This is an action for damages for the wrongful death of Linda Garvin, the daughter of Berthold J. and LaVerne Garvin, who was killed in an automobile accident on November 17, 1969, in Madison County, Nebraska. The first cause of action was for the recovery of general damages suffered by the next of kin for wrongful death of Linda, and the second cause fоr the recovery of special damages for funeral and burial expenses in the specified amount of $1,420. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant Coover on both causes of action and the jury found in favor of plaintiff against the defendant Roush on the first cause of action and assessed the damages at “none,” and found in favor of the plaintiff on the second cause and fixed the damages at $1,427. Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, claiming that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and law in that it was inadequate. No complaint is made of the instructions or any other portion of the trial. The case is submitted on an abbreviated bill of exceptions containing only the testimony of four witnesses, whose testimony is limited to personal facts about the deceased.
Linda Garvin was born on April 21, 1949, аnd as previously indicated, died on November 17, 1969, at the age of 20 years and approximately 7 months. Although appellant’s brief claims, appellees do not deny it, and the trial court instructed that Linda’s minority would not have ended until December 25, 1969, that position is based on L.B. 167, Laws 1969, *584 c. 298, s. 1, p. 1072, Legislature of Nebraska, Eightieth Session, which lowered the age of majority to 20 years. It is true that that session of the Legislature adjourned on September 24, 1969, and laws in the ordinary course of events do not become effective until after the passage of 3 calendar months following adjournment. However, this particular act was passed and then approved on March 13, 1969, with tiie еmergency clause. Therefore, Linda had reached her majority at the time of her death.
The evidence shows that Linda was a bright, considerate, dependable, and loving child who had a variety of interests both in and out of school. She had contributed to the family well-being by heiping to care for her sister and brothers who were 3, 5, and 7 years younger than she, and also had helped with other household chores and in a family business activity which involved delivering milk. She graduated from high school and commenсed her nurses training at Nebraska Wesleyan University and Bryan Memorial Hospital in August of 1967, and at the time of her untimely death was participating in a 3-month course in psychiatric training at the Hastings Regional Center. Linda’s parents had paid approximately $2,500 of her education costs, and apparently she had earned the remaindеr. Indications were that she would have become a registered nurse sometime during the year 1970.
In view of the fact that Linda had reached her majority at the time of her death, there is nothing to support an award for loss of services during her minority. That would leave only the possibility that Linda would have contributed back something from the benefits of her. own education to that of her younger siblings. There was no contract, no definite amount, no particular promise. The only testimony on that point was that in a conversation with her father he said she was going to have to put something back and she said that was fine. A not un *585 likely reply from a normal child against the backdrop of that situation.
Up until Selders v. Armentrout (No. 1),
Other than the testimony аbout the education money, both of Linda’s parents testified that they gained companionship with her attendance at church, took pride and comfort in her industry and application to her school work, found comfort and companionship from her interest in sewing and music, felt pride and comfort in her interest in sports and family recreation, and in her devotion to her family. If anything, it is probably true that the feeling of *586 loss which these parents felt at the death of their daughter was understated considеring, among other things, that their testimony came some 8 years after their tragedy. The question here which we must answer, however, is whether there was such a reasonable еxpectation of monetary contributions on Linda’s part and a monetary worth which can reasonably be assigned to the loss of her society, comfort, and сompanionship that we can say the verdict of “none” was so inadequate as to be contrary to the evidence and therefore wrong as a matter of law.
It is virtually impossible to “color match” cases in attempting to decide a given issue. Appellant cites Vandenberg v. Langan,
However, one common thread runs throughout all of those cases, namely, that damages in any wrongful death case are incapable of computation and are largely a matter for the jury. In Selders v. Armentrout (No. 2),
supra,
this court said: “The amount which should be awarded in any wrongful death case is incapable of computation and is largely a matter for the jury. As stated in Dorsey v. Yost,
“The evidence in this case was such that the jury сould have concluded the pecuniary loss to the parents, including the value of society and companionship, was relatively small. We are unable to sаy under all the facts and circumstances the verdicts were inadequate.”
From all that appears in the record before us, the case was fairly tried and submitted to the jury under proper instructions, and we are not inclined to disturb its verdict. We conclude, therefore, that the judgment should be affirmed.
Affirmed.