On Junе 7, 1973, defendant (hereinafter YMCA), and third-party defendant, Luding-ton Area School District (hereinafter the school district), entered into a contract which provided that the school would have the exclusive use of the YMCA camp from September 24, 1973, to September 28, 1973. On September 23, 1973, plaintiffs, a tеacher for the Ludington Area School District and his wife, were at the YMCA camp in anticipation of the school’s use of the camp beginning on the following day. During the evening, plaintiff Sharon Gartside was injured when she was thrown from a horse which she was riding at the camp. As a result of these injuries, plaintiffs filed a suit against the YMCA alleging that they negligently encouraged her to ride a very spirited and quick-tempered horse and negligently provided her with defective riding equipment. The YMCA then filed a third-party complaint against the school district for indemnification. The school district made a motion fоr summary judgment, GCR 1963, 117.2(1), which was granted, and the YMCA appeals.
The standard of review for determining the correctness of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment pursuаnt to GCR 1963, 117.2(1), is set out in
Borman’s, Inc v Lake State Development Co,
"A motion based solely on subsection 1, challenges the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim and is to be considered by an exаmination of the pleadings alone. Todd v Biglow,51 Mich App 346 , 349;214 NW2d 733 (1974). [The] job [of] a reviewing court is to accept as *338 true the well-pleaded facts in plaintiffs complaint, * * * , Weckler v Berrein [sic] County Road Commission,55 Mich App 7 , 9;222 NW2d 9 (1974), and to determine whether these claims are so 'clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possible [sic] justify a right to recovery.’ Crowther v Ross Chemical & Manufacturing Co,42 Mich App 426 , 431;202 NW2d 577 (1972).”
The YMCA’s claim for indemnification is bаsed on a provision of its contract with the school district, whereby the school district promised:
"(f) To indemnify YMCA against, and to hold YMCA, its agents and emplоyees harmless from, all claims, demands, costs or damages (including attorneys’ fees) because of bodily injury, including death, or property damage to any person or legal entity at any time arising out of or in any way connected with School’s use of the Camp and its facilities.”
The trial court granted the school district’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that the contract provision for indemnification was only intended to apply during the period of the contract: September 24, 1973, to September 28, 1973. While this is one possible interpretation of the contract provision, the indеmnity clause is not free from ambiguity on this point. Accepting the well-pleaded facts in the YMCA’s complaint as true, its claim that the indemnity provision wаs intended to apply to an accident which occurred on September 23, 1973, is not so clearly unenforceable as a matter of lаw that no factual development could possibly sustain it. Accordingly, the trial judge erred in granting the school district’s motion for summary judgment on this basis.
The school district also contends that even if the trial judge erred in granting the motion for sum *339 mary judgment on the basis that the contract provision did not apply tо an injury occurring on September 23, 1973, the order of summary judgment should be affirmed because the indemnity provision of the contract did not bind the school district to indemnify the YMCA for damages caused by its sole negligence.
Indemnity contracts, like other contracts, are to be enforced so аs to effectuate the intentions of the parties,
Title Guaranty & Surety Co v Roehm,
Although indemnity contracts аre strictly construed, they are to be enforced so as to effectuate the intentions of the parties. Accordingly, in ascertaining the intеntions of the parties, one must consider not only the language used in the contract but also the situation of the parties and the circumstanсes surrounding the contract, see,
Title Guaranty, supra.
As the Supreme Court stated in
Vanden Bosch v Consumers Power Co,
"Although not 'expressly’ stated in the agreement, we are persuaded from our reading of that agreement, in light оf the surrounding circumstances, that the parties intended that Consumers Power be indemnified against liability for its own negligence of the type precipitating this litigation.”
Applying this reasoning to the facts in this case, we conclude that there are some factual developments possible undеr the allegations in the YMCA’s pleadings which may establish its right to indemnification. We recognize that the YMCA may not be able to establish, at trial, that the pаrties clearly intended to provide for indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence, see, Fireman’s Fund, supra, Hubbert, supra, Klann, supra, see also Geurink, supra. In the cases cited above, the trial judge ruled that the indemnitees had failed to prove that the written contract provisions, when considered in light of the surrounding circum *341 stances, clearly showed the parties’ intention to indemnify the indemnitee for his own negligence. However, these rulings on the indemnitor’s motion for a directed verdict 1 wеre made after trial so that the indemnitee was given an opportunity to prove the parties’ intention.
In
Meadows, supra,
this Court affirmed the trial judge’s decision to grant the indemnitor’s motion for summary judgment but only because the contract provision in that case was barren of any reference to the concept of indemnity for damages caused by the indemnitee’s own negligence. In
Vannoy v City of Warren, 2
Mich App 78;
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Costs to defendant-third-party plaintiffs.
Notes
In
Geurink v Herlihy Mid-Continent Co,