Garner v. LizanaGarner v. Lizana
Lead Opinion
|Jn this legal malpractice action, plaintiff, Diane Garner, appeals a trial court judgment granting an exception of per-emption filed by defendants, Bruce Lizana and the Law Office of Bruce H. Lizana, P.L.C. (“the Lizana defendants”), and dismissing her lawsuit. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court judgment under review and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April of 2004, Diane Garner underwent back surgery at Kenner Regional Medical Center. When Ms. Garner was released from the hospital, La Bodega, Inc., d/b/a American International Healthcare (“La Bodega”), provided postoperative care to her. According to Ms. Garner’s petition, La Bodega repeatedly violated the post-operative service orders given to it by the hospital, resulting in Ms. Garner’s incurring a serious post-operative infection, additional surgery, and extensive medical care and resulting expenses.
IsMs. Garner consulted with an attorney, Bruce Lizana, and he agreed to represent her in a medical malpractice claim against La Bodega. On April 4, 2005, Mr. Lizana filed a petition for damages on Ms. Garner’s behalf in the 24th Judicial District Court against La Bodega.
In November of 2006, Mr. Lizana withdrew as counsel of record for Ms. Garner.
On January 27, 2009, Mr. Lizana and another attorney, Richard Trahant, filed a new petition for damages on Ms. Garner’s behalf against La Bodega, again 14alleging claims of medical malpractice.
Ms. Garner filed the instant lawsuit against the Lizana defendants on September 16, 2010, alleging legal malpractice. She also filed an amended petition for damages on December 4, 2012. In her petition, as amended, Ms. Garner claimed that Mr. Lizana was negligent in the handling of her medical malpractice case, resulting in the dismissal of her claims against La Bodega as untimely. She further alleged that Mr. Lizana was aware that her medical malpractice claim had prescribed and that her first medical malpractice suit had been dismissed, but he fraudulently withheld this information from her. She specifically alleged in her amended petition that Mr. Lizana “consistently reported to [her] that her case was proceeding properly, when in fact the case had been dismissed,” “continued to report to [her] that her case was still proceeding,” and “continued to mislead [her] into believing that her case was still viable,” when in fact it had been dismissed. She also alleged that after Mr. Lizana was informed of the favorable medical review panel’s ruling, he advised her that the medical review panel’s ruling would “make her case stronger.”
The Lizana defendants filed a peremptory exception of peremption on April 26, 2012, seeking dismissal of Ms. Garner’s legal malpractice claims as untimely, 15based on the three-year peremptive period for legal malpractice claims set forth in
After hearing argument of counsel on January 15, 2013, the trial court orally granted the exception of peremption filed by the Lizana defendants and dismissed Ms. Garner’s legal malpractice suit against them. A written judgment to this effect was signed by the trial court on January 25, 2013. In his oral reasons for judgment, the trial court stated that fraudulently failing to disclose the fact that a claim has been dismissed is not the type of fraud intended in
On appeal, Ms. Garner argues that the trial court erred in failing to find that Mr. Lizana’s alleged fraudulent act of intentionally misleading her regarding the status of her case was a second, independent act of legal malpractice from his alleged original act of malpractice of failing to timely request a medical review panel to review her medical practice claim. She also argues that the trial court erred in failing to find that the fraud exception to
J¿AW AND ANALYSIS
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:5605 provides, in pertinent part:
A. No action for damages against any attorney at law duly admitted to practice in this state, any partnership of such attorneys at law, or any professional corporation, company, organization, association, enterprise, or other commercial business or professional combination authorized by the laws of this state to engage in the practice of law, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of an engagement to provide legal services shall be brought unless filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date that the alleged act, omission, or neglect is discovered or should have been discovered; however, even as to actions filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such actions shall be filed at the latest within three years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.
E. The peremptive period provided in Subsection A of this Section shall not apply in cases of fraud, as defined in Civil Code Article 1953.
Louisiana Civil Code article 1953 defines “fraud” as:
a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other. Fraud may also result from silence or inaction.
Peremption is a time period fixed by law for the existence of a right, and the right is extinguished upon expiration of the peremptive period, unless it is timely exercised. La. C.C. art. 3458; Robert v. Robert Management Co. L.L.C.,
l7In accordance with
At the hearing on the exception of per-emption, Ms. Garner argued that her legal malpractice claim for Mr. Lizana’s failure to timely file her complaint with the medical review panel was not perempted, pursuant to the fraud exception contained in
All right, Counsel, Revised Statute 9:5605 does create a three year peremp-tive period with regard to legal malpractice. Paragraph E states that the three year peremptive period shall not apply in the case of fraud. That’s the issue before the Court today, whether or not this statute should apply because of the allegations of fraud that are cited in the petition. The Court must assume the allegations of the petition.
