44 Iowa 553 | Iowa | 1876
II. We come now to consider the several alleged matters of waiver.
Besides, the premium note was in force, and whuffly collectible. The defendant’s contract not having been terminated, the plaintiff’s contract was not terminated. The latter was necessary to support the former. Nor was the defendant’s right to collect the note suspended. It was an absolute promise to pay on a certain day. Defendant’s right to collect the note included the right to collect it by installments, if plaintiff preferred to pay it in that way. But part payment could not have the same effect as full payment while the plaintiff was still in default.
But it is said that the defendant offered to extend the time of payment. The offer relied upon is contained in a letter to the plaintiff from the secretary of the company, and is in these words: “Let me know what time you want — will do anything reasonable.” It is plain to see that the offer of extension was conditioned upon some specific time being agreed upon. No specific time was agreed upon, and there was, therefore, no extension, and the fact that the loss occurred when the note was past due remains unaffected.
It is urged finally, by plaintiff, that he had a right to rely upon the statement of the company’s secretary contained in the lost letter, to the effect that if the plaintiff should burn the company would be compelled by law to pay. It is claimed in substance that, while the policy stood suspended just previous to the making of such statement, the effect of the statement was to constitute a waiver of the provisions of the policy creating a suspension, and to put the policy immediately in force again; in other words, although the statement of the company’s secretary as to what the law is was not true, the plaintiff had a right to assume it to be true, and to withhold payment accordingly. To this two answers may be made. Eirst, it is no part of the business of a secretary of an insurance company to declare the law; and second, as every person is presumed to know the law, no statement about it can operate as a waiver or estoppel. The foregoing is all the evidence
We think the Circuit Court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff.
Reversed.