277 Pa. 88 | Pa. | 1923
Opinion by
Appellee, a widow, asked commutation of future installments payable under a compensation agreement arising from the death of her husband. The employer objected unless there was evidence to sustain the requirements of the act. No specific reason was assigned; the answer merely denied the right in the language of the act. Section 316 of the Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, 748, provides, “The compensation contemplated by this article may at any time be commuted by the board...... if it appear that such commutation will be for the best interest of the employee or the dependents of the deceased employee, and that it will avoid undue expense or undue hardship to either party.” The board ordered commutation, and an exception thereto was taken by appellant as follows: “The board erred in its action in commuting the payments of compensation due the claimant, a widow, without making any provisions to safeguard the rights of the employer in the event of her remarriage.” This precise question was not raised in the answer, and, while no particular form of pleading is prescribed by the act or the rules of the board, yet, in fairness to claimants, they should be advised in some manner of a specific objection, like the one now urged, so they may know what to meet. The widow had no information that possible remarriage would be set up to defeat her claim for commutation; it was not until after the case was argued before the board that the question was presented. As the specific objection was not brought upon the record in advance of the hearing, we might not reverse under such circumstances, even if appellant’s position be entirely sound. However, as the matter is of importance, one wherein the lower courts of the Commonwealth disagree, we shall indicate the rules that should govern in like cases.
We do not agree with either view. The one adopts a hard, rigorous policy toward the widow, while the other places no limitation on the right to commutation where remarriage is possible. We said, in Lovasz v. Carnegie Steel Co., 266 Pa. 84, 85, a widow with minor children is not entitled to commutation without joinder of a guardian for the children who would act under au
The intent and spirit of the compensation law is to provide a fund to insure to widows and other dependents of deceased employees a regular competence for a certain period of time because of their inability to adequately provide for themselves. It is based on a social obligation, or on a right springing from the situation of the parties because of the service performed in furtherance of the employer’s business when the employee was injured. It was not intended this purpose should be carried beyond its true import; to do so would create an anomalous condition, naturally resulting from remarriage, with compensation continued thereafter. At first, payments ceased immediately on remarriage. This had the effect of creating practices that required relief; so, to induce freedom of remarriage, one-third of the balance of installments to become due were given when that event took place. This amendment further emphasized the true reason for the law; when a new husband stepped forward to take the place of the one deceased, the responsibility of the employer ceased beyond that felt necessary to assuage the distress occasioned by the first husband’s death.
Though the act is remedial, and is to receive a liberal construction (Pater v. Superior Steel Co., 263 Pa. 244, 246), it should not be construed so as to subject the em
“Undue expense” or “undue hardship to either party” does not mean that permission is given to grant commutation in any and all cases, but the terms were used in a restrictive sense. It is contrary to the express language used and against public policy to order the employer to pay what, in law, he is declared not bound to pay. Likewise, it would be unfair for the board to hold that every widow asking commutation is presumed to be acting dishonestly in that she is seeking to secure a large sum of money on the eve of a second marriage. The board has no more right to prejudge her case and embarrass her than a judge has to conclude a defendant is guilty from his looks. These widows are entitled to the presumption of dealing fairly, and that their request is based on the future good that will come in other ways than that here disputed.
In determining the question of undue hardship, acting under the authority of section 316, consideration must be given to remarriage when that question is put in issue. Where the board is reasonably certain it is not intended, commutation should be granted without safeguarding the rights of the .employer, and it should not be ordered where the contrary appears. In doubtful cases, the board, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may refuse commutation, or may grant it on condition that some sort of indemnity or other safeguard be given. Where there is an abuse of sound discretion, either in ordering or failing to order the safeguard to be given the employer in event of remarriage, that question may be determined on appeal, as in other cases. The form such safeguard may take is largely a matter for the board, who, to work out the benefits of the act, must do so with the least embarrassment to those to be benefited.
Judgment affirmed.