances were máde; and the Court, after examining the pleadings
. In Sykes v. Wright, 1949, 201 Okl. 346, 205 P.2d 1156, the Court held that a judgment entered in a wrongful death action under Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., for an amount agreed upon by parties, in which case liability was determined by court upon issues joined, constituted a full determination of cause of action, and upon satisfaction of judgment entered, cause of action was extinguished, though court in journal entry of judgment undertook to reserve to plaintiff the right to sue other joint tort-feasors as agreed upon by the parties in their contract of settlement. See also Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 Okl. 25, 267 P. 641; Eberle v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 10 Cir., 1941, 120 F.2d 746.
. Read Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., footnote 3, supra.
. Thus distinguish the' case at bar from the three following cases: (1) Sykes v. Wright, footnote 3, supra, where at page 1159 of 205 P.2d the Court observed: “ * * * The judgment entered in this case was upon the merits and issues joined by the pleadings. The judgment determined the amount all persons dependent on the deceased were damaged. This extinguishes the cause of action and no justiciable claim against others jointly and severally liable for the tort remains. (Citing authority.)” (2) Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., footnote 3, supra, where at page 643, of 267 P. it was said: “ * * * The question here involved is not a question of plaintiff’s intention; it is a question of her legal right to split her cause of action, to apportion her damage, and to recover by separate actions separate portions thereof. Plaintiff had but one cause of action. This cause of action, of course, existed against all wrongdoers, but it was a single cause of action, and when suit was filed on this cause of action and damage in the sum of $7,500 claimed as her full damage, and such claim reduced to judgment, the cause of action then merged in the judgment, and the satisfaction of the judgment was a satisfaction and settlement of the cause of action.” (3) Eberle v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., footnote 3, supra, where at page 749 of 120 F.2d Judge Phillips said: “ * * * The administratrix might have entered into a compromise with McGeorge, dismissed her action against it, released McGeorge or convenanted not to sue McGeorge and reserved her right to sue Sinclair and Gray. Instead of following that course, the administratrix elected to enter into the contract compromising and settling her two single causes of action, received the sum stipulated in satisfaction thereof, and submitted the compromise to the court for its approval. The court by