| Ala. | Apr 20, 1916
. “The law, in its practical administration in cases of this kind, regards only proximate or immediate, and not remote, causes, and, in ascertaining which is proximate and which remote, refuses to indulge in metaphysical niceties. Where, in the sequence of events between the original default and the final mischief, an entirely independent and unrelated cause intervenes, and is of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the mischief, .the second cause is ordinarily regarded as the proximate cause and the other •as the remote cause.”—Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Calhoun., 213 U.S. 1" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1909-02-23" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/atchison-topeka--santa-fe-railway-co-v-calhoun-96989?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="96989">213 U. S. 1, 29 Sup. Ct. 321, 53 L. Ed. 671" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1909-02-23" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/atchison-topeka--santa-fe-railway-co-v-calhoun-96989?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="96989">53 L. Ed. 671; Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1877-04-30" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/milwaukee--saint-paul-railway-co-v-kellogg-89495?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="89495">94 U. S. 469, 24 L. Ed. 256.
“Where two distinct, successive causes, unrelated in operation, to some extent contribute to an injury, it is settled that where there is an intervening and direct cause, a prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis for recovery of damages, if such prior cause did no more than furnish the condition, or give rise to the occasion, by which the injury was made possible. It seems to be sound in principle and well settled by authority that where it is admitted or found that two distinct, successive causes, unrelated in their operation, conjoin to produce a given injury, one of them must be the proximate, and the other the remote, cause of the injury, and the court, in passing on the facts
“Suppose that if it had not been for the intervention of a responsible third party the defendant’s negligence would have produced no damage to the plaintiff, is the defendant liable to the plaintiff? This question must be answered in the negative, for the general reason that causal connection between the negligence and damage is broken by the interposition of responsible human action. I am negligent on a particular subject-matter. Another person, moving independently, comes in and, either neg: ligently or maliciously, so acts as to make my negligence injurious to a third person. If so, the person so intervening acts as a nonconductor and insulates my negligence, so that I cannot be sued for the mischief which the person so intervening directly produces. He is the one who is liable. * * * For the spontaneous action of an independent will is neither the subject of regular, natural sequence, nor of accurate precalculation by us. In other words, so far as concerns my fellow beings, their acts cannot be said to have been caused by me, unless they are imbeciles or act under compulsion, or under circumstances produced by me, which gave them no opportunity for volition.” — Wharton on Neg. 138.
After a full discussion of this subject, Mr. Freeman, in noting some differences in the cases where the subsequent act of the third person is merely negligent, concludes:
“But the courts, at least in this country, refuse to hold a tort-feasor liable for the results of a subsequent act which is willfully wrong, unless that act was actually intended by him.”—Gilson v. Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 65 Vt. 213" court="Vt." date_filed="1892-07-01" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/gilson-v-delaware--hudson-canal-co-6583983?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6583983">65 Vt. 213, 26 Atl. 70, 36 Am. St. Rep. 802, note, 807, 842, 843, citing the authorities.
Our own decisions, so far as they have spoken, are in harmony with these principles, and in the case of Tobler v. Pioneer, etc., Co., 166 Ala. Ala. 482, 509, 52 So. 86" court="Ala." date_filed="1909-12-21" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/tobler-v-pioneer-mining--mfg-co-7364958?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7364958">52 South. 86, 96, it was said: “A wrongful act of independent third persons (it conclusively appears that this was such, though they may have been the servants of the master), not actually intended or reasonably to be expected by the master, is not the consequence of the master’s wrong, and he is not bound to anticipate the general, probability of such acts.”
We do not overlook those cases decided under statutes which forbid the employment of children in certain places and pursuits which common experience has shown are peculiarly dangerous to them. Such prohibitions, extending usually to children under 14 years of age, are, no doubt, intended to protect immature children, not only against the perils of their own immediate tasks, but also against their propensity to playful diversions, and the general perils of their environment. In’some such cases the doctrines of proximate cause seem to have been applied somewhat liberally in favor of the master’s liability for the original wrongful employment of the child.—Rolin v. Tobacco Co., 141 N.C. 300" court="N.C." date_filed="1906-05-08" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/rolin-v--tobacco-co-3668644?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3668644">141 N. C. 300, 53 S. E. 891, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 335, note, 8 Ann. Cas. 638; Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 140 Ala. 727, 79 S.E. 836" court="Ga." date_filed="1913-10-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/elk-cotton-mills-v-grant-5579299?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5579299">79 S. E. 836, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 656, note; Perry v. Tozer, 90 Minn. 431" court="Minn." date_filed="1903-11-18" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/perry-v-tozer-7972730?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7972730">90 Minn. 431, 97 N. W. 137, 101 Am. St. Rep. 416. But, even in such cases, the injury must result naturally from the work itself, or from the operation of the business by others, or from contact with some dangerous condition or agency belonging to or permitted about the place.
The trial court properly gave the general affirmative charge for the defendant, and the judgment will be affirmed.
Affirmed.