Lead Opinion
This case raises the question of whether the state is entitled to a reasonable time frame in which to implement a purely discretionary decision regarding traffic control. The court of appeals held that ODOT’s June 9,1981 decision to install a six-phase traffic signal with protection for left turns was not a discretionary and planning function, and that ODOT’s immunity from tort liability therefore ceased with the initial determination in 1979 that a traffic signal should be installed at the intersection to replace the red and yellow flashing lights. This determination is erroneous. It would make little sense to immunize a purely discretionary decision but then deny the state a reasonable time frame in which to implement it.
The state of Ohio waived immunity from tort liability when R.C. Chapter 2743 became effective in 1975. This waiver was never absolute, however, and as we held in Reynolds v. State (1984),
We reject the notion that ODOT’s immunity terminated in 1979 when it decided to replace the red аnd yellow flashing lights with some other kind of signal. We hold instead that the decision-making process continued through the June 9,1981 selection of a six-phase signal. The decision tо install this fype of signal instead of the two-phase signal that ODOT had con
ODOT’s immunity did not terminate with the June 1981 selection оf a six-phase signal. ODOT correctly asserts that deciding when to install a traffic light also requires the exercise of discretion. Speaking for the Court of Claims, the late Justiсe Leonard Stern agreed, citing a Florida case, Payne v. Broward Cty. (Fla. 1984),
We recognize that setting a timetable for implementation of a discretionary decision itself involves the exercise of judgment. We must add, however, that an agency may not delay implementation indefinitely. We hold that once an agency has made a discretionary decision, it has a reasonable amount of time to implement that decision without incurring tort liability.
In this case the time lag between the June 9,1981 discrеtionary decision to install the six-phase signal and completion of installation on August 3, 1982 was approximately fourteen months. During this period, ODOT made a number of discrеtionary decisions. First, it decided to fund the project out of federal moneys that did not become available until October 1981. Then bids were solicited and evaluаted, and a contractor was chosen in November 1981. Installation was delayed pending delivery of custom-ordered items; work began on the installation in June 1982 and was completed two months later.
On these facts, we concur with the Court of Claims that the fourteen-month time frame for implementation of the decision to install the six-phase signal was not unreasonable. Thus, ODOT is not liable for damages arising from the collision that fatally injured plaintiff’s decedent on June 18, 1982.
For the reasons aforеsaid, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the judgment of the Court of Claims is reinstated.
Judgment reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dis
Although I do agree with the general statements of law contаined in the majority’s opinion, I disagree with its holding that ODOT acted within a reasonable amount of time in installing the traffic signal device.
It is well-established that the state has a duty tо maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition. See R.C. 5501.11; Knickel v. Dept. of Transp. (1976),
The majority correctly states that a decision involving a high degree of official discretion is protected from liability by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Winwood v. Dayton (1988),
In the case before us, it is undisputed that the decision concerning whether to install a traffic control device involved a high degree of official discretion. Such a decision concerns basic policy considerations. Winwood, supra, at 284,
The facts of this case indicate that in 1971, ODOT had studied the intersection at issue and found it to be a high-accident lоcation. ODOT installed yellow and red flashing lights in October 1974. Again in 1978, ODOT identified the intersection as a high-accident location. ODOT recognized that the intersection was not in а reasonably safe condition in May 1979 and determined that a traffic signal was necessary. ODOT admitted that implementation of the May 1979 study was a “priority matter.” Accordingly, on May 17, 1979, ODOT decided to install a fully actuated two-phase traffic signal at the intersection. The traffic signal was installed August 3, 1982.
Thus, over thirty-eight months elapsed between thе tíme that ODOT determined that a signal was necessary and the time that the project was completed. During this thirty-eight-month period, there were twenty-five accidents inсluding six fatalities and severe injuries to six other persons. Also, within that thirty-eight-month time span, there were long periods of time during which ODOT failed to take the steps necessary to implement its decision to install a traffic control device. ODOT’s own summary of activity between the May 1979 report and final installation of the traffic signal in August 1982 shows that sоme of the delay was due to departmental review and revisions. Some of the delay, however, was due to such factors as change in personnel and thе “press of other work, primarily pavement marking plans,” which alone resulted in a six-month delay.
ODOT breached its duty to maintain the intersection in a reasonably safе condition by its unreasonable delay in acting to remedy a known dangerous highway intersection when the decision to do so had already been made. This intersection had a large
inconsistent with the intersection’s designation as a high-accident location. For these reasons, I would affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.