Garrett v. Columbus Civ. Serv. Comm.Garrett v. Columbus Civ. Serv. Comm.
Rendered on August 19, 2010
Teresa Villarreal, for appellant.
Richard C. Pfeiffer, Jr., City Attorney, and Emily D. Bennett, for appellee.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
KLATT, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Paul Garrett, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his appeal from a decision of appellee, the City of Columbus, Civil Service Commission (“Commission“). For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶3} In June 2009, certified mail that the Division had sent to Garrett‘s home address was returned to the Division marked with a forwarding address in Malta, Ohio. City employees in the competitive clаss of classified service must maintain their residence within Franklin County or a county contiguous to Franklin County. Section 158-1 of the Charter of the City of Columbus, Ohio (hereinafter “Section 158-1“); Rule VI(D)(2) of the Rules and Regulations of the Municipal Civil Service Commission (hereinafter “Rule VI(D)(2)“). Because Malta is located outside of Franklin County and its contiguous counties, the Division asked the Commission to investigate whether Garrett was in violation of Section 158-1 and Rule VI(D)(2).
{¶4} In a July 8, 2009 letter, the Commission notified Garrett that it had scheduled a residency hearing for July 21, 2009. The lettеr directed Garrett to bring to the hearing documentation that demonstrated his compliance with the residency requirement.
{¶5} Garrett and his attorney appeared at the July 21, 2009 hearing. After the hearing officer swore him in, Garrett admitted that he had relocated to Malta after selling his Carroll, Ohio residence. When Garrett began receiving certified mail from the City at his Malta address, he moved to an extended-stay hotel in Groveport, Ohio in an attempt to satisfy the residency requirement. Garrett, however, only lived at thе Groveport hotel for a week before moving back to Malta.
{¶7} Relying upon
{¶8} In response, the Commission moved to dismiss Garrett‘s appeal, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Commission contended that the trial court could not exercise jurisdiction over Garrett‘s appeal beсause the administrative decision Garrett appealed did not result from a quasi-judicial proceeding. The trial court agreed with the Commission‘s argument, and it issued a decision granting the motion to dismiss.
{¶10} Relying upon these facts, Garrett аrgued that the August 11, 2009 hearing constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding, and thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider his appeal of the Commission‘s decision. Soon after filing his motion for reconsideration, Garrett also filed a motion seeking leave to amеnd his “complaint.” Garrett explained that he wanted to assert causes of action for wrongful termination and declaratory judgment against the City. The trial court denied both of Garrett‘s motions.
{¶11} The trial court entered judgment dismissing Garrett‘s appeal on January 4, 2010. Garrett now appeals from that judgment, and he assigns the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court erred in granting Defendant-Appellee City of Columbus, Civil Service Commission‘s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
Ohio Civ. Proc. R. 12(B)(1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction) and12(B)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted) on the grounds that the actions of the Civil Service Commission resulting in a[n] Order of termination were not conducted pursuant to a quasi-judicial hearing.
[2.] The Trial Court erred in denying Plaintiff-Appellant‘s motion for leave to amend his pleading to allege additional claims for relief pursuant to
Ohio Civ. Proc. R. 15(A) .
{¶12} By his first assignmеnt of error, Garrett argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it did not possess subject matter jurisdiction over his appeal. We disagree.
{¶13} A court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case if the court has the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate that case. Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶11. Without subject matter jurisdiction, a court cannot consider the merits of a controversy. Turner v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 180 Ohio App.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-6608, ¶9; Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. Tri-State Constr., L.L.C., 173 Ohio App.3d 683, 2007-Ohio-6185, ¶18. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law, and thus, this court reviews a trial court‘s ruling on such a motion under the de nоvo standard. Crosby-Edwards v. Ohio Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 175 Ohio App.3d 213, 2008-Ohio-762, ¶21; Heskett v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Servs., 166 Ohio App.3d 311, 2006-Ohio-2074, ¶9.
