Garrish v. United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement WorkersGarrish v. United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [docket entry 57], Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(e), the Court concludes that a hearing would not aid in the disposition of this motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will conditionally deny Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ renewal of this motion after the close of discovery.
Plaintiffs are employees of Defendant General Motors Corporation (“GM”) who work at GM’s Truck and Bus facility (“the facility”) in Pontiac, Michigan. (C. 1 at ¶¶4, 8.) Plaintiffs are also members of Defendant United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, International Union (“UAW”) and Defendant Local 594. Plaintiffs purport to represent the interests of 6,000 employees at the facility. Defendant GM builds vehicles. Defendant UAW is a union purporting to represent the interests of workers at GM. Defendant Local 594 is a local union and an element of Defendant UAW.
Defendants UAW and GM are parties to a National Collective Bargaining Agreement (“NCBA”). The NCBA concerns Plaintiffs’ employment rights, including wages, hours of employment, and working conditions. Defendant Local 594 and the facility are parties to a Local Collective Bargaining Agreement (“LCBA”), which allows them to negotiate matters not covered by the NCBA.
This dispute is rooted in a strike over local demands and grievances that Local 594 began, with the UAW’s permission, at the facility on April 23, 1997 and that ended on July 21, 1997. Plaintiffs allege that, although GM met all legitimate demands of Local 594 within the strike’s first month, Defendant unions fraudulently prolonged the strike for approximately two months for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs allege that the unions sought to obtain roughly $200,000 in “overtime” payments from GM to high-level officials of Local 594. Second, Plaintiffs allege that the unions sought to obtain employment at GM for the relatives of high-level UAW officials.
Plaintiffs further allege that GM ultimately paid $200,000 to Local 594 to be divided among its high-level union representatives. (C. at ¶ 88.) Plaintiffs allege that GM knew this payment was illegal, and that GM nonetheless provided the $200,000 as a means of paying the union leaders to end the strike. (C. at ¶¶ 89, 97.) According to Plaintiffs, at least one member of Local 594’s executive board shared in the disbursement of the improperly-obtained $200,000.
Plaintiffs also aver that Local 594 ultimately obtained employment for Todd Fante and Gordon Campbell. Plaintiffs aver that both Messrs. Fante and Campbell were unqualified for the positions for which GM hired them and that hiring them was a violation of the NCBA. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Campbell is the son of Jay Campbell, chairman of Local 594’s bargaining committee (C. at ¶ 50), and that Mr. Fante is the son of a friend of Donny Douglas, who was the UAW’s representative during the 1997 strike negotiations at the facility. (C. at ¶ 51.)
Plaintiffs brought suit on August 7, 2000. In their first amended complaint, filed on October 4, 2000, Plaintiffs asserted several “counts” pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), Title III, ¶ 301, 1947, as amended,
II LEGAL STANDARD
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members if impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class ...
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final in-junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
(c) (1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits....
District courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” into whether the prerequisites of
To make a proper determination with respect to Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, this Court must address three distinct issues:
a. The adequacy of the class definition proposed by the plaintiffs;
b. The four prerequisites to certification provided inFed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) (that is, numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation); and
c. The specific subcategories provided inFed.R.Civ.P. 23(b) .
The Court will address each of these issues in turn.
Ill ANALYSIS
a. The adequacy of the class definition proposed by Plaintiffs
Before the Court may certify a class pursuant to
Plaintiffs in this case propose to define the class as “all members of Local 594 who were on GM’s active payroll at its Pontiac truck facility on the day the strike began,” except for the “members of Local 594 who were responsible for the events giving rise to this litigation.” (Pl.Br. at 8.) Because the Plaintiffs’ definition of the class is readily ascertainable by reference to objective criteria, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have adequately defined the class.
b.
i. Numerosity
Plaintiffs assert that they meet the numerosity requirement because joinder of all class members would be impracticable. Defendant unions do not object to certification on this ground. Defendant GM argues that numerosity is not satisfied because “at most two people can maintain a Section 301 claim based upon the only alleged breach of contract in this case,” which was the alleged hiring of Messrs. Fante and Campbell. (GM Br. at 10.)
That argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, if Plaintiffs were to prove that a prolongation of the strike occurred because of the unions’ wrongful attempt to secure employment for those two gentlemen, it would not only be the two Plaintiffs who arguably would have obtained the jobs that went to Messrs. Fante and Campbell who would have proven that they were harmed. Rather, all of the Plaintiffs who lost wages because of the wrongful prolongation of the strike would have proven harm, and all could be entitled to relief.
The second reason that the Court rejects GM’s argument is that GM goes too far when it states conclusively that the “only alleged breach of contract in this case is the hiring of Fante and Campbell as journeymen builders.” (GM Br. at 9.) The Court has reached no such conclusion. Instead, the Court has merely observed that “[i]t is
not entirely clear
... that Plaintiffs allege [the alleged illegal payments from GM to the union leaders] to have been a breach of contract.”
Garrish v. UAW,
The Court is satisfied that joinder of all class members is impracticable because there are more than one hundred named Plaintiffs already, and this number may expand greatly.
ii. Commonality
Commonality exists when there is a common issue among the plaintiffs and the resolution of that issue would advance the litigation.
Sprague v. General Motors Corp.,
iii. Typicality
The typicality criterion limits a class’s claims to those that the named plaintiffs’ claims fairly encompass; i.e., typicality exists when the Court concludes that “as goes the claim of the named plaintiff, so go the claims of the class.”
Sprague,
As the Court has made clear, the substantive claims of the putative class are essentially the same for every putative class member and for each named Plaintiff. That is, the salient questions for each Plaintiff are the same: whether the union Defendants wrongly prolonged the strike to obtain wrongful employment for Messrs. Fante and Campbell; whether the union Defendants wrongly prolonged the strike to obtain payments to union leaders; and, whether Defendant GM violated a collective bargaining agreement. At trial, proof of these questions by one named Plaintiff would likely prove the claim of each named Plaintiff. The Court therefore holds that the typicality requirement exists.
Defendants disagree. Both Defendants argue that a salient issue for each Plaintiff will be whether he satisfies the statute of limitations. Defendant GM makes this argument in relation to the typicality requirement of
Defendant GM also argues that the individual nature of the harms that each Plaintiff suffered militates toward the conclusion that typicality does not exist. (GM Br. at 16.) The Court rejects this argument because “individual problems involving ... ascertainment of damages” do not preclude certification.
Riordan v. Smith Barney,
iv. Fairness and Adequacy of Representation
The adequacy inquiry exists to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the putative class.
Rutherford v. City of Cleveland,
But they should have. Because Plaintiffs must bear the burden of showing that they meet the strictures of
c.
An alternate reason for the Court’s disposition of this motion is that, even if Plaintiffs had met their burden under
Defendants argue that the salient issue for the typical Plaintiff will be whether that he satisfies the statute of limitations, and this individualized inquiry dictates whether common issues of law or fact do not predominate.
Defendants argument is well taken because the Court has made clear that, should Defendants make good on their averment that they will assert the statute-of-limitations defense, each Plaintiff would have to adduce competent evidence that he satisfies the statute of limitations for a hybrid § 301 action before a jury may find that he prevails in a hybrid suit under § 301.
Garrish,
Under such circumstances, this Court seriously questions whether “the defendants could realistically be expected to argue the applicability of [the] statute of limitations defenses to numerous class members individually at one trial” and whether the jury could “assimilate such overwhelming information.”
Butler v. Stirling,
No. 98-3223,
IV CONCLUSION
For reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [docket entry 57] is DENIED without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ renewal of this motion after the close of discovery.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. "C." refers to Plaintiffs amended complaint, filed on October 4, 2000 [docket entry 11].