Aрpellant’s brief on appeal fails to comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 41 (2) as it contains no specifications of error. The requirement of the rule is not to be lightly disregarded, for specifications оf error are in effect the appellant’s pleadings in the appellate court. The specifiсations of error are necessary for a respondent to determine the questions to be answered, аnd are necessary for the higher court to single out the specific areas in controversy. 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1217, p. 34; 3 Am.Jur. 287, Appeal & Error, § 694.
Only by reason that both parties have discussed the applicable issues, this court does consider the appeal. See: Greenstreet v. Greenstreet,
Appellant Garren, licensed by the State of Idaho to сonduct a collection agency, instituted this action against respondent Rollis, who at the time of the evеnts precipitating this litigation, was a Justice of the Peace in the Post Falls Precinct of Kootenai County. Appellant claims damages for the refusal of respondent to issue certain executions or abstracts of judgment submitted by him to her for signature, claiming such an action was merely a ministerial act.
The record beforе this court, consists of the complaint, motion to dismiss, supported by respondent’s affidavit, and affidavit of appellant. From this record the following facts appear:
Prior to July 1, 1959, when the geographical jurisdiction of thе justice court was expanded county-wide, appellant filed five separate actions in respondent’s Justice Court (no one contends they were filed in the small claims department of the court). At the time appellant advised respondent he wanted the service of process in these actions made by mail to avoid the costs of sheriff’s service, and pursuant to the request, summons were mailed to each of the defеndants named in those actions. The defendants contacted the respondent either orally or by letter. With thе exception of *89 one case, no hearing was held upon the issues presented by the complaints, nor was notice of any trial given, nor was trial requested by the appellant. One of these defendants did come before the respondent, but a final determination was not had because respondent was unsuccessful in her attempt to get appellant and that defendant together.
Misunderstandings arose between appellant and respondent, and in December 1960, she returned to appellant all files and filing fees. In February 1961, apрellant brought forms of judgment in each of the actions and demanded that respondent sign them; she first refused to sign the judgments, but finally complied with the demand “in order to get rid of him”. About ten weeks later respondent was asked to exeсute abstracts of judgment or writs of execution, which she refused, and this suit was instituted.
The trial court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment, and appellant brought this appeal.
The purported service of process by mail on the various defendants was contrary to the applicable statutory provisions (I.C. § 16-302 et seq., and I.R.C.P. 84), and I.R.C.P. 5(b), and would give no jurisdiction to the court to act, in the absence of a voluntary appearance on thе part of the respective defendants. I.R. C.P. 4(i) provides:
“The voluntary appearance of a party or the service of any pleading by him is equivalent to personal service of the summons and a copy of the complaint upon him.”
What was formerly I.C. § 16-401 provided in effect that in a justice’s court, pleadings, “may, excеpt the complaint, be oral or in writing.” However, after November 1, 1958, the effective date of the Idaho rulеs of civil procedure, this section previously designated as a rule of court, was abrogated by I.R.C.P. 81 (b) which provides:
“These rules shall apply in justices’ and probate courts unless expressly limited to district courts, exceрt insofar as such rules are inapplicable to the organization, powers and course of proсeedings in such courts. These rules shall not apply to proceedings in the Small Claims Department of Justices’ Courts.”
Thus, an oral pleading is no longer accepted in the justice’s court and cannot be considered аs an appearance by the defendant. There being neither lawful service of process upon nor a voluntary appearance before the court by any of the defendants, the justice court was whоlly without jurisdiction of the defendants.
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Under the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States, a personal judgment rendered without service of process on, or legal notice to, a defendant, in the absеnce of a voluntary appearance or waiver is void, and not merely voidable. McDonald v. Mabee,
Thus the trial court was correct in its ruling on the motion for summary judgment, and the order dismissing the action is affirmed.
Costs to respondent.