{¶14} Garrett claims that
{¶15} A proceeding does not qualify as quasi-judicial unless the law mandates that the proceeding include notice, a hearing, and the opportunity for the introduction of evidence. M.J. Kelley Co. at paragraph two of the syllabus. See also Zupp v. Mun. Civ. Serv. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-895, 2010-Ohio-2614, ¶12; Braun v. Columbus, Bd. of Indus. Relations, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-496, 2007-Ohio-7148, ¶9. “Whether there is an adjudication [that a court of common pleas can review] depends not upon what the administrative agency actually did, but rather upon what the administrative agency should have done.” In re Appeal of Howard (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 717, 719. Thus, regardless of the procedural amenities granted on the administrative level, absent a legal requirement that the agency provide notice and a hearing before rendering a decision, an appellant has no ground to appeal that administrative decision. Id. at 719-20; Zupp at ¶13; Gaines v. Columbus Civ. Serv. Comm., 182 Ohio App.3d 576, 2009-Ohio-2662, ¶11.
{¶16} Here, we must first identify what decision Garrett appealed before we can determine whether the proceedings that led to that decision were quasi-judicial. Before this court, Garrett argues that he appealed the August 11, 2009 decision to terminate his employment. We reject this argument. The only decision named in the notice of aрpeal is the Commission‘s July 28, 2009 decision to stop certifying Garrett‘s payroll. Additionally, the notice of appeal states that “[a] copy of the decision and order appealed from is attached hereto and incorporated by reference.” Garrett attached the July 22, 2009 memorandum and the July 28, 2009 letter to his notice, not the August 11, 2009 decision.
In the course of an investigation, the Commission, a single commissioner, the Executive Secretary, or a Hearing Officer, may subpoena witnesses and/or require the production of documents and records relevant to the investigation. The Commission‘s investigation may be public or private and may terminate with such decision or report within the power of the Commissiоn to render or make.
{¶18} Notably, neither the Charter nor the Rules include a requirement that the Commission give notice or hold a hearing as part of an investigation. Therefore, the Commission‘s decision to stop certifying Garrett‘s payroll did not result from a quasi-judicial proceeding. We consequently conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Garrett‘s appeal from that decision.
{¶20} Garrett also contends that the trial court could exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action challenging the legality оf the City‘s residency requirement. The viability of a hypothetical declaratory judgment action is not relevant to our analysis. The question before this court is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over Garrett‘s administrative appeal. We answer that question negatively. Accordingly, we overrule Garrett‘s first assignment of error.
{¶21} By his second assignment of error, Garrett argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to add causes of action to his appeal. We disagree.
{¶22} This court reviews the denial of a motion to аmend under the abuse of discretion standard. Wilmington Steel Prods., Inc. v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 120, 122. ” ‘[A]buse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Id.
{¶23} In Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 66 Ohio St.3d 452, 1993-Ohio-115, the appellant combined its appeal from an administrative decision with a “complaint” seeking declaratory judgment relief. The trial court dismissed the complaint that the appellant had engrafted onto its notice of appeal.
[I]n order to request a declaratory judgment[,] appellant was required to file a separate
R.C. Chapter 2721 action. Procedurally, apрellant‘s request for declaratory judgment could not be combined with its appeal.
Id. at 454 (emphasis sic).
{¶24} Like the appellant in Community Concerned Citizens, Garrett sought to combine an administrative appeal with a complaint asserting causes of action. Applying the holding of Community Concerned Citizens to this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to amend the notice of appeal to include causes of action. See also Holm v. Clark Cty. Auditor, 168 Ohio App.3d 119, 2006-Ohio-3748, ¶3 (holding that the trial court properly dismissed claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the appellant had filed in conjunction with an administrative appeal); Pullin v. Hiram, 11th Dist. No. 2001-P-0146, 2003-Ohio-1973, ¶28 (same). As the trial court recognized, an administrative appeal and a complaint are procedurally incompatible. Accordingly, we overrule Garrett‘s second assignment of error.
{¶25} For the fоregoing reasons, we overrule Garrett‘s first and second assignments of error, and we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
SADLER and FRENCH, JJ., concur.