In reviewing the matter, the Court has reviewed the entire record of the matter, and the Court has also reviewed case law that has been, cited to the Court and through its own research, in particular, case law — the case of Brumfield versus McElwee, which I believe you’re familiar with, Counsel, which specifically states that if the fraudulent conduct is failure to disclose the fact that the claim has been dismissed, that is not the type of fraud that is included by the statute.5 When the statute talks about fraud not applying to the peremptive period, what it means is the malpractice itself. In this case the malpractice was the failure of Mr. Lizana to file the med mal claim timely. The fact that he, if the Court accepts the allegations of the petition, committed fraud thereafter by concealing from his client that the matter had been dismissed is of no moment. The exception of peremption is granted.
Accordingly, the trial court in the instant case held that post-malpractice, fraudulent concealment does not constitute fraud as contemplated in the exception set forth in
On appeal, Ms. Garner concedes that “the first act of malpractice, [Mr. Lizana’s] failure to file a complaint with the medical review panel, is time-barred by statute.” However, she contends that Mr. Lizana’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and suppression of the truth that her first medical malpractice ease had been dismissed in May of 2006 is a second act of malpractice, which is not time-barred, which resulted in the loss of her opportunity to assert a legal claim
In response to Ms. Garner’s appeal, the Lizana defendants argue that Ms. Garner’s argument on appeal that Mr. Lizana’s alleged fraudulent action (his alleged concealment and misrepresentation of his act of malpractice) is a separate act of malpractice (ie., separate from his original alleged act of malpractice in not timely requesting a medical review panel review of Ms. Garner’s medical malpractice claim and thus triggering a new peremptive period), was not previously argued by Ms. Garner, either in pleadings or orally, before the trial court, and accordingly is not properly before us on appeal. Upon review, we agree with the Lizana defendants’ position on this issue. Our review of the record confirms that Ms. Garner did not make this argument before the trial court, and accordingly, it is not properly before us on appeal. Treen Construction Co. v. Schott,
Ms. Garner also argues on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to find that the fraud exception of
We acknowledge that the trial court’s interpretation of
Upon review, we find that this broad and, in our opinion, inaccurate interpretation of
In Brumfield, supra, the only allegation made by the plaintiff was that the defendant attorneys failed to communicate with her regarding the status of her case.
In Smith, supra, the court found that the information given to the plaintiffs by the defendant attorneys should have
In Atkinson, supra, this Court specifically agreed with the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff did not establish her fraud exception (i.ethat the plaintiff did not prove that the defendant attorney had in fact committed fraud).
Finally, in Andre, supra, this Court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the petition did not make allegations of fraud; rather, the claims sounded in negligence.
In contrast, we find that the facts of the instant case are more closely aligned with those in Jones v. Arias,
Peremptive statutes are to be strictly construed against peremption and in favor of maintaining the claim. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 08-1163 (La.5/22/09),
If evidence is introduced at the hearing on an exception of peremption, the trial court’s findings of fact are evaluated under the manifest error standard of review. Schonekas, Winsberg, Evans & McGoey, L.L.C. v. Cashman,
Upon review, we find that the allegations contained in Ms. Garner’s petition for damages, as amended, that Mr. Lizana consistently reported to her that her case was proceeding properly, when in fact the case had been dismissed, which for purposes of the exception of peremption herein are presumed to be true, fall under the fraud exception set forth in
I ^CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court sustaining the exception of peremption filed by the Lizana defendants. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WINDHORST, J., dissents with reasons.
LILJEBERG, J., dissents with reasons.
Notes
. Diane B. Jackson v. La Bodega, Inc., d/b/a America International Healthcare, et al, No. 618-769, 24th Judicial District Court, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.
. See
. Mr. Lizana’s withdrawal as counsel of record for Ms. Gamer was filed in the proceeding entitled: In Re: Medical Review Panel Claim of Diane B. Jackson Garner, No 634-774, 24th Judicial District Court, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.
. Diane B. Garner v. La Bodega, Inc., d/b/a American International Healthcare and United National Insurance Company, No. 669-052, 24th Judicial District Court, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.
. In Brumfield, the Fourth Circuit stated that "the jurisprudence applying fraud provisions in malpractice actions applied it in cases where the alleged fraudulent act itself comprised the malpractice, unlike the case herein, where the fraud occurred after the legal malpractice took place." Brumfield v. McElwee,
. In Brumfield, the court stated that Mr. Brumfield "simply alleges, without any specificity or corroborating evidence, the defendants failed to disclose to him the status of his case. The record is absent any evidence that the defendants knowingly and intentionally sought to deceive Mr. Brumfield and cause harm to him in any respect.” Brumfield v. McElwee,
. In Smith, the court found that "the particular allegations of fraud alleged by the Smiths concern only [defendant] Slattery’s actions after the alleged legal malpractice occurred, namely the neglect to take timely action in the medical malpractice case.... The record clearly shows that the Smiths were upset with [defendant] Slattery when he reported on the status of their case prior to December 10, 1999 [the date the Smiths knew or should have known that they had a potential legal malpractice suit], and therefore, they had adequate warning to place them on notice that they should seek the advice of another attorney long before the prescriptive period expired.” Smith v. Slattery,
. In Atkinson, this Court found that "[t]he trial judge found that Atkinson did not established [sic] her fraud exception and we find no such proof either.” Atkinson v. LeBlanc,
. In Andre, this Court quoted the trial court as stating in its reasons for judgment that "[a]ll of the allegations of fraud are essentially based on one foundation and that was the failure to disclose.... Even though fraud is alleged, the underlying facts for that fraud are the malpractice claims for failure, the misrepresentation for failure, and then where it is, the intentional failure to properly pursue zealously, the intentional failure to properly communicate. All of that's a failure. That, even though it's called fraud, it strikes a negligence, which 9:5605 does not apply to.” Andre v. Golden,
Dissenting Opinion
dissents with reasons.
hi respectfully disagree with the majority, and must dissent for the reasons which follow. While many of the facts of this case present equitable difficulties and beg for a result different than that reached by the trial court, the same can be said of most cases in which the finality of peremption is at issue. Finding the jurisprudence on the applicable statutory law to be convincing, legislative intent to support sustaining the exception, and a lack of evidence of actual fraud, I concur with the dissent of Judge Liljeberg, and offer additional reasons.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT and PREROGATIVES
It is clear from the record that the defendant was negligent in the handling of Mrs. Garner’s case, and that the three-year peremption period had expired. At issue now is whether the exclusion from peremption provided in
Peremption has always been the legal means by which the legislature provides an absolute deadline which, unlike prescription, is not susceptible to suspensions, interruption, or exclusions. If it is now decided that by enactment of
Moreover, given one interpretation which is reasonable, meaningful, and widely accepted in jurisprudence, courts should not choose an alternative interpretation which renders
Jurisprudence interpreting
I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
NO EVIDENCE OF FRAUD
I am further concerned that before us are only general allegations of fraud which lack any real specifics. The trial court had no evidence before it, and this Court has no evidence or conclusions of fact to consider and to which to apply an alternative interpretation of
For most exceptions, allegations of fact must be taken as true, but rulings on exceptions of peremption in legal malpractice cases involve and depend largely on determinations of fact. Therefore, in the absence of a stipulation of facts, hearings on exceptions of peremption in legal malpractice cases in which fraud is at issue may involve the taking of evidence. Coffey v. Block,
CONCLUSION
This Court should not disregard what I believe is the inescapable — if not obvious— legislative intent of
LILJEBERG, J., dissents with reasons.
hi have considered the opinion of the majority and, based on the applicable jurisprudence as it stands at this point, I cannot agree. For the following reasons, I believe that the trial court properly granted defendants’ Exception of Peremption and dismissed plaintiffs lawsuit.
Ms. Garner asserts that after Mr. Liza-na’s first act of malpractice by failing to timely file a complaint with the medical review panel, Mr. Lizana committed a second act of malpractice when he fraudulently misrepresented and concealed the true status of her case. She argues that Mr. Lizana’s misrepresentation of the status of her case meets all of the elements of a legal malpractice claim, because it occurred during the existence of an attorney-client relationship, was based on negligent representation by Mr. Lizana below the standard of practice, and resulted in loss to Ms. Garner.
This Court has held that separate acts of malpractice shall be considered a single tort where the underlying factual basis is the same and the alleged acts occurred during continuous periods of representation. Gettys v. Sessions and Fishman, L.L.P.,
In Dauterive, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant law firm, alleging legal malpractice for the law firm’s failure to timely file a proof of claim in bankruptcy court. Id. at 1,
In the present case, Ms. Garner claims that Mr. Lizana’s misrepresentation of the status of her case constitutes a separate act of malpractice, independent of the malpractice in failing to file a complaint with the medical review panel. Although there may have been separate acts alleged, as in Dauterive, there was only tort occasioned by one act of fault. Here, the underlying factual basis is the same for both the failure to timely file a complaint with the medical review panel and Mr. Lizana allegedly misrepresenting the truth by concealing from Ms. Garner that her case had been dismissed. Both acts also occurred during a continuous | .-¡period of representation by Mr. Lizana. Thus, the one tort of legal malpractice alleged in this case was the failure to timely file Ms. Garner’s complaint with the medical review panel within one year of the alleged medical malpractice, or by April of 2005. Accordingly, in my view, the trial court did not err by failing to find that Mr. Lizana’s alleged fraudulent act of intentionally misleading Ms. Garner regarding the status of her case was a separate act of malpractice.
Ms. Garner further argues that the trial court erred by failing to find that the fraud exception of
In Atkinson v. LeBlanc, 03-365, p. 9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/15/03),
Similarly, in Corriere v. Bodenheimer, Jones, Szwak, & Winchell, L.L.P., 47,186 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/22/12),
1 ^Considering the record before us, along with the applicable law, I do not believe that the trial court erred by finding that the fraud exception in
. In order to establish a valid legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove: 1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; 2) negligent representation by the attorney; and 3) loss caused by that negligence. MB Industries, L.L.C. v. CNA Insurance. Co., 11-303, 11-304, p. 15 (La.10/25/11),